review-followup Wave 3: 설정 prefix app.* 통일(P20), Wave 3 종료

- 결정 16: `ca-skeleton.*`·`backend.graphql` 등 → `app.*`(APP_* env 키 이름 유지), selector 키 상수 하나(`CapabilitySelectors`),
  바인딩만 되던 `streaming-idle` 삭제
- `StrictSettingsBinder`가 env 오타까지 거부 — 모든 capability(graphql·websocket·mongo는 edge 제약으로 파일만 strict),
  httpclient 리플렉션 `HttpClientEnvironmentKeys` 삭제
- persistence-jpa가 `APP_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD` secret 요구를 기여(bootstrap이 JPA 스위치를 읽지 않음), Redis ACL fixture에서 pub/sub 권한 제거
- 결함 수정: SMTP 설정 env 이름 충돌(P20-new-1), `bindExcept`가 system env까지 filter(P20-new-2), graphql 빈 deployment-mode 메시지(P20-new-6)
- 통합: P30과 충돌 11건(P30의 명시적 bean 구조 유지), P30 코드의 옛 키를 app.*로, persistence-jpa 포맷
- 현황표: 소유자 결정 36(persistence-jpa 설정은 플랫폼 키만 app.persistence-jpa.*로, 공유 기능 트리 예외), 재개 문서에 일시 정지 상태

Wave 3 종료 검증: check · ci verifyDependencyLocks --warning-mode=fail(714 task) · mainCheck · architectureCheck
verifyPublicPathSnapshot :app-bootstrap:verifyEnvKeys configContractCheck · :app-bootstrap:integrationTest
:sample-portfolio:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:systemTest · integrationCheck · -p build-logic test ·
-p optional-platforms ci · :app-bootstrap:qualificationBootJar releaseCheck 통과

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
donghyeon-ka
2026-09-29 17:01:54 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 8bbf1bf01d
commit 27f23add08
295 changed files with 2284 additions and 1484 deletions
+3 -3
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@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ exposes.
## Minimum to start
```yaml
ca-skeleton:
fileserver:
app:
fileserver-platform:
enabled: true
instance-id: ${HOSTNAME} # writer-lease owner; must be unique per node
storage:
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Startup fails, rather than degrading, when any of these is missing or unsafe:
These roles decide the tier inside each operation. In front of it, every operation's use case
carries a `file:*` permission that the web adapter's method security checks against
`ca-skeleton.authz.role-permissions`; `security.yml` grants `file:read` to `ROLE_FILE_READ`,
`app.authz.role-permissions`; `security.yml` grants `file:read` to `ROLE_FILE_READ`,
`file:upload`, `file:delete`, `file:copy` and `file:move` to `ROLE_FILE_WRITE`, and `file:admin` to
`ROLE_FILE_ADMIN`. Renaming a tier role here means mapping the new name there as well, or the
caller is refused before the tier is consulted (`docs/fileserver/design-deviations.md` §5).
+1 -1
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@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ append, finalize, cancel, the single-request upload), `file:delete`, `file:copy`
`ROLE_FILE_WRITE` and `ROLE_FILE_ADMIN` — the fileserver's own default tier roles — so a caller
holding a tier holds its permissions. A deployment that renames the tier roles, or supplies its own
`FileAccessPolicyPort` under other role names, maps those names in
`ca-skeleton.authz.role-permissions` too; `security.access-policy: unenforced` relaxes only the
`app.authz.role-permissions` too; `security.access-policy: unenforced` relaxes only the
tier and ownership check, never the permission gate.
The resumable transfers run on the transfer pool, and method security reads the security context
+4 -4
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@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ The Fileserver ships off. Nothing is registered — no endpoint, no thread pool,
is enabled explicitly.
```yaml
ca-skeleton:
fileserver:
app:
fileserver-platform:
enabled: true
instance-id: ${HOSTNAME}
default-namespace: default
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ to an unkeyed digest, which would be reversible for an enumerable identifier spa
Each is a separate switch, and each defaults to off:
```yaml
ca-skeleton:
fileserver:
app:
fileserver-platform:
admin:
enabled: false # management plane; intended for a management port
tus: