feat!: 남은 리뷰 발견을 고치고 개발 매뉴얼과 기능 생성 명령을 더한다

문제: High·P1을 고친 뒤에도 P2·P3 약 90건이 남았다. 연결·구독·메시지
크기 상한이 없는 전송(WebSocket·gRPC·GraphQL deadline), 낙관적 충돌의
500, upsert 경쟁, Mongo 무제한 timeout, 샘플 목록 N+1, 갈라진 복사본
(TenantId 3벌, 이벤트 ID 문법 5곳, SQLState 표 2벌), 문서를 읽는 PR
테스트와 캐시를 막는 lane 설정 등이다. 새 기능을 어디에 어떤 순서로
만드는지 알려 주는 문서와 도구가 없었다. MinIO 공식 이미지가 사라져
객체 저장소 lane이 돌지 않았다.

방법: 영역별 묶음으로 실패 테스트를 먼저 쓰고 고쳤다. 고치는 중에 찾은
결함도 함께 고쳤다(durable operation id가 UUIDv4라 이벤트가 전부 DEAD,
S3 어댑터 생성·작은 chunk 읽기 실패, Redis 조건부 기록의 EVALSHA 권한).
MinIO는 pgsty/minio를 digest로 고정했다(Chainguard는 태그·실행 사용자·
mc 이미지 문제로 버림). docs/manual/에 작업 순서와 판단 지점을 쓰고,
scripts/new-feature.sh가 5개 leaf에 뼈대를 만든다. 생성→빌드→통과
왕복을 verifyFeatureScaffold가 mainCheck에서 본다. 묶음별 결과와
결정은 리뷰 README 14절에 있다.

위험·한계: 파생 서비스 동작이 바뀐다. JDBC batch 50 기본, 운영 jar에서
H2 제거, 트랜잭션 30초 제한, 격리 수준을 Hikari에서 고정, gRPC·
WebSocket·GraphQL 새 한도, correlation ID 규칙 밖이면 서버가 교체,
샘플 키 오류 코드 IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID. 새 leaf 두 개
(composition:durable-operation, adapter:inbound:messaging)와 새
마이그레이션(postgresql V20·V21, notification V11·V12, sample V8_1,
grpc-ledger V002)이 생긴다. V21 유일 인덱스는 기존 중복이 있으면
실패한다(runbook에 확인 쿼리).

검증: ci, mainCheck(생성 명령 왕복 포함), integrationCheck(MinIO 포함
전 컨테이너 lane), -p optional-platforms ci integrationCheck 통과.

Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-01-maturity-review/README.md 14절
BREAKING CHANGE: JDBC batch 기본 켜짐, H2 운영 의존 제거, 트랜잭션
기본 제한 30초, gRPC·WebSocket·GraphQL 서버 한도 기본값 추가,
샘플 Idempotency-Key 오류 코드 변경.
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-11-03 19:52:06 +09:00
parent 34565130e0
commit 1400dc1506
768 changed files with 26982 additions and 3348 deletions
+49 -11
View File
@@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
| `max-idle-time` | `30s` | Idle eviction |
| `max-life-time` | `5m` | Picks up DNS, load-balancer, and certificate changes |
| `validate-after-inactivity` | `5s` | Stale and half-open detection |
| `eviction-interval` | `15s` | Background cleanup |
| `shutdown-timeout` | `5s` | Drain deadline before forced close |
| `requires-route-pool` | `false` | Set when route-scoped limits are mandatory; the JDK transport then refuses the profile |
| `requires-bounded-pending-queue` | `false` | Same, for a bounded pending queue |
@@ -94,14 +92,49 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
| `dns` | `300ms` | Hostname resolution |
| `connect` | `500ms` | Socket connect |
| `tls-handshake` | `1s` | TLS and ALPN |
| `proxy-connect` | `500ms` | Proxy socket or CONNECT |
| `request-write-idle` | `1s` | No progress writing the request |
| `response-header` | `2s` | Until final response headers |
| `read-idle` | `3s` | Between response chunks |
| `total-call` | `4s` | The whole logical call, including retry backoff |
`total-call` must not be shorter than `connect` or `response-header`; the validator emits
`INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET` otherwise.
`INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET` otherwise. Every timeout above, and `pool.pending-acquire-timeout`, must be
greater than zero (`TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE`): both engines read zero as "wait forever".
`total-call` also bounds the setup of a streaming download — connect, send, and the wait for
response headers. Once the stream is handed over, each gap of the body is bounded by `read-idle`
instead, so a long download is not cut at an arbitrary total (design §15.3).
### Removed settings
Six keys were removed because they were bound and reached no transport (review 2026-11-01 05-15).
Setting one now fails startup with `HTTPCLIENT_UNKNOWN_SETTING` naming the key, instead of being
accepted and ignored.
| Removed key | Why |
|---|---|
| `timeout.request-write-idle` | Neither engine can bound a blocking socket write |
| `timeout.proxy-connect`, `proxy.connect-timeout` | The TCP connect to a proxy is governed by `timeout.connect` |
| `pool.eviction-interval` | Apache's idle evictor runs at `max-idle-time` |
| `pool.shutdown-timeout` | A retired runtime drains for `app.httpclient.rotation-drain-timeout` |
| `observability.operation-name-required` | An operation name is mandatory in the API; the switch could only be true |
### `circuit-breaker`
What counts as a failure is fixed: a 5xx, 408 or 429 response — whether the call throws or returns
it as a result — and every transport failure. Every other 4xx is a healthy answer. These settings
only say how many failures, out of how many calls, open the circuit. Defaults are Resilience4j's own,
which every profile ran with before the keys existed.
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `failure-rate-threshold` | `50` | Percent of failed calls in the window that opens the circuit, 1–100 |
| `minimum-number-of-calls` | `100` | Calls recorded before the rate is evaluated; at most `sliding-window-size` |
| `sliding-window-size` | `100` | The last N calls the rate is computed over (count-based) |
| `wait-duration-in-open-state` | `60s` | How long an open circuit rejects before trial calls; positive |
| `permitted-calls-in-half-open-state` | `10` | Trial calls while half-open; at least 1 |
An out-of-range value fails startup with `CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID`. The breaker belongs to
the profile, not to a runtime generation, so a certificate rotation keeps its state.
### `redirect`, `request`, `response`
@@ -132,12 +165,12 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `policy` | `none` | Named policy for reporting |
| `max-attempts` | `1` | Attempts, not retries |
| `max-attempts` | `1` | Attempts, not retries; at most 5 (`RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED`) |
| `base-backoff` | `50ms` | |
| `max-backoff` | `200ms` | |
| `jitter` | `FULL` | `NONE` \| `FULL` \| `DECORRELATED` |
| `retry-after` | `HONOR` | `HONOR` \| `IGNORE` \| `CAP` |
| `budget` | — | Shared token bucket name |
| `budget` | — | Shared token bucket name. A retrying profile that names none gets its own bucket, with the same pool-derived capacity (`max-total-connections / 10`, at least 1, refilled each minute) |
### `tls`
@@ -158,9 +191,7 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
| `proxy.enabled` | `false` | |
| `proxy.host` / `proxy.port` / `proxy.type` | — / `0` / `HTTP` | |
| `proxy.credential-provider` | — | Proxy authentication is separate from target authentication |
| `proxy.connect-timeout` | `500ms` | Recorded as its own metric |
| `proxy.import-ambient-no-proxy` | `false` | Ambient `NO_PROXY` never widens a validated profile |
| `observability.operation-name-required` | `true` | |
| `observability.full-url-recording` | `false` | |
| `observability.body-logging` | `false` | |
@@ -193,9 +224,16 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
`HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED`, `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL`,
`TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED`,
`RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS`, `FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN`, `BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN`,
`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`.
`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`,
`TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE`, `RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED`, `CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID`,
`HTTPCLIENT_UNKNOWN_SETTING`.
The last three name settings the platform binds but cannot yet honour. Neither the Apache classic
`HTTPCLIENT_UNKNOWN_SETTING` covers a gap in the shared strict binder: Spring's unbound-key check
stops at the first level under a list element, so `clients[0].timeout.<typo>` used to bind nothing
and fail nothing. The platform now checks every key under `clients[N]` and `dynamic-targets[N]`
against the settings records.
`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED` and `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED` name settings the platform binds but cannot yet honour. Neither the Apache classic
client nor the JDK client exposes a DNS-resolution timeout, and no proxy-credential path exists, so
a non-default value is refused rather than accepted and ignored. Leaving the defaults alone is
unaffected — only a deliberate, unmet request fails.