feat(mongodb): implement the MongoDB document persistence platform

Implements the mongodb-superpowers-package design: Stable Tasks 1-50 and
Advanced Tasks 1-15.

The design assumes 19 Stable + 12 Advanced Gradle projects under
modules/mongodb*. This repository's fail-closed registry declares exactly 19
leaf identities, so those modules become package boundaries inside the
registered leaf :adapter:outbound:persistence-mongo, with the design's module
dependency table enforced by ten ArchUnit rules. The mapping and every
deviation are recorded in docs/mongodb/repository-adaptation.md.

Contract highlights, all enforced by tests rather than convention:

- Transaction body retry and commit retry are separate loops. A new session per
  body attempt; commit-only retry on an unknown commit. The body is never
  replayed after a commit ambiguity, so a failover cannot become a duplicate.
- MongoExecutionOutcome keeps both ambiguous outcomes distinct from success and
  failure, and MongoFailureContext records only the design-permitted fields.
- Failure classification reads server error labels before numeric codes.
- BSON representations come from a pinned manifest, never a library default,
  and a golden type-signature gate fails on any drift.
- Index and validator changes go through the manifest and the admin plane;
  metadata ownership gates every drop.
- Every Advanced capability refuses construction unless its flag is enabled.

Verified against real servers, not only unit tests. Running the lanes for the
first time exposed four defects that a green `check` had hidden:

- Four release lanes passed while executing zero tests; the gate now counts
  executed tests per lane and fails on zero.
- The "single replica set" fixture was a standalone, because Testcontainers 2.x
  needs withReplicaSet(); its test only asserted a connection string.
- The three-node fixture was three independent clusters, so no election could
  occur, and awaitNewPrimary() compared against the post-stop primary.
- The migration lease checked modifiedCount, so a same-millisecond refresh read
  as a lost lease.

scripts/verify-mongodb-platform.sh now reports:
  9 lanes, 0 skipped, 0 failed, every evidence category produced.

scripts/verify-mongodb-advanced.sh reports NOT PROMOTABLE: actual-topology
evidence (real sharded cluster, real KMS, real target deployment) is
unobtainable here, so it is named rather than assumed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-08-14 13:41:00 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 3b5aee50e3
commit d57d2f62a0
430 changed files with 29846 additions and 154 deletions
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# Advanced — CSFLE and Queryable Encryption
**Capabilities:** `MongoCapability.CSFLE`, `MongoCapability.QUERYABLE_ENCRYPTION`
**Properties:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.csfle.enabled`,
`ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.queryable-encryption.enabled`
**Status:** Advanced.
## Requirements
| | |
|---|---|
| Topology | Replica set or sharded cluster. |
| Server | MongoDB 7.0 or 8.0 (see §4 for the 8.0 query-type limits). |
| Privilege | `MongoPrincipalRole.ENCRYPTION_ADMIN` for the key vault; the application role never holds it. |
| Environment | A real KMS and key vault. A local key provider does not exercise any of the failure modes that matter. |
## 1. CSFLE
`MongoCsfleProfile` binds a collection to its `MongoCsfleFieldPolicy` list, a key vault
`MongoCredentialReference` and the key vault namespace. `MongoCsfleClientFactory` builds the encrypted
client; `MongoDataKeyResolver` resolves data keys.
`MongoCsfleMode`:
| Mode | Queryable | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| `RANDOMIZED` | no | Same plaintext encrypts differently each time. The safe default. |
| `DETERMINISTIC` | equality only | Same plaintext always yields the same ciphertext, so equality works — and so does frequency analysis. |
| `UNINDEXED` | no | Stored encrypted, excluded from any index. |
`MongoCsfleFieldPolicy.forPii(field, queryable)` defaults to `RANDOMIZED` when the field is not
queried. Deterministic encryption requires a written `equalityQueryJustification`; the constructor
refuses a blank one, naming frequency analysis. A low-cardinality deterministic field (a status, a
country, a boolean) leaks its distribution to anyone who can read the collection, which is the party
encryption was protecting against.
## 2. Queryable Encryption
`MongoQueryableEncryptionProfile` binds a collection to `MongoEncryptedFieldDescriptor` entries.
`MongoQueryableEncryptionQueryType` has exactly two values:
- `EQUALITY`
- `RANGE` — must declare its domain (`min`, `max`). The constructor refuses a range field without one,
because changing the domain later means re-encrypting the field.
`MongoQueryableEncryptionCollectionManager` owns the collection's lifecycle, because a QE collection
is not just a collection: it carries metadata collections.
## 3. Metadata ownership
`MongoEncryptionMetadataOwnership` maps `customers` to `enxcol_.customers.esc` and
`enxcol_.customers.ecoc`, and reports `__safeContent__`-prefixed indexes as
`MongoMetadataOwnership.ENCRYPTION_MANAGED`.
These are never application-owned and never droppable by drift reconciliation. A drift tool that
drops `enxcol_.customers.ecoc` corrupts the collection's queryability. This is the single most
important integration point between encryption and
[ADR-MONGO-004](../../adr/ADR-MONGO-004-index-schema-admin-plane.md).
## 4. Unsupported combinations
Refused at declaration, not discovered at runtime:
| Combination | Why |
|---|---|
| CSFLE **and** QE on the same collection | Two incompatible encryption schemes over one namespace. Both profile constructors refuse it. |
| CSFLE on a time series collection | `requireNotTimeSeries(true)` raises `MongoOperationRejectedException`. |
| QE `prefix` / `suffix` / `substring` | Not available on the platform's 8.0 baseline. The factory methods throw `UnsupportedOperationException` rather than returning a profile that fails later. |
| Deterministic CSFLE without a justification | `IllegalArgumentException` naming frequency analysis. |
| Range QE without a declared domain | `IllegalArgumentException` naming re-encryption. |
## 5. Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| `MongoEncryptionException` on read | Wrong data key, or the key vault is unreachable | Check KMS reachability and the key vault credential. Data is intact; the client cannot decrypt it. |
| `MongoEncryptionException` on write | KMS permission revoked mid-operation | Restore the grant. Writes fail closed — nothing was written in plaintext. |
| Queries return nothing on a deterministic field | The field was re-keyed | Equality matching is over ciphertext; a new key produces different ciphertext. Re-encrypt the field. |
| QE queries fail after a drift reconciliation | A metadata collection was dropped | Restore from backup. This is why ownership gates drops. |
**Key rotation.** Rotating the customer master key re-wraps the data keys and does not require
re-encrypting documents. Rotating a *data* key does require re-encrypting every document that used
it. These are different operations with different costs, and confusing them is how a rotation becomes
an outage.
## 6. Promotion evidence
Per [ADR-MONGO-ADV-001](../../adr/ADR-MONGO-ADV-001-capability-promotion.md), promotion requires the
real KMS and key vault, plus negative cases that fail closed: wrong key, missing permission, rotation
mid-operation (`MongoAtlasCapabilityContractSuite.kmsFailureModes`). A local key provider certifies
none of these — it never rejects anything.
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# Advanced — GridFS compatibility and migration
**Capability:** `MongoCapability.GRIDFS_COMPATIBILITY`
**Property:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.gridfs-compatibility.enabled`
**Status:** Advanced, compatibility only. Decision D-14.
## Position
GridFS is a **compatibility adapter for files that already exist there**. New files use the existing
Fileserver / Object Storage adapter, which is the source of truth for binary content.
The reason is not preference. GridFS stores file chunks in the same collections, on the same replica
set, competing for the same working set as your documents. A large file read evicts document pages
from cache, and file storage growth becomes replica-set growth — which means it becomes oplog
pressure, backup duration and failover time. Object storage was built for this and MongoDB was not.
## Reading legacy files
`MongoGridFsCompatibilityReader` reads existing GridFS content as
`GridFsLegacyContent(legacyId, filename, sizeBytes, checksum, stream)`. It reads; it does not write.
## Migration
`MongoGridFsMigrationJob` moves a file to object storage in a fixed order:
```
read legacy content
→ write to object storage
→ verify the target checksum matches the source
→ switch the reference
→ (later, separately) delete the source
```
Three properties, each of which exists because of a specific way this goes wrong:
1. **Verify before switching.** `MongoGridFsObjectReference` requires a non-blank checksum, and the
job returns empty and writes no reference when the target checksum does not match the source. A
migration that switches the reference on a successful *write* rather than a verified *copy*
silently points at a truncated object.
2. **The source is never deleted here.** Deletion is a separate, later decision after the new
location has been serving reads long enough to be trusted. A migration that deletes as it goes has
no rollback.
3. **The checkpoint separates migrated from failed.** `MongoGridFsMigrationCheckpoint` tracks
`migratedCount()`, `failedCount()`, `clean()` and `lastMigratedLegacyId()`, so a restart continues
from the last completed file rather than starting over, and a partially failed run is visible as
partial rather than as "done".
## Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| `migrate` returns empty | Checksum mismatch | The copy is bad. Investigate before retrying; do not force the reference. |
| `IllegalArgumentException` on the reference | Missing checksum | A reference without a checksum cannot be verified and is refused. |
| Checkpoint not `clean()` | Some files failed | Re-run for the failed ids only; the checkpoint names the last successful one. |
| Reference switched but content missing | Source deleted too early | Restore from backup. This is what rule 2 prevents. |
## Promotion evidence
Actual-topology evidence against the real object storage backend, a security review of the storage
credential, the migration path above, failure cases (checksum mismatch refused, missing checksum
refused, restart resumes), and this document as the runbook.
New file storage does not go through here at all — see the fileserver adapter.
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# Advanced — Multi-tenancy
**Capabilities:** `MongoCapability.SHARED_COLLECTION_TENANCY` (Advanced),
`MongoCapability.DATABASE_PER_TENANT` (Experimental)
**Properties:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.shared-collection-tenancy.enabled`,
`ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.database-per-tenant.enabled`
## 1. Shared collection
Every tenant's documents live in one collection, discriminated by a tenant field.
`MongoTenantContext` carries the tenant. `MongoTenantPredicateInjector` adds the tenant predicate to
every query, every atomic filter and the **first** aggregation stage. `TenantScopedMongoOperations`
is the entry point, so a caller cannot construct an unscoped operation by forgetting.
Three details are load-bearing:
- **Injection, not convention.** A tenant predicate that each query is expected to add itself is a
cross-tenant leak waiting for one missed `where(...)`. The injector adds it structurally.
- **First aggregation stage.** `firstStageMatch(...)` places the tenant `$match` before anything else.
A `$lookup` or `$group` that runs before the tenant filter has already crossed the boundary, even if
a later stage filters the output.
- **An absent tenant is not "all tenants".** The injector takes an `Optional<MongoTenantContext>` so
the missing case is a decision the policy makes explicitly, not a predicate that quietly disappears.
`MongoTenantManifestValidator.validate(manifest, tenantScopedUniqueIndexes)` checks that every unique
index that should be per-tenant actually includes the tenant field. A unique index on `email` alone in
a shared collection makes an email globally unique across tenants — tenant B cannot register an
address tenant A already used, which is both a bug and an information leak.
`requireShardKeyAnalysed(...)` requires a shard-key readiness report before a shared-collection tenant
model is sharded: tenant id as a shard key prefix concentrates the largest tenant on one shard.
### Observability
`tenantId` and `rawTenantId` are on `MongoObservationConvention`'s forbidden tag list. Cardinality
grows with the customer list, and the tag ships tenant identity into the metrics backend.
## 2. Database per tenant (Experimental)
`MongoTenantDatabaseResolver` maps a tenant to its database; `MongoTenantClientRegistry` holds the
clients.
Experimental for a specific reason: it is correct in the small and unbounded in the large. Each tenant
database costs connections, file handles and monitoring cardinality. It works beautifully at 20
tenants and falls over at 2,000, and nothing in a functional test distinguishes the two. Promotion
requires operational scale evidence.
`MongoTenantLifecyclePolicy`:
- `requireActivationReady(tenantKey, schemaAndIndexesValidated)` — a tenant is not activated until its
schema and indexes are validated. Activating first means the first customer request is the migration
test.
- `requireDeleteAllowed(...)` — deletion requires an explicit retention decision. Dropping a tenant
database is irreversible and takes the backup surface with it.
`MongoTenantMigrationCoordinator` runs a migration across tenant databases with per-tenant results.
Partial failure is normal and must be reported per tenant: "migration failed" across 500 databases is
not a report anyone can act on.
## 3. Choosing
| | Shared collection | Database per tenant |
|---|---|---|
| Isolation | Logical, enforced by injection | Physical |
| Tenant count | Unbounded | Bounded by connections and file handles |
| Per-tenant restore | Hard | Natural |
| Noisy neighbour | Shared resources | Isolated |
| Migration | One collection | N databases, partial failures |
| Cross-tenant query | Possible (and must be forbidden) | Structurally impossible |
Shared collection is the default. Database-per-tenant is for a small number of tenants with a
contractual isolation or per-tenant-restore requirement.
## 4. Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-tenant data visible | An operation bypassed `TenantScopedMongoOperations` | Treat as a security incident. Find the path, close it, audit access. |
| Unique constraint fires across tenants | Unique index missing the tenant field | Rebuild the index with the tenant field as prefix; the validator catches this before it ships. |
| One shard holds most data | Tenant id as shard-key prefix with a dominant tenant | Refine the shard key with a high-cardinality suffix. |
| Connection exhaustion | Database-per-tenant beyond the connection budget | The scale limit. Consolidate or move to shared collections. |
| Migration partially applied across tenants | Normal | `MongoTenantMigrationCoordinator` reports per tenant; re-run for the failures only. |
## 5. Promotion evidence
Shared-collection tenancy: actual-topology evidence, a security review covering cross-tenant access,
a migration path, failure cases (injection proven on query, atomic filter and first aggregation
stage), this runbook. Database-per-tenant additionally requires **operational scale evidence** and
stays Experimental until it exists.
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# Advanced — Search and Vector Search
**Capabilities:** `MongoCapability.SEARCH`, `MongoCapability.VECTOR_SEARCH`
**Properties:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.search.enabled`,
`ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.vector-search.enabled`
**Status:** Experimental (design §3.3). Hybrid search likewise.
## Requirements
| | |
|---|---|
| Topology | A deployment with the search service. Atlas Local in a container is a pull-request convenience and is **not** release evidence. |
| Privilege | `MongoPrincipalRole.SEARCH_ADMIN` for index management; the application role queries only. |
| Gate | `MongoAtlasCapabilityContractSuite` on the actual target deployment. |
## 1. Created is not ready
`MongoSearchIndexState`: `CREATED``BUILDING``READY`, plus `FAILED` and `DELETING`.
`MongoSearchReadinessGate.requireReady(state)` refuses anything but `READY`. A search index is built
asynchronously: the create call returns immediately and the index answers queries with *partial*
results while building. Not an error, not empty — partial. A deployment that creates an index and
starts querying serves incomplete results for as long as the build takes, and nothing reports it.
## 2. Search indexes are not application-owned
`MongoSearchIndexDescriptor.metadataOwnership()` is `MongoMetadataOwnership.SEARCH_MANAGED`, and
`droppableByApplicationDrift()` is false. The index reconciliation described in
[ADR-MONGO-004](../../adr/ADR-MONGO-004-index-schema-admin-plane.md) must not drop it.
## 3. Query guardrails
`MongoSearchQuery` binds an index, an allowlist of paths, the search text and a result limit.
- `requireAllowedPaths(allowed)` raises `MongoOperationRejectedException` on a path outside the
allowlist. Without it, a caller can search any indexed field, including ones indexed for a
different purpose.
- Search text length and result count are bounded at construction. An unbounded search text is a
cost multiplier on someone else's service.
## 4. Vector search
`MongoVectorIndexDescriptor.cosine(path, dimensions)` declares the index.
`MongoEmbedding.forIndex(index, values)` binds an embedding to it and **rejects a dimension
mismatch** — a 1536-dimension embedding against a 768-dimension index is not a runtime degradation,
it is a category error, and catching it at construction beats catching it as a confusing server
message.
`MongoEmbedding` copies its backing array in and out. A vector that shares an array with its caller
can be mutated after the query is built, which produces a query nobody wrote.
`MongoVectorQuery` requires `numCandidates > limit` — searching 10 candidates to return 10 results is
an exhaustive scan wearing an ANN index's name. `MongoVectorQuery.nearest(embedding, 10)` uses the
standard 20× ratio (200 candidates for 10 results).
## 5. Relevance is the gate, not functionality
`MongoVectorSearchBenchmarkGate.standard()` requires **recall** alongside latency and index size.
`requiredEvidence()` names recall explicitly.
This is the difference between search and everything else in the platform. A vector index can be
functionally perfect — it accepts the index, accepts the query, returns k results, within the latency
budget — and return the wrong k. A gate that measures only latency certifies a fast wrong answer.
`failures(recall, latencyMs, indexMb)` reports which dimension failed so the finding is actionable.
## 6. Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Incomplete results after a deploy | Queried a `BUILDING` index | Wait for `READY`. The gate prevents this; if it fired, something bypassed it. |
| `MongoOperationRejectedException` on a path | Path not in the allowlist | Add it deliberately, or fix the caller. |
| Dimension mismatch | Model changed | A new model means a new index. Build alongside, cut over, then retire. |
| Recall dropped without a code change | The index was rebuilt with different parameters, or the data distribution shifted | Re-run the benchmark gate; treat a recall regression like a failing test. |
| Index `FAILED` | Build error on the search service | Search-side diagnosis; the application must not fall back to a scan silently. |
## 7. Promotion evidence
Per [ADR-MONGO-ADV-001](../../adr/ADR-MONGO-ADV-001-capability-promotion.md): the actual target
deployment (not Atlas Local), security review of `SEARCH_ADMIN`, a rebuild path, failure cases
(non-ready index refused, disallowed path refused, dimension mismatch refused), this document as the
runbook, **and** relevance evidence. Search and vector search do not promote on functional success.
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# Advanced — Sharding
**Capability:** `MongoCapability.SHARDING`
**Property:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.sharding.enabled`
**Status:** Advanced. Reshard orchestration remains Experimental.
## Requirements
| | |
|---|---|
| Topology | A real sharded cluster. A replica set cannot exercise routing. |
| Server | MongoDB 7.0 or 8.0. |
| Privilege | `MongoPrincipalRole.SHARD_ADMIN` for the admin plane; the application role is unchanged. |
| Gate | `mongoShardedTest` lane with `MongoShardingContractSuite`. |
## Shard key
`ShardKeyDescriptor` declares the key as an ordered list of `ShardKeyPart` plus a `ShardStrategy`:
| Strategy | Distributes | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| `RANGE` | by value ranges | Range queries stay targeted; a monotonic key (a timestamp, an `ObjectId`) sends every insert to one shard. |
| `HASHED` | by hash of the key | Inserts spread evenly; every range query becomes scatter-gather. |
There is no strategy that is good at both, which is why the choice is a declaration rather than a
default.
## Routing classification
`ShardAwareQueryValidator` classifies each query before execution:
| `MongoRoutingClassification` | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `TARGETED` | The full shard key is present. One shard answers. |
| `PREFIX_TARGETED` | A prefix of a compound key is present. A subset of shards answers. |
| `SCATTER_GATHER` | No shard-key predicate. Every shard answers. |
| `REJECTED` | Scatter-gather where the profile forbids it. |
A scatter-gather query is not an error — some queries legitimately need every shard — but it must be
declared. Undeclared scatter-gather raises `MongoShardRoutingException`. The reason is that
scatter-gather passes every test on a single-shard development cluster and only degrades once the
cluster grows, at which point the query is already in production and the fix is a schema change.
## Unsupported combinations
- Unique index on a field that is not a prefix of the shard key. MongoDB cannot enforce it across
shards, and it fails at index creation, not at query time.
- Transactions that touch documents on multiple shards remain supported but cost a cross-shard
two-phase commit. Prefer a shard key that keeps a transaction's documents co-located.
- CSFLE on a sharded collection: see [encryption.md](encryption.md) for the combinations that are
refused.
## Admin plane
`MongoShardingAdminGateway` (D4, `SHARD_ADMIN` credential) covers shard-collection, refine-shard-key
and reshard.
`ShardKeyAnalyzer` produces a `ShardKeyReadinessReport` before sharding a collection: cardinality,
frequency skew and monotonicity. A key with low cardinality creates jumbo chunks that cannot be split;
a monotonic key creates a hot shard. Both are visible in the report and invisible in a functional
test.
`ReshardApproval` is required for a reshard — a named approver and a stated window. Resharding
rewrites the collection: it duplicates the data during the operation and saturates IO. It is not a
runtime operation and the type refuses to pretend otherwise.
## Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| `MongoShardRoutingException` | Undeclared scatter-gather | Add the shard key to the predicate, or declare the query as scatter-gather in its profile after review. |
| Jumbo chunks | Low-cardinality shard key | Refine the shard key (adds a suffix, non-destructive) before considering a reshard. |
| One hot shard | Monotonic range key | Refine with a high-cardinality prefix, or reshard to hashed if range queries are not needed. |
| Balancer never converges | Chunk migration blocked by long-running operations | Check for long transactions and cursors; the balancer waits on them. |
## Promotion evidence
Per [ADR-MONGO-ADV-001](../../adr/ADR-MONGO-ADV-001-capability-promotion.md): actual sharded-cluster
evidence, security review of the `SHARD_ADMIN` role, a migration path for an existing unsharded
collection, failure cases (undeclared scatter-gather refused, jumbo chunk detected), and this
document as the runbook. Reshard orchestration stays Experimental until operational scale evidence
exists.
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# Advanced — Time Series
**Capability:** `MongoCapability.TIME_SERIES`
**Property:** `ca-skeleton.persistence-mongo.advanced.time-series.enabled`
**Status:** Advanced.
## Requirements
| | |
|---|---|
| Topology | Replica set or sharded cluster. |
| Server | MongoDB 7.0 or 8.0. |
| Privilege | Standard application role; collection creation goes through the admin plane. |
## Descriptor
`MongoTimeSeriesDescriptor` declares:
- **timeField** — required, a BSON date. This is the bucketing axis.
- **metaField** — optional but nearly always wanted: the series identity (device id, tenant, sensor).
Documents sharing a `metaField` value bucket together, which is where the compression comes from.
- **granularity** — `MongoTimeSeriesGranularity`:
| Granularity | Bucket span | Use for |
|---|---|---|
| `SECONDS` | 1 hour | Sub-second to per-second ingest. |
| `MINUTES` | 24 hours | Per-minute metrics. |
| `HOURS` | 30 days | Hourly rollups. |
Granularity that is too fine produces many small buckets and loses the compression; too coarse
produces oversized buckets that must be read whole to answer a narrow query.
## What a time series collection is not
`MongoTimeSeriesCapabilityValidator` refuses the operations the collection type does not support, at
declaration time rather than at first use:
- **No arbitrary updates.** Time series data is append-mostly. Delete and limited update support
exists on recent servers but is not part of this platform's contract.
- **No unique index on the measurement.** There is no `_id` to be unique on in the usual sense.
- **No CSFLE.** Refused — see [encryption.md](encryption.md).
- **No change stream on the raw buckets** as a business event source. The bucket documents are a
storage representation, not your measurements.
Converting an existing regular collection to a time series collection is a copy, not an alter. Plan
it as a migration with a dual-write window.
## TTL
Time series collections use `expireAfterSeconds` on the collection rather than a TTL index on a
field. The [TTL rules](../schema-index-migration-guide.md#4-ttl) still apply: expiry is physical
cleanup on a bucket boundary, so a measurement can outlive its expiry by up to a bucket span plus the
monitor interval. Do not treat absence as a deadline.
## Operations
`MongoTimeSeriesOperations` is the port for insert and windowed read. Reads are bounded by the same
`MongoOperationBudget` as everything else: an unbounded time-range query on a time series collection
is the fastest way to read a year of data into heap.
## Failure recovery
| Symptom | Cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Writes rejected with an unsupported-operation error | An update or unique-index expectation | The collection type does not support it; change the access pattern. |
| Poor compression / large storage | Missing `metaField`, or granularity too fine | Both require a rebuild; measure on a copy before committing. |
| Slow range queries | Granularity too coarse for the query window | Same: rebuild with the granularity matched to the dominant query. |
## Promotion evidence
Actual-topology evidence on the target deployment, a migration path from the existing collection,
failure cases (unsupported update refused, CSFLE combination refused), and this document as the
runbook.