#!/usr/bin/env bash # Vulnerability gate, shared by the stage workflows. Called by .gitea/workflows/pr.yml and main.yml # (`filesystem`) and release.yml (`image `); not by Gradle and not on the desktop, because # it downloads and installs its tools (docs/work/operate.md 4.1). # # bash scripts/ci/trivy-scan.sh filesystem dependency tree: block High/Critical, report # Medium/Low, fail on any CISA KEV match # bash scripts/ci/trivy-scan.sh image release image: write image-sbom.cdx.json, # block High/Critical, report Medium/Low # # Tools are pinned release binaries with an asserted SHA-256, installed under RUNNER_TEMP (or a # temporary directory): a checksum is a supply-chain claim that can be checked offline, an action # pinned to a commit is not. .trivyignore.yaml is the one suppression source; each entry carries a # reason and an expiry by policy (.github/dependency-vulnerability-policy.md). # Optional mirrors: TRIVY_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL, JQ_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL, KEV_FEED_URL. set -euo pipefail readonly TRIVY_VERSION='0.71.2' readonly TRIVY_SHA256_AMD64='0510e71e2fd39bf863856d499c8dc19feb4e7336546394c502a8f5cc7ab27460' readonly TRIVY_SHA256_ARM64='fe1c7106e15a5365d485b098a8c338f91e3b7ba71cb0e4963b98a3a098763cfc' readonly JQ_VERSION='1.8.1' readonly JQ_SHA256_AMD64='020468de7539ce70ef1bceaf7cde2e8c4f2ca6c3afb84642aabc5c97d9fc2a0d' readonly JQ_SHA256_ARM64='6bc62f25981328edd3cfcfe6fe51b073f2d7e7710d7ef7fcdac28d4e384fc3d4' readonly DEFAULT_KEV_FEED_URL='https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json' cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." tools="$(mktemp -d "${RUNNER_TEMP:-/tmp}/trivy-scan.XXXXXX")" trap 'rm -rf "${tools}"' EXIT download() { # url, sha256, destination curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 "$1" --output "$3" printf '%s %s\n' "$2" "$3" | sha256sum -c - } case "$(uname -m)" in x86_64 | amd64) trivy_arch='64bit'; trivy_sha="${TRIVY_SHA256_AMD64}"; jq_asset='jq-linux-amd64'; jq_sha="${JQ_SHA256_AMD64}" ;; aarch64 | arm64) trivy_arch='ARM64'; trivy_sha="${TRIVY_SHA256_ARM64}"; jq_asset='jq-linux-arm64'; jq_sha="${JQ_SHA256_ARM64}" ;; *) echo "trivy-scan: unsupported architecture $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac download "${TRIVY_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL:-https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-${trivy_arch}.tar.gz" \ "${trivy_sha}" "${tools}/trivy.tar.gz" tar -xzf "${tools}/trivy.tar.gz" -C "${tools}" trivy download "${JQ_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL:-https://github.com/jqlang/jq/releases/download/jq-${JQ_VERSION}}/${jq_asset}" \ "${jq_sha}" "${tools}/jq" chmod 0755 "${tools}/trivy" "${tools}/jq" export PATH="${tools}:${PATH}" [ "$(jq --version)" = "jq-${JQ_VERSION}" ] || { echo "trivy-scan: unexpected $(jq --version)" >&2; exit 1; } scan_filesystem() { trivy fs --scanners vuln,license --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --exit-code 1 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml . trivy fs --scanners vuln,license --severity MEDIUM,LOW --exit-code 0 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml . trivy fs --scanners vuln --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW,UNKNOWN --exit-code 0 \ --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml --format json --output "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" . # A KEV-listed vulnerability fails regardless of its CVSS score. The feed and the scan are both # checked for shape first: an empty or malformed input would otherwise intersect to nothing and # print "no catalog match" for a check that never ran. if ! curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \ "${KEV_FEED_URL:-${DEFAULT_KEV_FEED_URL}}" --output "${tools}/kev.json"; then echo "trivy-scan: KEV feed unavailable; set KEV_FEED_URL to an approved mirror" >&2 exit 1 fi jq -e ' (.catalogVersion | type == "string" and test("\\S")) and (.dateReleased | type == "string" and test("\\S")) and (.count | type == "number") and (.count > 0) and (.count == (.count | floor)) and (.vulnerabilities | type == "array") and ((.vulnerabilities | length) > 0) and (.count == (.vulnerabilities | length)) and (all(.vulnerabilities[]; (.cveID | type == "string" and test("^CVE-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4,}$")))) and (([.vulnerabilities[].cveID] | unique | length) == .count) ' "${tools}/kev.json" > /dev/null || { echo "trivy-scan: the KEV feed is malformed" >&2; exit 1; } jq -e ' (type == "object") and (.Results | type == "array") and ((.Results | length) > 0) and (all(.Results[]; type == "object")) and (all(.Results[]; (.Vulnerabilities == null) or (.Vulnerabilities | type == "array"))) and (all(.Results[]; all(.Vulnerabilities[]?; (type == "object") and (.VulnerabilityID | type == "string" and test("\\S"))))) ' "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" > /dev/null || { echo "trivy-scan: the Trivy KEV input is malformed" >&2; exit 1; } jq -r '[.Results[]?.Vulnerabilities[]?.VulnerabilityID] | unique[]' "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" | sort -u > "${tools}/found.txt" jq -r '.vulnerabilities[].cveID' "${tools}/kev.json" | sort -u > "${tools}/kev.txt" hits="$(comm -12 "${tools}/found.txt" "${tools}/kev.txt")" if [ -n "${hits}" ]; then printf 'trivy-scan: CISA KEV-listed vulnerability found regardless of CVSS:\n%s\n' "${hits}" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "trivy-scan: no KEV catalog match." } # The image scan sees the base image's OS packages, which the filesystem scan cannot. The SBOM is # written before the blocking scan, so the inventory survives the run that refuses to publish. scan_image() { trivy image --format cyclonedx --scanners license --output image-sbom.cdx.json "$1" test -s image-sbom.cdx.json trivy image --scanners vuln,license --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --exit-code 1 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1" trivy image --scanners vuln,license --severity MEDIUM,LOW --exit-code 0 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1" } case "${1:-}" in filesystem) scan_filesystem ;; image) scan_image "${2:?image reference}" ;; *) sed -n '2,13p' "$0" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac