refactor: 백엔드 리펙토링 진행 중

This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-09-25 17:57:07 +09:00
parent fe80bb3ff3
commit fcddab7e2a
7518 changed files with 3217541 additions and 21259 deletions
+1 -6
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# split into capability artifacts.
# Update only after review with:
# ./gradlew :adapter:inbound:graphql:updateGraphQlApiSurface -PapproveGraphQlApiSurfaceChange
# types: 168
# types: 163
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.HealthGraphqlController
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.api.GraphQlClientProfile
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.api.GraphQlOperationId
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.autoconfigure.GraphQlPlatformSettings
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.autoconfigure.GraphQlPlatformStartupValidator
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.autoconfigure.GraphQlRetiredSafetyAxis
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.autoconfigure.GraphQlRootAutoConfiguration
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.autoconfigure.GraphQlRuntimeTransport
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.context.ActorRef
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.context.GraphQlCommandAttribution
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.context.GraphQlDeadline
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlAnonymousOperationExcept
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionPipeline
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionPipelineException
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionPipelineValidator
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionProfile
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionProfileException
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlExecutionStage
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlOperationSelection
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.execution.GraphQlPreparsedCacheKey
@@ -132,8 +129,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.pagination.HmacGraphQlCursorCodec
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.policy.GraphQlClientPolicy
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.policy.GraphQlOperationType
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlBatchLoaderRegistrar
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlBlockingBridge
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlBlockingBridgeFullException
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlCostBudgetHandler
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlDataFetcherExceptionResolver
dev.caskeleton.adapter.inbound.graphql.runtime.GraphQlDocumentAuthorizationHandler
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ All capabilities are off by default. Flags are `ca-skeleton.grpc.advanced.<capab
| Custom load balancer | `custom-load-balancer` | `EXPERIMENTAL` | — |
| Proxyless xDS | `xds` | `EXPERIMENTAL` | xDS control plane |
| gRPC-Web | `grpc-web` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` | gRPC-Web proxy |
| Servlet HTTP/2 | `servlet-compat` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` | Servlet container |
| Servlet HTTP/2 | `servlet-compat` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` (flag only; no Servlet transport code since 2026-09-25) | Servlet container |
| Spring Integration bridge | `integration-bridge` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` | — |
| Reactor adapter | `reactor` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` | — |
| Kotlin coroutine / Flow | `kotlin` | `ADVANCED_STABLE` | Kotlin toolchain |
@@ -42,14 +42,12 @@ implemented and tested in this repository. What no capability has is evidence fr
`GrpcAdvancedPromotionEvidence` for each one is empty, and no promotion has been granted.
**Four capabilities cannot produce meaningful evidence here at all**, because the infrastructure they
need is absent. `GrpcAdvancedInfrastructureTestkit.missingInfrastructure` names them, and a suite that
runs without its infrastructure passes and establishes nothing.
need is absent (gRPC-Web proxy, Servlet container, xDS control plane, Kotlin toolchain), and a suite
that runs without its infrastructure passes and establishes nothing.
**Kotlin is the sharpest case.** This repository has no Kotlin toolchain, so
`GrpcKotlinCompatibilityGate.supportableHere()` returns false and always will until one exists. The
four contract requirements — one schema source shared with Java, coroutine cancellation propagated,
Flow backpressure inside the Stable buffer bounds, platform evidence types preserved — are checkable
without a toolchain and are checked. The compile lane is not.
**Kotlin is the sharpest case.** This repository has no Kotlin toolchain, so Kotlin is not
supportable here until one exists. Only the Java-side coroutine cancellation bridge
(`GrpcCoroutineContextBridge`) is implemented and tested; there is no compile lane.
## Promotion thresholds
+11 -2
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@@ -52,8 +52,17 @@ opens nothing.
## Authorization
Every public operation calls the injected `FileAccessPolicy` before any quota reservation or storage
mutation, so a denial leaves no record, no reservation, and no staging object. Startup refuses to
run a production profile with an allow-all policy.
mutation, so a denial leaves no record, no reservation, and no staging object. Finalize is
authorized as `FINALIZE`, and management-plane reads as `ADMIN_READ`. Startup refuses to run a
production profile with an allow-all policy.
Each file records its owner: the principal that created it and, when the transport resolved one,
its tenant (the `tenant` subject attribute). The default role policy grants an operation on an
existing file only to its owner in the same tenant, so two callers holding the same role cannot
read, download, finalize, delete, copy or move each other's files. An admin role does not bypass
this — acting on another caller's file is what the audited management plane is for. A file created
before ownership was recorded (migration V5) has no owner and is reachable only through the
management plane. Anonymous read, when enabled, publishes every file and skips the owner check.
## Delegation
+6 -12
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@@ -67,8 +67,7 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
| `base-url` | URI | — | Required for a trusted profile; no userinfo, no query |
| `allowed-hosts` | list | empty | Required in production |
| `allowed-ports` | list | empty | Compared against the effective port |
| `api` | `REST_CLIENT` \| `WEB_CLIENT` | `REST_CLIENT` | Decides blocking or reactive runtime |
| `transport` | `APACHE` \| `JDK` \| `REACTOR_NETTY` \| `JETTY` \| `SIMPLE` | `APACHE` | `SIMPLE` is rejected in production |
| `transport` | `APACHE` \| `JDK` \| `JETTY` \| `SIMPLE` | `APACHE` | `SIMPLE` is rejected in production; `JETTY` needs a deployment-registered provider |
| `protocols` | list | `HTTP_1_1` | The default transport is Apache, whose classic client is HTTP/1.1 only; a profile that wants HTTP/2 declares it together with a transport that can deliver it. `HTTP_3` requires the experimental acknowledgement |
| `experimental-acknowledgement` | string | — | Must equal `I_ACCEPT_HTTP3_EXPERIMENTAL_SEMANTICS` |
@@ -191,9 +190,9 @@ materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validatio
`HOSTNAME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED`, `PLAINTEXT_FALLBACK_FORBIDDEN`, `TLS_PROTOCOL_FORBIDDEN`,
`RETRY_BACKOFF_REQUIRED`, `MISSING_PRODUCTION_SETTING`, `DUPLICATE_CLIENT_NAME`,
`HTTPCLIENT_ACTIVE_WITHOUT_CLIENTS`, `DYNAMIC_BASE_URL_REQUIRED`,
`DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`, `REACTIVE_AUTHENTICATION_UNSUPPORTED`,
`DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`,
`HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED`, `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL`,
`TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED`, `REACTIVE_REDIRECT_UNSUPPORTED`,
`TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED`,
`RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS`, `FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN`, `BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN`,
`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`.
@@ -205,16 +204,11 @@ unaffected — only a deliberate, unmet request fails.
Three of these are about a guarantee that used to be silently unmet rather than refused:
- `HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED` — declaring `protocols: [HTTP_2]` alone states that HTTP/2
is required. Only `REACTOR_NETTY` can be configured to offer H2 and nothing else; the JDK client
treats it as a preference and negotiates HTTP/1.1, and Apache's classic client is HTTP/1.1 only.
- `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL` — a per-route ceiling above the total is incoherent, and on Reactor,
where the per-route knob is the only one that exists, it silently becomes the effective limit.
is required. No transport can be configured to offer H2 and nothing else; the JDK client treats it
as a preference and negotiates HTTP/1.1, and Apache's classic client is HTTP/1.1 only.
- `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL` — a per-route ceiling above the total is incoherent.
- `TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED` — an empty `tls.protocols` used to pass and then let the JVM choose,
so emptying the list to "tighten" a profile loosened it.
- `REACTIVE_REDIRECT_UNSUPPORTED` — engine redirect following is disabled on every transport and
only the blocking stack has a coordinator that follows hops with per-hop re-validation. A
`WEB_CLIENT` profile with `redirect.enabled=true` did not follow redirects; the caller received the
3xx as an ordinary response. Refused until the reactive coordinator exists.
- `RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS` — `retry.policy` was read by nothing on the execution path, so
the actuator could report `none` for a profile retrying three times. The two settings must now
agree: `policy: none` requires `max-attempts: 1`, and any other policy requires more than one.
-2
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@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ fields:
env: APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_N_ALLOWED_HOSTS_M
- field: clients[N].allowed-ports[M]
env: APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_N_ALLOWED_PORTS_M
- field: clients[N].api
env: APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_N_API
- field: clients[N].transport
env: APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_N_TRANSPORT
- field: clients[N].protocols[M]
+2 -2
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@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ a mesh retry policy changes.
## Error model
Every outbound failure is one of these stable types. The type is derived from the classified failure
category, not from whatever the engine happened to throw, so it means the same thing on Apache, JDK,
and Reactor Netty. Each carries `HttpFailureMetadata`: client, operation, method, URI **template**,
category, not from whatever the engine happened to throw, so it means the same thing on Apache and
JDK. Each carries `HttpFailureMetadata`: client, operation, method, URI **template**,
evidence, replayability, stage, retryability, attempt, elapsed, remaining deadline, status, trace id
— and nothing else.
-1
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@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ never silently degrades into a pass.
| `RetryStormBudgetTest` | 10 000 logical calls against a failing upstream produce at most 11 000 physical attempts at a 10 % budget | structural |
| `LargeBodyResourceTest` | a 32 MiB streaming download consumes every byte without buffering the payload on the heap | structural + machine-dependent heap bound |
| `PoolSaturationPerformanceTest` | 24 concurrent calls against a 4-connection pool all reach a terminal outcome; none hang | structural |
| `Http2StreamSaturationTest` | 32 concurrent reactive streams share a 2-connection pool and complete | structural |
| `OAuthRefreshContentionTest` | 100 genuinely concurrent callers produce exactly one token request | structural |
| `RuntimeRotationDrainTest` | 50 rotations close all 50 retired generations and leave no drain thread | structural |
+1 -3
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@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ cd src
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:test --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:httpClientStableContractTest --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:httpClientSecurityTest --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:httpClientBlockHoundTest --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:spring62CompatibilityTest --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:spring70CompatibilityTest --console=plain
./gradlew :adapter:outbound:httpclient:httpClientFailureInjectionTest --console=plain # needs Docker
@@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ python3 ../scripts/verify-httpclient-docs.py
- [ ] Typed clients are the default entry point; H2 and H3 are separately authorised.
- [ ] H1–H4 cannot bypass timeout, host, TLS, auth, size, or observation policy.
- [ ] Apache, JDK, and Reactor produce identical result and exception metadata.
- [ ] Apache and JDK produce identical result and exception metadata.
- [ ] Pool, DNS, connect, TLS, and retry backoff all fit inside the effective deadline.
- [ ] Every extra attempt is explained by idempotency, replayability, evidence, deadline, and budget.
- [ ] Non-idempotent `SENT_NO_RESPONSE` surfaces as `HttpAmbiguousExecutionException`.
@@ -33,7 +32,6 @@ python3 ../scripts/verify-httpclient-docs.py
- [ ] Trust-all and hostname-verification bypass fail at startup.
- [ ] Canonicalisation, DNS/IP validation, redirect revalidation, and egress control all pass.
- [ ] No transparent retry occurs after the first delivered byte.
- [ ] No platform code blocks a Reactor event loop, proven by a BlockHound self-check.
- [ ] The negotiated wire protocol matches what the support matrix claims per transport.
- [ ] Logical calls and attempts are separate metrics with no forbidden label.
- [ ] DNS, pool, TLS, reset, partial response, and HTTP/2 GOAWAY are reproducible.
+2 -2
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@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ Root package: `io.backend.skeleton.httpclient` → `dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbo
| `httpclient-auth` | `…httpclient.auth` | `…outbound.httpclient.auth` |
| `httpclient-security` | `…httpclient.security` | `…outbound.httpclient.security` |
| `httpclient-observability` | `…httpclient.observation` | `…outbound.httpclient.observation` |
| `httpclient-transport-reactor-netty` | `…httpclient.reactor` | `…outbound.httpclient.reactor` |
| `httpclient-webclient` | `…httpclient.webclient` | `…outbound.httpclient.webclient` |
| `httpclient-transport-reactor-netty` | `…httpclient.reactor` | removed (decision 9, 2026-09-25: blocking only) |
| `httpclient-webclient` | `…httpclient.webclient` | removed (decision 9, 2026-09-25: blocking only) |
| `httpclient-service-client` | `…httpclient.service` | `…outbound.httpclient.service` |
| `httpclient-dynamic-target` | `…httpclient.dynamic` | `…outbound.httpclient.dynamic` |
| `httpclient-jetty-http3-experimental` | `…httpclient.http3` | `…outbound.httpclient.http3` |
+13 -29
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@@ -2,13 +2,10 @@
## Response lifecycle
A blocking streaming download returns `BlockingStreamingResponse`, never a bare `InputStream`.
Closing is idempotent and always releases the connection — after a full read, a partial read, a
decode failure, or a size rejection. The status is validated before any body byte is delivered, so a
failed download never becomes a half-consumed stream the caller has to reason about.
A reactive download emits bounded `DataBuffer` values. Buffers are released on completion, error,
and cancellation; a dropped buffer is direct memory nobody returns.
A streaming download returns `BlockingStreamingResponse`, never a bare `InputStream`. Closing is
idempotent and always releases the connection — after a full read, a partial read, a decode failure,
or a size rejection. The status is validated before any body byte is delivered, so a failed download
never becomes a half-consumed stream the caller has to reason about.
Wire bytes and decoded bytes are bounded independently, because a compressed payload passes a wire
check and then expands. Limits are enforced while reading, not after buffering.
@@ -19,34 +16,21 @@ check and then expands. Limits are enforced while reading, not after buffering.
response headers received
→ nothing delivered yet
→ a read-only operation may still be retried
→ first InputStream read or first Flux onNext
→ transparent retry is permanently disabled
→ the response is handed to the caller
→ transparent retry is no longer possible
```
`FirstByteDeliveryGuard` latches once and never resets. Retrying after delivery would replay a
stream the caller has already partly consumed, producing duplicated or reordered data that no
downstream code can detect.
Retrying after delivery would replay a stream the caller has already partly consumed, producing
duplicated or reordered data that no downstream code can detect. The streaming gateway hands out
the response only after the attempt has finished, so there is no retry left to run once the caller
reads.
## Request bodies
A reopenable body is opened once per attempt, which is what makes it replayable; reusing the
previous stream would silently send an empty body on the retry. A one-shot stream or publisher
instance is never retried. `ReactiveBodySource` takes a publisher *factory* rather than a publisher
so a reactive body can honestly declare itself replayable.
A multipart body is exactly as replayable as its weakest part.
previous stream would silently send an empty body on the retry. A one-shot stream is never retried.
## Server-sent events
Three budgets stay separate:
- `setupDeadline` — establishing the stream
- `streamingIdleTimeout` — silence once it is open
- `maxStreamDuration` — optional total lifetime
Applying the request-shaped `total-call` timeout to an SSE subscription would terminate a perfectly
healthy stream on schedule, so it is not applied.
`Last-Event-ID` is opt-in. Replaying from an id is only correct when the producer guarantees it;
sending it blindly can skip or duplicate events. Reconnects consume the retry budget like any other
physical attempt, and cancelling the subscription stops both the stream and any pending reconnect.
The platform has no server-sent-event client. It was part of the reactive stack, which was removed
(decision 9, 2026-09-25): the platform runs blocking calls on the caller's thread only.
+15 -15
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@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ proves it; anything the suite cannot prove is **Experimental** and says so.
| API | Grade | Role | Constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `RestClient` | Stable | Blocking execution | Bounded concurrency and an effective deadline are mandatory |
| `WebClient` | Stable | Reactive, streaming, SSE | No blocking work on the event loop |
| `RestClient` | Stable | Blocking execution (the only execution model) | Bounded concurrency and an effective deadline are mandatory |
| HTTP Service Client (`@HttpExchange`) | Default | Declarative typed client | Operation metadata is mandatory |
| Generic Exchange (H2) | Restricted | Dynamic method, path, body | Base URL and policy are immutable |
| Dynamic Target (H3) | Restricted | User-supplied URL | Separate SSRF policy; inherits no credential |
@@ -16,13 +15,16 @@ proves it; anything the suite cannot prove is **Experimental** and says so.
## Transports
| Transport | Blocking | Reactive | HTTP/1.1 | HTTP/2 | HTTP/3 | Grade | Verified by |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---|---|
| Apache HttpClient 5 (classic) | yes | no | yes | **no** | no | Stable (blocking default) | `httpClientStableContractTest`, `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` |
| JDK HttpClient | yes | `sendAsync` | yes | yes (TLS/ALPN) | no | Stable (lightweight, blocking HTTP/2) | `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` |
| Reactor Netty | limited | yes | yes | yes | experimental | Stable (reactive default) | `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` |
| Jetty | facade | yes | yes | yes | yes | **Experimental** | `Http3OptInTest` only |
| Simple request factory | yes | no | limited | no | no | Local test only | rejected in production by `ClientProfileValidator` |
The platform is blocking only (decision 9, 2026-09-25): every call runs on the caller's thread —
a virtual thread in this template — through `RestClient`. There is no reactive execution path, no
`WebClient`, and no Reactor Netty transport.
| Transport | HTTP/1.1 | HTTP/2 | HTTP/3 | Grade | Verified by |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---|---|
| Apache HttpClient 5 (classic) | yes | **no** | no | Stable (default) | `httpClientStableContractTest`, `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` |
| JDK HttpClient | yes | yes (TLS/ALPN) | no | Stable (lightweight, HTTP/2) | `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` |
| Jetty | yes | yes | yes | **Experimental** | `Http3OptInTest` only |
| Simple request factory | limited | no | no | Local test only | rejected in production by `ClientProfileValidator` |
### Apache is HTTP/1.1 here, and why
@@ -33,8 +35,9 @@ classic client fails outright against a prior-knowledge h2c server.
So `ApacheBlockingTransportProvider.capabilities()` declares HTTP/1.1, and a profile that pairs
Apache with `HTTP_2` is rejected at startup instead of quietly running HTTP/1.1 while this table
claims otherwise. **Blocking HTTP/2 is served by the JDK transport**; reactive HTTP/2 by Reactor
Netty. Both are measured from the client after a real TLS handshake, not read from configuration.
claims otherwise. **HTTP/2 is served by the JDK transport**, measured from the client after a real
TLS handshake, not read from configuration. No transport can be restricted to HTTP/2 alone, so a
profile that declares only `HTTP_2` is refused (`HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED`).
The JDK transport declares `routeScopedPool=false`, `boundedPendingAcquireQueue=false`, and
`dynamicTargetStable=false`. A profile that needs any of those is rejected at startup rather than
@@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ gives route-scoped pooling and Dynamic Target pinning, JDK gives HTTP/2.
| Capability | Gate |
|---|---|
| Dynamic Target (H3) | Apache and Reactor Netty only; JDK and Jetty are rejected |
| Dynamic Target (H3) | Apache only; JDK and Jetty are rejected |
| HTTP/3 | `experimentalAcknowledgement` must equal `I_ACCEPT_HTTP3_EXPERIMENTAL_SEMANTICS` |
| Cross-origin redirect | opt-in per profile; credentials are stripped on the hop |
| Retry | evidence-based; never enabled by HTTP method alone |
@@ -58,10 +61,8 @@ gives route-scoped pooling and Dynamic Target pinning, JDK gives HTTP/2.
| Spring Framework 6.2 API surface | every PR | required | `spring62CompatibilityTest` |
| Apache HC5 + RestClient | every PR | required | `httpClientStableContractTest -Phttpclient.contract.transports=apache` |
| JDK HttpClient + RestClient | every PR | required | `httpClientStableContractTest -Phttpclient.contract.transports=jdk` |
| Reactor Netty + WebClient | every PR | required | `httpClientStableContractTest -Phttpclient.contract.transports=reactor` |
| SSRF / cardinality suite | every PR | required | `httpClientSecurityTest` |
| Toxiproxy fault suite | nightly, release | required | `httpClientFailureInjectionTest` |
| Event-loop blocking (BlockHound) | every PR | required | `httpClientBlockHoundTest` |
| Performance certification | nightly, release | required | `httpClientPerformanceTest -Pperformance.assertions.enabled=true` |
| Jetty HTTP/3 | nightly | Experimental, non-blocking | `test -Phttp3.tests.enabled=true` |
@@ -82,6 +83,5 @@ Stated so the matrix is read as a measurement rather than an aspiration.
| Gap | Why | What is proven instead |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP/2 frame injection (`REFUSED_STREAM`, arbitrary `GOAWAY`) | The fixture server exposes no frame-level control, and a purpose-built h2 server is a larger dependency than the guarantee is worth here | `Http2EvidenceMapperTest` proves the frame → evidence mapping, and `NegotiatedProtocolContractTest` proves h2 is really negotiated |
| Netty buffer-leak detection | Netty reports a leak when an unreferenced buffer is collected, which the suite does not force | `NettyLeakDetectionExtension` asserts the PARANOID detector is live and reports nothing; explicit release assertions in the streaming suites are the primary guarantee |
| Spring 6.2 runtime | This repository's Boot 4.0 baseline pins Spring 7 | `spring62CompatibilityTest` confines the common packages to the 6.2 API surface |
| Performance latency baseline | Numbers measured on a build agent are not a certification | `httpClientPerformanceTest` asserts structural bounds unconditionally; latency and heap bounds run under `-Pperformance.assertions.enabled=true` |
+31 -6
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@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ app:
consumer: { type: SASL_SCRAM, credential-id: kafka-consumer }
# admin은 application runtime에 설정하지 않는다
hostname-verification: true
# 사설 CA로 서명된 TLS 브로커면(tls-enabled: true일 때만):
# trust-store: { location: /etc/kafka/ca.p12, type: PKCS12, password-credential-id: kafka-truststore }
access:
publishable: [order-events]
consumable: []
@@ -191,13 +193,36 @@ app:
연결 시점에 해석하므로, 설정 덤프나 힙 덤프에서 나오는 것은 이름뿐이다. producer와 consumer는
서로 다른 `credential-id`를 써야 하며, 같으면 부팅에 실패한다.
`SASL_SCRAM`·`USERNAME_PASSWORD`의 사용자 이름은 `CredentialProvider.username(credentialId)`가
준다. credential id를 사용자 이름으로 보내지 않는다. 비밀번호와 사용자 이름은 JAAS 문자열에 들어가지
않고, 연결이 인증할 때마다 provider에서 읽힌다. 그래서 provider가 만료 시각을 주는 credential은
재기동 없이 rotation된다(`security.md`).
`MUTUAL_TLS`는 클라이언트 인증서를 key store로 제출한다. `credential-id`는 key store 비밀번호를
가리킨다.
```text
producer:
type: MUTUAL_TLS
credential-id: kafka-producer-tls # key store 비밀번호
key-store: { location: /etc/kafka/producer.p12, type: PKCS12 }
```
`trust-store`를 생략하면 JVM 기본 trust store를 쓴다. 사설 CA 브로커는 `trust-store.location`
(PKCS12·JKS·PEM)과, 잠긴 store면 `password-credential-id`를 준다.
Kafka producer는 이 항목을 실제 클라이언트 설정(`security.protocol`, `sasl.mechanism`,
`sasl.jaas.config`, `ssl.enabled.protocols=TLSv1.3,TLSv1.2`, hostname 검증)으로 옮긴다. 평문으로
조용히 넘어가지 않도록 다음 경우 부팅에 실패한다: 브로커가 `tls-enabled`나
`authentication-enabled`를 켰는데 `app.messaging.security.<broker>`가 없을 때, security 항목은
있는데 `CredentialProvider` bean이 없을 때, 같은 브로커에 맞는 항목이 둘 이상일 때.
한계: truststore/keystore 설정 키가 없어 TLS는 JVM 기본 truststore를 쓰고, `MUTUAL_TLS`는 클라이언트
인증서를 제출할 수 없다(미지원).
`sasl.jaas.config`, `sasl.client.callback.handler.class`, `ssl.truststore.*`, `ssl.keystore.*`,
`ssl.enabled.protocols=TLSv1.3,TLSv1.2`, hostname 검증)으로 옮긴다. 평문으로 조용히 넘어가지
않도록 다음 경우 부팅에 실패한다: 브로커가 `tls-enabled`나 `authentication-enabled`를 켰는데
`app.messaging.security.<broker>`가 없을 때, security 항목은 있는데 `CredentialProvider` bean이 없을
때, 같은 브로커에 맞는 항목이 둘 이상일 때, provider가 SASL 사용자 이름을 주지 않을 때,
`MUTUAL_TLS`인데 `key-store`가 없거나 `tls-enabled`가 꺼져 있을 때, `trust-store`를 줬는데
`tls-enabled`가 꺼져 있을 때, store 파일을 열 수 없을 때.
`access.publishable`은 강제된다. security 항목이 있는 브로커의 destination은 이 목록에 있어야
publish된다. 목록 밖 publish는 `REJECTED`(`PUBLISH_FORBIDDEN`)이고, 빈 목록이면 아무것도 publish되지
않는다.
## Backpressure
+22 -6
View File
@@ -36,17 +36,30 @@ heap dump나 설정 출력에서 사용 가능한 credential이 나오지 않는
`CredentialIds`는 `bearer `, `sk-`, `-----begin`, `eyJ` 같은 접두사를 거부한다.
참조가 들어갈 자리에 secret 자체를 붙여넣는 가장 흔한 사고를 막는다.
SASL(PLAIN·SCRAM) 사용자 이름도 `CredentialProvider.username(credentialId)`가 준다. credential id는
저장소 안의 참조이지 broker가 아는 사용자 이름이 아니다. provider가 이름을 주지 않으면 기동에
실패한다.
key store·trust store는 경로만 설정에 둔다. 비밀번호는 credential id로 provider가 해석한다
(`configuration-reference.md` 보안 절).
## Rotation
`CredentialRotationPlan.isDue()`는 만료 **전에** 참이 된다.
broker가 연결을 거부하기 시작한 시점에는 이미 publish가 실패하고 consumer가 멈춰 있다.
rotation은 세대 교체다. `DefaultMessagingRuntimeRegistry.install()`이 새 세대를 원자적으로
게시하고, 이전 세대는 마지막 lease가 닫힐 때까지 열려 있다가 닫힌다.
진행 중인 publish는 시작한 연결에서 confirm을 받는다.
Kafka SASL credential은 producer를 다시 만들지 않고 바뀐다. JAAS 설정에는 login module 이름만
있고, `KafkaCredentialCallbackHandler`가 연결이 인증할 때마다 `CredentialRuntimeRegistry`에서
사용자 이름과 비밀번호를 읽는다. registry는 provider가 준 만료 시각의 rotation lead(기본 30분)
안으로 들어오면 새로 가져오므로, 새 연결과 재인증(broker `connections.max.reauth.ms`)이 새 값을
쓴다. 만료 시각을 주지 않는 provider의 credential은 캐시된 값을 계속 쓴다.
drain deadline이 이 대기를 제한한다. 없으면 lease 하나가 새면 폐기된 credential이
무기한 열려 있고, rotation이 보안상 무의미해진다.
key store·trust store 비밀번호는 예외다. Kafka가 SSL context를 만들 때 한 번 읽으므로 바꾸려면
producer를 다시 만들어야 한다(재기동).
transport 세대 교체(`DefaultMessagingRuntimeRegistry.install()`)는 transport 자체를 바꿀 때 쓴다.
새 세대를 원자적으로 게시하고, 이전 세대는 마지막 lease가 닫힐 때까지 열려 있다가 닫힌다.
drain deadline이 이 대기를 제한한다.
## Header
@@ -66,10 +79,13 @@ logical identity가 호출자 제어가 된다.
## ACL
`DestinationAccessValidator`가 broker ACL **이전에** 검사한다.
publisher가 broker ACL **이전에** 검사한다(`PUBLISH_FORBIDDEN`).
broker ACL 거부는 애플리케이션 컨텍스트가 없는 연결 수준 오류로 도착하므로
"어느 모듈이 어디에 publish하려 했는가"가 조사 대상이 된다.
publish 가능한 destination은 선언된 destination이다. broker에 `app.messaging.security.<broker>`
항목이 있으면 그중 `access.publishable`에 적힌 것만 남는다(빈 목록이면 publish 불가).
## 관측성 누출
`MessagingRedactor`는 denylist다.
+10 -4
View File
@@ -17,10 +17,16 @@ enables the capability; construction is refused otherwise.
## 1. CSFLE
`MongoCsfleProfile` binds a collection to its `MongoCsfleFieldPolicy` list, a key vault
`MongoCredentialReference` and the key vault namespace. `MongoCsfleClientFactory` builds the encrypted
client settings. Data-key selection is the adopter's: `MongoCsfleFieldPolicy.keyAlias()` is the
alias the driver resolves against the key vault.
`MongoCsfleProfile` binds a collection (`database` + `collection`) to its `MongoCsfleFieldPolicy`
list, a key vault `MongoCredentialReference` and the key vault namespace. `MongoCsfleClientFactory`
builds the encrypted client settings from it: the `$jsonSchema` is generated from the field policies
(a dotted path becomes nested `properties`) and keyed by the namespace `database.collection`, and the
key vault client is built from the profile's own credential through `MongoCredentialResolver`.
An automatic-encryption schema names a data key by id, not by alias. The adopter resolves each
`MongoCsfleFieldPolicy.keyAlias()` against the key vault (for example
`ClientEncryption.getKeyByAltName`) and passes the alias → key id map to `settingsFor`; an alias with
no id is refused. Deterministic fields are typed `string` in the schema.
`MongoCsfleMode`:
+1 -38
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Every top-level public type under the platform packages. Growth is a reviewed change.
# Update only after review with:
# ./gradlew :adapter:outbound:notification:updateNotificationApiSurface -PapproveNotificationApiSurfaceChange
# types: 416
# types: 379
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.NotificationConfig
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.NotificationRoutesSettings
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.core.FailOpenNotificationProvider
@@ -61,20 +61,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.observation.NotificationSe
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.EmailAttachments
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ProviderResults
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.UnconfiguredAttachmentResolver
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.apns.ApnsFailureClassifier
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.apns.ApnsNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.apns.ApnsProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.apns.ApnsRequestMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmBatchCoordinator
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmBatchResult
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmContactPointUpdater
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmFailureClassifier
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmGateway
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmMessageMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmTargetMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.fcm.FcmWireTarget
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.http.JdkNotificationHttpGateway
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.http.NotificationEndpoints
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.http.NotificationHttpGateway
@@ -89,7 +75,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SesFailureCla
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SesNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SesProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SesRequestMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SesSuppressionUpdater
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SnsCertificateProvider
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.ses.SnsSignatureVerifier
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.smtp.JavaMailSenderSmtpDispatch
@@ -99,28 +84,6 @@ dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.smtp.SmtpFailureC
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.smtp.SmtpMimeMessageFactory
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.smtp.SmtpNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.smtp.SmtpProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioCallbackAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioDeliveryProjector
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioFailureClassifier
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioReconciliationCapability
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioRequestMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioSignatureValidator
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioSmsProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.twilio.TwilioStatusNormalizer
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webhook.WebhookNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webhook.WebhookSignatureStrategy
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webhook.WebhookSubscription
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.EncryptedWebPushPayload
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.Rfc8291Aes128GcmEncryptor
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.VapidAuthorizationProvider
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.VapidJwtSigner
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.VapidKeyRegistry
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.WebPushFailureClassifier
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.WebPushNotificationProviderAdapter
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.WebPushProviderProperties
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.WebPushReceiptCapability
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.webpush.WebPushRequestMapper
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.security.AesGcmCallbackPayloadProtection
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.security.AesGcmContactPointProtector
dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.security.AesGcmNotificationPayloadProtection
+10 -18
View File
@@ -66,14 +66,11 @@ and `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_*` aliases so operators do not have to invent
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `type` | `APNS`, `FCM`, `SES`, `SMTP`, `TWILIO`, `WEB_PUSH`, `WEBHOOK` — a closed enum, so an unknown value fails binding rather than assembling into nothing |
| `type` | `SES`, `SMTP` — a closed enum, so an unknown value fails binding rather than assembling into nothing |
| `enabled` | A disabled profile is bound and validated but contributes no runtime |
| `primary-for-channel` | Exactly one primary per channel |
| `environment` | Required when enabled |
| `credential-profile` | Provider credential key id resolved through `SecretMaterialProvider`; never inline secret material |
| `topic` | APNs bundle id |
| `vapid-public-key` | Web Push application server key |
| `callback-signing-secret-ref` | Reference, not material |
| `timeout` | Positive and finite |
| `max-concurrency` | Positive |
| `rate-per-second` | Positive |
@@ -100,22 +97,19 @@ The shipped reference profile is `providers.ses` and is disabled by default. It
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY`, whose active key id must match
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ID`.
`type` is the closed **provider model**, not a promise that the shipped composition contains a
dispatch assembler for every value. Current shipped reachability is:
`type` lists only the families the shipped composition can assemble. Current shipped
reachability is:
| Provider type | Contract/adapter code | Shipped dispatch assembler | Shipped callback assembler | What happens when enabled for dispatch |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `SMTP` | yes | **yes** | no | assembles when Spring Mail relay settings are complete |
| `SES` | yes | **yes** | **yes** | assembles an EMAIL runtime from the typed `ses` block; SNS callback verification remains available in `INGEST_ONLY` |
| `TWILIO` | yes | no | no | dispatch fails startup by profile name |
| `FCM` | yes | no | no | dispatch fails startup by profile name |
| `APNS` | yes | no | no | dispatch fails startup by profile name |
| `WEB_PUSH` | yes | no | no | dispatch fails startup by profile name |
| `WEBHOOK` | yes | no | no | dispatch fails startup by profile name |
This distinction is deliberate: tested provider protocol code is not the same thing as a
composition-reachable provider. Adding a family to the shipped runtime requires a
`ProviderRuntimeAssembler` plus the settings/secret inputs that adapter actually needs.
APNs, FCM, Twilio, Web Push and Webhook adapters used to ship as protocol code with no assembler, so
enabling one failed startup. They were removed; the `docs/capability-status.md` "제거된 코드" table
names the last commit that had them. Adding a family back means adding its adapter, a
`ProviderRuntimeAssembler`, its `ProviderType` constant and the settings/secret inputs it actually
needs, together.
## SMTP relay
@@ -164,8 +158,7 @@ Startup fails rather than degrading when:
- a TTL-required profile has no expiry source
- a callback signing secret is missing
- a production profile enables trust-all
- an APNs profile is missing its environment or topic
- a Web Push profile is missing its VAPID key
- an SES profile is missing its `ses` block, or callbacks are on and `ses.allowed-topic-arns` is empty
- two provider profiles share an id
- a route points only at disabled providers
- `mode` is `SERVING` and no provider profile is enabled
@@ -177,7 +170,7 @@ All key material arrives through `SecretMaterialProvider`. Nothing is read from
committed file, or from a plaintext log. Contact point encryption and lookup HMAC keys must be
distinct, and the encryption key must be exactly 256 bits.
Eight purposes, eight keys. Each is base64 of at least 32 bytes and each must differ from every
Seven purposes, seven keys. Each is base64 of at least 32 bytes and each must differ from every
other; the platform decodes them at startup and refuses to boot if one is blank, short or shared. A
blank value used to be skipped, which meant the platform started without the key and found out on
the first contact point — in production, on a recipient's notification.
@@ -195,7 +188,6 @@ any example: a value that appears in the repository is a value that has been dis
| Provider credential encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ID` |
| Provider request lookup HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
| Payload encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID` |
| Web Push VAPID signing | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY_ID` |
A key id is not secret — an id identifies key material without revealing it — but it is required,
and it has no default on purpose. A constant id makes a rotation indistinguishable from the key it
+2 -8
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ that owns its responsibility. No public contract, evidence rule, or reliability
| `notification-template-thymeleaf` (reference renderer) | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.template` |
| `notification-email-smtp` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.smtp` |
| `notification-email-ses` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.ses` |
| `notification-sms-twilio` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.twilio` |
| `notification-push-fcm` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.fcm` |
| `notification-push-apns` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.apns` |
| `notification-webpush` (transport + crypto) | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.webpush` |
| `notification-webhook-extension` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.provider.webhook` |
| `notification-observability` (Micrometer impl) | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.observation` |
| `notification-admin-runtime` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.admin` |
| `notification-spring-boot-starter` | `adapter:outbound:notification` | `…platform.autoconfigure` |
@@ -71,9 +66,8 @@ adapter:outbound:notification adapter:outbound:persistence-jpa adapter:inb
Two plan edges cannot be expressed as project edges in this repository, and are replaced by ports:
1. `notification-email-ses`, `notification-sms-twilio`, `notification-push-fcm`,
`notification-push-apns`, `notification-webpush`, `notification-webhook-extension`
→ `httpclient platform`.
1. `notification-email-ses` → `httpclient platform`. (The Twilio, FCM, APNs, Web Push and
Webhook adapters that shared this edge were removed: none had an assembler.)
`adapter-outbound-notification` is not allowed to depend on `adapter-outbound-httpclient`.
The provider adapters therefore call
`dev.caskeleton.adapter.outbound.notification.platform.provider.http.NotificationHttpGateway`,
+4 -35
View File
@@ -27,39 +27,8 @@ send, so `MessageId` is never mapped to `DELIVERED`.
| `Reject` | `PROVIDER_REJECTED` |
| `RenderingFailure` | `TEMPLATE_FAILURE` |
## Twilio
## Removed provider families
`accepted`/`queued` is acceptance only. `sent` is carrier acceptance. `delivered` is device delivery.
Callbacks are not ordered. A `sent` arriving after `delivered` is stored and ignored by the
projection. Missing callbacks are corrected by status polling under the provider rate limit.
Signature verification uses the canonical external URL from the profile, not the URL the servlet
container reconstructed behind a proxy.
## FCM
| Error | Classification |
|---|---|
| `UNREGISTERED` | `INVALID_RECIPIENT`; invalidate the contact point, never retry |
| `INVALID_ARGUMENT` | `INVALID_PAYLOAD` |
| `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` | `THROTTLED`, exponential backoff |
| `UNAVAILABLE` | `TRANSIENT_PROVIDER`, honour `Retry-After`, add jitter |
| Credential failure | `AUTHENTICATION`; opens the provider route |
A batch is one transport call and many attempts. Partial results map back by input index; one
transport failure does not become one shared outcome unless the adapter can prove it.
## APNs
2xx is acceptance. Environment and topic mismatches are configuration failures, not delivery
failures. Sandbox and production tokens are separate namespaces.
## Web Push
`TTL` is mandatory by protocol. `201` is acceptance. `404` is an expired subscription per RFC 8030;
provider-documented `410` maps the same way. Payloads use `aes128gcm` per RFC 8291 and VAPID JWTs are
signed per RFC 8292 with the audience taken from the endpoint origin.
VAPID key rotation is not ordinary credential rotation: a restricted subscription may need to be
re-created, so it is a migration operation.
Twilio, FCM, APNs, Web Push and Webhook adapters were removed because nothing assembled them; their
runbooks went with them. The last commit that had both is named in `docs/capability-status.md`
(제거된 코드). A deployment that adds one of these providers back writes its runbook here with it.
+9 -20
View File
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ against real PostgreSQL; the wire and the crash are not. That is what the grade
| Channel | Reference implementation | Grade | Strongest evidence the platform records by default |
|---|---|---|---|
| Email | SMTP, Amazon SES API | Contract implemented / runtime unqualified | Provider acceptance; recipient mail-server delivery, bounce and complaint when the provider publishes events |
| SMS | Twilio Programmable Messaging | Contract implemented / runtime unqualified | `accepted`/`queued`, `sent`, and carrier-DLR `delivered`/`undelivered` |
| Mobile push (Android and cross-platform) | FCM, FID-first with legacy registration token compatibility | Contract implemented / runtime unqualified | FCM acceptance and explicit failures |
| Mobile push (Apple) | APNs HTTP/2 provider API | Contract implemented / runtime unqualified | APNs acceptance |
| Web Push | RFC 8030, RFC 8291, RFC 8292 | Contract implemented / runtime unqualified | Push-service acceptance; user-agent acknowledgement only where the service offers receipts |
| SMS | none shipped — adapter removed; the channel type stays in the application API (see `docs/capability-status.md` 제거된 코드) | Extension | Whatever the added provider adapter can prove |
| Mobile push (FCM, APNs) | none shipped — adapter removed; the channel type stays in the application API (see `docs/capability-status.md` 제거된 코드) | Extension | Whatever the added provider adapter can prove |
| Web Push | none shipped — adapter removed; the channel type stays in the application API (see `docs/capability-status.md` 제거된 코드) | Extension | Whatever the added provider adapter can prove |
| In-app inbox | Own database | Optional stable | `PERSISTED`, `SEEN`, `READ` |
| Webhook | HTTP client platform | Extension | Whatever the receiving HTTP contract states |
| Webhook | none shipped — adapter removed; the channel type stays in the application API (see `docs/capability-status.md` 제거된 코드) | Extension | Whatever the receiving HTTP contract states |
## Shipped provider assembly reachability
@@ -33,13 +32,10 @@ implementation is selectable in the default composition. Dispatch reachability i
|---|---|---|---|
| SMTP | **yes** | no | EMAIL dispatch reference family |
| SES | **yes** | **yes** | EMAIL dispatch + SNS callback ingestion; disabled reference profile ships in `config/module-defaults/notification.yml` (`composition:notification-platform`) |
| Twilio | no | no | contract implementation / extension wiring |
| FCM | no | no | contract implementation / extension wiring |
| APNs | no | no | contract implementation / extension wiring |
| Web Push | no | no | contract implementation / extension wiring |
| Webhook | no | no | extension wiring |
An enabled dispatch profile with no assembler fails startup by profile/family; it never silently
APNs, FCM, Twilio, Web Push and Webhook adapters shipped as protocol code with no assembler and
were removed; `ProviderType` now lists only SES and SMTP, so such a profile fails binding as an
unknown type. An enabled dispatch profile with no assembler fails startup by profile/family; it never silently
assembles into an empty runtime. SMTP additionally names `spring.mail.host` when its shipped
assembler is absent because the relay was not configured.
@@ -73,21 +69,14 @@ The remaining unmet claim, and what would meet it:
| Internal queue commit | `PLATFORM_QUEUED` |
| SES `MessageId` | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| SES `Delivery` | `NETWORK_OR_CARRIER_ACCEPTED` |
| Twilio `accepted` / `queued` | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| Twilio `sent` | `NETWORK_OR_CARRIER_ACCEPTED` |
| Twilio `delivered` | `DEVICE_DELIVERED` |
| FCM send success | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| APNs 2xx | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| Web Push `201` | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| Web Push receipt capability | `DEVICE_DELIVERED` |
| In-app row commit | `PROVIDER_ACCEPTED` |
| In-app `seen` endpoint | `USER_AGENT_DISPLAYED` |
| In-app `read` endpoint, authenticated app receipt | `USER_READ` |
Promotions the platform will not make, in code or in configuration:
- FCM send success is not `DEVICE_DELIVERED`.
- An APNs 2xx is not `DELIVERED`.
- A push or SMS acceptance, from any provider adapter a deployment adds, is not `DEVICE_DELIVERED`.
- A provider 2xx is not `DELIVERED`.
- An SES `MessageId` is not `DELIVERED`.
- An SMTP `250` is not inbox delivery.
+22 -62
View File
@@ -117,10 +117,12 @@ env_keys:
- name: APP_SERVER_FORWARD_HEADERS_STRATEGY
# source: feature-env-driven-runtime-configuration D2 (2026-06-05) — APP_ unification.
# Fail closed: forwarded headers are trusted only when a deployment opts in behind a
# sanitizing/trusted proxy.
# sanitizing/trusted proxy. native = Tomcat RemoteIpValve, which honours them only from
# peers matching server.tomcat.remoteip.internal-proxies. framework is not allowed: its
# ForwardedHeaderFilter believes every peer, and the rate limiter refuses to start on it.
type: enum
default: none
allowed_values: [none, native, framework]
allowed_values: [none, native]
classification: public-config
required: false
reload_policy: restart-only
@@ -1199,19 +1201,10 @@ env_keys:
compatibility_impact: additive
required_test: redis-rate-limit-contract:transport-provider-default-pair
- name: APP_RATE_LIMIT_CLIENT_IP_MODE
# source: feature-rate-limit-idempotency-contract — rate-limit client IP source policy.
# Use forwarded-headers-trusted only behind an ingress/LB that overwrites X-Forwarded-For.
type: enum
default: remote-addr-only
allowed_values: [remote-addr-only, forwarded-headers-trusted]
classification: public-config
required: false
reload_policy: restart-only
owner_branch: feature-rate-limit-idempotency-contract
validation: enum_in_allowed_values
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: rate-limit-contract:client-ip-mode
# APP_RATE_LIMIT_CLIENT_IP_MODE removed (2026-09-25, review follow-up I-5a): its
# forwarded-headers-trusted value keyed unauthenticated callers by the leftmost X-Forwarded-For
# entry, which the caller writes. The client IP is getRemoteAddr(); behind a proxy set
# APP_SERVER_FORWARD_HEADERS_STRATEGY=native and server.tomcat.remoteip.internal-proxies.
- name: APP_RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_ENABLED
# DEPRECATED 2026-08-10: the rate limiter no longer owns a Redis client of its own. One client, built by RedisSdkAutoConfiguration, serves every capability, so a second endpoint and a second set of ceilings could only ever disagree with it.
@@ -3996,6 +3989,20 @@ env_keys:
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: websocket-contract:canonical-property-namespace
- name: APP_WEBSOCKET_CHANNEL_QUEUE_CAPACITY
property: app.websocket.channel-queue-capacity
owner_module: adapter-inbound-websocket
type: integer
default: 10000
allowed_values: null
classification: public-config
required: false
reload_policy: restart-only
owner_branch: refactor/review-followup
validation: positive_integer
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: websocket-contract:canonical-property-namespace
- name: APP_GRAPHQL_ENABLED
# 2026-09-25 capability packaging: the module is on when present (its own config yml maps
# this key with default true); false is the explicit off. Absent from the build is the
@@ -4028,21 +4035,6 @@ env_keys:
validation: enum
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: adapter-contract:graphql-deployment-mode
- name: APP_GRAPHQL_EXECUTION_PROFILE
property: backend.graphql.execution-profile
owner_module: adapter-inbound-graphql
type: enum
default: BLOCKING_MVC
allowed_values: [BLOCKING_MVC, REACTIVE_WEBFLUX, MIXED_CONTROLLED]
classification: public-config
required: false
required_when: APP_GRAPHQL_ENABLED=true
reload_policy: restart-only
owner_branch: 2026-09-20-inbound-graphql-review-remediation
validation: enum
compatibility_impact: additive
required_test: graphql-contract:wired-operator-settings
- name: APP_GRAPHQL_VALIDATION_POLICY_VERSION
property: backend.graphql.validation-policy-version
owner_module: adapter-inbound-graphql
@@ -4318,22 +4310,6 @@ env_keys:
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: adapter-contract:notification-secret-material-required
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY
# source: NTF-INT-007 — Signs Web Push requests; the browser push service rejects anything else.
# Full row owned by secrets-classification.yaml. Bound by
# ca-skeleton.notification.platform.secrets.vapid-signing-key; the platform decodes it at startup and
# refuses to boot if it is blank, shorter than 32 bytes, or equal to another purpose's key.
type: string
default: null
allowed_values: null
classification: secret
required: false
reload_policy: restart-only
owner_branch: worktree-notification-platform
validation: base64_at_least_32_bytes_and_distinct_per_purpose
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: adapter-contract:notification-secret-material-required
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY
# source: NTF-INT-007 — Keyed hash of provider request ids, which are provider-side identifiers.
# Full row owned by secrets-classification.yaml. Bound by
@@ -4446,22 +4422,6 @@ env_keys:
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: adapter-contract:notification-secret-material-required
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY_ID
# source: NTF-INT-007 — the id written into every envelope the VAPID_SIGNING key produces.
# An identifier, not key material, so it is public-config; the material itself is the
# APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY row above. Bound into
# ca-skeleton.notification.platform.secrets.active-key-ids.VAPID_SIGNING.
type: string
default: null
allowed_values: null
classification: public-config
required: false
reload_policy: restart-only
owner_branch: worktree-notification-platform
validation: non_blank_when_platform_enabled
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: adapter-contract:notification-secret-material-required
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID
# source: NTF-INT-007 — the id written into every envelope the PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC key produces.
# An identifier, not key material, so it is public-config; the material itself is the
+14 -30
View File
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_ENCRYPTION_KEY
# Encrypts recipient contact points at rest — addresses and phone numbers.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY
# Blind index over contact points, so a lookup never needs the plaintext.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -231,8 +231,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_SIGNING_KEY
# Signs the callback URLs a provider posts delivery outcomes back to.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY
# Encrypts stored provider credentials, which are themselves secrets.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
# Encrypts notification variables and retained callback bodies at rest.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -277,26 +277,10 @@ secrets:
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: secrets-contract:notification-payload-encryption-no-leak
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_VAPID_SIGNING_KEY
# Signs Web Push requests; the browser push service rejects anything else.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
rotation_policy: dual-read-restart-only
prod_default: null
required_when: ca-skeleton.notification.platform.enabled=true
dev_sentinel_prefix: __LOCAL_DEV_
owner_branch: worktree-notification-platform
masking_rule: full
compatibility_impact: behavior-change
required_test: secrets-contract:notification-vapid-signing-no-leak
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY
# Keyed hash of provider request ids, which are provider-side identifiers.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
@@ -311,8 +295,8 @@ secrets:
- name: APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_FINGERPRINT_HMAC_KEY
# Keyed fingerprint of callback bodies, used to detect replays.
# One of eight purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all eight, and the platform enforces
# One of seven purpose-scoped keys. They must all differ: a single key reused across purposes
# means a compromise of any one of them is a compromise of all seven, and the platform enforces
# the distinction at startup rather than trusting the deployment to have noticed.
classification: secret
source: secret-manager
+8 -11
View File
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ bound.
3. `NO_SNAPSHOT_YET` on a starting instance means it never reached the control plane. It fails after
the initial fetch timeout rather than starting with no routing.
**Do not** add application-level retry policy while xDS is enabled. `GrpcXdsStartupGuard` refuses it,
because retry defined in two places has a winner that depends on resolution order rather than on a
decision.
**Do not** add application-level retry policy while xDS is enabled. `GrpcXdsProfile` refuses an
`APPLICATION` retry owner, because retry defined in two places has a winner that depends on
resolution order rather than on a decision.
---
@@ -52,17 +52,15 @@ the proxy did not expose. Check that the proxy's CORS `expose_headers` includes
configuration in `envoy/envoy.yaml` shows it in place.
**If the method is client- or bidirectional-streaming**, it cannot work over gRPC-Web at all — a
browser has no way to send a stream of messages. `GrpcWebCompatibilityGate` reports such a method
before it is exposed.
browser has no way to send a stream of messages. `GrpcWebRpcSupport.require` refuses such a method.
---
## Servlet: a transport setting appears to be ignored
It is ignored. The container owns the socket, so keepalive tuning, maximum connection age and
flow-control window tuning belong to it. `GrpcServletStartupValidator` refuses those settings at
startup rather than accepting and dropping them, because a setting that is silently ignored sends the
investigation somewhere else.
flow-control window tuning belong to it. This repository has no Servlet transport code that would
refuse them, so configure them on the container.
A Servlet run never substitutes for Netty certification.
@@ -93,6 +91,5 @@ real-environment test and seven days of soak. A Stable default needs thirty.
Promotions are independent: promoting one capability changes no other's grade, and
`GrpcAdvancedSupportMatrix.apply` refuses a decision made against a different matrix state.
Before citing a suite as evidence, check `GrpcAdvancedInfrastructureTestkit.missingInfrastructure`.
A suite that ran without the proxy, the container, the control plane or the toolchain it needs passed
and established nothing.
Before citing a suite as evidence, check that it ran against the real infrastructure it needs (proxy,
container, control plane or toolchain). A suite that ran without it passed and established nothing.
+6 -5
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ not interchangeable providers for one port.
| Question | Fileserver HTTP platform | Object Storage |
|---|---|---|
| Who serves bytes to the client? | This application, through Fileserver HTTP routes | The selected object store, often through direct/presigned transfer |
| Primary application contract | Upload/download/lifecycle HTTP workflow and Fileserver application ports | Provider-neutral managed/direct object-storage ports |
| Storage semantics | Application-owned staging, verification, publication, range/conditional delivery, upload leases | Managed object publication plus remote-store versioning/direct/multipart semantics |
| Who serves bytes to the client? | This application, through Fileserver HTTP routes | This application, streaming through the semantic transfer port (no direct/presigned transfer exists) |
| Primary application contract | Upload/download/lifecycle HTTP workflow and Fileserver application ports | Provider-neutral managed and staged object-storage ports |
| Storage semantics | Application-owned staging, verification, publication, range/conditional delivery, upload leases | Managed and staged object publication plus remote-store versioning semantics |
| Local filesystem role | Certified backing store for the application-owned Fileserver platform | `filesystem-local-dev` development/provider implementation |
| Remote S3-style semantics | Not its purpose | First-class capability |
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ and conditional requests, verification/quarantine, resumable upload state, lifec
and optional delegated serving such as X-Accel-Redirect.
Use **Object Storage** when the application needs an object-storage abstraction whose provider owns
the storage/transfer semantics, especially S3-compatible managed objects, presigned/direct transfer,
or multipart workflows.
the storage semantics, especially S3-compatible managed objects. Direct/presigned transfer and
multipart upload are not implemented: their unassembled code was removed (see
`docs/capability-status.md` 「제거된 코드」).
Do not enable both as two independent sources of truth for the same logical object. If a product
needs both, one capability must own the logical object/control record and the other must be an
@@ -219,4 +219,46 @@ W5 행 전부, `docs/study/*.ko.md`·`docs/*-superpowers-package/`를 현재 코
| Wave | 상태 | 검증 | 커밋 | 비고 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 준비 | 완료 (2026-09-25) | 기준 `./gradlew check --continue` 통과(481 task) | - | 현황표 812행(완료 161 / 해당 없음 106 / 남음 544 / 보류 1), 소유자 결정 20건 |
| 준비 | 완료 (2026-09-25) | 기준 `./gradlew check --continue` 통과(481 task) | `fe80bb3f` | 현황표 812행(완료 161 / 해당 없음 106 / 남음 544 / 보류 1), 소유자 결정 20건 |
| 1–2 | 진행 중 — 사용량 한도로 일시 중단 (2026-09-25) | 묶음별 leaf `check`·벤더 lane은 각 worktree에서 통과. main 통합 검증은 아직 | - | 아래 「중단 시점 상태」 |
### 중단 시점 상태 (재개용)
- 브랜치 `refactor/review-followup` @ `fe80bb3f`. **main 작업 트리에 커밋 안 된 변경이 있다**: 아래 표의 `D`·`W1` 커밋을 `git cherry-pick -n`으로 적용한 상태(충돌 0). 이 상태를 버리지 않는다.
- 묶음별 결과 파일·공통 지시·스크립트 사본: `.claude/review-followup/`(gitignore 대상, 디스크에 남음). `results/P*.md` = 행 결과·제거된 코드·새 결함, `agent-brief.md` = 구현 에이전트 공통 지시, `apply_results.py` = 결과 파일로 현황표 갱신(`--only-waves W1`), `by_area.py` = 남은 행을 영역·Wave별로 나열.
- 각 묶음의 커밋은 브랜치 `worktree-agent-*`(13개)에 있다. worktree 폴더는 모두 깨끗한 상태에서 정리했다(`git worktree remove`) — W2 커밋은 브랜치에서 `git cherry-pick -n <해시>`로 가져온다.
| 묶음 | 브랜치 | D·W1 커밋 (main에 적용됨) | W2 커밋 (Wave 2에서 적용) | 행 결과 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 messaging | `worktree-agent-ac82c0859f4fb76da` | `3ecef978` | `2ae3c960` | 완료 18, 남음 2(Wave 3 3-C) |
| P2 object storage | `worktree-agent-a0383097e74acaf1e` | `2c7b3d25` `69ca6565` `f8bf7b6d` | `11eac0c7` | 완료 20 |
| P3 notification | `worktree-agent-a9bbc66a423c4d1fa` | `38d31b98` `12adea6e` | `6db6214c` | 완료 17, 남음 1(X2-P2-7b → P10에서 완료) |
| P4 file server | `worktree-agent-a4be05fc0e42cb70c` | `433bacdb` | `ed2c0929` | 완료 24 |
| P5 realtime·gRPC | `worktree-agent-ab8fb70ea2e85b04c` | `9b296c7c` `b39d3de0` | `a498ad84` | 완료 24(+N-9c 완료, N-9b 해당 없음) |
| P6 Redis | `worktree-agent-a6ab0657d876ae6b9` | `22f28a3e` | `5761314d` | 완료 14 |
| P7 core·bootstrap | `worktree-agent-a50ffe5361b9ddd73` | `9a05d686` | `3a39b6b5` | 완료 11, 남음 1(X1-#1d = P9 E-5) |
| P8 GraphQL | `worktree-agent-ab74dd57027acdc42` | `6390bf89` `0392d8c9` | `aa5f4d90` | 완료 8, 해당 없음 1, 남음 2(Wave 3 3-D) |
| P9 JPA·durable op | `worktree-agent-adbb19427d5d1740b` | `21bcba8d` | `3152e50b` | 완료 14 |
| P10 web | `worktree-agent-afae86287ba980dfb` | `983cc832` | `5c08d3be` | 완료 13 |
| P11 httpclient | `worktree-agent-afdf5842812e13046` | `06764fcb` `c44030e8` | `52511391` | 완료 12, 해당 없음 4 |
| P12 Mongo | `worktree-agent-aa2a445bdd99d8bd7` | `ceddd6d1` | `3dc06bba` | 완료 11(+F-1c W5 사실상 해결) |
| P13 build/CI | `worktree-agent-a93a684bfe0982466` | `50cb2d9e` | `6b1cddc6` | 완료 5 |
13개 묶음 전부 끝남. 모든 `D`·`W1` 커밋이 main 작업 트리에 적용돼 있다(충돌 0, 커밋 전).
재개 순서:
1. (완료) 13개 묶음의 `D`·`W1` 커밋 적용.
2. migration 버전 충돌 확인: P9가 persistence-jpa `V18`, P4가 fileserver `V5`, P1이 messaging `V1005`를 추가했다.
3. lockfile 재생성(`resolveAndLockAll --write-locks`) → Wave 종료 검증 전체 → `apply_results.py --only-waves W1` → 「제거된 코드」 표에 결과 파일 행 추가 → 커밋 `review-followup Wave 1` → Slack 브리핑.
4. W2 커밋 적용 → 같은 검증 → 커밋 `review-followup Wave 2`.
5. 새로 발견한 결함(`P*-new-*`)을 현황표 행으로 추가하고 Wave 3 이후에 배정.
소유자에게 물을 것(모아 둔 것):
- P3-new-5: 알림 profile runtime이 사라진 경우 무한 재시도할지, FAILED로 닫을지.
- P2-new-2: sample poster 업로드에서 abort와 reconcile이 경합하면 게시된 객체가 붙지 않은 채 남는다. 어떻게 정리할지.
- P11-new-4: Dynamic Target이 cross-origin redirect될 때 호출자가 넣은 관례 밖 헤더(`X-Client-Key` 등)도 전부 버릴지.
- P6-new-2: 멱등성 `complete`가 연결 풀 포화로 `UNAVAILABLE`이면 executor가 재시도할지, 복구 경로에 맡길지.
- P8: DataLoader 키 실패 때 adopter가 준 에러 code를 client에 그대로 내보낼지.
- P9: durable operation 설계 선택 4개(서버 생성 id, payload fingerprint로 재제출 판정, 고정 outbox event type, 보존 1일) 승인 여부.
- P13-new-1: build-logic·build-tools를 main build가 plugin으로 불러올 때의 의존성도 잠글지(잠그면 Spring Boot plugin을 올릴 때마다 lock 갱신 필요).