review-followup Wave 3 라운드 3(P28·P29): fileserver use case·file:* 권한, 보안 파일 primitive 공용화, jvm-test-suite

- 결정 32: fileserver transport 연산 21개를 `port.in` use case로, 쓰기·읽기에 `file:*` 권한(소유자·tenant 정책은 유지),
  inbound 서비스 이름 `*UseCase`, port 구현 이름 `<Tech><Port>` 규칙(S2-#13b, 24개)
- 디렉터리 descriptor 파일 primitive를 `adapter:outbound:support`로(S4-lead-2 일부 — fileserver는 번역만),
  persistence-fileserver를 scan·클래스별 조건 대신 명시적 `@Bean` 설정으로(S2-#8a 일부), `FileVerifier`를 adapter로
- 호출자 0인 `poster.image-attached` 이벤트 삭제, SES SDK client를 레지스트리 종료 때 close, fileserver migration V1–V5 고정
- P29: auxiliary 레인 → Gradle `jvm-test-suite`(BUILD-O3-5, build-logic 16,768 → 5,851줄), redis-sdk가 runtime을 api로(P22-new-3)
- 통합: JPA API surface 기준선 재승인(이름 규칙 변경), migration lane에 V19 반영, messaging 통합 테스트가 jar 안 migration 목록 조회(ORCH-new-5)
- P28·P29 에이전트가 세션 재시작으로 중단 — 커밋된 것만 합치고 결과 파일은 오케스트레이터가 확정, S6-#10a는 P30으로

검증: ./gradlew ci verifyDependencyLocks --warning-mode=fail(714 task) · mainCheck architectureCheck verifyPublicPathSnapshot
:app-bootstrap:verifyEnvKeys configContractCheck · :app-bootstrap:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:integrationTest
:sample-portfolio:systemTest integrationCheck · -p build-logic test · -p optional-platforms ci · releaseCheck qualificationBootJar 통과

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
donghyeon-ka
2026-09-29 14:54:06 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 09e2dd63d6
commit 0579935746
275 changed files with 5838 additions and 3312 deletions
+36 -32
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ A create that fails after the record exists must end in `FAILED`, but the table
The record therefore walks `CREATED → UPLOADING → FAILED`, which is also the honest reading: the
upload had been admitted before it failed.
Pinned by `UploadApplicationServiceTest` (application-core).
Pinned by `ResumableUploadUseCasesTest` (application-fileserver).
### 2. `ContentKey`'s alphabet admits a leading separator
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Deleting a file that is mid-verification has no legal transition. The lifecycle
with `409 FILE_NOT_READY` rather than inventing an edge, which matches the allowed-state list the
JPA `markDeleting` statement already enforced.
Pinned by `FileLifecycleServiceTest`.
Pinned by `FileLifecycleUseCasesTest`.
### 4. `If-Match` is specified as an ETag but the lifecycle was designed around the row version
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The HTTP contract sends an entity tag; the metadata store guards on a numeric ve
takes `Optional<String> expectedEtag` and compares against the record's strong validator, so the
precondition a client sends is the precondition that is checked.
Pinned by `FileLifecycleServiceTest`.
Pinned by `FileLifecycleUseCasesTest`.
### 5. The filename policy left `:` intact
@@ -174,40 +174,44 @@ an extension point for a backend this template does not ship:
`ContentStoreCapabilities` reports what the running store actually supports, so no unimplemented SPI
is advertised as available.
## Known deviation from the repository's application-layer contract
## The repository's application-layer contract
### 5. Fileserver application services are not `CommandUseCase` / `QueryUseCase`
### 5. Fileserver operations are use cases (resolved, owner decision 32)
`src/application-core/CLAUDE.md` requires every inbound port implementation to extend
`CommandUseCase` or `QueryUseCase` and to carry `@UseCaseCapability`, which declares its transaction
mode, idempotency and repository access. The Fileserver instead exposes multi-method services —
`UploadApplicationService`, `DownloadApplicationService`, `FileLifecycleService`,
`FileserverAdminService` and their `Default*` implementations.
Every operation the transport reaches is a `CommandUseCase` or `QueryUseCase` behind a one-method
port in `application.fileserver.port.in` — create, append, status, cancel, finalize and the
single-request upload; describe, prepare, open and transfer for downloads; delete, copy and move;
and the eight management-plane operations. Each implementation (`*ApplicationUseCase`) declares its
`@UseCaseCapability`, so the ArchUnit rules that check transaction mode, repository access and
outbound calls now see the Fileserver like every other feature.
This is a real deviation, not an oversight, and it is unenforced: the ArchUnit rules
`inbound_port_implementations_end_with_use_case` and
`inbound_port_implementations_declare_capability` only match types that implement `UseCase`, so a
service that never does is silently exempt. The capability contract that every other feature in
this repository declares is therefore absent here.
Two authorities guard a write, and both stay:
Two things follow from it. The transaction mode of each operation is expressed only by which
`TransactionPort` method the body happens to call, rather than declared and checked. And the
application layer holds transport policy it would not hold if each operation were a use case with
its own command: HTTP status codes on `FileserverErrorCode`, `Range` and conditional-request
parsing in `api.transfer`, and `Content-Disposition` construction.
| Check | Where | Decides |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `@RequiresPermission("file:…")` | the use case's proxy, enforced by the web adapter's method security | whether the caller's roles grant the operation at all |
| `FileAccessPolicyPort` | inside the use case, before any side effect | the tier (read/write/admin), and that the caller owns the file in its tenant |
The status mapping in particular is a deliberate trade rather than an accident. It lives in
`application-core` so the servlet transport, the reactive transport and the Nginx delegation path
cannot answer the same failure with three different statuses. Moving it to the transport layer
resolves the layering complaint and reintroduces exactly that drift, which is why this is an
architecture decision rather than a cleanup.
The permissions are `file:read` (describe, download, upload status), `file:upload` (create,
append, finalize, cancel, the single-request upload), `file:delete`, `file:copy`, `file:move` and
`file:admin` (every management-plane operation). `security.yml` grants them to `ROLE_FILE_READ`,
`ROLE_FILE_WRITE` and `ROLE_FILE_ADMIN` — the fileserver's own default tier roles — so a caller
holding a tier holds its permissions. A deployment that renames the tier roles, or supplies its own
`FileAccessPolicyPort` under other role names, maps those names in
`ca-skeleton.authz.role-permissions` too; `security.access-policy: unenforced` relaxes only the
tier and ownership check, never the permission gate.
**Status: open, deliberately unresolved in this change set.** Closing it means roughly thirty
command/query use cases, a decision about where the shared status vocabulary lives, and a change to
the ArchUnit rules so a service that bypasses the contract fails the build instead of being exempt
from it. That belongs in its own ADR with its own review, and doing it inside a correctness patch
would mix a large mechanical refactor into changes that need to be readable.
The resumable transfers run on the transfer pool, and method security reads the security context
of the calling thread, so `BlockingTransferExecutor` carries the request's context onto the worker
(`BlockingTransferExecutorSecurityContextTest`). Without it an authenticated append was refused as
anonymous.
Nothing here is pinned by a test, because the deviation is the absence of a constraint. The next
step is the ADR, not another test.
What is not a use case is what no transport calls: `CleanupService` and
`FileReconciliationService` are driven by background workers with no caller identity, and a
mutating use case must declare a permission a scheduler could not hold.
`FileserverUseCaseContractDeviationTest` freezes that list.
The HTTP status vocabulary on `FileserverErrorCode` stays in the application layer, for the reason
this section used to give: the servlet transport and the Nginx delegation path must not answer the
same failure with different statuses.