refactor: 각 어댑터터별 리펙토링 진행

2026-08-24 18:26:40 +09:00
parent e98b56eb03
commit 0137263441
439 changed files with 31935 additions and 4719 deletions
@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ still waiting on gets claimed by a second worker, and the recipient receives the
 | `callbacks.enabled` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACKS_ENABLED` | `false` | boolean |
 | `callbacks.max-body-bytes` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_MAX_BODY_BYTES` | `65508` | 1..65508 |
 | `callbacks.replay-skew` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_REPLAY_SKEW` | `5m` | positive |
+| `callbacks.trusted-proxies` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | *(empty)* | CSV of peer addresses |
+
+여러 provider가 요청 URL에 서명하므로, 그 URL을 잘못 재구성하면 정상 webhook이 전부 서명 실패가 된다.
+`trusted-proxies`가 비어 있으면 forwarded 헤더를 **믿지 않고** 컨테이너가 관측한 값을 쓴다. 무조건 믿으면
+아무 호출자나 자기 서명이 검증될 URL을 고를 수 있어 서명 자체가 무의미해진다. 로드밸런서 뒤에 있는 배포는
+그 peer를 명시한다.

 65508 is not a round number by accident: it is the ciphertext column's 65536 bytes minus the AES-GCM
 nonce and tag. A larger configured value would pass every check above the database and fail the
@@ -69,6 +75,43 @@ them, because the keys are deployment-chosen; supply them as YAML or as
 A profile pins provider type, environment, credential profile, timeouts, concurrency and rate limit.
 Sender identity and credential profile are separate concerns.

+## SMTP relay
+
+The one provider profile the template ships, off. A deployment that wants the common case sets
+`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENABLED=true` and the relay address; one that wants a different
+profile id or a second family declares it in its own YAML instead.
+
+The profile and the relay are separate tables below because they answer different questions. The
+profile says *which* provider serves EMAIL and under what limits; the relay says *what the transport
+is*. Host, port and credentials are not here at all — they stay `spring.mail.*`, because Spring
+already owns them and a second spelling would be a second thing to keep in step.
+
+| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `providers.smtp.enabled` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENABLED` | `false` | boolean |
+| `providers.smtp.primary-for-channel` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_PRIMARY` | `true` | boolean; exactly one primary per channel |
+| `providers.smtp.environment` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` | required when enabled |
+| `providers.smtp.credential-profile` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_CREDENTIAL_PROFILE` | `default` | resolved through `SecretMaterialProvider`, never inline material |
+| `providers.smtp.timeout` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_TIMEOUT` | `10s` | positive, finite |
+| `providers.smtp.max-concurrency` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_MAX_CONCURRENCY` | `4` | positive |
+| `providers.smtp.rate-per-second` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_RATE_PER_SECOND` | `10` | positive |
+
+| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `smtp.tls-mode` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_TLS_MODE` | `STARTTLS_REQUIRED` | `STARTTLS_REQUIRED` or `IMPLICIT_TLS` |
+| `smtp.sender-identity` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_SENDER_IDENTITY` | `no-reply@example.invalid` | address |
+| `smtp.connect-timeout` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT` | `5s` | positive, finite |
+| `smtp.read-timeout` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_READ_TIMEOUT` | `10s` | positive, finite |
+| `smtp.write-timeout` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_WRITE_TIMEOUT` | `10s` | positive, finite |
+| `smtp.max-concurrency` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_DISPATCH_CONCURRENCY` | `4` | positive |
+
+The TLS mode enum has no plaintext member. An unencrypted relay is refused by construction rather
+than by a validator somebody has to remember to run.
+
+The default sender is an RFC 2606 reserved domain that resolves nowhere, so a deployment that forgot
+to set one produces a traceable bounce instead of mail apparently sent from an address it does not
+own.
+
 ## Startup failures

 Startup fails rather than degrading when:
@@ -91,6 +134,33 @@ All key material arrives through `SecretMaterialProvider`. Nothing is read from
 committed file, or from a plaintext log. Contact point encryption and lookup HMAC keys must be
 distinct, and the encryption key must be exactly 256 bits.

+Eight purposes, eight keys. Each is base64 of at least 32 bytes and each must differ from every
+other; the platform decodes them at startup and refuses to boot if one is blank, short or shared. A
+blank value used to be skipped, which meant the platform started without the key and found out on
+the first contact point — in production, on a recipient's notification.
+
+Every default below is **unset**, deliberately. Supply the values out of band, per environment. Do
+not write one into this table, into `application.yml`, into an `.env` file that is tracked, or into
+any example: a value that appears in the repository is a value that has been disclosed.
+
+| Purpose | Key material | Active key id |
+|---|---|---|
+| Contact point encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID` |
+| Contact point lookup HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
+| Callback signing | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_SIGNING_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_SIGNING_KEY_ID` |
+| Callback fingerprint HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_FINGERPRINT_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_FINGERPRINT_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
+| Provider credential encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ID` |
+| Provider request lookup HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
+| Payload encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID` |
+| Web Push VAPID signing | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY_ID` |
+
+A key id is not secret — an id identifies key material without revealing it — but it is required,
+and it has no default on purpose. A constant id makes a rotation indistinguishable from the key it
+replaced, so nothing could decrypt what was written before it. Change the id in the same deployment
+that changes the material, and keep the superseded key readable under its old id until the data it
+wrote has been re-encrypted. The rotation sequence is in
+[at-rest-threat-model.md](at-rest-threat-model.md).
+
 ## Readiness

 The platform contributes a `notifications` actuator endpoint and a health indicator. It reports DOWN