review-followup Wave 3 라운드 3(P27): 빌드 잔여 — INTERNAL_ERROR 비재시도, messaging 카드 검증 leaf 테스트, cosign 서명
- 결정 28: `INTERNAL_ERROR` retryable=false(레지스트리·코드·문서·기대값) - 결정 29: messaging 카드 검증을 `adapter:outbound:messaging` 테스트로, snakeyaml은 test configuration에서만 - 결정 31: release.yml에 cosign keyless 이미지 서명·검증 job(공식 체크섬 고정 설치, id-token은 그 job만) - persistence-fileserver `ca.api-surface`(P16-new-6), `ca.release-provenance` 제거(BUILD-O3-5 일부) - 에이전트가 세션 재시작으로 중단 — 결과 파일은 오케스트레이터가 작성, 미커밋 `jvm-test-suite` 전환은 패치로 보관 - 통합: messaging CLAUDE.md 충돌(encoder 위치 + test 전용 snakeyaml 문장 병합) 검증: ./gradlew mainCheck, -p build-logic test, -p optional-platforms ci, releaseCheck -PgitRevision 통과. ci verifyDependencyLocks --warning-mode=fail은 web-advanced `WebStreamingSoakIT` 1건(1001 > 1000) 외 통과 — 단독 3회 통과, 경합 가능성으로 ORCH-new-3 행에 기록 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 5.5
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642b7e0d18
commit
36ba0810c8
@@ -375,10 +375,15 @@ jobs:
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- fileserver-pvc-certification
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- fileserver-sensitive-telemetry-scan
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# Job-level, because a job that declares `permissions:` replaces the workflow set entirely: this
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# is the only job that writes anything anywhere, and `packages: write` stops at its boundary.
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# job and app-image-signing are the only ones that write anything anywhere, and
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# `packages: write` stops at their boundary. No OIDC token here: this job runs the repository's
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# Gradle build inside the Dockerfile, and the signing identity stays out of that.
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permissions:
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contents: read
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packages: write
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# The signing job below reads the digest from here. It is the digest, not a tag, that is signed.
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outputs:
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pinned_reference: ${{ steps.push.outputs.pinned_reference }}
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 90
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steps:
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@@ -575,6 +580,7 @@ jobs:
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# digest recorded below is immutable by construction, and it is the field the GitOps repository
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# pins — the tags exist so a person can find the digest, not so a cluster can resolve one.
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- name: Push the release and revision tags
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id: push
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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docker push "${IMAGE_REPOSITORY}:${IMAGE_VERSION_TAG}"
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@@ -595,6 +601,7 @@ jobs:
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exit 1
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fi
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printf 'PINNED_REFERENCE=%s\n' "${pinned_reference}" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
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printf 'pinned_reference=%s\n' "${pinned_reference}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
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printf 'container-release: pushed %s\n' "${pinned_reference}"
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# The handoff to the GitOps repository, in a form a person and a script can both read. It is
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# written to the job summary as well as to an artifact because the summary is where somebody
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@@ -628,3 +635,108 @@ jobs:
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path: image-release.txt
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if-no-files-found: error
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retention-days: 90
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# Keyless signature of the pushed digest (owner decision 31). A job of its own so that
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# `id-token: write` — the GitHub OIDC token Fulcio turns into a short-lived signing certificate
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# naming this workflow and tag — exists only here, in a job that checks nothing out and builds
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# nothing. The signature goes to the registry beside the image (hence `packages: write`) and the
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# transparency-log entry to Rekor; there is no key to store or rotate.
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#
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# The digest is signed, never a tag: a tag can be moved to other content, a digest cannot.
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# Verification runs right after signing with the identity a deployment should require, so a
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# release whose signature a cluster would reject fails here instead of at admission.
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#
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# Local limit: signing needs the tag run's OIDC token and a pushed GHCR image, so it is exercised
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# only by a real release. DeveloperExperienceContractTest pins the structure of this job.
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app-image-signing:
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needs:
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- app-image-release
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permissions:
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contents: read
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packages: write
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id-token: write
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 30
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env:
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PINNED_REFERENCE: ${{ needs.app-image-release.outputs.pinned_reference }}
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steps:
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# Same policy as Trivy above: a pinned release binary with an asserted SHA-256, no action.
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# The two hashes are the cosign-linux-{amd64,arm64} lines of the official v3.1.3
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# cosign_checksums.txt, which was itself verified against its Sigstore bundle
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# (identity keyless@projectsigstore.iam.gserviceaccount.com, issuer https://accounts.google.com)
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# when they were pinned. The checksum file is fetched again here and must still carry the
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# pinned line, so a re-published release asset fails the job instead of passing silently.
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- name: Install pinned cosign under RUNNER_TEMP
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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readonly COSIGN_VERSION='3.1.3'
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readonly COSIGN_SHA256_AMD64='4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71'
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readonly COSIGN_SHA256_ARM64='c5d324e091826b0d7a78eb16fef316450b4eb9aaec045611c08ba06f5e73220a'
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readonly DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL="https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v${COSIGN_VERSION}"
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case "${RUNNER_ARCH:-X64}" in
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X64)
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asset='cosign-linux-amd64'
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expected_sha256="${COSIGN_SHA256_AMD64}"
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;;
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ARM64)
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asset='cosign-linux-arm64'
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expected_sha256="${COSIGN_SHA256_ARM64}"
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;;
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*)
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echo "::error::unsupported runner architecture: ${RUNNER_ARCH:-unknown}"
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exit 1
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;;
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esac
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install_dir="${RUNNER_TEMP}/cosign-${COSIGN_VERSION}"
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mkdir -p "${install_dir}"
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curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 \
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--proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \
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"${DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL}/cosign_checksums.txt" \
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--output "${RUNNER_TEMP}/cosign_checksums.txt"
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if ! grep -qxF "${expected_sha256} ${asset}" "${RUNNER_TEMP}/cosign_checksums.txt"; then
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echo "::error::cosign_checksums.txt no longer lists the pinned ${asset} hash"
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exit 1
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fi
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curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 \
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--proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \
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"${DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL}/${asset}" \
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--output "${install_dir}/cosign"
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printf '%s %s\n' "${expected_sha256}" "${install_dir}/cosign" | sha256sum -c -
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chmod 0755 "${install_dir}/cosign"
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printf '%s\n' "${install_dir}" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
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- name: Check the reference to sign
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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if [[ ! "${PINNED_REFERENCE}" =~ ^ghcr\.io/[a-z0-9._/-]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]; then
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echo "::error::app-image-release handed over no digest reference; got '${PINNED_REFERENCE}'"
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exit 1
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fi
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printf 'CERTIFICATE_IDENTITY=%s/%s\n' "${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}" "${GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF}" \
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>> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
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- name: Sign in to the container registry
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env:
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REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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printf '%s' "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" \
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| docker login ghcr.io --username "${GITHUB_ACTOR}" --password-stdin
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- name: Sign the image digest (keyless)
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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cosign sign --yes "${PINNED_REFERENCE}"
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# The identity a deployment admission policy should require: this workflow file at this tag,
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# issued by GitHub's OIDC provider. Anything else — another workflow, another repository, a
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# branch run — does not verify.
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- name: Verify the signature with the release identity
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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cosign verify \
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--certificate-identity "${CERTIFICATE_IDENTITY}" \
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--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
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"${PINNED_REFERENCE}" > cosign-verify.json
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{
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printf '### container-release signature\n\n'
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printf -- '- signed: `%s`\n' "${PINNED_REFERENCE}"
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printf -- '- certificate identity: `%s`\n' "${CERTIFICATE_IDENTITY}"
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printf -- '- issuer: `https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com`\n'
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} >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
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