refactor: 부가 기능을 capability 모듈로 포장하고 기본 조립을 web-only로 전환

설계: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging-design.md
계획/진행 기록: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging.md

- Wave 0: 규칙 고정(AGENTS.md capability 완료 기준·테스트 규칙) + 차단 결함 7건
  (compose overlay 검사, redis-sdk CI job, 적용된 V9/V13 원복 + V16, @EnableScheduling,
  messaging bridge 순서, prod 에러 상세 validator, sample loggers read-only)
- Wave 1: 데이터·보안 Critical 10건 (durable operation 25P02, operation 유스케이스 이동,
  outbox 재인코딩, Kafka TLS/SASL, 알림 트랜잭션, SNS 서명, tus checksum, GraphQL fragment,
  Redis lane, gRPC FAILED_TERMINAL)
- Wave 2: 리팩터링 잔재·실험용 자리 삭제, outbox v1 fencing(V17), 멱등성 V2 정본화
- Wave 3: 라이브러리형 코드 정리(동작하지 않는 설정·인터페이스·gate 제거, web-advanced 분리)
- Wave 4: capability 11개를 "있으면 켜짐" 모듈로 포장, 끄는 장치 제거, 기본 조립 web-only,
  qualificationBootJar 분리
- Wave 5: 빌드 로직 축소(17.2k -> 10.8k줄), sample 테스트 컨벤션 적용

삭제한 코드는 docs/capability-status.md "제거된 코드" 표에 복구 커밋(208077fd)과 함께 기록.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-09-25 12:49:07 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 208077fddf
commit 6d27356e2b
2822 changed files with 27992 additions and 166879 deletions
+34 -54
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@@ -3,68 +3,48 @@
What an operator needs when the HTTP boundary misbehaves. Organised by what you observe, because
that is what you have at 3am — not by which module owns it.
## Reading the two "too much traffic" answers
## Reading a `429`
The platform never answers these two interchangeably, and the difference tells you where to look.
`RateLimitInterceptor` answers `429 RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` with `Retry-After` when the edge rate
limit refuses a caller. `RATE_LIMIT_UNAVAILABLE` means the rate-limit store could not be reached,
not that the caller exceeded anything — look at the store, not the caller.
| You see | It means | Where to look |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `429 RATE_LIMITED` climbing for one caller | that caller exceeded its quota | the caller. Nothing is wrong with the service. |
| `429` climbing across **all** callers | quota is being charged for requests the service then shed | look at 503 first; see below |
| `503 ADMISSION_REJECTED` | the service has no capacity | saturation: check the admission profile's concurrency and what is holding slots |
## Errors that are not the `Envelope`
The second row is a real consequence of the design and worth knowing before it confuses you. Quota
is charged *before* capacity is requested, deliberately — the reverse order lets a caller who is
about to be rate-limited occupy a slot on the way to being told so. Under sustained overload every
caller's quota therefore drains on requests that never ran. **Rising 429 during an incident is a
symptom of shedding, not of callers misbehaving.** Read the 503 rate first.
Every HTTP error the application writes is the `Envelope` from `GlobalExceptionHandler`
(`spring.mvc.problemdetails.enabled=false`), with an `error.code` a client branches on.
## A control that appears configured and does nothing
This has happened here, and the failure is silent by construction. A configured-but-unwired control
behaves exactly like a working one until it is needed.
- **Check first:** the platform snapshot's `uninstalledControls()`. `WebPlatformStartupValidator`
fails startup on a missing required control, so a running instance with one missing means it was
not in the required list.
- **The instance found the hard way:** the problem catalog was complete, fully unit-tested, and
reached by nothing on the framework's error path. Spring answered failures with its own
`ProblemDetail` — RFC 9457-shaped, so it looked correct — carrying no `code` field. It was found
by a cross-stack parity recording, not by any test of the catalog.
- **How to confirm quickly:** send a request that must fail validation and check the body has a
`code`. No `code` means the platform's handler is not installed.
- **How to confirm quickly:** send a request that must fail validation and check the body has
`error.code`. A body without it (Spring's `ProblemDetail`, or the container's error page) means
the handler is not installed or the response came from the edge.
## A response is truncated or the connection dies mid-document
Two different causes, distinguished by the status the client did receive.
- **Client got a status, then nothing** — the response budget was crossed after commit. The
platform cannot retract a status, so it ends the connection: a truncated response the client
rejects is better than a short one it accepts as complete. Raise `maxResponseBytes` for that
operation's profile, or make the endpoint paginate.
- **Client got nothing at all** — either the request budget was crossed before headers, in which
case there is a problem document, or the proxy refused it. `client_max_body_size` in nginx is
below the application's body budget by default, and nginx answers with its own HTML rather than a
problem document. See `repository-adaptation.md` §8 for which bound fires where.
- **Client got a status, then nothing** — the response failed after commit. The status cannot be
retracted, so the connection ends mid-document.
- **Client got nothing from the application** — the proxy refused it. `client_max_body_size` in
nginx answers with its own HTML rather than the `Envelope`. See `repository-adaptation.md` §8.
## A retried write happened twice
The idempotency key is the control, and there are exactly three ways it fails to apply.
1. **The client did not send one.** The operation profile says `OPTIONAL`, so it ran unguarded.
Change the profile to `REQUIRED` if a duplicate is unacceptable.
2. **The client sent a different body.** Answered `422 IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED`, never a replay —
replaying would hand back a receipt for a request the caller never made.
1. **The client did not send one.** The endpoint does not require the key, so it ran unguarded.
Require it if a duplicate is unacceptable.
2. **The client sent a different body.** Answered `422 IDEMPOTENT_REQUEST_MISMATCH`, never a
replay — replaying would hand back a receipt for a request the caller never made.
3. **The record expired.** TTL is per-operation with a 72h cap. A retry after expiry is a new
request by definition.
A `409 IDEMPOTENCY_REQUEST_IN_PROGRESS` is not a failure: an earlier attempt is still running and
A `409 IDEMPOTENT_IN_FLIGHT` is not a failure: an earlier attempt is still running and
the caller should retry after `Retry-After`.
## Rolling deploy stalls with instances half-drained
`shutDownGracefully` waits for in-flight work, and on Reactor Netty an open-but-idle keep-alive
connection counts as in-flight. Calling `stop()` while that wait is in progress hangs.
`shutDownGracefully` waits for in-flight work, and an open-but-idle keep-alive connection can count
as in-flight. Calling `stop()` while that wait is in progress hangs.
- **Symptom:** an instance neither serving nor exiting, no error in its log.
- **Cause:** an unbounded graceful wait. `GracefulShutdownProbe` bounds it at a stated grace period
@@ -74,9 +54,8 @@ connection counts as in-flight. Calling `stop()` while that wait is in progress
## Metrics stopped arriving, or the bill jumped
Almost always a high-cardinality tag. `WebMetricCardinalityPolicy` refuses anything off an
eight-name allowlist at the point of recording, so a new tag cannot appear by accident — but a
`routeTemplate` carrying a *resolved* path can, and that is one series per resource.
Almost always a high-cardinality tag — typically a `routeTemplate` carrying a *resolved* path, which
is one series per resource.
- **Check:** the tag values in the metrics backend for `routeTemplate`. Braces mean templates;
identifiers mean the resolved path leaked through.
@@ -85,14 +64,17 @@ eight-name allowlist at the point of recording, so a new tag cannot appear by ac
## Cross-origin requests fail only in the browser
The API answers correctly and the browser refuses the response. Everything below is refused at
startup by `WebCorsPolicyValidator`, so a running instance with one of these means the profile was
built somewhere that does not validate.
The API answers correctly and the browser refuses the response. CORS is `CorsSettings`
(`ca-skeleton.cors.*`) applied by `SecurityConfig`. Startup refuses two settings:
- `*` with credentials — no browser honours it.
- An origin with a path, a trailing slash, or uppercase — never matches what the browser sends.
- `https://*.example.com` — matches nothing; CORS compares origins exactly.
- Wildcard `allowedHeaders` on a credentialed profile — not honoured with credentials.
- `APP_SECURITY_CORS_ENABLED=true` with no origin.
- `*` in `APP_SECURITY_CORS_ORIGINS` with `APP_SECURITY_CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS=true` — no browser
honours it.
Two more start fine and still fail in the browser:
- `https://*.example.com` in the origin list — it is compared as a literal and matches nothing.
- An origin with a path (`https://app.example.com/ui`) — an origin is scheme, host and port only.
A preflight answered `401` means CORS ran after authentication. Preflights carry no credentials by
design; the order is asserted by `WebPipelineOrderContract`.
@@ -109,8 +91,6 @@ both times, and every latency percentile computed from that data is wrong while
```bash
cd src
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:test # unit, boundary, architecture
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:webCrossStackParityTest # Tomcat vs Jetty vs Reactor Netty
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:webNginxProxyTest # real proxy; needs Docker, fails without it
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:systemTest # Tomcat, real socket
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:webJettyCompatTest # second servlet container
./gradlew :adapter:inbound:web:webFluxContractTest # reactive stack
```