# ACL accounts — test fixtures, not a deployment file **Nothing in this directory is loaded by a deployment.** Every file here is a fixture for the local and test lanes: its passwords are public (`fixture-*`, written in this repository), and `lane-fixture-accounts.acl` also provisions three accounts that only a lane topology needs — among them `ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap`, which has `~* &* +@all`, every command on every key. Loaded into a real Redis, that line alone gives anyone who can reach the server and read this repository full control of it (`CONFIG`, `MODULE`, every key). A deployment writes its own ACL file of the same shape: the application accounts it actually uses, passwords from its secret store, and none of the lane-only accounts (review 2026-11-03 RR-07-04). The application enforces its half of that: under the `prod` runtime profile it refuses to start while a secret holds a value beginning with `fixture-` (`SecretSourceValidator`): a key the secrets registry classifies `secret`, a variable a module's `RequiredProductionSecrets` bean names, or the variable a `secret://…/` credential reference in the environment names. A reference held in code — the typed SDK's admin account, contributed as a `RedisAccountContribution` bean — is none of those: the composer names its variable in a `RequiredProductionSecrets` bean too (`src/adapter/outbound/redis-sdk/README.md`), or the `fixture-admin` password passes. A deployment that copied a lane's `APP_REDIS_AUTHENTICATION_*_REFERENCE` and `REDIS_LANE_*` values stops before it connects. Values that are not secrets — a pod's `HOSTNAME`, an application name — are not read, because `fixture-` is an ordinary word as well. One file per `CommandAccess` level. Each account is deliberately narrower than the SDK's own rules: the account is the last enforcement boundary and a permit issued inside the process never widens it, so a mistake in the SDK is still refused by the server. A Redis ACL file accepts nothing but complete `user` lines — no comments and no line continuations — which is why the rationale lives here instead of inline. Every account here carries a **fixture** password (`fixture-*`). They are written down rather than left as `nopass` because an account that accepts any password makes every assertion about authentication pass for the same reason a typo would have — and because these files are what a fork copies. The four per-role files carried `nopass` long after the combined lane file had been fixed; a fork that copied one of them got an open account and a green lane. | File | Account | Grants | | --- | --- | --- | | `application.acl` | `CommandAccess.APPLICATION` | the typed data-structure commands over `prod:*`, with the dangerous and deprecated names denied | | `application-advanced.acl` | `APPLICATION_ADVANCED` | the above plus pub/sub, transactions, and the registered-script path. `EVAL` is absent: only `EVALSHA` of an already loaded digest is reachable. `+time` is granted because the rate-limit and idempotency scripts read the server clock with `redis.call('TIME')`, and `TIME` is in no data category (`@read`/`@write`): without it every such script fails with an ACL error. The startup SCRIPT probe runs `TIME` so a template missing it fails at boot | | `raw-gateway.acl` | `RAW_GATEWAY` | exactly the commands the catalog classifies `RAW_ONLY`, and nothing else | | `lane-fixture-accounts.acl` | – | what the lanes load (Redis takes one `aclfile`): `user default off`, the four per-role accounts of this table, and three lane-only accounts — `ca-skeleton-replication` (replica sync) and `ca-skeleton-sentinel` for the replicated and sentinel topologies, `ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap` (`+@all`) to create the cluster lane's slots. Never a deployment file | | `admin-readonly.acl` | `ADMIN_READONLY` | read-only diagnostics. Every destructive counterpart is denied here and blocked in the command policy catalog — two independent controls for the same rule | ## Who loads `lane-fixture-accounts.acl` The Redis topology lanes (`src/adapter/outbound/redis-sdk/compose/{standalone,sentinel,cluster,tls}`), the application's Compose lanes that switch Redis on (`local-redis`, `all-adapters` in `src/app-bootstrap/compose-lanes/compose-profile-contracts.json`), and the development stack's `redis` service (root `compose.yaml`). They all mount this directory read-only; neither keeps a copy, because a second copy of these lines is a second place for a password or a key pattern to drift. The Compose lanes connect the application as `ca-skeleton-application` and `ca-skeleton-application-advanced`, through `secret://@environment/` references whose variables carry the fixture passwords above. They run with the Redis namespace environment `prod`, because every account here is fenced to `~prod:*`. `scripts/verify-compose-profile-contracts.sh` compares each Redis lane's references, passwords and namespace with the account lines in this file, so changing a password or a key pattern here without the lanes fails that check rather than the lane's first command.