Maps the 31-module plan onto the registry's 19 leaves as packages; the two
edges the registry forbids (provider->httpclient, inbox->messaging) are
replaced by application-owned ports. See docs/notification/module-mapping.md.
Acceptance is not delivery: ProviderSubmissionResult refuses to carry a
delivery outcome, and AMBIGUOUS is a first-class terminal state that blocks
automatic retry and fallback until reconciliation resolves it.
Providers: SES (SigV4 + SNS callback), Twilio (X-Twilio-Signature +
reconciliation), FCM (FID-primary batch), APNs, Web Push (RFC 8030/8291/8292),
SMTP and webhook. Contact points are AES-256-GCM encrypted with a separate
HMAC lookup fingerprint; nothing raw reaches a log, metric tag or exception.
Dispatch commits the attempt row, calls the provider with no transaction open,
then records the outcome; the durable queue uses FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review found one defect shape repeated across the platform: surfaces
that were declared, bound, and documented, but that nothing read. An
operator configuring fullUrlRecording, bodyLogging, retry.policy,
validatedDnsPinning, timeout.dns, or any of ten declared metric names got a
guarantee the code never delivered. Every such surface is now in exactly one
of three states -- wired for real, rejected at startup, or registered in a
test-enforced gap list with its reason. No silent no-ops remain.
P0:
- Activate the platform from bootstrap behind app.httpclient.enabled, with a
single auto-configuration importing the nine child configurations.
- Give the platform a strict, repository-level ENV contract: 74 leaf fields
derived from the settings record tree, unknown APP_HTTPCLIENT_* rejected.
- Route typed HTTP service clients through the call kernel via
KernelHttpExchangeAdapter, so they stop bypassing platform policy.
- Pin dynamic-target DNS resolution to the socket for the life of a call,
closing the resolve-then-connect TOCTOU / rebinding window.
- Actually transmit the idempotency key, and make retry eligibility depend on
transmission rather than on merely holding one.
- Reject reactive authentication and reactive redirect at startup instead of
declaring support that does not function.
- Fix the Reactor-only Stable contract row so the lane stops failing.
- Stop advertising HTTP/3 on a transport that negotiates HTTP/1.
P1 covers execution and retry accounting, redirect security (per-hop target
guarding, sensitive-header stripping, 303 body handling), runtime rotation
and transport resource ownership keyed by generation, dynamic-target
hardening (subdomain matching, global-unicast classification, strict CIDR
parsing), protocol intent, pool and timeout wiring, streaming and body
limits, observability parity, and OAuth single-flight refresh on a bounded
pool with a bounded wait.
P2 covers configuration and documentation drift, the Gradle check wiring for
the four hermetic lanes, and the CI gate matrix.
Two test-quality defects surfaced while closing these: the HTTP/2 stream
saturation test ran against cleartext HTTP/1.1 while asserting nothing about
the protocol, and an OAuth contention test slept on a latch that could fire
before the callers it meant to observe. Both now assert what their names
claim.
Verification run: :adapter:outbound:httpclient:check and :app-bootstrap:check
(checkstyle, spotless, spotbugs, and the four hermetic lanes),
verifyCleanArchitectureDependencies, verifyEnvKeys, verifyOneTypePerFile,
verifyDependencyLocks, the documentation and gate-matrix verifiers, and the
performance lane against a real TLS+ALPN HTTP/2 server.
Not executed, and tracked rather than claimed: Docker/Toxiproxy fault
injection, JMH, a real QUIC/HTTP3 server, a real Spring Framework 6.2
distribution (now a delegated-pending gate), live OAuth/TLS/proxy/DNS
integration, and a whole-repository check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
