review-followup Wave 3: 설정 prefix app.* 통일(P20), Wave 3 종료
- 결정 16: `ca-skeleton.*`·`backend.graphql` 등 → `app.*`(APP_* env 키 이름 유지), selector 키 상수 하나(`CapabilitySelectors`), 바인딩만 되던 `streaming-idle` 삭제 - `StrictSettingsBinder`가 env 오타까지 거부 — 모든 capability(graphql·websocket·mongo는 edge 제약으로 파일만 strict), httpclient 리플렉션 `HttpClientEnvironmentKeys` 삭제 - persistence-jpa가 `APP_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD` secret 요구를 기여(bootstrap이 JPA 스위치를 읽지 않음), Redis ACL fixture에서 pub/sub 권한 제거 - 결함 수정: SMTP 설정 env 이름 충돌(P20-new-1), `bindExcept`가 system env까지 filter(P20-new-2), graphql 빈 deployment-mode 메시지(P20-new-6) - 통합: P30과 충돌 11건(P30의 명시적 bean 구조 유지), P30 코드의 옛 키를 app.*로, persistence-jpa 포맷 - 현황표: 소유자 결정 36(persistence-jpa 설정은 플랫폼 키만 app.persistence-jpa.*로, 공유 기능 트리 예외), 재개 문서에 일시 정지 상태 Wave 3 종료 검증: check · ci verifyDependencyLocks --warning-mode=fail(714 task) · mainCheck · architectureCheck verifyPublicPathSnapshot :app-bootstrap:verifyEnvKeys configContractCheck · :app-bootstrap:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:systemTest · integrationCheck · -p build-logic test · -p optional-platforms ci · :app-bootstrap:qualificationBootJar releaseCheck 통과 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5.5
parent
8bbf1bf01d
commit
27f23add08
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ exposes.
|
||||
## Minimum to start
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
ca-skeleton:
|
||||
fileserver:
|
||||
app:
|
||||
fileserver-platform:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
instance-id: ${HOSTNAME} # writer-lease owner; must be unique per node
|
||||
storage:
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Startup fails, rather than degrading, when any of these is missing or unsafe:
|
||||
|
||||
These roles decide the tier inside each operation. In front of it, every operation's use case
|
||||
carries a `file:*` permission that the web adapter's method security checks against
|
||||
`ca-skeleton.authz.role-permissions`; `security.yml` grants `file:read` to `ROLE_FILE_READ`,
|
||||
`app.authz.role-permissions`; `security.yml` grants `file:read` to `ROLE_FILE_READ`,
|
||||
`file:upload`, `file:delete`, `file:copy` and `file:move` to `ROLE_FILE_WRITE`, and `file:admin` to
|
||||
`ROLE_FILE_ADMIN`. Renaming a tier role here means mapping the new name there as well, or the
|
||||
caller is refused before the tier is consulted (`docs/fileserver/design-deviations.md` §5).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ append, finalize, cancel, the single-request upload), `file:delete`, `file:copy`
|
||||
`ROLE_FILE_WRITE` and `ROLE_FILE_ADMIN` — the fileserver's own default tier roles — so a caller
|
||||
holding a tier holds its permissions. A deployment that renames the tier roles, or supplies its own
|
||||
`FileAccessPolicyPort` under other role names, maps those names in
|
||||
`ca-skeleton.authz.role-permissions` too; `security.access-policy: unenforced` relaxes only the
|
||||
`app.authz.role-permissions` too; `security.access-policy: unenforced` relaxes only the
|
||||
tier and ownership check, never the permission gate.
|
||||
|
||||
The resumable transfers run on the transfer pool, and method security reads the security context
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ The Fileserver ships off. Nothing is registered — no endpoint, no thread pool,
|
||||
is enabled explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
ca-skeleton:
|
||||
fileserver:
|
||||
app:
|
||||
fileserver-platform:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
instance-id: ${HOSTNAME}
|
||||
default-namespace: default
|
||||
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ to an unkeyed digest, which would be reversible for an enumerable identifier spa
|
||||
Each is a separate switch, and each defaults to off:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
ca-skeleton:
|
||||
fileserver:
|
||||
app:
|
||||
fileserver-platform:
|
||||
admin:
|
||||
enabled: false # management plane; intended for a management port
|
||||
tus:
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user