# `src/` 모듈별 코드 리뷰 — 2026-09-24 ## 개요 | 항목 | 내용 | |---|---| | 대상 | `src/` 아래 모든 등록 leaf(`src/config/architecture/modules.json`) + `src/build-logic`, `src/build-tools`, root Gradle, `.github/workflows` | | 기준 | 현재 작업 트리 (`main` @ `208077fd`). `944a1e34`(2026-09-17) 이후 변경분을 중점 검토 | | 규모 | main 코드 약 32만 줄 | | 방법 | 기능 단위 15개 그룹으로 나눠 리뷰 에이전트 15개를 병렬 실행(읽기 전용, Gradle 미실행). 이후 Critical 15건은 오케스트레이터가 코드에서 직접 재확인 | | 축 | correctness, readability/simplicity, architecture(HARD-STOP 1-5), security, performance, tests, 문서 drift | | 이전 리뷰 | `docs/reviews/2026-09-18-techlead-review/*`, `2026-09-19-review-remediation-master.md` 기준으로 closed 항목의 회귀 여부를 함께 판정 | ## 판정 **Verdict: BLOCKED** - Critical 15건, Required 76건(중복 1건 제외), Consider 약 55건. - 게이트 결과: `./gradlew architectureCheck --console=plain` → **BUILD SUCCESSFUL** (1m 43s). 의존 방향·application-core 순수성·runtime membership·Clean Architecture 의존 검사 전부 통과. - 모듈 경계(HARD-STOP 1, 2, 3, 5)는 모든 그룹에서 위반 0건. 막히는 이유는 경계가 아니라 **동작 결함, 보안 설정의 실제 미적용, 최근 리팩터 커밋의 회귀**다. - HARD-STOP 4 위반 1건: web 어댑터가 저장소 포트·트랜잭션·객체 인가를 직접 수행(I-1 = A-4). ## 그룹별 요약 | 그룹 | 대상 leaf | 판정 | Critical | Required | |---|---|---|---|---| | A Core | domain-core, shared-contract, application-core, support, identifier | NEEDS_FIX | 0 | 6 (A-4는 I-1과 같은 결함) | | B Notification | application-notification, adapter-outbound-notification | NEEDS_FIX | 2 | 5 | | C File server | application-fileserver, persistence-fileserver, outbound fileserver, web-fileserver, composition | BLOCKED | 1 | 9 | | D Object storage | application-objectstorage, adapter-outbound-objectstorage | NEEDS_FIX | 0 | 4 | | E JPA | adapter-outbound-persistence-jpa | BLOCKED | 2 | 4 | | F Mongo | adapter-outbound-persistence-mongo | NEEDS_FIX | 0 | 6 | | G Redis | redis-runtime, redis-sdk, cache-redis | NEEDS_FIX | 1 | 5 | | H HTTP client / messaging bridge | httpclient, outbound messaging, messaging-kafka | NEEDS_FIX | 1 | 5 | | I Web | adapter-inbound-web | BLOCKED | 1 | 6 | | J GraphQL | adapter-inbound-graphql | NEEDS_FIX | 1 | 5 | | K Realtime / gRPC adapter | adapter-inbound-websocket, adapter-inbound-grpc | NEEDS_FIX | 0 | 7 | | L Bootstrap / sample | app-bootstrap, sample-portfolio | NEEDS_FIX | 1 | 3 | | M Messaging platform | `messaging:*` | NEEDS_FIX | 2 | 5 | | N gRPC platform | `grpc:*`, `grpc-advanced:*` | NEEDS_FIX | 1 | 5 | | O Build / CI | build-logic, build-tools, root Gradle, workflows | BLOCKED | 2 | 2 | ## Critical 15건 (오케스트레이터 재확인 결과 포함) "코드 확인"은 인용된 줄을 직접 열어 주장과 일치함을 확인했다는 뜻이다. 실행으로 재현한 것은 없다. | # | 그룹 | 결함 | 위치 | 재확인 | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | O | root plugin `apply()`가 `../docker-compose..yml` 부재 시 예외 → Docker 빌드 컨텍스트(`src`)에서 `verifyDependencyLocks` 불가, release 이미지 빌드 차단 | `src/build-logic/.../bootstrap/DeveloperBootstrapPlugin.java:40-50` | 코드 확인 (`repositoryDirectory = projectDir.getParentFile()`, Dockerfile `WORKDIR /build/src`) | | 2 | O | CI `redis-sdk` job의 `--tests '*…'` 따옴표가 word-split 후에도 남아 매칭 0 → 항상 실패, `release-gate`가 success 요구 | `.github/workflows/ci-quality-gates.yml:120`, `_reusable-gradle.yml:58-63` | 코드 확인 (CI 미실행) | | 3 | E | 이미 적용된 Flyway 마이그레이션 3개를 제자리 수정 → 이전 버전이 적용된 DB 전부 checksum mismatch로 기동 실패 | `persistence-jpa/.../postgresql/V9__…sql`, `V13__…sql`, `jpa/outbox-storage/V1__…sql` | 코드 확인 (`git log --follow`: V9는 08-15 생성 후 9da00eb7에서 주석 변경, V13은 09-18 생성 후 09-23 변경, outbox V1은 07-31 생성 후 09-23 변경. `validate-on-migrate` 끄는 설정 없음). 템플릿에서 파생된 서비스 DB도 영향 | | 4 | E | durable operation 재제출이 같은 트랜잭션에서 unique 위반 후 재조회 → PostgreSQL 25P02로 실패 | `persistence-jpa/.../operation/DurableOperationStoreAdapter.java:47-78` | 코드 확인 (PostgreSQL 실행 미검증) | | 5 | L | outbox relay의 `@Scheduled`가 `@EnableScheduling` 없이는 동작 안 함. 앱 전체에서 유일한 `@EnableScheduling`이 `idempotency.provider=jdbc` 조건부 | `app-bootstrap/.../outbox/OutboxRelayScheduler.java:36`, `.../idempotency/IdempotencyConfig.java:17-19` | 코드 확인 (main의 `@EnableScheduling`은 sample·composition·IdempotencyConfig 3곳뿐) | | 6 | H | canonical bridge의 `@ConditionalOnBean(EncodedMessagePublisher)`가 platform auto-config보다 먼저 평가됨(after 지정 없음) + 빈 `producer-id`가 조건을 통과해 `new ProducerId("")` 예외 | `adapter/outbound/messaging/.../MessagingBridgeRootAutoConfiguration.java:25,39-44` | 코드 확인 (컨텍스트 조립 테스트 미실행) | | 7 | M | outbox relay·DLQ·retry-topic이 이미 인코딩된 `EncodedMessage`를 `publish()`로 넘김 → 재인코딩 실패 → 모든 row REJECTED/FAILED | `messaging-outbox-jdbc-postgresql/.../OutboxRelay.java:223-229`, `DefaultMessagePublisher.java:177` | 코드 확인 | | 8 | M | 검증은 통과하는 Kafka TLS/SASL 설정이 producer에 적용되지 않음 (`KafkaSecurityConfigurer`는 bean으로만 생성, 호출 0) | `messaging-spring-boot-starter-kafka/.../KafkaMessagingAutoConfiguration.java:109-154` | 코드 확인 | | 9 | B | 알림 recovery/replay 워커가 `@Modifying` 쿼리를 트랜잭션 없이 실행 → 매 pass 실패, 예외는 WARN으로 삼켜짐 | `adapter/outbound/notification/.../dispatch/LeaseRecoveryService.java:106` 외 3곳 | 코드 확인 (파일 내 `inWrite/TransactionPort/@Transactional` 0건. PG 실행 미검증) | | 10 | B | SNS 인증서 URL 검증이 `*.amazonaws.com` 전체 허용(공격자 S3 버킷 통과), TopicArn allowlist·Timestamp 검사 없음, 콜백은 `permitAll` | `.../ses/SnsSignatureVerifier.java:99-109`, `SesProviderCallbackAssembler.java:19` | 코드 확인 (suffix `"amazonaws.com"`). SES callback 활성 시에만 노출(기본 off) | | 11 | C | tus `Upload-Checksum`을 chunk가 아니라 파일 전체 누적 digest와, 그것도 offset 커밋 후에 비교 | `adapter/inbound/web-fileserver/.../tus/TusController.java:167-174` | 코드 확인 | | 12 | I | durable-operation 조회/취소를 web 어댑터가 저장소 포트·트랜잭션·인가로 직접 수행(HARD-STOP 4), 운영 조립처 없음 | `adapter/inbound/web/.../operationasync/OperationQueryService.java:54-58,80` | 코드 확인 (`new OperationQueryService(` main 0건) | | 13 | J | 인가 단계가 fragment를 visit budget 없이 재귀 전개 → 1.6KB 문서로 2^40 방문, cost 단계보다 먼저 실행 | `adapter/inbound/graphql/.../runtime/GraphQlDocumentAuthorizationHandler.java:109-137` | 코드 확인 (chain 순서 `selection → authorization → cost`) | | 14 | G | SCRIPT lane 한도(기본 8)가 연결이 아니라 동시 lease 수 → Redis 정상이어도 동시 9번째 호출부터 거부, rate-limit fail-closed로 전면 429/503 | `redis-runtime/.../RedisRuntimeOwner.java:134-140`, `RedisSdkSettings.java:687` | 코드 확인. closed H8의 회귀 | | 15 | N | gRPC idempotency가 FAILED_TERMINAL 행에서 claim 없이 PROCEED → 커밋 시 예외 또는 중복 실행, fake는 이 전이를 허용해 차이를 숨김 | `grpc/grpc-policy/.../GrpcIdempotencyInterceptor.java:109-114` | 코드 확인 (production caller 0, 잠복) | ## 공통 패턴 1. **closed로 기록됐지만 코드가 따라오지 않은 항목**: Redis H8(#14)·M4(rate-limit hash), Kafka H6(timeout 취소 무효), object storage L3(파일 unchanged), websocket BOOT-002(prod 판정 재구현), messaging MSG-006(cleanup job 미전환), gRPC M1(admission race 일부만), JPA H10(tenant 규칙 이름 기반), GraphQL M1(DataLoader 에러 코드). closure 문서가 코드 상태를 보장하지 못한다. 2. **보안·안전 설정이 바인딩·검증만 되고 적용되지 않음**: Redis 안전 설정 약 20개, Kafka TLS/SASL(#8), gRPC `environment` 기본 LOCAL, GraphQL `persistedOperationOnly`·`idempotencyKey`, httpclient dynamic `trace-propagation`, `StartupSafetyValidator`의 prod 에러 상세 차단 주장, `wire-type-manifest.yaml`, Mongo tenancy/CSFLE, shared-contract cardinality 보호. 운영자는 보호받는다고 믿는다. 3. **조립되지 않은 코드가 대량으로 남아 있음**: GraphQL 약 57%(14.7k LOC), redis-sdk 약 22k LOC, notification R1 약 4.5k LOC, web library-only 약 5.7k LOC, object storage direct/multipart 약 3.2k LOC, messaging 미사용 API 타입. 일부 문서는 이 코드를 "제공되는 보호"로 서술한다. 4. **fake가 실제 adapter와 계약이 달라 결함을 숨김**: gRPC ledger fake(#15), tus fake digest(#11), Redis fake HDEL/PEXPIRE, notification recorder fake, durable operation in-memory store(#4), messaging fake publisher(#7). 5. **최근 리팩터 커밋의 회귀**: `208077fd`(#1), `9da00eb7`(#2, #3, BOOT-002, `StartupSafetyValidator` 축소), `60b6a319`(#3 V13), `ace8aaae`(sample이 중앙 ArchUnit에서 빠짐). ## 권고 순서 1. **Wave 0 — 결정 없이 바로 고칠 수 있는 차단 항목**: #1, #2, #3(파일 3개 원복 + 새 버전 추가 + 버전 파일 해시 고정 테스트), #5, #6, L-2(prod 에러 상세 validator), L-3(sample `loggers` read-only). 2. **Wave 1 — 데이터·보안 Critical**: #4, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #13, #14, #15, #12(유스케이스를 application-core로 옮기거나 기능 삭제). 3. **Wave 2 — 그룹별 Required**: 아래 각 그룹 섹션 순서대로. closed 항목 회귀분은 remediation master에 재오픈 기록. 4. **Wave 3 — 조립되지 않은 코드 정리**: 삭제 vs 유지는 소유자 결정이 필요(아래). ### 결정 필요 - 조립되지 않은 대형 코드(redis-sdk, GraphQL `advanced/**` 등, notification R1, web library-only, object storage direct/multipart)를 삭제할지, 별도 artifact로 옮길지, 유지할지. 이전 closure(C3, NOTIF-ADR-005, M1 LIBRARY_ONLY)가 "유지"로 결정했으나, 이번 리뷰는 그 전제(도입 가능성, 테스트된 부품)가 일부 성립하지 않음을 확인했다. — 승인자: 저장소 소유자 ## 검증 기록 | 항목 | 결과 | |---|---| | `cd src && ./gradlew architectureCheck --console=plain` | BUILD SUCCESSFUL, 172 tasks (`verifyApplicationCoreDependencyPurity`, `verifyNoIgnoredSourcePackages`, `verifyRuntimeModuleRegistry`, `verifyRuntimeModuleMembership`, `verifyCleanArchitectureDependencies`, `:app-bootstrap:architectureTest` 포함) | | Critical 15건 코드 재확인 | 15/15 인용 위치의 코드가 주장과 일치 | | 테스트·`check`·`ci` | 미실행 (전체 실행은 별도 승인 범위. 리뷰 에이전트는 병렬 Gradle 충돌 방지를 위해 읽기 전용) | | 실행으로만 확정 가능한 항목 | #4(PostgreSQL 25P02), #6(auto-config 조립 순서), #9(TransactionRequiredException), #2(CI), #13(DoS 시간) — 각 그룹 섹션에 확인용 테스트를 제안해 둠 | > **보정 (2차 리뷰 반영):** B-2의 "위조 callback이 `SesSuppressionUpdater`로 suppression을 만든다"는 과장이다. 이 클래스는 참조가 0이다. 서명 검증 우회 자체는 유효하다. A-2는 bridge 없이 `RuntimeEnvironment.isProductionActive(...)` 정적 호출 한 줄로 고칠 수 있다. 상세는 `2026-09-24-src-maintainability-review.md`의 "1차 리뷰 보정" 절. ## 그룹별 상세 아래는 그룹별 리뷰 결과 원문이다. 경로는 저장소 루트 기준이며, 일부 그룹은 약어(`B/`, `BR/`, `S/`, `.../`)를 쓴다. 각 발견의 Status는 이전 리뷰 ID 기준(new / regression / known-open)이다. ### Group A — Core #### Leaf별 판정 | leaf | 판정 | 이유 | |---|---|---| | `src/domain-core` | PASS | 순수 Java. main 7개 파일이 마커와 포트뿐; README가 말한 ArchUnit 규칙이 app-bootstrap architectureTest에 실제로 있음 | | `src/shared-contract` | NEEDS_FIX | 코드 결함 없음. 쓰는 곳 없는 "계약" 타입 여럿, README가 없는 런타임 보호를 약속 | | `src/application-core` | NEEDS_FIX | 테스트 0·호출자 0인 V2 발행 코드 약 466줄; operation 조회/취소 유스케이스 부재로 web 어댑터가 대신 보유; 문서 불일치 | | `src/adapter/outbound/support` | NEEDS_FIX | 예외 메시지를 그대로 WARN 로그 → PII·비밀값 누출 가능; `RuntimeProfileSnapshot` "유일한 reader" 주장 틀림 | | `src/adapter/outbound/identifier` | NEEDS_FIX | 문서만 문제(의존성·훅·테스트 이름 불일치). `UuidCodec`은 죽은 코드 | #### 발견 (심각도 순) 1. **[Required][security] `FailOpenDependencyLogger`가 `cause.getMessage()`를 그대로 WARN 로그에 남김** — `src/adapter/outbound/support/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/support/FailOpenDependencyLogger.java:37-47` - 근거: `error="{}: {}"`에 `getSimpleName()`과 `getMessage()`. Javadoc `:10-11`은 "PII cannot reach the log". 호출자 `FailOpenNotificationProvider.java:42`로 fork의 `GoogleEmailClient`/`SlackClient` 예외가 올라옴. 테스트 `FailOpenDependencyLoggerTest.java:64-73`은 메시지 `"connection refused"`로 `@gmail.com` 부재를 확인 → 아무것도 증명 못 함. - 왜 문제인가: 메일 예외 메시지엔 수신자 주소, RestClient I/O 예외엔 Slack webhook URL 전체(비밀값)가 흔히 포함. 따옴표·줄바꿈이 key=value 로그 형식도 깸. - 수정: 예외 클래스 이름만 기록(필요 시 길이 제한·정제된 reason code). 테스트는 `alice@example.com`, `https://hooks.slack.com/...`를 메시지에 넣어 재작성. - 상태: new (application-core README "notification 값은 로그에 안 남긴다"를 우회하는 경로) 2. **[Required][security] BOOT-002 회귀: prod 판정을 손으로 재구현, 가드는 bootstrap만 검사** — `src/adapter/inbound/websocket/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/inbound/websocket/config/WebSocketPlatformSafetyConfiguration.java:78-84` - 근거: `"prod".equals(profile) || "production".equals(profile)` (trim/소문자 없음) vs `RuntimeEnvironment.fromProfile`(trim+소문자). 결과가 `:63` `WebSocketPlatformStartupValidator(production(...))`로 전달. 9da00eb7(09-23)에서 생긴 파일. `RuntimeProfileSnapshot.java:12-13`의 "the only production type ... that reads getActiveProfiles"는 거짓(fileserver, httpclient, objectstorage, websocket도 직접 읽음). 가드 `RuntimeProfileAccessArchitectureTest.java:13,21`은 `dev.caskeleton.bootstrap..`만 검사. 근본 원인: 브리지가 outbound leaf에 있어 `INBOUND_ADAPTERS_DO_NOT_DEPEND_ON_OUTBOUND_ADAPTERS` 때문에 websocket이 못 씀. - 왜 문제인가: `SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE=Prod` → bootstrap 검증기는 PROD로 보지만 websocket prod 안전 검증은 건너뜀(fail-open 분기). - 수정: websocket은 `RuntimeEnvironment.isProductionActive(List.of(env.getActiveProfiles()))`(shared-contract edge 허용); ArchUnit 범위를 `dev.caskeleton..`로(messaging, sample 제외); Javadoc(`RuntimeEnvironment.java:39-41` 포함) 정정. - 상태: BOOT-002 회귀 (websocket 그룹 코드) 3. **[Required][tests] V2 단건 발행 코드가 테스트 0, 호출자 0** — `src/application-core/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/application/outbox/v2/PublishNextOutboxDeliveryUseCase.java:26-242`, `OutboxV2RetryPolicy.java:33-151` - 근거: `git grep 'PublishNextOutboxDelivery\|OutboxV2RetryPolicy\|OutboxPublicationAdmissionPort'` → 자기 파일과 docs뿐; 테스트 삭제 이력 없음; 계획서 `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-18-outbox-v2-one-record-publication-policy.md`의 "Prove …" 8개 항목 모두 미체크. 위험: `:111-115` `publisher.publish()`가 future 반환 전 동기로 오래 걸리면 `publishTimeout` 미적용 → lease 만료 후 `requireTransition`이 `IllegalStateException`; `:84-87` 2건 이상 claim 후에야 예외 → 행들이 lease 동안 묶임. - 수정: `PublishNextOutboxDeliveryUseCaseTest`, `OutboxV2RetryPolicyTest` 추가, 또는 어댑터/bulkhead가 당분간 없으면 삭제(`OutboxBackoffPolicy`와 역할 중복). - 가정/반론: 곧 wiring하지 않음 / Javadoc이 "Unwired" 명시한 의도적 후보. - 상태: new (H7과 같은 종류; H7 종결은 당시 16개 클래스만) 4. **[Required][architecture] operation 조회·취소 유스케이스 부재 → web이 store 포트·트랜잭션·객체 권한 규칙 보유** — `src/application-core/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/application/operation/` - 근거: `adapter/inbound/web/.../operationasync/OperationQueryService.java:54-58,71-80`이 `DurableOperationStorePort.find/cancel`, `transactions.inWrite` 직접 호출; `OperationAccessPolicy.java:28`(owner+tenant)가 web에 있음 → `application-core/CLAUDE.md:211`(D3 "no thin web→read-port path"), `ObjectAccessPolicy.java:16`("Owned here rather than by the transport")에 어긋남. 반대로 `SubmitDurableOperationUseCase`는 `CommandUseCase`가 아니고 production 호출자 0, `LegacyOutboxAppendPort`(Javadoc상 legacy/sample 전용) 사용. - 수정: `GetDurableOperationUseCase`(QueryUseCase), `CancelDurableOperationUseCase`(CommandUseCase + `@UseCaseCapability`) 추가; owner·tenant 판정은 `ObjectAccessPolicy` 뒤로; web은 `WebRequestContext`→actor·tenant 변환만. - 가정/반론: `DurableOperationStorePort`가 D3의 read-port / `AdapterBoundaryArchitectureTest.java:354`가 inbound→outbound 포트 접근을 허용하고 기능이 아직 조립 전. HARD-STOP 4 해당 여부는 web 그룹 판단. - 상태: new 5. **[Required][docs] shared-contract가 존재하지 않는 런타임 보호를 약속** — `src/shared-contract/README.md:350`, `src/shared-contract/CLAUDE.md:22` - 근거: README "1001번째 tenant 부터는 bucket folding 자동 적용" — `CardinalityBounds`/`MetricNaming` production 참조 0, 실제 필터 `MetricsCardinalityMeterFilter.java`는 `ForbiddenMetricTags`만. `RedisHealthSnapshotProvider` 구현·소비자 0인데 CLAUDE.md는 "used by adapters and bootstrap health composition"(M5 잔재). `AlertSeverity`, `BaggageAllowlist`는 테스트에서만. - 수정: tenant 상한을 `MeterFilter.maximumAllowableTags`로 실제 연결하거나 README 주장 삭제; 소비자 없는 타입 삭제 또는 testFixtures로. - 상태: new 6. **[Required][docs] leaf CLAUDE.md/README가 현재 코드와 다름** - `application-core/CLAUDE.md:76-106`, `README.md:143-165,545-575`: notification 패키지는 application-notification으로 이동했는데 규칙 잔존; cache, lease, realtime, operation, filepublication, inbox 절 없음. - `identifier/CLAUDE.md:30-33`: 의존성 "`:domain-core` + uuid-creator" (실제 `:application-core`뿐); `:38` `.claude/hooks/ca_import_gate.py` 없음; `:47` `UuidCodecSpec` → `UuidCodecTest`. - `identifier/README.md`: 패키지명 오류(`dev.caskeleton.adapter.identifier`), 폐기된 Spock 절, SSOT를 `allowedProjectDependencies`로 기재. - `support/README.md:6-8,24`: "CLAUDE.md 없음"(있음), SSOT를 `src/build.gradle`로(실제 modules.json), 없는 `OutboundHttpDependencyLogger` 언급. - `shared-contract/README.md:436,499`: `RateLimiter`, `RateLimiterFactory` 없음. - 수정: modules.json·코드 기준 동기화, 사라진 타입/파일 언급 삭제. 7. **[Consider][correctness] `ValidatedIntegrationEvent`가 `envelopeSha256`–`envelopeBytes` 일치를 확인 안 함** — `src/application-core/.../messaging/event/ValidatedIntegrationEvent.java:40-88` (DB 복원 경로 `OutboxStoreAdapter.java:197`, `CanonicalOutboxEventRowMapper.java:71`가 저장된 해시를 그대로 신뢰; `CORRELATION_GRAMMAR`가 `*`라 길이 무제한인데 메시지는 "bounded"). 수정: 생성자에서 해시 재계산·비교, correlationId `{0,127}`. 가정/반론: DB 행 손상·변조 가능 / 인코더가 올바른 해시 생성. 8. **[Consider][correctness] v1 `IdempotencyExecutor.runAndComplete`가 완료 기록 실패를 action 실패로 처리** — `src/application-core/.../idempotency/IdempotencyExecutor.java:103-110` (action 성공 후 `codec.serialize`/`store.complete` 실패 → `discard` → 재시도 때 action 재실행; 전체를 한 `inWrite`로 감쌀 때만 안전 — sample `PublishPosterImageUseCase.java:119`는 그렇게 함 — 전제 미기재·미강제. V2 `IdempotencyExecutorV2.java:207-211`은 `preserveUnknown` 예외가 원래 예외를 삼킴). 수정: try 범위를 `action.get()`으로 축소; V2는 `addSuppressed`. 9. **[Consider][structure] 죽은 코드** — `identifier/.../UuidCodec.java` (외부 참조 0; "canonical" 계약도 틀림 — jshell로 `UUID.fromString("1-1-1-1-1")` 수용 확인), `application-core/src/test/.../CompiledPackageScanner.java`(참조 0), `application-core/.../fileexport/FileExportPort.java`(`@Deprecated(forRemoval)`, `exportCsv` 호출자 0). 수정: 삭제. 10. **[Nit]** identifier가 `ca.spring-library`를 써서 순수 단위 테스트에 webmvc-test·tomcat 유입 → `ca.java-library`; `MasterSwitch.java:57-66` 주석 줄 깨짐; `DomainContextStrategy`/`Factory`는 case 하나뿐인 확장 지점. #### 확인 후 기각한 lead - `RateLimiterFactory`, support README lead: 사실 → #6. notification PII: `Notification` 객체 자체는 logger로 안 감(예외 메시지 경로로 샘 → #1). - 5개 leaf build.gradle edge 모두 허용 범위; application-core의 비-`dev.caskeleton`/`java`/`javax` import 0. - `DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT` retryable=false는 `docs/registries/error-codes.yaml:873`과 일치; 새 `MasterSwitch` 상수는 `values()`로 모두 소비; `StrictSettingsBinder`는 httpclient env manifest 테스트가 간접 검증; `CacheAsideExecutor`/`LeaseWatchdog`는 H5 결정대로 유지, 회귀 없음. #### 커버리지 정독: domain-core, support, identifier 전체; shared-contract 변경분 + activation/runtime/tracing/ratelimit/concurrency/metrics; application-core 944a1e34 이후 변경분 전체 + idempotency(v1·V2), outbox relay, cache executor, operation. 훑음: realtime, lease, inbox, lock, filepublication, OutboxPayloadPolicy. 동작 확인은 jshell UUID 파싱 1건. ### Group B — Notification (vertical slice) #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `application-notification` | NEEDS_FIX | Template/variable failure in dispatch repeats forever; recorder overwrites the recipient row with stale data; admin reconcile has no tenant check; ~4.5k lines of R1 code with no production implementation or caller. | | `adapter-outbound-notification` | NEEDS_FIX | Forged SNS callbacks can be accepted; recovery and replay passes likely fail on every run; the HTTP response size cap does not limit what is read. | No HARD-STOP violations; every import within `modules.json` edges. #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Critical][correctness] Background recovery and replay passes run `@Modifying` queries with no transaction, so every pass fails** — `src/adapter/outbound/notification/src/main/java/.../platform/dispatch/LeaseRecoveryService.java:106` - Evidence: first statement of `recoverOnce()` is `leases.expireOverdue(batchSize)` → `RecipientDeliveryJpaRepository.java:58-60` `@Modifying ... int expireOverdue`. `grep 'TransactionPort\|inWrite'` over the adapter main → 0. `NotificationDispatchService.java:334-338` already records this exact failure for a query in the same repository ("…so the release threw TransactionRequiredException"). PG integration tests wrap modifying calls in `fixture.inTransaction(...)` (`PostgreSqlRecipientLeaseFencingIntegrationTest.java:60,152`). Same defect in: `ProviderEventProjectionService.java:58,120` (`markFailed`, `bindAttempt` outside `inWrite`), `ProviderEventReplayWorker.java:72` (`markFailed` in catch, `@Modifying` at `ProviderEventJpaRepository.java:144-149`), `ReconciliationService.java:82` (`ledger.append` without transaction). - Why it matters: `NotificationBackgroundWorkers` swallows the exception with a WARN → crash recovery, expiry retirement and callback replay silently never happen. The dispatch error path relies on recovery (`NotificationSchedulerWorker.java:96-98`) → failed deliveries stay DISPATCHING forever. - Fix: wrap each row's work in `TransactionPort.inWrite` (e.g. move recovery into an application-notification service with the dispatch transaction boundary); move `resolve`/`markFailed` inside `inWrite`; add one real-DB PG-lane test running `recoverOnce`/`replayOnce`. - Status: new. Not execution-confirmed (Gradle not run); the PG test would confirm. 2. **[Critical][security] SNS signature checks can be bypassed (bucket host, no topic allowlist, no freshness)** — `.../SnsSignatureVerifier.java:101-109`, `.../SesProviderCallbackAssembler.java:19` - Evidence: host check accepts `amazonaws.com` or any `*.amazonaws.com` + path `/SimpleNotificationService-*.pem` → an attacker's S3 bucket (`https://.s3.amazonaws.com/SimpleNotificationService-x.pem`) passes and their cert verifies any envelope (`SnsCertificateUrlTest` has no S3 case). `SesCallbackAdapter.java:50-53` checks only `isValid` — no TopicArn allowlist, so a genuine AWS-signed message from the attacker's own topic is accepted. `Timestamp` never checked. Endpoint is `permitAll` (`CallbackMvcSecurityConfiguration.java:35`). Certificate cache (`NotificationCallbackProviderConfig.java:36-46`) is unbounded, keyed by attacker-supplied URL, network fetch inside `computeIfAbsent`. - Why it matters: forged Bounce/Complaint/Delivery → suppressions (`SesSuppressionUpdater`) and false delivery states; with #6 one request can OOM. - Fix: host `^sns\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com(\.cn)?$`; required per-profile `allowed-topic-arns` when SES callbacks are on; reject stale Timestamp; bounded cache + cert subject check. - Status: new. Exposure only when an SES profile + callbacks are enabled (default off). 3. **[Required][correctness] Template/variable failure in dispatch repeats forever (poison pill)** — `NotificationDispatchService.java:146` - Evidence: `render()`, `gateway.profile()`, `URI::create` run before the attempt row is inserted, uncaught. Submit only checks `templates.get(plan.template())` (`NotificationSubmissionService.java:118`); variable schema, SUBJECT control chars, URI scheme checked only at dispatch (`CanonicalNotificationRenderer.java:70`, `TemplateSlotPolicy`). No attempt row → recovery re-queues (`LeaseRecoveryService.java:111-120`). No render-failure test. - Why it matters: a missing variable or newline in a subject → "accepted", then fails and re-queues every lease period forever; never FAILED. - Fix: catch pre-dispatch `NotificationException`s before `insertDispatching` → FAILED with `TEMPLATE_FAILURE`; run the variable-schema check in `prepare()` too. - Status: new 4. **[Required][correctness] Recovery leaves some rows DISPATCHING forever, then gets stuck on them** — `LeaseRecoveryService.java:122-140` - Evidence: when every attempt already has a completion (crash between `recorder.record` and `applyNextAction`, or failed retry dispatch) the loop does nothing; `reconcile` → `Unsupported` also leaves the row (SMTP and SES have no reconciliation → every mid-send SMTP crash). `selectExpiredDispatching` (`ORDER BY lease_until LIMIT batchSize`) returns the same rows each pass. No "all attempts completed" test. - Why it matters: once `claimBatchSize` such rows exist no other abandoned delivery is ever recovered. - Fix: all attempts completed → re-derive recipient state from the last attempt via retry policy; `Unsupported` → RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED (not re-picked, operator-visible). - Status: new 5. **[Required][correctness] Recorder writes a stale recipient snapshot without the lease check, undoing the late-match callback it just applied** — `DispatchOutcomeRecorder.java:105,123-124,135` - Evidence: `bindUnmatched(...).forEach(projection::project)` rolls the callback result (e.g. DELIVERED) onto the recipient row (`JpaDeliveryAttemptStore.java:221-239`); right after, `recipients.save(updated)` writes back `deliveryOutcome()`/`evidenceLevel` from the dispatch-start snapshot. `save` is unfenced, breaking `RecipientLeaseStorePort.java:14` ("Every operation after the claim is fenced"). Only test uses a no-op `projections.save` fake (`DispatchOutcomeRecorderTest.java:176`). - Why it matters: attempt row DELIVERED, recipient row back to UNKNOWN; the event is already APPLIED so replay won't fix it. - Fix: re-read the recipient after projection; write only recorder-owned fields through `saveHeldBy(lease)`. - Status: new 6. **[Required][security/perf] HTTP response "cap" reads the whole body first** — `JdkNotificationHttpGateway.java:136-141` - Evidence: `BodySubscribers.mapping(ofByteArray(), body -> copyOf(...))` buffers everything then truncates; comment `:73-75` claims never-ending chunked responses are prevented — false. No test. - Fix: `BodySubscribers.ofInputStream()` + `readNBytes(max)` (or a custom subscriber); oversized-body test. - Status: new 7. **[Required][security] Admin reconcile has no tenant check and calls providers inside a write transaction** — `NotificationAdminApplicationService.java:156-158`, `:287-289` - Evidence: `redrive`/`suppress` call `requireTenant`, `reconcile` does not → tenant-scoped operator acts on another tenant's attempts. `setProviderState` changes a global runtime but a tenant-scoped actor may call it. `AdminOperationExecutor` wraps the batch in `transactions.inWrite` → up to 200 provider round-trips in one DB transaction (contradicts `NotificationDispatchService.java:36-39`). `AdminAuthorizationGuard.java:43` always reports `SUPPRESS` as the denied authority. - Fix: look up each attempt's tenant + `requireTenant`; `PROVIDER_CONTROL` only for unscoped actors; executor only claims/saves the operation, provider calls outside the transaction. - Status: new 8. **[Consider][structure] Large body of code with no caller** — ~95 files / 4.5k lines of R1 types in root package `application.notification` (per-file `grep -rlw` = 0 except `NotificationPort`, `Notification`, `NotificationChannel`); `platform/reactor/*` no bean/test/consumer yet `reactor-core`/`reactor-test` declared; `spring-web` declared as "Slack RestClient" but `grep org.springframework.web` over the adapter = 0; `EmailNotifier`, `SmsNotifier`, `MobilePushNotifier`, `WebPushNotifier`, `ApplicationReceiptServiceImpl` no main references. Fix: delete Reactor facade + deps + `spring-web` now; re-check the R1 "retain" decision. Counter: NOTIF-ADR-005 retains R1 without a removal date. 9. **[Consider][correctness] SMTP reports pre-send failures as "ambiguous"; one dispatch branch clears next-dispatch time** — `SmtpNotificationProviderAdapter.java` throws `IllegalArgumentException` for non-email contact points and `reveal` failures surface as plain exceptions → not `ProviderCallNotStartedException` → `NotificationDispatchService.java:278-287` records AMBIGUOUS, duplicateRisk, reconciliation for a never-sent message. `DispatchPipeline.java:57-58` returns `READY_TO_DISPATCH` when `notBefore` not reached → caller `transition(..., Optional.empty())` sets `next_dispatch_at` NULL → row never claimed again (hard to hit). Fix: `ProviderCallNotStartedException` for these; pass `notBefore` as next-dispatch time. 10. **[Consider][docs]** Adapter `README.md:3-5` / `CLAUDE.md:18-31` call the whole implementation "R0 legacy" (R2 platform is most of the leaf; SMTP/SES shipped); `application-notification` has no CLAUDE.md (rules in `application-core/CLAUDE.md:76-111`); `CLAUDE.md:8` Boot 4.0.0 vs 4.0.8; "no inline FQN" rule violated on 65 adapter main lines (e.g. `LeaseRecoveryService.java:34-36`) — rest of known-open L6. Fix: rewrite around R2; new `src/application-notification/CLAUDE.md`. 11. **[Nit][structure] `contract-v1` test templates orphaned** — `src/adapter/outbound/notification/src/test/resources/notification/templates/**` (`grep -rn 'contract-v1\|notification/templates' src docs` → only historical plan `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-28-...md:927-930`; no `getResource`/`ClassPathResource`; filters `|html_text`, `|mrkdwn` match neither `{name}` placeholders nor `TemplateSlotMode`; consumer `NotificationTemplateRendererTest` deleted in 9da00eb7). Fix: delete the 4 files. Status: new (lead confirmed) #### Leads checked and dismissed - HARD-STOP/edges: application-notification imports only `java.*` + `dev.caskeleton`; adapter only `application.notification`, own packages, `support`, `shared.error`. - H3 (Thymeleaf OGNL) not regressed (default `PlaceholderTemplateEngine`, `NotificationPlatformCoreConfig.java:70`); L7 keep; L9 effectively closed (`NotificationPlatformReachabilityTest.java:67-72`). - AES-GCM random 12-byte nonce + header as AAD; Twilio signature constant-time; HTML slot `href` https-only + allowlisted tags/attrs; SSRF resolves every address (DNS rebinding window documented). #### Coverage note Deep: dispatch, scheduler, recovery, background, recorder, reconciliation, projection, submission, pipeline, retry policy, admin; SNS/SES callback path; HTTP gateway/endpoints; template engine/policy/renderer; provider runtime/gateway; SMTP adapter; persistence-jpa stores/SQL to confirm behavior. Skimmed: non-default adapters (FCM, APNs, WebPush, Twilio, Webhook), inbox/contact, settings/autoconfigure. R1: usage scan only. ### Group C — File server (vertical slice) #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `src/application-fileserver` | NEEDS_FIX | Quarantined bytes deleted; recovery path never runs; cancel leaves records/bytes behind; terminal sessions not checked; no per-file owner authz. | | `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-fileserver` | NEEDS_FIX | 0 tests; race-critical writer/cleanup SQL untested anywhere. | | `src/adapter/outbound/fileserver` | NEEDS_FIX | Every append re-reads the whole prefix. Path-traversal guards solid. | | `src/adapter/inbound/web-fileserver` | BLOCKED | tus checksum checked against the wrong digest, after bytes are saved (Critical). | | `src/composition/fileserver-platform` | PASS | Wiring only; every edge allowed by modules.json. | No HARD-STOP violations: build.gradle edges ⊆ `allowed_dependencies`; `application-fileserver/src/main` has 0 Spring/Jakarta imports. #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Critical][correctness/security] tus `Upload-Checksum` compared with the running whole-file digest, after the chunk is saved** — `src/adapter/inbound/web-fileserver/.../tus/TusController.java:167-174` - Evidence: `uploadService.append(...)` commits the offset first; then `checksumVerifier.verify(header, appended.sha256Snapshot())`, where `sha256Snapshot` is the running digest from byte 0 (`LocalAppendEngine.java:55-58,71`). - Why it matters: an honest client with a correct per-chunk checksum fails on every chunk after the first; a mismatching chunk stays saved with the offset advanced and finalize publishes it. Returns 422 where tus says 460. - Test gap: `TusProtocolContractTest.java:149-167` sends a *wrong* checksum on chunk 2 and the fake's `digestOf` (`InMemoryUploadApplicationService.java:117`) is also cumulative — the test hides the bug. - Fix: per-request digest inside append; pass expected checksum into `append`, verify before `commitOffset`, roll back on mismatch; map to 460; add a correct-checksum chunk-2 test. - Status: new 2. **[Required][correctness/data] QUARANTINE verdict schedules staged bytes for deletion** — `src/application-fileserver/.../upload/DefaultFinalizeUploadService.java:236-253` - Evidence: javadoc `:220-222` says only REJECT schedules removal; code queues `FAILED_VERIFICATION_CONTENT` for both. `DefaultCleanupService.cleanStaging` (`:134-146`) deletes without state check (`isReclaimable` `:219-223` covers published content only). Admin `reverify` (`DefaultFileserverAdminService.java:136-157`) then has no bytes. - Fix: queue cleanup only for REJECT (or move to `quarantineRoot`); `cleanStaging` re-checks reclaimability. - Status: new 3. **[Required][correctness] "Ambiguous completion → reconciliation" does not work end to end** — `DefaultFinalizeUploadService.java:317-333` - Evidence: no caller of the reconciler (`grep -rn 'reconcileRecoverable\|\.reconcile(\|FileReconciliationService'` → bean def `FileserverMaintenanceServiceConfiguration.java:59-65` + one test); `RecoveryQueue.pending/resolve` have no production caller. Content key written only in the VERIFYING→READY commit, so a failed commit leaves bytes under a key no record names → `reconcilePrePublishWithKey` (`DefaultFileReconciliationService.java:108-155`) unreachable (tests fabricate a VERIFYING record with a key). `AmbiguousCompletionException` from `publish` (`AtomicMoveContentPublisher.java:63-80`) never reaches the queue. - Why it matters: `docs/fileserver/operations.md:71-76`, `security.md:72-75` promise this recovery. - Fix: choose `ContentKey` in the application and persist it on VERIFYING before the move (write-ahead); add a scheduled worker calling `reconcileRecoverable` and draining `RecoveryQueue`. - Status: new 4. **[Required][correctness] `cancel` is a partial copy of the delete logic** — `DefaultUploadApplicationService.java:250-270` - Evidence: `markDeleting` accepts READY (`FileTransitionRepository.java:68-69`) but cancel only queues `forStaging`; `cleanStaging` never moves DELETING→DELETED. - Why it matters: tus DELETE on a finished upload (or single-shot rollback after `releaseLease` fails post-READY) leaves published bytes and quota forever, record stuck in DELETING; every cancelled upload stays DELETING. - Fix: refuse cancel after UPLOADED, or reuse `DefaultFileLifecycleService.delete` retire step (`:84-104`) + DELETED transition in staging cleanup. - Status: new 5. **[Required][correctness] Abandoned uploads never cleaned up** — `cleanup/CleanupType.java` (`EXPIRED_UPLOAD`) - Evidence: no producer of `EXPIRED_UPLOAD` (`grep enqueue(`); `LocalOrphanScanAdapter` walks only `contentRoot` (`:64,80`); `forOrphan` items marked done without deleting (`DefaultCleanupService.java:155-158`). tus accepts `Upload-Defer-Length: 1` (`TusRequestParser.java:48-50`) but no PATCH sets the length, so such uploads can never finish. - Why it matters: unbounded disk growth any client can trigger. - Fix: sweep sessions past `expiresAt` → EXPIRED + `EXPIRED_UPLOAD`; orphan items actually delete; reject `Upload-Defer-Length` until implemented. - Status: new 6. **[Required][correctness] Terminal sessions treated as live** — `DefaultUploadApplicationService.java:319-328` - Evidence: `UploadSession.terminal()` never read (grep `\.terminal()` → 0). Append to cancelled/rejected upload → `acquireLease` refused by SQL → `JpaUploadSessionStore.java:146-150` reports "writer lease is held by another owner", `retryable=true`; tus HEAD still 204 with an offset. - Fix: `requireActiveSession` and `status` return 410/404 when `terminal()`. - Status: new 7. **[Required][performance] Every append rehashes the whole prefix — O(n²) IO** — `src/adapter/outbound/fileserver/.../LocalBlockingContentStore.java:365-374` - Evidence: `reattach` builds a new `LocalUploadHandle` per request (`DefaultUploadApplicationService.append:209-211`) so `digestAt` misses and `rehashPrefix` re-reads 0..offset (`LocalAppendEngine.java:55-58`); finalize reads the file twice more (`stagingDigest:346-362`, `verifyStaged:41`) on the servlet thread outside `transferExecutor` (`TusController.java:178`). - Why it matters: 10 GiB in 5 MiB chunks ≈ 10 TiB re-read. - Fix: bounded per-uploadId digest cache keyed by offset; reuse finalize digest in `verifyStaged`. - Status: new 8. **[Required][security] Authorization checks role tiers only** — `RoleBasedFileAccessPolicy.java:44-61` - Evidence: `descriptor` argument unused; `FileDescriptor` has no owner; all controllers upload into `defaultNamespace()`. Any writer can cancel/delete/move anyone's file; any reader downloads everything. `FileOperation.FINALIZE` never authorized (grep 0) contrary to `security.md`. Admin reads use `READ_METADATA` (`DefaultFileserverAdminService.java:209-211`), mitigated by transport `RestrictedPathRule`. - Fix: `ownerPrincipalId` on `FileRecord`/`FileDescriptor` checked by the default policy; authorize FINALIZE; admin tier for admin reads. - Assumption: multiple mutually untrusted users. / Counterargument: may be a shared-drive template — then docs must say so, and the port still gives adopters no owner data. - Status: new 9. **[Required][correctness] Upload concurrency effectively 4 per node; limit returns 413** — `DefaultTransferAdmissionController.java:48-56` - Evidence: all entry points share one default namespace scope → `scope-upload-permits=4` (`fileserver.yml:89`) caps the node, `instance-upload-permits=16` never reached; limit throws `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` (→413, `FileserverErrorCode.java:37`) which clients treat as permanent. `JpaFileQuotaService.reserve` checks no limit. - Fix: `TRANSFER_ADMISSION_REJECTED` (429) for concurrency; scope by principal. - Status: new 10. **[Required][tests] persistence-fileserver's race-critical SQL untested** — `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-fileserver` (0 test files) - Evidence: only coverage is `persistence-jpa/src/postgresqlIntegrationTest/.../PostgreSqlFileserver*` (`persistence-jpa/build.gradle:86-87`); `grep 'claimForCleanup\|terminate(\|reclaimExpiredClaims'` in tests → in-memory fakes only. `UploadLeaseRepository.terminate/claimForCleanup`, V4 `ACTIVE` clauses, claim-token settlement never run against real SQL. - Fix: tests in the leaf's own strict lane: acquire-after-terminate, claim-while-leased, stale-token settlement. - Status: new 11. **[Consider][correctness] Draft-12 create ignores the POST body** — `Draft12UploadController.java:84-94,171-174` (Content-Length taken as final length, body dropped; empty POST → 0-byte upload). Fix: read `Upload-Length` or append the body. 12. **[Nit][docs]** `adapter/outbound/fileserver/CLAUDE.md` lists 2 deps and says bootstrap owns the platform (actual: 4 deps, composition owns it); `composition/fileserver-platform/build.gradle` comments name `persistence-jpa`/`adapter:inbound:web`. #### Leads checked and dismissed - Path traversal: `DefaultPhysicalPathResolver` (server key, shape regex, normalize + re-check) and Nginx mapper sound. - M4 publish TOCTOU, C2 verification fail-open, L2 no-progress spin: no regression. - Append rollback truncates+forces, escalates to ambiguous when unprovable. Correct. - Size limits: multipart shares `max-file-size` placeholder; batch part count capped (MVC + reactive). - `@EntityScan`/`@EnableJpaRepositories` follow repo pattern. `bin/` gitignored. Admin plane gated by `RestrictedPathRule` (`SecurityConfig.java:73-90`). #### Coverage note Read in full: upload/finalize/cancel/cleanup/reconciliation/admin services, append/publish/store, tus/draft-12/upload controllers, reactive handlers, persistence session/lease/quota/cleanup adapters, migrations V3/V4. Skimmed: R1/R2 publication, problem mapping, metrics, most composition configs. Left out: always-true null checks in `FileserverStartupConfiguration.java:61-66`; reactive `contextFactory::current` reads a thread-local (inert in servlet setup). ### Group D — Object storage #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `application-objectstorage` | PASS | Registry edges OK (application-core only); strong identity parsing with tests. Fix #1 will likely add a fence field to `ObjectFinalizeRequest`. | | `adapter-outbound-objectstorage` | NEEDS_FIX | No HARD-STOP. Staged-publication kernel + handoff service (wired, used by the sample) have a data-deletion path, non-idempotent replays, crash-recovery gaps, and no behavioral tests. | #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Required][correctness] Abort can delete data behind an already-published reference; finalize not fenced by the handoff** — `src/adapter/outbound/objectstorage/.../kernel/StagedObjectPublicationKernel.java:257-269` - Evidence: `abort` calls `provider.retire(...)` before `terminate(operation, ABORTED)`; `PUBLISHED` is terminal so `ObjectOperationRecord.java:143-148` throws — after the delete. Local-dev really deletes (`LocalDevObjectDataStore.java:147-155`). `ObjectPublicationHandoffService.authorizeAbort` (`:100-113`) reads only the stage record; `ObjectPublicationHandoffRecord.java:136-139` allows abort when released or lease expired. `finalizePublication` (`:183-237`) never reads the handoff; `ObjectFinalizeRequest` has no fence. - Result: claim → finalize → release → authorizeAbort → abort deletes the file while manifest/pointer/lifecycle stay PUBLISHED; same with a late finalize racing an abort after lease expiry. - Severity note: only `filesystem-local-dev` is deployable and S3 `retire` is UNSUPPORTED (`S3ManagedObjectProvider.java:121-125`); becomes Critical once a production provider implements retire. - Fix: load the operation first and reject `REFERENCE_PUBLISH_IN_PROGRESS`/`PUBLISHED`; CAS an ABORT_IN_PROGRESS fence before the destructive call (like `DirectMultipartCoordinator`); add fence+claimant to `ObjectFinalizeRequest` and require an active matching lease; `authorizeAbort` rejects once in publish phase. - Status: new 2. **[Required][correctness] Handoff release, authorizeAbort and staged abort replays are not idempotent** — `.../control/ObjectPublicationHandoffRecord.java:119-120,165-171` - release on an already-released record → `requireOwner` throws "owner/fence is stale"; the sample calls `releaseClaim` on every reconcile of a terminal READY intent (`ReconcilePosterImageUploadUseCase.java:96-97`) → second reconcile always throws. - authorizeAbort `:137` throws if released with a future lease, otherwise writes a new revision and never reports `REPLAYED`. - second `abort`: `deleteIfExists` false → `StagedObjectPublicationKernel.java:264-265` throws "could not be retired"; `AbortPosterImageUploadUseCase` (marked `IDEMPOTENT`, `:28`) re-calls abort (`:91-92`) while ABORT_AUTHORIZED → stuck permanently. Contrast `DirectMultipartCoordinator.abortMultipart:322-324` returns `REPLAYED`. - Fix: same terminal state + same fence/claimant → return `REPLAYED` without writing; abort returns `REPLAYED` if operation already `ABORTED`, before touching the provider. - Status: new 3. **[Required][correctness] Four crash windows leave staged operations stuck** — `.../kernel/StagedObjectPublicationKernel.java` - stage: operation advanced to DATA_UPLOADED (`:123-127`) before stage record created (`:139`) → replay `loadStage` null → `:91-92` "not uploadable"; data orphaned and un-abortable. - verifyIntegrity: stage CAS (`:161`) before operation advance (`:166`) → replay REPLAYED at `:156-157`, later finalize fails at `:206`. - finalize: once REFERENCE_PUBLISH_IN_PROGRESS (`:210`), `:206-207` throws "not finalizable" on every retry. - scan verdict: same ordering in `RoutingObjectScanMaintenanceAdapter.java:84-110`. - The managed path (`RoutingObjectMutationAdapter.publish:140-154`) recovers from these states. - Fix: operation record as single source of truth; secondary writes create-or-require-same; replay path completes the missing advance; finalize accepts REFERENCE_PUBLISH_IN_PROGRESS and re-runs idempotent `references.publish`. - Status: new 4. **[Required][tests] Staged kernel and handoff service have no behavioral tests** — `.../test/.../kernel/StagedObjectPublicationKernelTest.java:11-23` (tests only `ObjectScanVerdictPolicy`); grep for `ObjectPublicationHandoffService`/`finalizePublication`/`authorizeAbort` in adapter tests → 0; `ObjectPublicationHandoffRaceTest` one takeover case; bootstrap `ObjectStorageCompositionIntegrationTest:73-83` legacy put/get only; sample `PosterImagePublicationWorkflowTest` mocks ports. Fix: local-dev full-flow + replay tests, failure injection between the two writes (wrap `ObjectControlStore`). Status: new 5. **[Consider][correctness] Local control-store `create` not atomic** — `.../filesystem/LocalDevObjectControlStore.java:51-65` (`CREATE_NEW` then write; concurrent reserve reads empty/partial file → corrupt decode `CanonicalJsonObjectControlRecordCodec.java:72-73`; crash mid-write leaves key corrupt forever). Fix: temp file + force + `Files.createLink` as in `LocalDevObjectDataStore.create:55-60`. Assumption/Counter: few concurrent retries in local-dev / README claims restart+corruption characterization. 6. **[Consider][security] Legacy filesystem adapter: unbounded read + absolute server path in HTTP response** — `.../FilesystemObjectStorageAdapter.java:61,71` - `:71` still `Files.readAllBytes` — remediation master records L3 closed, but `git log` shows the file unchanged since `821fe00c`/`5f10b791`. - `:61` returns `target.toUri()` (`file:////...`); `PosterWebMapper.java:35` puts it in the HTTP `location` field; sample `application.yml:324-327` enables this backend by default. - Fix: logical URI (`objectstorage:` + key); check `Files.size` against a configured max before reading. - Status: regression of L3 (closure record does not match code); path leak new. 7. **[Consider][structure] ~3.2k lines of direct/multipart code unreachable, plus empty placeholders** - 0 main callers: `DirectTransferCoordinator`, `DirectMultipartCoordinator`, `ManagedMultipartCoordinator`, `MultipartOperationResolver`, `S3ObjectOperationResolver`, `ObjectOperationResolutionService`, `ObjectOperationEpochRecord`; `SelectedObjectStorageProviderFactory.{managedMultipart,directTransfer,directMultipart}Provider(..)` only from `S3ProviderCompositionTest`. `RoutingObjectDirectGrantAdapter` 0 references anywhere; `ObjectStorageMaintenanceCapabilityConfig` empty `@Configuration`. Ports `DirectObjectUploadPort`, `DirectObjectDownloadGrantPort`, `DirectMultipartUploadPort` have no consumers; `ObjectPurgeMaintenancePort` no implementation. - S3 contribution resolves credentials with `System::getenv` (`S3ObjectStorageProviderContribution.java:41`) instead of `SecretSourcePort` (same pattern fixed for httpclient H6). - Fix: delete the two empty types; stop constructing the unused multipart provider/presigner (`:130-158`); move direct/multipart code+ports out of main until a consumer exists; `SecretSourcePort` before S3 promotion. - Assumption/Counter: no fork needs direct/multipart before S3 promotion / code captures worked-out S3 behavior. - Status: new 8. **[Consider][readability] Publication/identity logic duplicated** — `.../config/RoutingObjectMutationAdapter.java:354-421,473-505` (`persistPublishedReference`/`createOrRequireSame` ≈ `ObjectReferencePublicationService.java:20-92`; `objectId`/`sha256Hex` ≈ `StagedObjectPublicationKernel.java:389-415`; `split("\\.")[1]` at `:504` and `RoutingObjectReadAdapter.java:103`; holds a `clock` but calls `Instant.now()` 10×). Fix: route through `ObjectReferencePublicationService`, one identity helper in `codec`, `ObjectReferenceCodec.routeToken(..)`, inject clock. 9. **[Consider][correctness] `inspect` always reports scan state NOT_REQUIRED** — `.../config/RoutingObjectReadAdapter.java:53` (SCAN_CLEAN destinations require CLEAN at finalize, `StagedObjectPublicationKernel.java:191`). Fix: derive from destination `publicationRequirement`. 10. **[Nit][correctness] Close order not actually reversed** — `.../config/ObjectStorageCapabilityAssembler.java:74,113-115` (`Map.copyOf` unordered; one throwing close skips the rest). Fix: ordered list + try/catch + `addSuppressed`. 11. **[Nit][docs]** `CLAUDE.md:30` allowed deps omit `application-objectstorage`; `CLAUDE.md:17,40` say `application-core` for types now in `application-objectstorage`; `CLAUDE.md:8` Boot 4.0.0 vs 4.0.8; `README.md:40` says local-dev rejected under "prod/production" (code: `prod` only); `.tmp` "report-first reconciliation" comments (`LocalDevObjectDataStore.java:81`, `LocalDevObjectControlStore.java:100`) point to non-existent code. #### Leads checked and dismissed - HARD-STOP 5: all edges allowed. - Key traversal/namespace escape: fixed regex (`ObjectStorageProviderOperation.java:36-45`, `LocalObjectPathGuard.java:119-136`), root confinement, symlink rejection; references have fixed format + checksum. - Presigned grants redact `toString`; `DirectGrantReplayCache` bounded (M4 holds). S3 blocked by readiness gate (H7 holds); L8 holds. - `resolve()` objectId formula matches staged kernel; `LocalObjectStreamTransfer.write` checks digest before linking; direct multipart abort idempotent; Ed25519 approval checks two distinct keys + validity window. #### Coverage note Read in full: kernel (staged/handoff/operation), routing adapters, local-dev provider, capability config/assembler, legacy filesystem adapter, identity/request contracts, diff since baseline. Skimmed: S3 providers, codecs, direct/multipart coordinators, legacy adoption. ### Group E — JPA / PostgreSQL persistence #### Leaf별 판정 | leaf | verdict | 한 줄 사유 | |---|---|---| | `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa` | **BLOCKED** | Critical 2건: 이미 적용된 Flyway 마이그레이션을 제자리 수정, durable operation 재제출이 PostgreSQL에서 트랜잭션을 깨뜨림. HARD-STOP 위반 없음(엔티티·리포지토리가 inbound/bootstrap으로 새지 않음). | | `src/config/jpa/readiness-cards.yaml` | PASS | 외부 prerequisite 하나가 없는 카드를 가리킴(FYI). | #### 발견 (심각도 순) 1. **[Critical][correctness/migration] 이미 적용된 versioned 마이그레이션 세 개를 제자리에서 수정** — `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/main/resources/db/migration/postgresql/V9__widen_capability_schema_stream.sql:3-8`, `.../postgresql/V13__outbox_canonical_transport_compatibility.sql:18-26,71`, `.../jpa/outbox-storage/V1__initialize_or_adopt.sql:140,218,296` - 근거(`git log --follow`): V9는 2026-08-15 생성, 9da00eb7에서 주석 변경. V13은 60b6a319(09-18) 생성, 9da00eb7에서 `char(64)→varchar(64)`, `NOT VALID` 추가. outbox-storage V1은 07-31 생성 후 트리거 `FOR EACH STATEMENT`, 파티션 제거, digest sha256으로 변경. V9 새 주석은 "renumbering an applied production migration would invalidate Flyway history"라면서 그 수정 자체가 checksum을 바꿈. - 왜 문제인가: Flyway SQL checksum은 주석 포함 파일 전체 CRC. `validate-on-migrate`는 Boot 기본값(true)이고 끄는 설정 없음 → 이전 파일이 적용된 모든 DB(local 프로필도 PostgreSQL+Flyway → 개발자 DB, 파생 서비스 DB)가 기동 시 checksum mismatch로 실패. 09-18판 V13이 적용된 DB는 컬럼이 `bpchar`로 남아 `ddl-auto: validate`에서도 실패. - 수정: 세 파일을 적용 당시 바이트로 복원(V9 `944a1e34`, V13 `60b6a319`). H3·M5 수정은 새 버전(`V16__…` ALTER TYPE + 재검증, outbox-storage `V3__…`)으로. 적용된 버전 파일 해시를 고정하는 단위 테스트 추가. - Status: new (H3/M5 수정 중 생김) 2. **[Critical][correctness] 같은 요청 재제출이 PostgreSQL에서 트랜잭션을 깨뜨림** — `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/.../operation/DurableOperationStoreAdapter.java:47-78` - 근거: `saveAndFlush`에서 `uq_durable_operation_scope`(23505) → `catch (DataIntegrityViolationException)` 안에서 같은 트랜잭션으로 `findByTenantAndPrincipal…` 재조회. `SubmitDurableOperationUseCase.submit`(application-core:87-99)이 미리 조회하지 않으므로 경쟁뿐 아니라 **모든** 동일 재제출이 이 경로. PostgreSQL은 에러 난 트랜잭션의 후속 문장을 25P02로 거부(`autosave` 설정 없음, grep 0). `SimpleJpaRepository.saveAndFlush`의 `@Transactional`이 caller 트랜잭션을 rollback-only로 표시하는 문제도 겹침. 같은 leaf `JpaProviderEventLedger.java:72-76`은 이 함정을 설명하고 `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`으로 회피. - 왜 문제인가: "resubmission being safe" 계약이 실제 DB에서 500. in-memory fake만 통과; PostgreSQL 계약 테스트(`DurableOperationStoreContractTest:183-188`)는 adapter를 거치지 않고 raw SQL로 충돌만 확인. - 수정: native `INSERT … ON CONFLICT (tenant, principal, operation_name, request_hash) DO NOTHING`; 0건이면 기존 row 조회. 실제 PostgreSQL에서 adapter 경유 이중 submit 테스트. - Status: new (원래 있던 결함, M6 수정 때 누락) 3. **[Required][correctness] `CanonicalOutboxAppendAdapter.append`에 caller 트랜잭션 확인 없음** — `.../outbox/CanonicalOutboxAppendAdapter.java:36-77` - 근거: 형제 `OutboxStoreAdapter.append`(:55-56)에는 `requireTransaction` 있음. 포트 Javadoc은 "participates in the caller's existing write transaction" 요구. `repository.save`는 트랜잭션이 없으면 스스로 열고 커밋. `PersistenceTransactionOwnershipTest`, `CanonicalOutboxAppendAdapterTest` 모두 미커버. - 왜 문제인가: 잘못 호출되면 outbox row가 비즈니스 쓰기와 따로 커밋 → 조용한 dual-write. - 수정: 같은 guard 추가; 세 벌(outbox/operation/liveevent)로 복사된 guard를 `transaction` 패키지 공용 helper로; ownership 테스트에 이 adapter 추가. - Status: new (H7 수정이 형제 클래스에만 적용) 4. **[Required][correctness+tests] 전체/단건 읽음 처리가 ARCHIVED inbox 항목을 되살림** — `.../notification/platform/inbox/InboxItemJpaRepository.java:83-99`, `InboxItemEntity.java:107-127` - 근거: `markAllRead` 서브쿼리가 `read_at IS NULL`만 보고 state로 거르지 않는데 `archive()`는 `readAt`을 설정하지 않음 → 읽지 않고 보관한 항목이 `state='READ'`로 바뀌어 기본 목록에 재등장. `unreadCount`는 ARCHIVED 제외(배지 0)인데 markAllRead는 그 항목을 갱신. 엔티티 `markRead`/`markSeen`도 ARCHIVED 미차단. `JpaNotificationInbox`/`InboxItemJpaRepository` 실행 테스트 없음; `PostgreSqlInboxCutoffIntegrationTest:86-105`는 운영 쿼리를 **복사한 SQL 문자열**을 돌리고 enum에 없는 `'UNREAD'` 사용. - 수정: 서브쿼리에 `AND state NOT IN ('ARCHIVED','EXPIRED','DELETED')`; 엔티티 전이에서 terminal/ARCHIVED 차단; 통합 테스트는 실제 repository로. - Status: new 5. **[Required][correctness] canonical 이벤트가 legacy claim을 타면서 aggregate 순서와 tenant 범위를 잃음** — `.../postgresql/PostgreSqlOutboxClaimRepository.java:15-29`, `README.md:177` - 근거: FIFO gate가 `aggregate_id`와 `occurred_at <`만 봄. `CanonicalOutboxAppendAdapter`가 저장하는 `tenant_scope`/`aggregate_type`/`aggregate_sequence`/`event_index`를 claim이 안 씀(`AggregateOrder`는 "Total order within one aggregate identity"). `occurred_at`이 같은 두 이벤트는 함께 claim, 순서 미정(`...RowLifecycleIntegrationTest:311`이 "LegacyFifoLimitation"으로 기록; README는 "aggregate 당 최대 한 row"). 다른 tenant/type의 같은 `aggregate_id` DEAD row가 서로 영구 차단. - 수정: canonical row(`contract_id IS NOT NULL`) gate를 `(tenant_scope, aggregate_type, aggregate_id)` + `(aggregate_sequence, event_index)` 순서로; 부분 유니크 인덱스; README 수정. - 가정/반론: 한 command가 같은 aggregate에 같은 `occurredAt` 이벤트를 2개 이상 냄 / 이 경로 플래그 기본 off(`outbox.yml:22`), V2 polling 경로는 이미 해결. - Status: new 6. **[Required][tests/security] H10 tenant 규칙이 필드 이름 `tenantId`로만 판정** — `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/testFixtures/.../testkit/arch/TenantScopedRepositoryPredicate.java:19,48-50` - 근거: Javadoc "Structural rather than name-based"인데 `TENANT_FIELD = "tenantId"` 이름 비교. `DurableOperationEntity.tenant`, `IdempotencyRecordEntity.tenant`, `OutboxEventEntity.tenantScope` 누락; 세 리포지토리 모두 `extends JpaRepository`(findAll/deleteAll 상속). - 수정: `tenant*` 필드/컬럼 모두 또는 marker annotation; 세 리포지토리를 `Repository` marker로 축소. - 가정/반론: 템플릿 사용자가 상속 CRUD를 호출 / 현재 adapter는 범위 지정 쿼리만 사용. - Status: new (H10 종결 범위의 빈틈) 7. **[Consider][correctness] 잘못된 canonical row 하나가 relay 전체를 멈춤** — `.../outbox/OutboxStoreAdapter.java:73-85,161-170` (배치 중 `IllegalStateException` → claim 트랜잭션 전체 롤백 → 같은 row가 매 주기 재선택). 수정: 해당 row DEAD 전이 후 계속. 가정/반론: DB CHECK로 못 막는 불일치(payload/envelope, 수동 UPDATE) / V13·V14 CHECK가 대부분 차단. 8. **[Consider][performance] outbox 지표 쿼리가 5초마다 테이블 전체를 셈** — `.../outbox/OutboxEventJpaRepository.java:21-27` (`countGroupedByStatus` 무필터, 7일치 PUBLISHED 포함, `OutboxRelayScheduler` 매 poll(PT5S) 호출; `OutboxReaper.deletePublishedBefore` 무제한 단일 트랜잭션 삭제). 수정: `status <> 'PUBLISHED'`만 집계; 삭제는 `LIMIT` 루프. 9. **[Consider][structure] `JpaObservabilityAutoConfiguration` 미사용 코드** — `.../autoconfigure/JpaObservabilityAutoConfiguration.java:26` (자기 자신 외 참조 0, package-private; Javadoc이 bootstrap 타입 링크). 수정: 삭제. 반론: M10에서 고급 capability 경로로 남겼을 수 있음. 10. **[Consider][security] experimental tenant guard의 "audited" admin scope가 기록을 남기지 않고 게이트 없이 생성됨** — `.../experimental/tenant/TenantAwareRepositoryGuard.java:36-54` (reason을 ThreadLocal에만 둠; public 생성자라 `ExperimentalEntryConsentTest:34-36` 게이트 목록에서 빠짐; `SchemaMultiTenantConnectionProvider.releaseConnection:50-57`은 reset 실패 시에도 tenant `search_path` 커넥션을 pool에 반환). 수정: audit sink + `enabledBy(gate, …)` factory; reset 실패 시 커넥션 `abort`. 반론: 운영 호출처 없는 experimental 코드. 11. **[FYI][docs] readiness card 외부 prerequisite가 없는 카드를 가리킴** — `src/config/jpa/readiness-cards.yaml:434-439` (`messaging-cdc-dispatch.v1`이 messaging 카드 11개에 없음; `minimum-readiness: R2` 어휘가 messaging `maturity:`와 불일치; `JpaReadinessRegistryValidator:169-179`는 형식만 검사; `postgresqlOutboxCdcCleanupIntegrationTest` 태스크 부재). 수정: `not-implemented` 동안 prerequisite 제거 또는 validator에 대상 파일 조회 추가. 12. **[Nit][docs]** `CLAUDE.md:237-243` 벤더 SQLState 표에 `55P03 → DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT` 누락(`PostgreSqlSqlStateErrorMapping.java:43`에는 있음). #### 점검 후 기각한 lead - SQL 문자열 조립: `set_config` 값은 bind parameter; `NamedStatementInspector`가 `*/` 차단; identifier는 validate된 registry 경유. - `PersistenceExceptionTranslator` cause chain 탐색·unknown→empty 정상; `TransactionRetryClassifier` 40001/40P01만 재시도 정상. - HARD-STOP 2/3: inbound의 persistence import 0; bootstrap은 SPI/config 타입만. - live-event position: counter row 락이 커밋까지 유지 → 커밋 순서 = position 순서, gap 없음. - 이전 `JpaModuleBoundaryTest` `auditing` 잔여물 해소. `JpaProviderEventLedger.bindUnmatched` stale 엔티티는 해시 매칭으로 자기 복구. #### 커버리지 자세히: outbox, operation, liveevent, inbox, transaction, failure/h2/postgresql 에러 매핑, autoconfigure, experimental tenant/rls, 변경된 마이그레이션(V9, V13, V14, V15, outbox-storage V1/V2), 관련 테스트, readiness cards. 훑음: notification platform 저장소 나머지, `PostgreSqlOwnerSafeIdempotencyStore`(claim 경로), springdata/hibernate 패키지. Flyway checksum 실패·25P02는 코드와 벤더 동작 근거 판단(실제 DB 재현 없음). ### Group F — MongoDB persistence #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `adapter-outbound-persistence-mongo` | NEEDS_FIX | No HARD-STOP violation; zero-dependency edge confirmed. Operator injection, multi-profile, bulk mapping, CSFLE and change-stream paths have correctness/security holes; tenancy docs promise enforcement the code does not have. | #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Required][security] Operator injection through an `Object` value on the equality paths** — `src/adapter/outbound/persistence-mongo/.../query/PolicyAwareMongoQueryBuilder.java:43-47`, `.../imperative/atomic/AtomicFilter.java:66-74` - Evidence: `whereEquals(String path, Object value)` → `Criteria.where(path).is(value)`; `AtomicFilter.toQuery()` passes values through `.is(entry.getValue())` with no type check. Javadoc (`:16-19`) claims NoSQL operator injection is "a compile-time impossibility". A `Map`/`Document` such as `{"$ne": null}` or `{"$regex": ".*"}` is sent as an embedded document the server reads as an operator — bypasses the field operator allowlist and `MongoRegexPolicy`; `AtomicFilter.id(Map.of("$gt",""))` defeats the single-document guarantee. No test covers it; the security lane (`build.gradle:189`) claims "injection" coverage but `MongoSecurityIntegrationLaneTest` has none. - Fix: one shared `requireScalar(value)` guard used by the builder and `AtomicFilter` (reject `Map`/`Bson`/`Document`, and collections for EQ) + regression test with `Map.of("$ne", …)`. - Status: new 2. **[Required][correctness] With more than one profile, startup and readiness ignore `active-profile`** — `.../autoconfigure/MongoStartupValidator.java:69-92`, `.../autoconfigure/MongoPlatformHealthIndicator.java:86-89` - Evidence: `active-profile` is read only by the client customizer via raw `environment.getProperty` (`client/MongoProfileClientSettingsAutoConfiguration.java:52-53`). Validator iterates every profile and throws on topology mismatch; health uses `anyMatch(profile.topology() != observed)`. Multi-profile is a tested setup (`MongoClientSettingsFactoryTest.java:117`); validator/health tests use one profile only. `primary` (REPLICA_SET) + `local` (STANDALONE) → startup always fails, or health permanently DOWN. - Fix: bind `activeProfile` once into typed settings; customizer, validator and health use only that profile; add a two-profile test. - Status: new (side effect of the H1 fix) 3. **[Required][correctness/data loss] Change-stream pipeline and consumer lose events** — `.../changestream/MongoChangeStreamPipeline.java:48-64`, `.../changestream/consumer/ReactiveMongoChangeStreamConsumer.java:174-179` - (a) `advancesPosition` passes only events strictly after the high-water mark (`isAfter`); events of one multi-document transaction share a `clusterTime`, so the 2nd+ are dropped. `MongoChangeStreamPipelineTest.twoEventsInOneTransactionAreDistinct` checks identity only, never the pipeline. - (b) `rawOf` passes only `fullDocument`; a delete arrives as `{}` without `operationType`/`documentKey`, contrary to `MongoChangeProjector` Javadoc. - (c) `BUSY`/`PARKED` do not advance the checkpoint (`projector/MongoChangeStreamRunner.java:293-297`) but `concatMap` continues and the next event's checkpoint moves past the skipped one. - (d) `MongoResumeCheckpoint.belongsTo()` has no production caller; factories fill `clusterIdentity` with `""` (`:186-194`), so the cross-cluster token check never runs. - Why Required not Critical: unreachable in the shipped bootJar (reactive excluded, `change-streams=true` refused) — but it is the consumer the README tells forks to adopt. - Fix: accept equal `clusterTime` and dedupe by identity; pass the full change envelope; error on a result that cannot advance the checkpoint; enforce `belongsTo` in `resumeFrom`. - Status: new 4. **[Required][correctness] Bulk path skips Spring mapping** — `.../imperative/bulk/MongoBulkExecutor.java:75-86`, `.../imperative/bulk/MongoBulkWritePlan.java:65-69` - Evidence: bulk builds `UpdateOneModel` from raw `getQueryObject()`/`getUpdateObject()` and calls the driver; atomic path uses `operations.updateFirst(query, update, documentType, collection)` (`MongoAtomicOperationsTemplate.java:137-139`) which applies `@Field` names and custom conversions. `DomainDocumentId`/`BigInteger` values have no codec (estimator `toJson()` fails); `@Field` aliases are written under the wrong name. Tests use String values only. - Fix: take `documentType` and map via `QueryMapper`/`UpdateMapper`, or reuse `MongoOperations.bulkOps(...)`; estimate on the mapped result. - Status: new (MNG-026 fixed the policy bypass; mapping bypass remains) 5. **[Required][security] `MongoCsfleClientFactory` ignores the profile's encryption policy** — `.../advanced/encryption/csfle/MongoCsfleClientFactory.java:40-47` - Evidence: `schemaMap` keyed by bare `profile.collection()` while the driver matches `db.coll` → nothing auto-encrypted; `profile.fields()` never read; `keyVaultCredential` not passed to `keyVaultMongoClientSettings` (contradicts `MongoCsfleProfile` Javadoc). No test, no caller. - Fix: key by namespace, generate schema from `fields()`, set key-vault settings from the separate credential, unit-test the generated settings. - Status: new 6. **[Required][security/docs] Shared-collection tenancy enforcement point does not exist** — `.../advanced/tenancy/shared/TenantScopedMongoOperations.java:19`, `docs/mongodb/advanced/multi-tenancy.md:13-14,79` - Evidence: no implementation or caller of `TenantScopedMongoOperations`; `MongoTenantPredicateInjector` called only from a test; docs say it is the entry point so callers "cannot construct an unscoped operation by forgetting". The injector itself is sound (fails closed on duplicate criteria, overwrites caller `tenantId`). - Fix: ship an implementation wrapping atomic ops + executor as the only route, or delete the interface and rewrite the doc. - Assumption: adopters trust the doc. / Counterargument: Advanced, flag-gated; fork expected to implement. - Status: new 7. **[Consider][performance] Reactive cursor re-serializes every row twice** — `.../reactive/cursor/MongoReactiveCursorPublisher.java:78-80` (`converter.write` + `toBsonDocument` in `doOnNext` just to measure bytes; fails for projection proxies). Fix: `RawBsonDocument` or decode-time hook. Status: new (side effect of M4 fix) 8. **[Consider][correctness] Migration lock swallows all write errors as "lost the race"** — `.../migration/MongoCollectionMigrationLock.java:112`. Fix: return empty only for code 11000, rethrow otherwise. Status: new 9. **[Nit][readability/docs]** `MongoPlatformAutoConfiguration.java` has 41 lines of inline FQNs (forbidden by leaf CLAUDE.md) and an orphaned Javadoc at `:192-198`; `CLAUDE.md:46` says `implementation(project(...))` but it is `runtimeOnly` (`app-bootstrap/build.gradle:129`); `CLAUDE.md:53` broken sentence. #### Leads checked and dismissed - Zero allowed dependencies: main imports resolve only to `…adapter.outbound.mongo`; no `project(` in build.gradle; no re-declared application types. - Regex: `Pattern.quote` on starts-with/contains; `whereMatches` validates; every query has `maxTimeMS`. - Keyset cursor: HMAC + `MessageDigest.isEqual` + length cap. OK. - Resume token: `toString` shows length only; invalidate → `startAfter`. OK. - CSFLE key material / credential URI: not stored or logged. - Prior H2 no regression; prior H6 now closed (16 files tracked). - `DataAccessException` unwrap loses cause but classifies UNCLASSIFIED/non-retryable — safe. - Tenant field updates blocked unless explicitly registered updatable. #### Coverage note Read in full: tenancy, CSFLE, changestream core/consumer/runner/pipeline, query builder/policy/regex, atomic, bulk, imperative executor, failure classifier, client settings/profile autoconfig, platform autoconfig, startup validator, health, topology probe, migration lock, diff since `944a1e34`. Skimmed: QE, search/vector, sharding, timeseries, gridfs, transaction, reactive executor, schema, observation, admin. ### Group G — Redis #### Leaf별 판정 | leaf | 판정 | 한 줄 사유 | |---|---|---| | `redis-runtime` | NEEDS_FIX | lease 하나가 연결 하나를 독점하고 SCRIPT 한도 8 → Redis가 정상이어도 동시 9번째 요청부터 거부. 공개 안전 설정 약 20개가 무효. 자기 테스트 1개 | | `redis-sdk` | NEEDS_FIX | 약 21.7k LOC인데 facade 구현·pub/sub 전송·조립 코드가 없어 도입 불가. 자기 테스트 0개 | | `cache-redis` | NEEDS_FIX | rate-limit hash 무한 증가(M4 회귀), lease replay가 유효 시간 부풀림, 남의 테스트 64개 보유, realtime adapter는 죽은 코드 | #### Findings (심각도 순) 1. **[Critical][performance/correctness] SCRIPT lane이 호출자마다 연결을 독점 → Redis 정상이어도 동시 9번째 호출부터 거부** — `src/adapter/outbound/redis-runtime/.../RedisRuntimeOwner.java:134-140` - Evidence: `if (current >= limits.get(kind)) throw reject(...)`의 `current`는 연결 수가 아니라 대여 중 lease 수. 한도 `RedisSdkAutoConfiguration.java:279` `limits.put(SCRIPT, getMaximumScriptConnections())`, 기본값 `RedisSdkSettings.java:687` `= 8`. 호출부(`RedisEdgeRateLimitAdapter.java:109`, `RedisIdempotencyStoreAdapter.java:109`, `RedisDistributedLeaseAdapter.java:145`)가 RTT 전체 동안 lease 보유. `RedisScriptLaneCapacityTest`가 세 번째 동시 borrow 거부를 단언(동작 고정). - Why it matters: rate-limit은 fail-closed → lane 포화 시 모든 요청 503/429; Redis 지연이 조금만 튀어도 전면 거부. 요청이 Redis에 전송되지 않았는데 idempotency·lease는 `Indeterminate` 보고(`RedisIdempotencyStoreAdapter.java:128-131`, `RedisDistributedLeaseAdapter.java:166-172`). `RedisHealthContributor.java:51`도 REGULAR lane에서 lease를 빌려 포화 시 `redisRequired` DOWN. - Fix: REGULAR/SCRIPT lane은 공유 멀티플렉싱 연결 N개 round-robin + in-flight `Semaphore`/`requestQueueSize`로 동시성 제한; 독점 lease는 TRANSACTION/BLOCKING/PUBSUB만; borrow 거부는 `Unavailable`로 분류. - Status: H8 회귀 (H8은 "한도 단위가 틀렸다"였는데 단위는 그대로 두고 64→8로 낮춤) 2. **[Required][correctness/performance] fixed-window/sliding-counter hash 무한 증가** — `src/adapter/outbound/cache-redis/.../ratelimit/RateLimitScripts.java:58-59,89-90` - Evidence: `HDEL`은 정확히 `windowStart - 2w` 필드 하나만 지우고, 허용 요청마다 `PEXPIRE`로 TTL 갱신. 기본값(sliding, w=1s, TTL 7s)에서 1.5s 간격 요청 → 버킷 0, 3000, 6000…이 삭제 대상에 안 걸리고 key도 만료 안 됨. `:39-40` 주석("refreshed per hit이 아니다")은 코드와 반대. fake(`InMemoryRedisCommandGateway.java:1717-1753`)가 HDEL/PEXPIRE를 흉내내지 않아 미테스트. - Why it matters: 활동 subject마다 메모리 누적; 같은 Redis의 idempotency/lease가 eviction·OOM 영향. - Fix: fixed window는 `start`/`count` 두 필드 덮어쓰기; sliding은 `start`/`cur`/`prev` 회전; live lane HLEN 상한 테스트. - Status: M4 회귀(수정 불완전) 3. **[Required][correctness] lease replay(status 2)가 서버 잔여 TTL을 무시하고 전체 TTL 재부여** — `.../lease/RedisDistributedLeaseAdapter.java:157-161` - Evidence: `ReplayedSameOperation(handle(request, ownership, startedAt))`가 재시도 시점부터 `leaseTtl - drift` 부여; 스크립트가 돌려주는 잔여 `PTTL`을 버림. 같은 파일 `inspect()`는 M7 수정으로 `observedValidityOf(reply.remainingMillis())` 사용(`:213`). - Why it matters: 첫 응답 유실 후 재시도 시 보유자가 서버보다 더 오래 lease를 가졌다고 믿음 → 두 보유자 겹침 가능. - Fix: status 2에서 `observedValidityOf(reply.remainingMillis())`; `localValidityOf`의 TTL≤drift 검사를 Redis 호출 전에. - Status: new (M7 계열) 4. **[Required][security/performance] 공개 Redis 안전 설정 약 20개가 바인딩·검증만 되고 적용 안 됨** — `src/adapter/outbound/redis-runtime/.../RedisSdkSettings.java:717,725` - Evidence: 모든 getter를 `redis-runtime`/`redis-sdk`/`cache-redis`/`app-bootstrap` `src/main`에서 `\.\(\)` grep → 설정 클래스 밖 참조 0: `getMaximumInFlightBytes`, `getMaximumReplyBytes`, 모든 `getMax*`(`limits`), `getCollection`/`getAdvanced`/`getMaxBlock` timeout, `getAcquireTimeout`, `getTlsHandshakeTimeout`, `getOverflowPolicy`, `getOfflineQueueCommands`. SDK는 하드코딩된 `RedisOperationLimits.defaults()`(`RedisOperationLimits.java:56`). 공개 env key로 등록됨(`docs/registries/env-keys.yaml:1959-2109` `APP_REDIS_LIMITS_*` 11개, `:2409`, `:2455`). - Why it matters: 운영자는 응답 크기·in-flight 상한으로 OOM을 막는다고 믿지만 아무것도 안 막음(closed된 H3와 같은 종류). - Fix: 우선 설정·env key 삭제; 필요한 것만 `RedisOperationLimits.from(settings)`로 연결. - Status: new 5. **[Required][tests/architecture] redis-runtime·redis-sdk 테스트가 cache-redis에 있어 해당 leaf focused check가 빈 초록불** — `src/adapter/outbound/cache-redis/build.gradle:22` - Evidence: cache-redis 테스트 76개 중 64개가 `.../redis/sdk/**`(2481줄 `InMemoryRedisCommandGateway` 포함); `redis-sdk/src`에는 `main`만; `redis-runtime` 테스트는 `RedisSdkAutoConfigurationRegistrationTest` 1개; 두 leaf 모두 CLAUDE.md/README 없음. - Why it matters: CLAUDE.md는 "소유 leaf의 `:test`를 돌려라" — redis-sdk는 NO-SOURCE, runtime은 1개(HARD-STOP 6 위험). 게이트 위반은 아님(`ArchitecturePlugin.java:22-23`은 production 선언만 검사). - Fix: `sdk/**` 테스트를 소유 leaf로 이동, fake는 `java-test-fixtures`로 공유, `testImplementation` edge 제거, leaf별 CLAUDE.md 추가. - Status: new (build.gradle 주석에 "temporarily") 6. **[Required][structure] "optional SDK"와 realtime adapter를 실제로 쓸 수 없음** — `src/adapter/outbound/redis-sdk/.../api/RedisOperations.java`, `src/adapter/outbound/cache-redis/.../realtime/*` - Evidence: `implements RedisOperations|ReactiveRedisOperations` main/test 0건; `implements RedisPubSubGateway`는 test `InMemoryRedisPubSubGateway.java:18` 하나뿐, runtime에 `connectPubSub`/`StatefulRedisPubSubConnection` 0건(구현 불가); `RedisConnectionRegistry`(redis-sdk) main 호출자 0이고 `RedisRuntimeOwner` lane 한도 로직 중복; `RedisEphemeralFanoutAdapter`, `RedisConnectionRegistryAdapter` 조립처 없음(test 외 grep 0). - Why it matters: README는 "SDK를 composition에 넣을 때만" 적용된다는데 넣을 대상이 없음. 약 22k LOC가 유지보수·리뷰 표면만 차지. - Fix: redis-sdk와 realtime 패키지 삭제; 필요 시 facade 구현 + PUBSUB 연결과 함께 재도입. - Assumption/반론: 6개월 내 SDK 소비자 없음 / C3 closure가 "optional library 유지" 결정 — 단, 도입 가능하다는 전제 위. - Status: new (C3 closure 미포함) 7. **[Consider][architecture] runtime에 SDK 표면이 섞여 있음** — `redis-runtime/.../RedisCommandGateway.java`(1227줄), `LettuceRedisCommandGateway.java`(1282줄) (메서드 118개 중 cache-redis main이 쓰는 건 약 15개; raw/admin 자격 증명·raw allowlist(`RedisSdkAutoConfiguration.java:119-142,182-193`)가 runtime에; runtime·sdk가 같은 패키지 9개 공유; `RedisCorrectnessRoles`가 consumer selector 값 하드코딩). Fix: runtime gateway는 semantic adapter에 필요한 메서드만, 나머지는 sdk로(#6 삭제 시 함께 사라짐); 패키지 `...redis.runtime.*`로. 8. **[Consider][readability] EVALSHA+NOSCRIPT 재로드 헬퍼 4벌 복사, 서로 조금씩 다름** — `CacheScripts.java:55-87`, `RateLimitScripts`, `LeaseScripts`, `IdempotencyScripts` (`CacheScripts`만 `startsWith("NOSCRIPT")` 폴백). Fix: `RegisteredLuaScript` 하나로 공유. 9. **[Consider][observability] 장애 로그가 JVM 수명 동안 한 번만 WARN, 예외 타입이 wrapper 이름** — `RedisSemanticFailureLogger.java:19,24-26` (`WARNED` 미초기화; `.get()`에서 잡아 `failureType`이 거의 항상 `ExecutionException`). Fix: cause unwrap, WARN을 시간 창 단위로. 10. **[Consider][security/ops] SCRIPT ACL probe가 스크립트 내부 명령 권한을 확인 안 함** — `RedisSemanticScriptAclProbe.java:420` (`return {1}`은 명령 0개 → ADVANCED 계정에 `+hset/+pexpire/+time` 없어도 기동 통과, 첫 요청 실패; `redisRequired`는 REGULAR lane만 probe → ADVANCED 자격 증명이 깨져도 readiness UP). Fix: `TIME/HSET/PEXPIRE/DEL`을 실제 수행하는 probe 스크립트; script capability 선택 시 health가 SCRIPT lane probe. 11. **[Consider][architecture] application executor를 adapter leaf에서 조립** — `RedisIdempotencyConfig.java:251-265` (PostgreSQL 쪽 `PostgreSqlIdempotencyProviderConfig.java:36-60`은 processing-lease 2m, codec `json.v1` 하드코딩으로 따로 조립 → `APP_IDEMPOTENCY_PROCESSING_LEASE` 적용 여부가 provider마다 다름). Fix: executor는 bootstrap에서 설정 소스 하나로 한 번만 조립, leaf는 store만 제공. 12. **[Nit][docs]** `app-bootstrap/CLAUDE.md:80,89`가 `autoconfigure/redis/RedisCapabilityConfig`·`RedisKeys`를 가리킴(실제 `cache-redis/.../capability/`); `cache-redis/CLAUDE.md`의 위치·패키지 루트·"Boot 4.0.0" 틀림; `src/README.md:302-306` `APP_CACHE_REDIS_ENABLED`/`CLIENT_MODE`는 `env-keys.yaml:2786-2794`에서 orphaned; cache-redis README의 `:app-bootstrap:test --tests '*RedisSemanticScriptAclProbeTest'`는 잘못된 leaf; `app.redis.capacity.*` env 레지스트리 `owner_module`이 cache-redis. #### 확인 후 기각한 lead - NOSCRIPT 재로드 경쟁: NOSCRIPT = 미실행, `SCRIPT LOAD` idempotent, cluster에선 Lettuce advanced `scriptLoad`가 모든 master 전파. - cluster 해시 태그·구분자 주입: 단일 키 스크립트; `CapabilityKeyspace.requireSegment`가 비-마지막 segment의 `:` 거부; digest 검증. - KEYS는 policy에서 `BLOCKED`, region 무효화는 generation INCR. M9, M13/L3 closed 확인. - 비밀 로깅: `RedisCredentials.toString` 마스킹, failure logger는 예외 클래스만. HARD-STOP 1-5 해당 없음. #### Coverage note 깊게: cache-redis main 전체, runtime owner/topology/auto-config/health/credential/keys, gateway script 메서드, 관련 테스트·fake 일부. 훑음: redis-sdk(policy yml, pub/sub, script 연산, connection registry), Lettuce gateway 데이터 명령. ### Group H — Outbound HTTP client + messaging bridge adapters #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `adapter/outbound/httpclient` | NEEDS_FIX | Dynamic Target sends trace headers to external hosts and skips redirect safety; custom API-key header not stripped on cross-origin redirect; reactive failures reported as NOT_SENT; OAuth2 token fetch blocks inside a map lock | | `adapter/outbound/messaging` | NEEDS_FIX | Canonical bridge bean never created in the assembled app (auto-config ordering); fixing that breaks startup on the shipped default (blank `producer-id`) | | `adapter/outbound/messaging-kafka` | PASS | Edges OK; only an interrupt-swallow (Consider) and javadoc drift (Nit) | HARD-STOP 1–5: none. All `project(...)` edges within `modules.json`. #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Critical][correctness] Canonical bridge `@ConditionalOnBean` evaluated before the platform auto-config; blank `producer-id` breaks startup** — `src/adapter/outbound/messaging/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/messaging/autoconfigure/MessagingBridgeRootAutoConfiguration.java:25,39-44` - (a) `@AutoConfiguration` has no `after`/`afterName`. The `EncodedMessagePublisher` bean (`DefaultMessagePublisher`) is registered only in `MessagingCoreAutoConfiguration:461`, imported by `dev.caskeleton.messaging.autoconfigure.MessagingPlatformRootAutoConfiguration`. Boot's `AutoConfigurationSorter` sorts alphabetically first → `dev.caskeleton.adapter…` precedes `dev.caskeleton.messaging…` → `@ConditionalOnBean(EncodedMessagePublisher.class)` sees no definition yet. Neither class has `AutoConfigureAfter`/`Order` (grep). - (b) `config/messaging.yml:15` `producer-id: ${APP_MESSAGING_PRODUCER_ID:}` always exists as an empty string; `@ConditionalOnProperty(name="producer-id")` treats `""` as "not false" and matches → `new ProducerId("")` → IAE at `ProducerId.java:16`. - No test assembles both: `MessagingPlatformBridgeAutoConfigurationTest` uses `withBean(EncodedMessagePublisher)` (user bean, always first) and "property absent". - Why it matters: docs (MSG-015) say the canonical bridge exists; in the real assembly `IntegrationEventPublishPort` is never created, and `canonical-transport-enabled=true` is refused by the validator (fail-closed, no data loss). Fixing (a) alone then breaks startup on defaults via (b). - Fix: `@AutoConfiguration(afterName = "dev.caskeleton.messaging.autoconfigure.MessagingPlatformRootAutoConfiguration")`; producer-id condition → `@ConditionalOnExpression("!'${app.messaging.producer-id:}'.isBlank()")`; one `ApplicationContextRunner` test with starter + bridge (blank / set). - Needs confirmation: Gradle not run; the assembly test confirms or refutes. - Status: new 2. **[Required][security] Dynamic Target sends `traceparent` and `X-Correlation-Id` to user-chosen external hosts even with `trace-propagation=false`** — `src/adapter/outbound/httpclient/.../dynamic/DefaultDynamicTargetGateway.java:154` - Evidence: `prepare()` always calls `PlatformHeaderPropagation.apply(headers)`; no main code reads `DynamicTargetPolicy.tracePropagation` (grep: record, settings, test asserts only). `docs/httpclient/configuration-reference.md:178`: "Off by default for dynamic targets". - Fix: `if (policy.tracePropagation()) headers = PlatformHeaderPropagation.apply(headers);` + absence test. - Status: new (H4 fix added propagation unconditionally to the dynamic path) 3. **[Required][security] Dynamic redirect loop bypasses `RedirectEvaluator`/`SensitiveHeaderStripper`** — `DefaultDynamicTargetGateway.java:121-136` - Evidence: on 303 only `method = GET` changes and `operation.withMethod(...)` keeps the body (`HttpOperation.java:91-101`) — the bug `BlockingRedirectCoordinator.java:97-104` already fixed; no `BODY_NOT_REPLAYABLE` check on 307/308; caller headers (e.g. `X-Api-Key`, allowed by `HeaderPolicy`) forwarded cross-origin; no test calls `DefaultDynamicTargetGateway.exchange` (grep 0). - Why it matters: `max-redirect-hops` is configurable (`HttpClientPlatformSettings.java:156`); enabling it sends POST payloads to an upstream-chosen host. - Fix: reuse `RedirectEvaluator.evaluate` + `stripForCrossOrigin` per hop, `EmptyBody` on 303; redirect contract tests (303 body, 307 one-shot, cross-origin header). - Status: new 4. **[Required][security] Allowed API-key header `X-Client-Key` not stripped on cross-origin redirect** — `.../security/SensitiveHeaderStripper.java:23,47`, `.../restclient/BlockingExecutionSupport.java:90` - Evidence: `ALLOWED_API_KEY_HEADERS = Set.of("X-Api-Key","Api-Key","X-Client-Key")` (`HttpClientAuthenticationAutoConfiguration.java:34-35`); the stripper in use is `standard()` which strips only `x-api-key`/`api-key`; `withAdditional` has no main caller; empty `allowedHosts` → `TrustedTargetPolicy.java:168` allows every host. - Why it matters: a profile with `redirect.enabled` + `allow-cross-origin` leaks the secret to the redirect target (both default off). - Fix: strip the actually resolved `RequestCredentials.headers().keySet()` on cross-origin hops; delete `withAdditional`. - Status: new 5. **[Required][correctness] Reactive path reports post-send failures as NOT_SENT / `HttpConnectException`** — `.../webclient/ReactiveAttemptExecutor.java:167`, `.../reactor/ReactorFailureClassifier.java:106-108`, `.../restclient/StableBlockingExceptionMapper.java:37` - Evidence: `classify(failure, baseMetadata.stage())` always gets `VALIDATION` (`provesNotSent=true`); no `AttemptProgressTracker` on the reactive path (grep 0); unknown exceptions → `fallback` `notSent(UNKNOWN)` → mapper `default` → `HttpConnectException`. Examples: `DataBufferLimitException` from `DataBufferUtils.join` over `maxWireBytes` (`WebClientResponseMapper.java:33`; handled nowhere), mid-response `PrematureCloseException`; no reactive too-large / mid-body tests. - Why it matters: NOT_SENT promises the server never received the request; callers re-send an executed POST → duplicate side effects. Breaks parity with blocking (H9 fixed blocking only). - Fix: record stage inside `exchangeToMono` (`REQUEST_BODY` after send, `RESPONSE_HEADERS`/`RESPONSE_BODY` on receipt); map `DataBufferLimitException` → `HttpResponseTooLargeException`; mapper `default` → dedicated unknown type. - Status: new 6. **[Required][performance] OAuth2 token network fetch runs inside `ConcurrentHashMap.compute`** — `.../auth/OAuth2CredentialProvider.java:62-66`, `.../auth/SingleFlightTokenLoader.java:79-83` - Evidence: `cache.compute(key, … tokenLoader.load(key))` holds the bin monitor up to 10 s; same-key/same-bin callers queue on the monitor instead of joining the single-flight future; after a timeout the next caller starts another 10 s load → Nth caller ≈ N×10 s. `SingleFlightTokenLoaderTest` tests the loader alone. Also: a timed-out caller calls `cancel(true)` on the shared future → late joiners get raw `CancellationException`; `CompletableFuture.cancel` does not interrupt → the 2-thread pool can stay blocked. - Fix: `get` + expiry check, `tokenLoader.load` outside the lock, then `cache.put` (loader already dedupes); translate `CancellationException` → `HttpAuthenticationException`. - Status: new 7. **[Consider][structure] `categoryOf` duplicated as `getSimpleName()` string switches, already diverged** — `BlockingAttemptExecutor.java:292-312`, `ReactiveAttemptExecutor.java:183-199` (reactive lacks `HttpCircuitOpenException`/`RateLimitRejected`/`BulkheadRejected` though `ReactiveAttemptResiliencePipeline.java:57-70` throws them → telemetry `UNKNOWN`). Fix: `FailureCategory category()` on each `HttpClientException` subclass; delete both switches. 8. **[Consider][error-handling] Bridge `prepare` turns every `RuntimeException` into `REJECTED_BEFORE_SEND` without a cause** — `.../platformbridge/PlatformIntegrationEventPublishAdapter.java:59-63`. Fix: narrow to `IllegalArgumentException`; carry cause via `OutboxRelayFailureReport` or `OutboxPublishRefusedException(outcome, cause)`. 9. **[Consider][correctness] Kafka seam swallows `InterruptedException`** — `src/adapter/outbound/messaging-kafka/.../KafkaSenderAutoConfiguration.java:110` (`OutboxMessagePublishAdapter.java:94` → `AMBIGUOUS`, `OutboundMessagePublisher.java:36` logs and ignores → relay keeps processing during shutdown, up to 30 s per item). Fix: catch in the lambda, `Thread.currentThread().interrupt()`, rethrow. 10. **[Nit][docs]** `src/README.md:320-345` describes activation via `ca-skeleton.capabilities.http-client` / `OutboundHttpSettings.bindLegacy` — actual `app.httpclient.enabled` (`HttpClientPlatformSettings.PREFIX`, `config/httpclient.yml:12`, `.env:236`); `OutboundHttpSettings` not in main. Kafka javadoc (`KafkaSender.java:7`, `KafkaAdapterConfig.java:14`) says the project must supply `KafkaSender` — the leaf supplies both; `KafkaAdapterSettings.addresses()` unused. #### Leads checked and dismissed - README vs CLAUDE activation key: confirmed → #10 (code + CLAUDE correct). - SSRF first line: userinfo rejected, IDN → punycode before allowlist, suffix at label boundary, all DNS answers validated, Apache socket pinned; DYNAMIC + JDK/Reactor/proxy refused at startup (`ClientProfileValidator:173-207`). - Engine-level redirects disabled on all 4 transports; Apache auto-retry off; TLS hostname verification `BOTH` with no off switch. - Retry idempotency: 408/425/429/5xx, write failure, timeout all gated by `safelyIdempotent`; negative `Retry-After` ignored. - Blocking response size enforced while reading (`CountingBoundedInputStream`); no header/credential logging (0 loggers in main), redacted `toString`. - C1-style component-scan bypass: exclusion regex in `CaSkeletonApplication.java:106,108` covers both packages. - `OutboxEnvelopeJson` payload pre-validated by `OutboxPayloadPolicy.requireValidPayload`; `OutboxMessagePublishAdapter.java:78` `join()` bounded by platform `orTimeout`. - Known-open: L5, L6 appear wired in code (not run-verified); M9 — no spring-kafka in `messaging-kafka` lock. #### Coverage note Deep: messaging main autoconfigure/config/outbox/platformbridge/core/realtime; messaging-kafka main; httpclient `dynamic/*`, blocking/reactive executors, redirect, reader/limiter, header, stripper, OAuth2/single-flight, retry engine/backoff, Apache/Jetty factory + cited tests. Skimmed: messaging R1 compiler/envelope/schema; httpclient `service`/`spring7`/`migration`/`observation`/`profile`. #1 and #5 need an assembly test / reactive contract test to confirm. ### Group I — Inbound HTTP (web) #### Leaf별 판정 | leaf | 판정 | 한 줄 이유 | |---|---|---| | `adapter-inbound-web` (`src/adapter/inbound/web`) | **BLOCKED** | 인바운드 어댑터가 저장소 포트 직접 호출·트랜잭션 개시·객체 단위 인가 결정(HARD-STOP 4). 인증 없는 콜백은 본문 크기 제한 없이 수신. 에러 envelope 계약에 빈틈. | #### 발견 (심각한 순) 1. **[Critical][architecture] durable-operation 조회/취소 유스케이스가 web 어댑터 안에 있고 운영에서 조립도 안 됨** — `src/adapter/inbound/web/.../operationasync/OperationQueryService.java:54-58,80`, `.../operationasync/OperationAccessPolicy.java:28-40` - 근거: `OperationQueryService`가 `DurableOperationStorePort.find/cancel` 직접 호출, `transactions.inWrite(...)`로 트랜잭션 개시, `OperationAccessPolicy.mayAccess`로 principal/tenant 인가 판단 → AGENTS.md "repository 직접 호출과 비즈니스 정책 금지", CLAUDE.md 표는 authorization을 `application-core`에 둠. - 조립 불가: `new OperationQueryService(`는 `testFixtures/.../OperationFixtureSupport.java:74`에만(운영 grep 0) → `app.web-platform.durable-operations.enabled=true`면 기동 실패. MVC에서 `WebMvcRequestContextHolder.store` 호출 0 → `WebMvcRequestContextArgumentResolver.java:40` `require`가 항상 예외. `OperationHttpController.java:75,100`의 `WebResourceNotVisibleException`은 opt-in problem 핸들러만 처리 → 기본 envelope 계약에선 catch-all **500**. 실서버 IT는 `OperationFixtureController.java:53`이 합성 context를 넣어 못 잡음(닫힌 H7과 같은 모양). - 수정: find/cancel + 접근 정책을 `application-core` 유스케이스(`QueryDurableOperationUseCase`/`CancelDurableOperationUseCase`)로; 컨트롤러는 `Authentication` → command 매핑만; `GlobalExceptionHandler`에 `WebResourceNotVisibleException` → 404. 당장 쓸 계획이 없으면 MVC/Reactive 컨트롤러와 `operationasync` 삭제가 가장 작은 변경. - 가정/반론: 가시성 판단 = 인가 정책 / `docs/web/repository-adaptation.md` §7이 HTTP projection을 web에 둠 — 단 저장소 호출·트랜잭션 조율까지는 아님. - 상태: new (Group A #4와 같은 결함을 반대편에서 본 것) 2. **[Required][security] 운영 servlet 앱에 요청 본문 상한 없음; 인증 없는 콜백이 본문 전체를 메모리에 읽은 뒤 크기 검사** — `.../notification/platform/callback/NotificationCallbackMvcController.java:85-87` - 근거: `@RequestBody byte[] body` 후 `if (body.length > maxBodyBytes)` — Spring 컨버터(`readNBytes(contentLength)`/`readAllBytes()`)가 이미 전체 버퍼링. 경로는 `CallbackMvcSecurityConfiguration.java:31-35` `permitAll`. Reactive는 `BoundedCallbackBodyReader.java:30` `DataBufferUtils.join(..., maxBytes)`로 막음 — servlet만 누락. - 근본 원인: `WebMvcBudgetFilter`는 fixture 앱에서만 생성(main grep 0); `backend.web.budgets.enabled=true`면 `WebMvcBudgetExceptionHandler`가 운영에 없는 `BudgetProblemMapper` 빈을 찾아 기동 실패; 그런데 `docs/web/repository-adaptation.md:158,160`은 본문 크기·JSON 깊이를 "Application, always"가 막는다고 기재. `NotificationCallbackMvcControllerTest.java:117-124`는 배열을 직접 넘겨 컨버터 경로 미검증. - 영향: `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACKS_ENABLED=true`(기본 false, `notification.yml:44`)면 누구나 수 GB 본문으로 힙 고갈; 가상 스레드라 스레드 수 제한도 없음. - 수정: 컨트롤러가 `HttpServletRequest`를 받아 `getContentLengthLong() > maxBodyBytes`면 413, 본문은 `getInputStream().readNBytes(maxBodyBytes + 1)`; 예산 필터를 유지하려면 `WebMvcPlatformAutoConfiguration`에서 등록, 아니면 문서 §8 정정. - 상태: new 3. **[Required][correctness] Envelope 에러 계약에서 `ProblemDetail`이 새어 나감** — `.../error/GlobalExceptionHandler.java:54,290-293` - 근거: `ResponseEntityExceptionHandler`가 처리하는 예외 20종 중 8개 hook만 override → 나머지(`MissingServletRequestParameterException`, `MissingRequestHeaderException`, `MissingServletRequestPartException`, `HandlerMethodValidationException`, `ResponseStatusException`, `AsyncRequestTimeoutException`, `TypeMismatchException` 등)는 Spring 7.0.9 `handleExceptionInternal`(630-631)에서 `ProblemDetail` 본문; `EnvelopeBodyAdvice.java:45`는 `application/json`이 아니면 감싸지 않음 → `application/problem+json` 그대로 → README.md:168(D5 "ProblemDetail 거부")과 모순. 실제 경로: sample `PosterImagePublicationController.java:58-61` 필수 헤더 `Idempotency-Key`·필수 파라미터 누락. 이 예외들의 테스트 0건. 추가로 `handleMethodArgumentNotValid`는 `getFieldErrors()`만 → 클래스 레벨 제약 위반은 `details: []`. - 수정: `handleExceptionInternal` 하나 override(status → `OperationalError`, `ErrorResponseFactory.body` 반환); `getGlobalErrors()`도 details에; 필수 파라미터/헤더 누락 slice 테스트. - 상태: new (C2 종결 범위는 opt-in 핸들러까지) 4. **[Required][correctness] `RequestLoggingFilter`가 Spring Security 뒤에서 돌고 trace id를 따로 생성** — `.../filter/RequestLoggingFilter.java:37,65-71,69` - 근거: `@Component`에 `@Order` 없음 → LOWEST_PRECEDENCE, Security 체인(-100) 뒤. MDC가 이 필터 안에서만 채워짐 → `AuthErrorResponseWriter.java:46-70`의 401/403 응답 `meta` id 전부 null, 경고 로그에 request_id 없음, 해당 요청은 `http_request` 접근 로그도 없음. `:69`는 traceparent 없으면 새 값 생성 → `WebMvcRequestIdFilter.java:78-80`의 `WebTraceId`와 불일치(H1과 같은 모양, trace id 쪽). - 수정: MDC 채우기를 security보다 앞의 `WebMvcRequestIdFilter`로 이동; 로깅 필터는 `WebTraceId`도 읽기; `OperationalContractRuntimeTest`에 "request-id 필터가 `springSecurityFilterChain`보다 앞" 단언. - 상태: new (H1/H7 형제) 5. **[Required][security] `FORWARDED_HEADERS_TRUSTED` 레이트리밋 키가 XFF 맨 왼쪽 값 사용, peer 검증 없음; forwarded 헤더 신뢰 판단이 네 벌** — `.../ratelimit/ForwardedHeaderClientIpResolver.java:15` - 근거: `split(",", 2)[0]`, `getRemoteAddr()` 신뢰 프록시 확인 없음. 저장소 자체 `infra/fileserver/nginx/nginx.conf:44`가 `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`(뒤에 덧붙임) → 맨 왼쪽은 클라이언트가 정함 → 요청마다 새 버킷, 비인증 레이트리밋 우회. `RateLimitKeyResolverTest.java:79-86`이 이 동작을 정답으로 고정. 판단이 네 곳: `proxy/TrustedProxyPolicy`(CIDR, 운영 호출 0), `ExternalRequestUrlResolver`(정확 문자열 집합), 이 resolver(검증 없음), reactive 콜백 `NotificationCallbackWebFluxHandler.java:105`(`request.uri()` 그대로 → servlet과 서명 대상 URL 불일치). - 수정: `TrustedProxyPolicy` 하나로 통일(XFF 오른쪽부터 첫 비신뢰 주소; peer 비신뢰면 remoteAddr). 더 간단: 이 모드 삭제 + `server.forward-headers-strategy=native`(Tomcat RemoteIpValve `internal-proxies`) + `REMOTE_ADDR_ONLY`. - 가정/반론: 뒤에 덧붙이는 LB(ALB, nginx 기본) 뒤에서 켬 / 기본값 안전, 문서에 "덮어쓰는 ingress에서만". - 상태: new (H3 종결은 서버 기본값만) 6. **[Required][architecture] 알림 제출 정책 기본값을 컨트롤러가 결정(HARD-STOP 4 후보)** — `.../notification/platform/submission/NotificationSubmissionController.java:48-51,81-89,120-123` - 근거: category 생략 → `"transactional"`, 템플릿 버전 `1`, locale `Locale.getDefault()`(호스트 JVM). category는 suppression 범위(`SuppressionEntry.java:53-54`, `CompositeNotificationEligibilityPolicy.java:40`)와 중복 제거 식별자에 들어감 → 생략 시 marketing suppression 미적용 = transport 계층의 비즈니스 결정. `NotificationTemplateController.java:74` `1L`도 같음. - 수정: `AcceptNotificationCommand`에서 세 값을 `Optional`로, 기본값은 유스케이스가 설정값으로 적용. - 가정/반론: category가 동의/suppression 기준(코드상 그러함) / 호출자가 명시적으로 "transactional"을 넘길 수 있음. 소유자가 정책으로 보면 Critical. - 상태: new 7. **[Required][docs/contract] `wire-type-manifest.yaml`이 런타임에 없는 wire 계약을 공개** — `.../main/resources/META-INF/web/wire-type-manifest.yaml:25-29` (`LONG: INTEGER_STRING`, `BIG_DECIMAL: DECIMAL_STRING`, ":4 client author가 읽는 계약"; 실제로는 숫자 — `JacksonSerializationPolicyTest.java:83-93`이 BigDecimal plain 숫자 단언, sample `StoredObjectResponse.java:4` `long size` 숫자; `WebWireTypeManifest` 빈은 생성만(`WebMvcPlatformAutoConfiguration.java:123-127`); 테스트는 상수=상수). 수정: yaml·빈·클래스 삭제(최소), 유지하려면 Jackson 모듈로 적용 + 실제 JsonMapper 테스트. 상태: new (lead 확인) 8. **[Consider][structure] 운영 소비자 없는 라이브러리 코드가 많고 운영 경로와 중복** — main 67개 파일(약 5.7k LOC) 운영 참조 0(클래스명별 grep); 외부 importer 0 패키지: `security/`, `cache/`, `openapi/`, `idempotency/`; `security/WebCorsPolicyValidator`가 실제 `CorsSettings`보다 엄격한 규칙인데 미호출; `observability/WebAuditPublisher` 참조 0; `RateLimitInterceptor.disabled(...)` M2 이후 dead; `cursor/CursorCodec.withDevKey()` 키 하드코딩. 수정: 쓸 것은 조립, 나머지 삭제; CORS 규칙은 `CorsSettings`로 합치고 validator 삭제. 반론: M1 종결 때 LIBRARY_ONLY 수용. 일부 known-open L4/L5/L6. 9. **[Consider][docs] 같은 코드 이름이 스위치에 따라 다른 status** — `problem-catalog.yaml:19-22` `VALIDATION_FAILED` 422 vs `OperationalError.java:15` 400; README D5에 opt-in problem 경로(`spring.mvc.problemdetails.enabled`) 미기재; reactive 핸들러도 `spring.mvc.*`로 켜짐(`WebFluxProblemExceptionHandler.java:44-45`); reactive 스택엔 envelope 핸들러가 없어 스위치 off면 Boot 기본 에러 JSON. 수정: README에 opt-in 경로 기재, 코드/status 정합, reactive는 `spring.webflux.problemdetails.enabled`. #### 확인 후 기각한 리드 - problem-catalog 422 vs README 400: 의도된 opt-in 경로(C2 종결), 기본 계약은 400 → 남는 문서 문제는 #9. `application-web-contract.yaml` `problemdetails: true`: testFixtures 전용. - CORS wildcard + credentials: `CorsSettings.java:32-37`에서 거부, `setAllowedOrigins` 정확 일치. - HARD-STOP 2/3: web main에 JPA/Spring Data/outbound import 0; `ProviderCallbackHttpRequest`는 bootstrap bridge에서 매핑. 문제는 #1뿐. - 의존 edge: `application-core`, `application-notification`, `shared-contract` 모두 허용; `web-fileserver`는 test 범위. - 인증 쪽 필터 순서 정상(request-id HIGHEST+10 < security; 콜백 체인 `securityMatcher` 분리; `RestrictedPathRule`이 `anyRequest`보다 먼저). - FYI: 레이트리밋이 HandlerInterceptor라 401 폭주는 제한 안 됨(README에 적힌 설계). - C3(known-open) 이제 닫힘: systemTest/performanceTest/testFixtures 리소스 10개 추적, untracked 없음. - JWT lazy decoder: Security 7.0.7 `SupplierJwtDecoder`가 `SingletonSupplier` → 가상 스레드 pinning 없음. #### 검토 범위 자세히: `auth/`, `settings/`, `notification/platform/**`, `ratelimit/`, `error/GlobalExceptionHandler`, `envelope/`, `filter/`, `mvc/{autoconfigure,filter,operation,context,budget}`, `operationasync/`, `proxy/`, `webflux/autoconfigure` + 관련 테스트·fixture; Spring 7.0.9 / Security 7.0.7 소스로 동작 확인. 대충: `advanced/`, `pagination`, `conditional`, `openapi`, `moduleboundary`. ### Group J — Inbound GraphQL #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `adapter-inbound-graphql` (`src/adapter/inbound/graphql`) | **NEEDS_FIX** | No HARD-STOP. One Critical DoS: the wired authorization stage expands fragments exponentially before any budget check. 5 Required: `__typename` rejected, errors masked and never logged, two security flags look active but do nothing. | #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Critical][security/perf] Authorization stage walks fragments exponentially with no budget, before the cost stage** — `src/adapter/inbound/graphql/.../runtime/GraphQlDocumentAuthorizationHandler.java:63,109-137`, `.../cost/GraphQlDocumentShapeAnalyzer.java:190-216` - Evidence: chain order `stable(selection, authorization, cost)` (`GraphQlPlatformAutoConfiguration.java:403-408`). Authorization calls `verifyIntrospection` → `selectsIntrospection` (analyzer 209-214) and `collect` (handler 130-135); both only guard cycles by push/pop on `expansionPath`, no visit budget. Only `walk` in the cost stage has the 200k budget. Attack document `query{...F0} fragment F0 on Query{...F1 ...F1} … fragment F39 on Query{_health}` ≈ 1.6KB (under the 16KiB cap) = 2^40 visits. `maxFragments=50` checked later in the cost stage. graphql-java 25 dedupes fragments in validation/execution (`OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged:101-111`, `FieldCollector:85-95`, `NoFragmentCycles` memo) → the document validates fast; the blowup exists only in platform code. - Why it matters: one request pins a request thread indefinitely (deadline never checked inside the walk). Anonymous in LOCAL/DEV; any authenticated principal in prod. - Fix: in both walkers replace the path Deque with a document-wide never-popped `Set visited` (results are set membership → same answers, linear walk), or run budgeted `analyze()` before authorization; systemTest with a 40× doubling fragment. - Status: new (side effect of the GQL-007 fix) 2. **[Required][correctness] `__typename` treated as introspection** — `.../cost/GraphQlDocumentShapeAnalyzer.java:40,199` - Evidence: `startsWith("__")`; shipped default `introspection-enabled: false` (`app-bootstrap/.../config/graphql.yml:18`), forced off in prod (`GraphQlPlatformStartupValidator.java:43-45`); no `__typename` test. - Why it matters: Apollo `addTypename` and urql's cache add `__typename` everywhere → all their queries rejected (`GRAPHQL_DOCUMENT_SHAPE_REJECTED/INTROSPECTION`). Spring/graphql-java introspection-off blocks only `__schema`/`__type`. - Fix: block only `__schema`/`__type`; systemTest `{ _health __typename }` succeeds with introspection off. - Status: new 3. **[Required][correctness/ops] Every failure masked, none logged** - Evidence: `GraphQlExceptionResolver.java:55` always returns the masked error → Spring treats it as resolved and logs only at DEBUG (`spring-graphql 2.0.5 ExceptionResolversExceptionHandler:99-101`); `GraphQlPlatformWebInterceptor.java:94`, `GraphQlPlatformInstrumentation.java:84` convert unknown RuntimeExceptions without logging; `grep -rl 'LoggerFactory|getLogger|System.Logger'` over main → 0 files, yet Javadoc says "the detail stays in the logs" (`GraphQlWireErrorMapper.java:30`, `GraphQlPlatformRejectionMapper.java:28`). - Why it matters: a prod NPE/DB error leaves no trace; the executionId the client gets matches nothing. - Fix: log once at ERROR with executionId + exception on the masking branch. - Status: new 4. **[Required][correctness] Wired DataLoader path and blocking bridge errors reach the client as `INTERNAL_ERROR`** — `.../runtime/GraphQlPlatformRejectionMapper.java:114-121` - Evidence: `GraphQlBatchTimeoutException`, `GraphQlMissingKeyException`, `GraphQlBlockingBridgeFullException` declare `CODE`s unknown to mapper and catalogue; `GraphQlErrorCodeCatalogTest.java:54-60` calls batch timeout "modelled-only" while `CLAUDE.md:171` marks DataLoader `wired`; bridge-full goes through Reactor `ExecutorScheduler.schedule` → `Schedulers.handleError` (ERROR log / uncaught handler on every rejection) → arrives wrapped in `RejectedExecutionException`; tests only assert `getErrors().isNotEmpty()` (`GraphQlBatchLoaderRegistrationTest.java:150`). - Fix: `GraphQlBatchTimeoutException extends GraphQlRequestCancelledException`; unwrap bridge-full → `DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE`; assert wire codes. - Status: new (gap in M1 closure) 5. **[Required][security] Stable extensions allowlist accepts `idempotencyKey`, which nothing honours** — `.../http/GraphQlExtensionsPolicy.java:44` (only consumer `mutation/GraphQlMutationIdempotencyInterceptor.java:48` is not on the request path). Why: retrying clients believe retries are deduplicated; the mutation runs twice. Fix: `stableDefaults()` → `none()` until wired. Status: new (side effect of M6 closure) 6. **[Required][security] `GraphQlClientPolicy.persistedOperationOnly` does nothing** — `.../policy/GraphQlClientPolicy.java:50` (`grep -rn 'persistedOperationOnly()'` → only `GraphQlClientPolicyTest:75` getter assert). Why: adopter sets true, arbitrary documents still execute (fail-open allow-list bypass). Fix: remove the field or reject `true` in the compact constructor until wired. Status: new 7. **[Consider][perf] Preparsed cache scans every entry under a global lock per lookup** — `.../execution/BoundedPreparsedDocumentProvider.java:142,167-178` (`expireIdle` iterates the whole map, default 1000). Fix: access-ordered `LinkedHashMap` → stop at first unexpired entry. Counter: tens of µs at 1000 entries. 8. **[Consider][security] Root type names hard-coded for authorization** — `.../runtime/GraphQlDocumentAuthorizationHandler.java:80-83` (literals "Query/Mutation/Subscription" vs cost stage `schema.getQueryType()` at `GraphQlDocumentComplexityScorer.java:258-260`; renamed roots → rules never match, `denyByDefault(false)` allow rules fail open). Fix: names from `context.schema()`. 9. **[Consider][correctness] Streaming path of the body-cap filter untested** — `.../runtime/servlet/GraphQlRequestBodyLimitFilter.java:85` (systemTest `GraphQlPlatformExecutionPathTest:224-241` covers only Content-Length fast path; `FrameworkServlet` likely wraps unresolved RuntimeException in `ServletException` → `catch (BodyTooLargeException)` misses → 500 instead of 413; unverified; cap itself holds). Fix: chunked-transfer test, catch via cause chain. 10. **[Consider][structure] ~57% of the code unreachable** (known-open GQL-025) — static reference closure from the four Spring entry points reaches **136 of 400 files / 11.2k of 25.9k LOC**. Candidates: `advanced/**` 134 files / 5,986 LOC (nothing outside references it, nothing binds `GraphQlAdvancedFeatureFlags`); packages `compat` 1,562, `release` 540, `fetch` 434, `mutation` 683 LOC; unreachable classes in wired packages — parallel HTTP layer in `http/` (11 classes: `GraphQlRequestEnvelopeValidator`, `GraphQlHttpResponseFactory`, `StatusMapper`, `MediaTypes`, …), `error/GraphQlRequestErrorMapper` (second error vocabulary), `autoconfigure/GraphQlPlatformActuatorEndpoint` + `…ConfigurationReport` (not beans), 16 of 19 `schema/` files; `moduleboundary/` (535 LOC) test-only data in the production jar. Fix: delete or move to a non-shipped artifact (keep `pagination` if wanted). Counter: earlier review judged them tested parts awaiting wiring. 11. **[Consider][docs]** `CLAUDE.md:168` marks Accept negotiation `wired` (`GraphQlMediaTypes` unreachable, unit test only); `CLAUDE.md:59,132-133`, `README.md:46-61` describe non-existent `GraphqlExceptionResolver` and "return null → Spring default" (reality: everything masked). Fix: grade `modelled`, document current resolver + masking. 12. **[Consider][ops] Production boots with the anonymous principal resolver, then refuses every request** — `.../autoconfigure/GraphQlPlatformAutoConfiguration.java:319` (prod requires a `GraphQlAuthorizationPolicy` bean but not a `GraphQlPrincipalResolver` → startup OK, 100% `AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED`). Fix: startup validator fails in prod without a principal resolver bean. #### Leads checked and dismissed - HARD-STOP 1-5: edges `shared-contract` + `application-core` only; no persistence/Spring Data imports; no GraphQL types in application-core/domain-core/shared-contract. - No internal detail leaks (allowlist + masking). `GraphQlBlockingBridge` pool and queue finite, opt-in (Nit: thread factory always names `-0`, `GraphQlBlockingBridge.java:56`). - Subscription lease/backpressure and `advanced/persisted` bypass: modelled only, not on request path; lease release idempotent (CAS). - Preparsed cache key uses server-side client profile + memoized schema hash → no cross-profile leak. BigDecimal expansion bounded (`GraphQlDecimalBounds`); `GraphQlRequestSize` recursion bounded by Jackson depth. - H1-H3, M1-M7: no regressions. #### Coverage note Read in full: wired path (`GraphQlPlatformAutoConfiguration`, all `runtime/*` incl. servlet filter), `cost/GraphQlDocumentShapeAnalyzer`, DataLoader executor/factory, `error/*`, client/extensions/authorization policies, preparsed cache, related tests/systemTests; checked graphql-java 25, spring-graphql 2.0.5, reactor 3.8.7 sources. Skimmed: `advanced/*` (except persisted + subscription lease), `compat`, `release`, `fetch`, `mutation`, `pagination`, `schema`, `observation`, `scalar`. Reachability computed with an inline script. ### Group K — Inbound realtime (WebSocket) + gRPC adapter #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | `adapter-inbound-websocket` | NEEDS_FIX | No HARD-STOP; the live STOMP channel is sound. The platform library breaks advertised guarantees (authentication, size limits, backpressure, shutdown ordering, concurrency) — none has a production caller yet. | | `adapter-inbound-grpc` | NEEDS_FIX | Deny-by-default config and error cleanup solid, but the exception interceptor drops `onComplete` and late `onCancel`. | #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Required][security] `HandshakeAdmissionPipeline` admits cookie/bearer handshakes on header presence alone** — `src/adapter/inbound/websocket/.../handshake/HandshakeAdmissionPipeline.java:131-136,140-144` - Evidence: `request.bearerToken().isPresent() ? Optional.of(anonymousReference())` (cookie branch the same); every caller gets the fixed actor `"0".repeat(64)`; comment says "the runtime replaces" it — nothing does. `grep -rn 'HandshakeAdmissionPipeline\|\.admit(' main` → no callers outside the class; no `BEARER_HEADER` test. - Why it matters: `HandshakeDecision.actor` documented as "who is connecting" — any `Authorization: Bearer x` is admitted; all users collapse into one actor (`maxConnectionsPerActor=4` becomes node-wide 4). - Fix: required `WebSocketCredentialVerifier` constructor parameter for COOKIE/BEARER; refuse 401 when absent. - Assumption / Counterargument: adopters call `admit()` without separate verification / Javadoc says verification is the security integration's job — but the return type means "verified". - Status: new 2. **[Required][correctness/security] Message/fragment limits never enforced on the servlet runtime** — `.../servlet/PlatformWebSocketHandler.java:37,84`, `.../inbound/FragmentAssembler.java:75` - Rule → Evidence: no `supportsPartialMessages()` override → Spring default `false` → `MessageHandler.Whole`, `isLast()` always true → `FragmentAssembler` returns early, never enforces `maxMessageBytes`/`maxFragments`; effective limit is Tomcat's 8 KiB default (no `maxTextMessageBufferSize`, grep 0). `WebSocketRuntimeContract.oversizedMessageClosesWith1009` passes only via the frame check. `:75` compares UTF-16 char counts against a byte budget. - Fix: `supportsPartialMessages() { return true; }`; composition sets container buffer to `maxFrameBytes`; running UTF-8 byte count; fragmented-message runtime test. - Status: new 3. **[Required][performance/security] `ReactiveFrameSink` buffer is unbounded, contradicting its own comment** — `.../webflux/ReactiveFrameSink.java:41-43` - Rule → Evidence: `Sinks.many().unicast().onBackpressureBuffer()` → reactor-core 3.8.7 `Queues.unbounded()`; `tryEmitNext` never fails, `write()` returns immediately, `releaseInFlight` returns both reservations → per-connection and node budgets do nothing on the reactive stack. No callers, no tests. - Fix: bounded `onBackpressureBuffer(Queues.get(n).get())` + slow-consumer test, or delete until the reactive stack is assembled. - Status: new 4. **[Required][correctness] `SerializedOutboundWriter.drain()` can strand a message** — `.../outbound/SerializedOutboundWriter.java:110-127,156-158` - Race: A polls empty, releases `queueLock`, still holds `writeLock`; B enqueues, `tryLock()` fails; A unlocks → B's message waits for an unrelated future offer. Javadoc `:106-108` ("nothing is stranded") false; `SerializedOutboundWriterTest.java:110` hides it by calling `drain()` manually. - Fix: after `writeLock.unlock()` recheck `queue.size()>0` under `queueLock` and loop (or WIP counter); remove the manual drain from the test. - Status: new 5. **[Required][correctness] `PlatformWebSocketHandler.stop()` runs after the web server stops** — `.../servlet/PlatformWebSocketHandler.java:162-167` - Rule → Evidence: `getPhase()` = `Integer.MIN_VALUE + 1` ("Stopped before the web server"); Spring stops higher phases first; Boot 4.0.8 `GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN_PHASE = MAX-1024`, `START_STOP_LIFECYCLE_PHASE = MAX-2048` → this bean stops last, promised 1001 never sent. `TomcatWebSocketAbuseIT.java:71` calls `stop()` directly. - Fix: phase above `GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN_PHASE` (e.g. `SmartLifecycle.DEFAULT_PHASE`); IT closes the context. - Status: new 6. **[Required][correctness] gRPC exception interceptor drops `onComplete` and late `onCancel`** — `src/adapter/inbound/grpc/.../GrpcExceptionHandlingInterceptor.java:72-86,95-97` - Rule → Evidence: `close()` sets `closed=true` on every close incl. OK; `runGuarded` returns early when closed → transport's `onComplete`/`onCancel` swallowed → grpc-stub 1.68.1 `ServerCalls` never runs `onCloseHandler`/`onCancelHandler` (`:193-215,277-307`) → streaming cleanup/metrics hooks broken. No test. - Fix: always pass `onComplete`/`onCancel` through (try/catch only); keep the gate for `onMessage`/`onHalfClose`/`onReady`; wire test asserting `setOnCloseHandler` runs. - Status: new 7. **[Required][correctness] `WebSocketSessionRegistry` register/deregister race breaks the per-actor cap** — `.../session/WebSocketSessionRegistry.java:63-64,94-100` - Race: register gets map M via `computeIfAbsent`; concurrent deregister empties M and `byActor.remove(actor, M)`; register inserts into detached M → `connectionsOf` misses it, next register creates M2 → cap exceeded. `countByEndpoint` (`:75`) same race. Test only runs concurrent registers. - Fix: register via `byActor.compute(...)` (atomic check+insert); deregister via `computeIfPresent(... isEmpty ? null : held)`; `compute`/`merge` for endpoint counter. - Status: new 8. **[Consider][correctness] Conflation replacement skips the per-connection bound; loss reported as success** — `.../outbound/OutboundQueue.java:78-79,193-210` (`replace` only checks `globalBudget.reserve`; on failure both values dropped but `offer` returns `CONFLATED`). Fix: same local check as `offer`, return `DROPPED`. Assumption/Counter: conflated values can grow / typical conflatable payloads fixed-size. 9. **[Consider][performance] `WebSocketCorrelationRegistry.countFor` scans all node in-flight entries per request** — `.../handler/WebSocketCorrelationRegistry.java:90,116-122` (O(total in-flight), check+insert not atomic). Fix: per-connection nested map and `size()`. 10. **[Consider][security] gRPC authentication policy is yes/no and swallows exceptions silently** — `.../GrpcAuthenticationInterceptor.java:35-41` (`boolean isAuthenticated(Metadata)`, no `Context` identity, `catch (RuntimeException ignored)`). Fix: `Optional authenticate(Metadata)` + `Context.Key`; WARN log without credentials. Counter: P1 is loopback-only. 11. **[Consider][performance] Live STOMP channel uses Spring's unbounded defaults** — `.../stomp/WebSocketConfig.java:57-66`, `.../stomp/LiveEventStompBroadcaster.java:174-208` (inbound `ThreadPoolTaskExecutor` `queueCapacity` = `Integer.MAX_VALUE`; synchronous `@EventListener` O(subscribers) fan-out on the publishing thread). Fix: set `queueCapacity` for inbound/outbound channels. Counter: docs label R1 best-effort. 12. **[Nit][docs]** `moduleboundary/WebSocketStableModule.java:89-90` duplicated `HANDSHAKE` Javadoc (known-open L3); both leaves' `CLAUDE.md` say Boot 4.0.0 (catalog: 4.0.8). #### Leads checked and dismissed - HARD-STOP 1-5: websocket imports only `application.realtime.*` ports and `@DomainEvent`; gRPC only `shared.error.*`; edges match modules.json. - gRPC interceptor order: authentication outermost — correct. TLS/deadlines/external bind: documented P2; loopback enforced by `@AssertTrue`. - STOMP authz: SUBSCRIBE exact match, SEND limited to `/app/`, `/app/../topic` does not reach broker; origin config rejects wildcards. - `ResumeTokenCodec` constant-time compare + expiry after signature. Rollback phantom events documented P2. M4 no regression. `LateResponseTombstone`/`FanoutDeduplicator` have eviction. #### Coverage note Read in full: entire gRPC main tree, STOMP scope, advanced STOMP/SockJS/Rabbit configs, safety configs, outbound, servlet, handshake, session, inbound, webflux sink + related tests; checked grpc-java/Spring/Reactor sources. Skimmed: codec/cbor/protobuf, evidence, release, presence, cluster, graphql-bridge. ### Group L — Composition root + sample consumer Path shorthand: `B/` = `src/app-bootstrap/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/bootstrap/`, `BR/` = `src/app-bootstrap/src/main/resources/`, `S/` = `src/sample-portfolio/`. #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | one-line reason | |---|---|---| | app-bootstrap | NEEDS_FIX | Outbox relay only scheduled when idempotency=jdbc (Critical); the prod block on error-detail exposure exists in docs, not code. | | sample-portfolio | NEEDS_FIX | Actuator loggers accept unauthenticated writes; sample dropped out of the central ArchUnit suite and its replacement has only 3 rules. | #### Findings (most severe first) 1. **[Critical][correctness] Outbox relay never runs unless idempotency provider = jdbc** — `B/autoconfigure/outbox/OutboxRelayScheduler.java:36`, `B/autoconfigure/idempotency/IdempotencyConfig.java:17-19` - Evidence: grep of all `src` for `EnableScheduling|ScheduledAnnotationBeanPostProcessor|SchedulingConfigurer` → in production code only the sample, `composition/fileserver-platform` (not shipped) and `IdempotencyConfig`, which is `@ConditionalOnProperty(...idempotency.provider, havingValue="jdbc")` with default `disabled` (`BR/config/capabilities.yml:30`). The relay is `@Scheduled` (`OutboxRelayScheduler.java:36`); `OutboxReaper` (persistence-jpa `OutboxReaper.java:39`) too. `BootstrapCapabilityReachabilitySystemTest` enables outbox only with `relay-enabled=false` and checks the scheduling processor only in the jdbc-idempotency case. - Why it matters: outbox + relay-enabled + a broker (the documented fork path) with idempotency disabled/redis/postgresql → relay bean created, never runs; events pile up PENDING, nothing logged. - Fix: `@EnableScheduling` on `OutboxConfig` (already gated by `ca-skeleton.outbox.enabled`); one `ApplicationContextRunner` test: outbox+relay on, idempotency=disabled → `SCHEDULED_ANNOTATION_PROCESSOR_BEAN_NAME` exists. - Status: new 2. **[Required][security] Prod profile claims error details are blocked; no code checks it** — `BR/application-prod.yml:13` - Evidence: comment "`StartupSafetyValidator` error-detail exposure and body-capture logging stay off"; `B/runtime/StartupSafetyValidator.java:30-32` only calls `validateMultiInstance()` (`validateProdSafety` deleted in 9da00eb7; the deleted `APP_ERROR_DETAIL_EXPOSURE_ENABLED` toggle was a no-op anyway). `BR/application.yml:26,28` lets `spring.web.error.include-stacktrace/include-message` be env-overridden in prod; grep `include-stacktrace` → only yml/.env/README; no custom `ErrorController`/`ErrorAttributes` → Boot `BasicErrorController` owns `/error`. Same false claim in `src/app-bootstrap/README.md:280-281` (contradicts `:785-788`), `src/README.md:219,223` ("5종"), `BR/config/runtime.yml:10-12`. - Why it matters: `APP_SERVER_ERROR_INCLUDE_STACKTRACE=always` in prod boots fine while docs say it is blocked. - Fix: one prod validator shaped like `JpaSchemaSafetyValidator` (exit 71 when `include-stacktrace`/`include-message` ≠ `never` or `include-exception=true`), registered in `RuntimeSafetyConfig`; fix the 4 doc locations. Unchecked: whether `/error` body is envelope-wrapped. - Status: new 3. **[Required][security] Anyone can change the sample app's log levels without auth** — `S/src/main/resources/application.yml:94` - Evidence: exposure `include: ...,loggers`, `management.endpoint.loggers.access` unset (unrestricted); `S/.../bootstrap/security/SamplePublicAccessSecurityConfig.java:24-27` `securityMatcher("/**")` + `csrf.disable()` + `permitAll()` at `@Order(-100)`; `SampleManagementSecurityConfig.java:24-27` also permitAll; `src/Dockerfile.sample:131` `EXPOSE 8080 9001`. - Why it matters: unauthenticated `POST /actuator/loggers/{name}` → TRACE (data leak) or OFF. Production denies this in `ManagementSecurityConfig`. - Fix: `management.endpoint.loggers.access: read-only`. - Status: new 4. **[Required][architecture/tests] Sample left the central ArchUnit suite; replacement does not cover HARD-STOP 2/3** — `S/src/test/java/dev/caskeleton/sample/portfolio/architecture/SampleArchitectureTest.java:25-69` - Evidence: ace8aaae deleted `sampleFixture project(':sample-portfolio')` (was `build.gradle:179` at 944a1e34); current `src/app-bootstrap/build.gradle` has 0 sample references → `DOMAIN_IS_PURE`, `WEB_DTOS_STAY_IN_WEB_ADAPTER`, `CONTROLLERS_DO_NOT_ACCESS_REPOSITORIES_OR_JPA_ENTITIES`, `APPLICATION_METHODS_DO_NOT_ACCEPT_WEB_DTOS` no longer see the sample. Replacement has 3 rules (framework bans for domain/application; web → sample persistence). Missing: domain → application/adapter/bootstrap; application → `..adapter.inbound.web..dto..`; controller → `org.springframework.data..`/`jakarta.persistence..`. Current code is clean (0 such imports). `S/CLAUDE.md:38-41` cites a non-existent rule `production_code_does_not_depend_on_sample_portfolio`. Also to check: `adapter:inbound:grpc` not on the architectureTest classpath and has 0 ArchUnit tests. - Fix: add the 3 `noClasses()` rules or `architectureTestRuntimeOnly project(':sample-portfolio')`; fix CLAUDE.md. - Assumption / Counterargument: sample is the reference adopters copy (README/CLAUDE say so) / disposable fixture. - Status: new (regression from ace8aaae) 5. **[Consider][structure] The remaining `StartupSafetyValidator` check can never fail** — `B/runtime/StartupSafetyValidator.java:42-61` (`B/autoconfigure/lock/DistributedLockConfig.java:23-29` creates `distributedLockProvider` under the same condition; missing dependency fails bean creation first; `CapabilityDependencyValidator.java:100-105` already requires JPA). Fix: delete it and the `RuntimeSafetyConfig.java:16-20` bean; #2's validator replaces it. 6. **[Consider][structure] Relational-dependency list lives in two places and has drifted** — `B/autoconfigure/jpa/DataSourceRequirement.java:28-60` vs `B/activation/CapabilityDependencyValidator.java:57-116` (Fileserver entry `:52-58` missing from the validator → fileserver on + JPA off likely fails with a missing-bean error not naming the switch, unverified; `B/runtime/SecretSourceValidator.java:39-40,93-101` always requires `APP_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD` even for a no-DB prod deployment). Fix: when `!jpa`, reject each `DataSourceRequirement.reasons(env)` (removes 4 ifs); require DB password only when `isRequired(env)`. 7. **[Consider][security/tests] Actuator endpoints that require login cannot be reached** — `B/management/security/ManagementSecurityConfig.java:25-54` (no `oauth2ResourceServer`/`httpBasic` on the actuator chain → `loggers` GET and `show-details: when-authorized` (`BR/config/observability.yml:45`) unreachable with any credential; `ActuatorSecurityHttpTest.java:95-96` injects `.with(user("ops"))` and asserts 200). Fix: drop `loggers` + `show-details: never`, or add `.oauth2ResourceServer(jwt())` and test with a real bearer token. Counter: fails closed. 8. **[Consider][sample] Sample defaults to schema settings prod forbids** — `S/src/main/resources/application.yml:45,53` (`out-of-order: true`, `ddl-auto: ...:update` on a Flyway-owned schema; `BR/application-local.yml:79-83` records this combination hid 2 mapping/migration mismatches). Fix: `validate`, `out-of-order: false`. 9. **[Nit][structure]** `B/autoconfigure/notification/NotificationApplicationCompositionAutoConfiguration.java` has 12 `@Bean`s (leaf CLAUDE.md: split at ~8), orphaned Javadoc at `:80-90`, many inline FQNs → split into submission/admin/dispatch/callback. 10. **[Nit][docs]** `BR/config/outbox.yml:7-8` says "Bound into OutboxProperties" and "NO env placeholders" (actual `OutboxSettings`, placeholders at `:18,19,22`); `BR/config/idempotency.yml:8` names non-existent `IdempotencyProperties` (→ `IdempotencySettings`); `src/app-bootstrap/README.md:7` "19개 leaf" (registry: 73; stated counts are defects); `src/app-bootstrap/CLAUDE.md:80,89` point to deleted `RedisCapabilityConfig`/`RedisKeys` in bootstrap; `S/README.md:418-420,434-437` describe the deleted `TestEnclosedConfigurationFilter` and a two-location customizer; `src/app-bootstrap/build.gradle:90-92` orphaned comment. 11. **[Nit][tests]** `src/app-bootstrap/src/test/resources/application-test.yml:113-117` sets `ca-skeleton.rate-limit.*` but the binder is `app.rate-limit` (`EdgeRateLimitTransportSettings.java:14`) — same in sample `application.yml:187-192`; `:112`/`:124` pair `api-base-path: ""` with `/api/healthcheck` (harmless, `addFilters=false`); `developer-experience/broken-readme.md` referenced by nothing (grep `broken-readme|definitelyMissingDxTask` → only itself) — delete. #### Leads checked and dismissed - All seven graph-pass leads confirmed; doc/test ones are #10/#11, the `StartupSafetyValidator` false assurance is #2. - No sample leak into production (no `allowed_dependencies` or production build.gradle reference). - `ProviderCallbackIngressBridge.java:43-88` deliberately closed as Core C2. 0-B `PersistenceJpaRootAutoConfiguration` internal-name reference resolved. - Deleted Outbox/DistributedLock/IdempotencyUniqueScope contract tests moved to persistence-jpa `postgresqlIntegrationTest`. - Sample systemTest idempotency regression looks fixed (provider=jdbc in `S/src/main/resources/application.yml:176-177` and systemTest `application-test.yml:105-106`; not run). - H5 commit inclusion can be closed (`git status --short src/app-bootstrap src/sample-portfolio` empty). `build.gradle:119-122` "Shipped so an operator can enable it" comment is known-open 0-A #2. #### Coverage note Deep: app-bootstrap main activation, runtime, outbox, idempotency, lock, notification, security, management; every `application*.yml`, `config/*.yml`, logback file; build.gradle; key ArchUnit declarations; sample entry point, bootstrap config, yml, ArchUnit test, relevant README/CLAUDE sections. Skimmed: tracing/logging/metrics code, test bodies, sample domain/application bodies (boundaries checked by grep). ### Group M — Vendored messaging platform (`messaging:*`) #### Per-leaf verdict | leaf | verdict | 한 줄 사유 | |---|---|---| | messaging-core-api | PASS | 문제 없음. 쓰이지 않는 타입 잔존 (#9) | | messaging-schema-api / -json / -avro / -protobuf | PASS | codec decode 크기 제한 있음 (avro/protobuf 훑음) | | messaging-cloudevents | PASS | 훑음. starter runtime 잔존은 known-open M13 | | messaging-policy | NEEDS_FIX | `DeadLetterOrchestrator`가 인코딩된 envelope을 `publish`로 넘김 (#1) | | messaging-transport-spi | PASS | 미사용 `MessagingLifecycle` (#9) | | messaging-runtime-core | NEEDS_FIX | #1 원인 지점, #4, #5 | | messaging-observability | PASS | 훑음 | | messaging-security | PASS | leaf 자체 이상 없음; 적용 누락은 #2 | | messaging-kafka | NEEDS_FIX | #2, #3(H6 회귀), #7 | | messaging-kafka-share-experimental | PASS | 훑음; 옛 prefix 오류 메시지 (#8) | | messaging-rabbit | PASS | 선택 경로가 막혀 도달 불가; #10 | | messaging-reliability-api | PASS | — | | messaging-outbox-jdbc-postgresql | NEEDS_FIX | #1, #4, #6 | | messaging-inbox-jdbc-postgresql | NEEDS_FIX | #6 | | messaging-claim-check | PASS | 조립처 없음; 무결성 검사 fail-closed | | messaging-admin-api / -admin-runtime | PASS | HMAC 상수시간 비교, plan digest·operation·source 바인딩 | | messaging-pulsar/nats-experimental | PASS | 훑음; SDK 없음, 기본 runtime classpath에 없음 | | messaging-spring-cloud-stream-bridge | PASS | 훑음; prefix drift (#8) | | messaging-spring-boot-starter | NEEDS_FIX | #1 조립, #5, #8 | | messaging-spring-boot-starter-kafka | NEEDS_FIX | #2, #5 | | messaging-spring-boot-starter-rabbit | PASS | validator만, broker 선택은 startup에서 거부 | | messaging-testkit | PASS | — | 실험 leaf 기본 runtime 포함 여부: starter 의존 목록에 없고 `app-bootstrap/gradle.lockfile`에 pulsar/nats/kafka-share 없음. `kafka-clients`는 test/architecture classpath에만(lockfile:203). #### Findings (심각도 순) 1. **[Critical][correctness] 플랫폼 내부 재발행 경로가 이미 인코딩된 payload를 다시 인코딩 → 전부 REJECTED** — `src/messaging/messaging-outbox-jdbc-postgresql/.../OutboxRelay.java:223-229` - Evidence: `OutboxRelay.publish`, `DeadLetterOrchestrator.java:101-104`, `KafkaRetryTopicPublisher.java:68-70` 세 곳이 `MessageEnvelope`를 `MessagePublisher.publish`로 넘김. 자동 조립 구현 `DefaultMessagePublisher`(`MessagingCoreAutoConfiguration.java:459-477`)는 `encode(message)` 무조건 호출(`DefaultMessagePublisher.java:177,303-308`) → `JacksonMessageCodec.encode`의 `registered.isInstance(payload)` 실패 → `PAYLOAD_TYPE_MISMATCH`(`JacksonMessageCodec.java:115-119`) → `PUBLISH_PREPARATION_FAILED`=REJECTED(`:178-179`) → relay가 `markFailed`로 terminal(`OutboxRelay.java:204-211`). bridge는 `publishEncoded`로 고쳐졌으나 이 세 곳은 아님. 관련 테스트(`OutboxRelayTest.java:416`, `DeadLetterOrchestratorTest`)는 가짜 publisher. - Why: platform outbox를 켜면 모든 row FAILED — business commit은 성공, 메시지는 0건. DLQ publish도 confirm 없이 영원히 requeue. - Fix: 세 호출자를 `EncodedMessagePublisher.publishEncoded`로(`messaging-schema-api` edge 허용됨); relay 뒤에 실제 `DefaultMessagePublisher`를 붙인 테스트. - Status: new 2. **[Critical][security] 검증은 통과시키는 broker 보안 설정이 실제 producer에 적용 안 됨** — `src/messaging/messaging-spring-boot-starter-kafka/.../KafkaMessagingAutoConfiguration.java:128-154` - Evidence: producer bean은 `spring.kafka.bootstrap-servers`, serializer, acks, idempotence만 설정; `KafkaSecurityConfigurer.configure` 호출 0건(bean 생성 `:109-111`뿐) → `app.messaging.security.` TLS/SASL, `app.messaging.brokers..bootstrap-servers` 미사용. per-broker `access.publishable`는 compile만(`MessagingConfigurationCompiler.java:243-246`), 실제 publish 판정은 `DeclaredDestinationAccess.of(destinations.all())`(`MessagingCoreAutoConfiguration.java:414-419`). configurer를 연결해도 SASL username에 credential 참조 id가 들어감(`KafkaSecurityConfigurer.java:149-151`). - Why: production profile이 `TLS_REQUIRED`·credential-provider 검사를 통과하지만 실제 연결은 PLAINTEXT·무인증. 보안을 검증했다는 결과만 남음. - Fix: producer config를 compile된 `KafkaBrokerProfile` + `BrokerSecurityProfile`에서 만들고 `KafkaSecurityConfigurer`로 병합, 하나라도 없으면 startup 실패; ACL은 `DestinationAccessPolicy`에 교집합; username은 provider가 반환. - Status: new (bootstrap 중복은 10-messaging §8-2에서 번호 없이 언급) 3. **[Required][correctness] handler timeout 시 취소가 아무것도 멈추지 않음** — `src/messaging/messaging-kafka/.../KafkaConsumerRegistrar.java:313-329` - Evidence: `CompletableFuture.cancel(true)`는 실행 중 작업을 인터럽트하지 않고 완료 전이면 항상 true → `!cancel && !isDone` 분기 도달 불가 → permit 즉시 반환 → `requeueAfterFailure`가 같은 offset 재읽기 → 첫 handler가 돌고 있는데 같은 메시지 재처리. 새 테스트는 `isCancelled()`만 확인(`KafkaConsumerRegistrarTest.java:201`). - Fix: handler 실제 종료(`whenComplete`) 시 permit 반환, 또는 우리가 소유한 `Future`에서 실행 후 `Future.cancel(true)`로 인터럽트; 테스트는 "첫 handler 종료 전 재dispatch 없음" 확인. - Status: regression of H6 (closed 기록, 수정 무효) 4. **[Required][correctness] admission 거부가 동기 예외로 던져져 relay pass 전체 중단, poison row 무한 반복** — `src/messaging/messaging-runtime-core/.../DefaultMessagePublisher.java:227` - Evidence: `admission.admit(...)`가 `try` 밖 → `MessageTooLargeException`/`MessageBackpressureException` 동기 throw; `OutboxRelay.runOnce`에 record 단위 catch 없음; CLAIM SQL은 `attempts` 미증가(`JdbcOutboxRepository.java:118-145`) → 크기 초과 row, 다른 writer가 넣은 reserved header row(`OutboxEnvelopeFactory.java:70-77`)가 FAILED/EXHAUSTED로 안 가고 매 lease 재claim; 같은 batch 나머지도 lease 종료까지 묶임. `OutboxRelayWorker.java:184-190`은 로그 없이 삼킴, `failedPasses()` 호출 0. relay는 REJECTED를 `retryable` 무관 terminal 처리. `DefaultBatchMessagePublisher.java:254`만 자기 쪽에서 막음. - Fix: `DefaultMessagePublisher` 안에서 admission 예외 → REJECTED(backpressure는 retryable=true); relay record별 try/catch + lease mark; 실패 pass 로그·metric. - Status: new 5. **[Required][performance] publish가 deadline 적용 전 caller thread를 최대 약 65초 막음(reactive thread 포함)** — `DefaultMessagePublisher.java:227-233` - Evidence: `InFlightLimiter` 최대 5초(`MessagingCoreAutoConfiguration.java:436-437`) + `KafkaProducer.send` metadata/buffer 대기 `max.block.ms`(기본 60초), 둘 다 `withDeadline` 전 동기. producer bean에 `MAX_BLOCK_MS` 없음(IT는 직접 설정: `KafkaAmbiguityChaosIT.java:148`, `KafkaBrokerCertificationIT.java:410`). `DefaultReactiveMessagePublisher.java:37`이 이 전체를 subscriber thread에서 실행. - Fix: `max.block.ms` ≤ publish timeout; reactive facade는 `subscribeOn(boundedElastic)` 또는 대기 없는 admission. - Status: new 6. **[Required][performance] cleanup job이 제한 없는 단일 DELETE** — `OutboxCleanupJob.java:50`, `InboxCleanupJob.java:56` - Evidence: 1-인자 `purge*Before(cutoff)` = `DELETE ... WHERE < ?` 한 번; limit CTE 버전(`JdbcOutboxRepository.java:485`, `JdbcInboxRepository.java:141`)은 main 호출 0; `InboxCleanupJob.DEFAULT_BATCH_SIZE` 미사용; javadoc은 "bounded batches". - Fix: `(cutoff, batchSize)` 버전 호출, 삭제 건수 < batch면 중지; 1-인자 버전은 port에서 제거. - Status: MSG-006 §6 불완전 종결 7. **[Required][correctness] consumer poison message가 지연 없이 무한 재시도(현재 잠재)** — `KafkaConsumerRegistrar.java:115,283-286,341,609` - Evidence: 기본 quarantine `unavailable()`; decode 실패·handler 예외 → `enqueueRequeue(Duration.ZERO)` → 즉시 seek+resume → 매 poll 같은 record, partition 영구 차단. `DefaultDeliveryProcessor.java:70-97`도 시도 제한 없이 requeue; `RetryDecisionEngine` bean 미사용. - Fix: `BackoffCalculator` 지연, 시도 한도 초과 시 DLQ/park; production profile에서 quarantine `unavailable()`이면 startup 거부. - Assumption/Counter: adopter가 README대로 consumer 직접 조립 / 유실보다 막힘이 낫다는 설계 — 단 지연 0은 그 선택의 요구 조건 아님. - Status: new 8. **[Consider][docs/config] 옛 prefix `backend.messaging` 잔존** — `messaging-spring-boot-starter/src/test/resources/application-valid.yml:6`, `application-invalid-ordering.yml`, `KafkaShareProfileValidator.java:35`, `StreamBridgePolicyGuard.java:34` (`grep -rnE "application-valid|invalid-ordering" src docs build-logic` → 과거 리뷰·plan만; 테스트 활성 profile은 `prod`/`production`뿐이라 fixture 미로드; 오류 메시지 두 곳이 `MessagingPrefixMigrationValidator`가 거부하는 키를 설정하라고 안내; `app.messaging.experimental.*` flag는 바인딩만). Fix: fixture 삭제, 메시지를 `MessagingSettings.PREFIX` 기준으로. Status: known-open L9 + 메시지 부분 new 9. **[Consider][structure] 미사용 API 타입** — `messaging-core-api/.../BatchMessageHandler.java`, `CapabilityRegistry`, `DelayedMessagePublisher`, `ManualMessageHandler`, `PauseResumeController`, `ProcessingGuarantee`, `transport-spi/.../MessagingLifecycle.java` (main 참조 0). Fix: 삭제. Counter: public surface라 breaking — 구현체 0. Status: known-open L7/L8 10. **[Consider][correctness] Rabbit publish sequence 예약 비원자적** — `RabbitMessagingTransport.java:148-161` (`nextPublishSequence()`와 `publish()` 사이 lock 없음 → 같은 sequence, `pending.put` 덮어쓰기 → 한 caller stage 미완료). Fix: `synchronized` 또는 단일 스레드 계약 명시. Counter: 현재 구현 없음·broker 선택 거부로 도달 불가. 11. **[Consider][correctness] outbox relay가 ordering key 순서를 지키지 않음** — `JdbcOutboxRepository.java:118-145` (CLAIM이 `ORDER BY created_at` + `SKIP LOCKED`, `ordering_key` 무시 → replica 여럿이거나 AMBIGUOUS row backoff 중 같은 key의 나중 row가 먼저). Fix: ordered destination + outbox 조합 startup 거부, 또는 같은 key의 더 오래된 미완료 row가 있으면 claim 안 함. Counter: relay는 "at-least-once, nothing more" 명시(`OutboxRelay.java:25-27`). #### Leads checked and dismissed - `application-valid.yml` lead: 사실 → #8. `MediaTypeVerifier`/`Sha256Verifier`/`ScriptableContentPolicy`는 `adapter/outbound/fileserver` 소속(범위 밖). - M9 spring-kafka 코드상 해소(build.gradle·lockfile grep 0; `SpringKafkaTransactionalProcessor` 이름만 오해). M13: `cloudevents-api/core`가 `app-bootstrap` productionRuntimeClasspath에 아직 있음(lockfile:85-86) — known-open. - HARD-STOP: messaging main의 domain/application/shared/adapter import 0; 모든 edge 일치. - H4(Rabbit 분류 typed), H7(종료 commit 실패), H8(replay 승인) 해소 확인. `messaging-inbox-jpa`/`messaging-outbox-jpa` 디렉터리는 gitignore된 `build/` 산출물(M16 회귀 아님). - outbox CLAIM fencing token, `next_attempt_at`, attempt budget·partial index, inbox `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` + 트랜잭션 강제 정상. #### Coverage note 깊게: runtime-core publisher, starter core/kafka/rabbit/reliability 자동 설정·provider selection, outbox relay/worker/JDBC·SQL, inbox, `KafkaConsumerRegistrar`/transport/security configurer, admission/limiter, admin guard·HMAC, claim-check. 훑음: schema codec 3종, cloudevents, observability, rabbit(transport·classifier), 실험 leaf 3개, stream bridge, testkit. ### Group N — gRPC 플랫폼 (`grpc:*` / `grpc-advanced:*`) #### Leaf별 판정 | leaf | 판정 | 이유 | | --- | --- | --- | | grpc-core-api | NEEDS_FIX | `GrpcDeadlineBudget`이 시간이 흘러도 만료되지 않음 (#2) | | grpc-policy | NEEDS_FIX | FAILED_TERMINAL 재시도 (#1), writer 백프레셔 (#6), rotation race (#5) | | grpc-operation-ledger-jpa | NEEDS_FIX | #1의 상대편 계약, claim 경로가 검증 우회 (#11) | | grpc-server | NEEDS_FIX | admission race (#5), `live()` 가드 무효 (#2) | | grpc-spring-boot-starter | NEEDS_FIX | environment 기본값 LOCAL → 설정 누락 시 보안 해제 (#3) | | grpc-admin | NEEDS_FIX | drain 이후 SERVING 복귀 race (#5) | | grpc-client | NEEDS_FIX | `rotate` get/set race (#5) | | grpc-advanced-resilience | NEEDS_FIX | resolver가 retry/hedging 설정 주입 가능 (#4) | | grpc-advanced-compat | PASS | envoy.yaml은 Consider (#8) | | grpc-advanced-streaming | PASS | Nit (#12) | | discovery, observability, codegen, proto-contract, testkit, advanced-bootstrap/diagnostics/edition | PASS | 의존 방향·순수성 확인, 큰 결함 없음 | #### 발견 (심각도 순) 1. **[Critical][correctness] FAILED_TERMINAL 뒤 재시도가 claim 없이 PROCEED** — `src/grpc/grpc-policy/…/idempotency/GrpcIdempotencyInterceptor.java:109-114` - 근거: 기존 FAILED_TERMINAL 행(insert 0행) → `decide`가 `proceed(...)` 반환(호출자가 행을 소유하지 않음) → `recordCommit` → `GrpcOperationLedgerEntity.markCommitted:123-124` → `requireInProgress()`가 `IllegalStateException`. fake `InMemoryOperationLedger.java:50-60`은 FAILED→COMMITTED 허용해 차이를 가림. JPA 테스트 `GrpcOperationLedgerRepositoryTest:190`("a failed claim is terminal")은 반대 계약 검증. - 왜 문제인가: ledger 쓰기가 business tx 안이면 키 영구 차단(모든 재시도 INTERNAL); tx 밖이면 mutation 커밋 + 행 FAILED 유지 → 다음 재시도가 같은 작업 재실행; 동시 재시도 두 개가 모두 PROCEED(원장이 막으려던 중복 실행). production caller 0(잠복, prior C1과 같은 종류). - 수정: port에 `reclaimFailed`(`UPDATE … SET state='IN_PROGRESS' … WHERE storage_key=:k AND state='FAILED_TERMINAL'`, 1행이면 소유); fake도 같은 전이 규칙; JPA·fake 공유 계약 테스트. - 상태: new 2. **[Required][correctness] `GrpcDeadlineBudget`이 생성 시점 Duration을 들고 있어 만료 미감지** — `src/grpc/grpc-core-api/…/deadline/GrpcDeadlineBudget.java:13,82-83` - 근거: `expired()`는 `remaining.isZero()`뿐(시계 입력 없음). 사용처: `GrpcRequestContext.live():84-85`, `GrpcServiceAdapter.handle:69-74`("deadline has passed" 가드), `GrpcContextSnapshot.live(now):69-71`, `GrpcClientCallContext:54`. 테스트는 `Duration.ZERO` budget만. - 왜 문제인가: 큐에서 deadline을 넘긴 호출도 use case 진입; 워커에서 `GrpcDeadlineCalculator.forDependency`가 downstream에 inbound보다 긴 deadline 부여; `GrpcRetryCoordinator` backoff 비교도 오래된 값. - 수정: 절대 시각 저장(`long deadlineNanos` + 주입 `LongSupplier`, 또는 `Instant` + `Clock`) → `remaining(now)`/`expired(now)`; 시간 경과 테스트. - 상태: new 3. **[Required][security] starter가 `environment` 미지정 시 LOCAL로 떠 보안 검사 전부 꺼짐** — `src/grpc/grpc-spring-boot-starter/…/boot/GrpcPlatformProperties.java:26` - 근거: TLS off·trust-all·reflection ENABLED 거부 검사(`GrpcPlatformStartupValidator.java:87-102`)가 모두 `tlsRequired` 조건 안; `defaultFor(LOCAL)`은 ENABLED이고 bean이 됨(`GrpcPlatformAutoConfiguration.java:86-88`); `enabled=true`만 켜고 environment 누락한 운영 배포 → schema 전체 공개 + trust-all로 통과. 테스트는 전부 environment 명시(`GrpcPlatformAutoConfigurationContextTest:35,53`). - 수정: 기본값 제거, `enabled=true`인데 environment 없으면 violation(또는 기본값 PROD). - 상태: new 4. **[Required][security] resolver service config의 retry/hedging 미검증** — `src/grpc-advanced/grpc-advanced-resilience/…/discovery/GrpcResolverSafetyPolicy.java:56-65,86-91` - 근거: `GrpcResolverUpdate.java:8-11`은 "retry policy를 사람이 쓴 것처럼 검증" 약속; 실제 검사는 authority·revision·credential 유사 문자열 정규식뿐 → `methodConfig[].retryPolicy`/`hedgingPolicy`가 `acceptedServiceConfig`로 통과; 반대로 정상인 `"retryThrottling":{"maxTokens":…}`는 `token` 부분일치로 거부. - 수정: JSON 파싱 + top-level 키 allowlist; retry/hedging은 `GrpcMethodPolicyCatalog` + `GrpcHedgingEligibility`로 검증하거나 거부; substring 정규식 삭제. - 상태: new 5. **[Required][correctness] 상태 보유 클래스들의 check-then-act / get-then-set race** - `src/grpc/grpc-server/…/GrpcAdmissionController.java:51-60`: `get() < max` 확인 후 `incrementAndGet()` → 동시 수만큼 bound 초과. - `src/grpc/grpc-policy/…/security/GrpcCredentialRotationManager.java:89-103,118-121`: `AtomicReference` get/set만 → `completeDrain`이 `rotate`와 겹치면 교체된 credential로 되돌아감; rotator 둘이 겹치면 문서(`:82`)가 금지한 역방향 rotation 통과. - `src/grpc/grpc-client/…/GrpcChannelRuntimeRegistry.java:91-103`: 같은 패턴, replacement 하나가 drain 목록에서 빠져 누수; `:114,128` synchronizedList를 락 없이 순회. - `src/grpc/grpc-admin/…/GrpcServiceHealthRegistry.java:50-53` vs `:85`: `draining` 확인과 `put(SERVING)` 사이 drain 시작 → drain 후 global SERVING(`:45` 주석이 막겠다던 상황). - `src/grpc/grpc-policy/…/streaming/GrpcStreamAdmission.java:42-49`: `computeIfAbsent`가 global bound 검사 앞 → 포화 시 거부된 신규 caller마다 count 0 엔트리 영구 잔류. - 수정: `synchronized` 또는 `updateAndGet`/CAS; `GrpcStreamAdmission`은 global 검사를 앞으로; `GrpcStreamAdmissionConcurrencyTest` 패턴으로 클래스별 동시성 테스트. - 상태: `GrpcAdmissionController` known-open(prior M1 근거에서 지목, 종결 때 `GrpcStreamAdmission`만 고침); `GrpcStreamAdmission` 잔류는 M1(b) 미완; 나머지 new. 6. **[Required][correctness] `GrpcSerializedStreamWriter`가 백프레셔 신호를 잃음** — `src/grpc/grpc-policy/…/streaming/GrpcSerializedStreamWriter.java:47,73,100-103,126-139` - 근거: (a) `LongSupplier payloadSizer`는 실제 payload 크기를 모름(테스트는 공유 `AtomicLong`을 미리 set — 동시 producer에선 다른 메시지 크기); (b) `PAUSE`를 `ACCEPTED`로 반환; (c) `flush()`가 isReady 무관하게 큐 전체 전송. `GrpcFlowControlPolicy.java:11`이 경고한 "isReady를 무시하는 writer"가 바로 이 구현. - 수정: `ToLongFunction`; `ACCEPTED_PAUSE` 결과 추가; `flush(BooleanSupplier ready)`. - 상태: H3 잔여분(`ToLongFunction` 미적용) + (b)(c) new 7. **[Consider][correctness] `GrpcContextBinder.wrap`이 io.grpc `Context`(취소·deadline)를 스레드 경계에서 버림** — `src/grpc/grpc-policy/…/context/GrpcContextBinder.java:12,60,86-98` (SNAPSHOT 값만 캡처해 실행 스레드의 `Context.current()`(보통 ROOT)에 붙임). 수정: `Context.current()` 캡처 후 `captured.wrap(work)`. 반론: platform 자체 token·`parentRemaining`은 따로 전달. 8. **[Consider][config] `envoy.yaml` 참조 설정이 그대로는 동작하지 않음** — `src/grpc-advanced/grpc-advanced-compat/src/main/resources/envoy/envoy.yaml:32-39,50-53` (`DownstreamTlsContext`에 인증서 없음 — `envoy --mode validate` 확인 필요; `allow_headers`에 `x-user-agent`, `grpc-timeout` 없음; `expose_headers`가 `error-code,error-category`인데 `GrpcErrorMapper.java:30-39` 실제 trailer는 `error-reason`, `error-execution-id`, `completion-outcome`, `grpc-status-details-bin` 미노출; `timeout: 30s`로 server stream 30초 절단; 테스트 `GrpcWebCompatibilityGateTest:124`는 부분 문자열만; main resources라 jar에 포함). 수정: test resources/docs로 이동, header 목록을 Java 상수와 대조하는 테스트, `grpc_timeout_header_max: 0s`. 9. **[Consider][architecture] starter의 미사용 의존과 아무것도 검사하지 않는 runtime 불변식** — `src/grpc/grpc-spring-boot-starter/build.gradle:21-22`, `GrpcPlatformAutoConfiguration.java:55-67,129-133` (main에서 `grpc.contract`/`grpc.codegen` import 0; `requireValid(..., Set.of())`로 advanced 격리 검사 항상 통과; `requireStableStarterIsClean` main caller 0 → `src/grpc/CLAUDE.md` "runtime에 강제" 설명 거짓; server profile bean이 `stableNetty` 값을 리터럴 복사). 수정: 두 edge + registry edge 삭제, 파라미터·`validateAdvancedIsolation` 삭제(Gradle gate 기준), 문서 정정, 팩토리 재사용. 반론: reflection에 descriptor 필요 가능. 10. **[Consider][structure] 같은 한계값이 여러 곳에 따로 정의** — 1 MiB/8192가 `GrpcServerProfile:70-71`, starter `:59-60`, `GrpcMessageSizeProfile:43`, `GrpcNamedChannelProfile:80-81,95-96`, `GrpcMetadataBudget:33`에 각각(정합 검사 없음); `GrpcStreamProfile`은 자기 테스트에서만 참조, `GrpcFlowControlPolicy`의 256/8MiB 복제. grpc-policy 62파일 규모 자체는 과하지 않음(실제 비용은 production 조립 부재로 fake가 실제 adapter와 달라지는 것, #1). 수정: `GrpcTransportLimits` 하나로, validator에 "method profile ≤ server profile", `GrpcStreamProfile` 삭제. 11. **[Consider][correctness] ledger claim 경로가 entity 검증 우회, storage_key가 컬럼 길이 초과 가능** — `src/grpc/grpc-operation-ledger-jpa/…/JpaGrpcOperationLedger.java:39-53` (native insert가 `sha256:` 형식 검증 안 거침; `callerFingerprint` 길이 무제한 → storageKey 최대 585자 vs `VARCHAR(512)`; insert 0행 + 조회 실패를 소유 획득으로 처리). 수정: `claim()`에서 형식 검증, fingerprint ≤256자, 키 해시로 고정 길이, 0행+조회 실패는 예외. 12. **[Nit][performance]** `GrpcClientMessageDeduplicator.java:11-17,75,112` ("constant space"라지만 outcome이 세션 내내 누적, `endSession`이 O(N) `removeIf`); `ReactiveGrpcClient.serverStream:50`은 List 래퍼일 뿐(삭제). #### 확인했지만 문제 없던 항목 - HARD-STOP 1-5: core-api 의존 0, framework-free 5개 leaf에 외부 import 없음, 모든 edge 허용, grpc→advanced 참조 0. - 0-A/0-B(ledger IT CI 미호출) 닫힘: `optional-platforms/build.gradle` `integrationCheck` + `integration-main.yml:313`. H3, M2 회귀 없음. - ledger SQL named param, `ON CONFLICT`가 PK·unique 모두 커버; NON_IDEMPOTENT retry 차단, hedging은 READ_ONLY unary만; `mapUnknown` description opaque; envoy admin 블록 없음·CORS exact; resume token HMAC + 상수시간 비교; `GrpcDrainCoordinator` 미거부는 prior §2에 기록됨. #### 커버리지 자세히: ledger-jpa 전체, grpc-policy idempotency/streaming/context/deadline/error/security/resilience, server 핵심, starter 전체, admin, client, advanced resilience/diagnostics/compat + envoy, 944a1e34 이후 바뀐 main 파일 전부. 훑음: codegen, proto-contract validator, observability, edition, bootstrap, testkit. ### Group O — 빌드 시스템, 아키텍처 registry, 의존성 게이트 #### 영역별 판정 | area | verdict | 이유 | |---|---|---| | root lifecycle / settings | NEEDS_FIX | `ca.developer-bootstrap`가 설정 단계에서 실패해 Docker/release 이미지 빌드 불가 | | CI workflows | BLOCKED | `redis-sdk` job이 항상 실패 → `release-gate` 매번 빨간불 | | architecture gates (build-logic) | NEEDS_FIX | 방향·purity 게이트 정상. `verifyNoIgnoredSourcePackages`는 범위가 좁고 git 오류 시 통과(fail-open) | | conventions (java/quality/lanes) | PASS | 품질 도구 배선이 리팩터 전 groovy 버전과 같고 약화 없음 | | modules.json / leaf build.gradle | NEEDS_FIX | registry 밖 production edge 0건. app-bootstrap test 입력 미선언, 좌표 중복 | | build-tools | PASS | 전부 fail-closed. 중복·규모는 known-open | | supply chain | PASS (Consider) | 버전 고정 + STRICT lock 있음, checksum 검증 없음 | #### Findings (심각도 순) 1. **[Critical][correctness] root plugin 적용 시점에 compose overlay가 없으면 빌드 전체 실패** — `src/build-logic/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/buildlogic/bootstrap/DeveloperBootstrapPlugin.java:40-50` - Evidence: `apply()` 안에서 `../docker-compose..yml`이 없으면 `GradleException`. root에서 적용(`src/build.gradle:29`). release는 context `src`로 `docker build --file src/Dockerfile ... src`(`.github/workflows/release.yml:329-338`); Dockerfile은 `WORKDIR /build/src`(`src/Dockerfile:29`)에서 `RUN ./gradlew verifyDependencyLocks`(`:57-60`) — `/build/docker-compose.local.yml`은 존재할 수 없음. 208077fd에서 추가. - Why: root 설정 단계에서 죽어 어떤 task도 실행 안 됨 → release 이미지 빌드 차단, Dockerfile 헤더의 로컬 명령도 실패. - Fix: overlay 확인을 `bootstrapDockerPreflight`의 `doFirst`로 이동, `apply()`는 부수효과 없음; TestKit 회귀 케이스(compose 파일 없는 root에서 `help` 성공). - Status: new (regression 208077fd) 2. **[Critical][CI] `redis-sdk` job은 통과 불가, `release-gate`가 이 job의 success를 요구** — `.github/workflows/ci-quality-gates.yml:120`, `.github/workflows/_reusable-gradle.yml:58-63` - Evidence: 입력 `":shared-contract:test --tests '*EdgeRateLimitProviderNeutralContractTest'"`를 reusable workflow가 `./gradlew ${GRADLE_TASKS}`로 따옴표 없이 펼침 → bash는 확장 결과의 따옴표를 제거하지 않음(`printf '[%s]'` 재현 → `['*EdgeRateLimitProviderNeutralContractTest']`) → 어떤 클래스와도 매칭 안 됨 → `failOnNoMatchingTests` 기본값으로 실패. `release-gate`는 `REDIS_RESULT == success` 요구(`:240,246-258`). 9da00eb7에서 변경. 이 클래스는 tag가 없어 이미 `:ci` → `:shared-contract:check` → `test`로 실행되므로 job 자체가 중복. - Fix: `redis-sdk` job과 `release-gate` 해당 줄 삭제(남긴다면 따옴표 제거). - Status: new (regression 9da00eb7). CI 미실행, bash/Gradle 동작에서 도출. 3. **[Required][HARD-STOP 6] "Git이 커밋할 수 있는 소스" 게이트가 main/test만 보고 git 오류 시 통과** — `ArchitecturePlugin.java:191-203`, `VerifyNoIgnoredSourcePackagesTask.java:70-87,102-119` - Evidence: 대상이 `List.of("src/main/java","src/test/java")` 하드코딩 → 나머지 Java source root 45개(testFixtures 10, integrationTest 10, systemTest 5, architectureTest 등; H9가 다룬 종류) 미검사. `git rev-parse`/`check-ignore` exit code 무시 → 128(fatal)이면 stdout 비어 "not a Git checkout" 또는 위반 0으로 통과; `IOException`도 null → 통과. `optional-platforms`의 `ci`는 이 task에 의존하지 않아 grpc 소스 미검사. 테스트 0(`grep -rl IgnoredSource build-logic/src/test app-bootstrap/src build-tools/src/test`). - Fix: 모든 project `sourceSets*.java.srcDirs` 수집; `.git`이 있는데 git이 0/1 외 코드로 끝나거나 실행 파일이 없으면 실패; `integrationTest`에 ignore 대상 패키지를 넣은 TestKit 케이스. - Status: new (groovy 시절부터의 공백, regression 아님) 4. **[Required][correctness/cache] app-bootstrap `test`가 선언하지 않은 저장소 파일을 읽음 → 로컬 UP-TO-DATE 거짓 통과** — `src/app-bootstrap/build.gradle:270-287` - Evidence: `ca.repository.root`로 `docs/runbooks/**`(`RunbookCoverageContractTest.java:129`, `ContainerRuntimeOomContractTest.java:110`), `src/.env.example`(`EnvProfileMatrixContractTest.java:30`)을 읽는데 선언 입력은 `docs/registries`뿐(`:282`). `org.gradle.caching=true`에서 runbook만 수정하면 `:app-bootstrap:test` UP-TO-DATE. 같은 패턴 `adapter/outbound/messaging/build.gradle:30-34`(schema 경로 sysprop, `inputs.file` 없음). CI에선 `GITHUB_SHA` → version `0.0.1+`(`ReleaseProvenancePlugin.java:24-37`) → 모든 jar manifest(`JavaConventionsPlugin.java:45-48,66-75`) → 커밋마다 test runtime classpath가 달라 cache miss(가려짐; CI의 test/SpotBugs cache 이득 0). cache를 살리려고 `normalization.runtimeClasspath.metaInf.ignoreAttribute`를 넣는 순간 거짓 통과가 CI로 이동. - Fix: `inputs.dir(docs/runbooks)`, `inputs.file(src/.env.example)`(RELATIVE), messaging `inputs.file(schema)` 선언 후 manifest normalization 검토. - Assumption/Counter: setup-gradle이 `caches/build-cache-1`을 유지 / 유지하지 않아도 로컬 focused test 거짓 통과만으로 HARD-STOP 6 위험. - Status: new 5. **[Consider][supply chain] artifact checksum 검증 없음, included build 의존성 미lock** — `src/gradle/`, `src/build-logic/settings.gradle:6-9`, `src/build-tools/settings.gradle` (`verification-metadata.xml` 없음; build-logic은 spotless/spotbugs/errorprone/dependency-management plugin을 lock·hash 없이 `gradlePluginPortal`에서; `settings-gradle.lockfile`은 catalog만). Fix: `--write-verification-metadata sha256` 커밋, build-logic/build-tools `dependencyLocking`. Counter: Trivy·dependency-review·고정 버전이 CVE 위험은 막음, metadata 갱신 부담. 6. **[Consider][correctness] 프로젝트 좌표 `dev.caskeleton:messaging-kafka` 중복** — `:adapter:outbound:messaging-kafka`(9da00eb7) vs `:messaging:messaging-kafka` (같은 이름, 같은 group(`JavaConventionsPlugin.java:44`); `VerifyDependencyPolicyTask`는 `group:name` 매칭이라 구분 불가; 같은 jar 파일명 → 한 composition에 둘 다 들어가면 `BOOT-INF/lib` 충돌; Gradle 충돌 해결이 둘을 합치는지 미확인). Fix: adapter leaf 이름 변경(예: `:adapter:outbound:kafka-sender`) + modules.json·디렉터리. 7. **[Consider][simplicity] runtime membership 검사가 방향 게이트와 중복** — `RuntimeMembershipPlugin.java:35-44`, `VerifyCompositionRuntimeMembershipTask.java:166-188` ("등록된" 집합 = sample 제외 main 모듈 전부; settings는 registry 모듈만 include(`ModuleRegistrySettingsInstaller.java:278-280`) → "미등록" 가능한 건 `:sample-portfolio`뿐이고 방향 게이트가 이미 차단; build-logic README의 "registry's memberships" 필드는 없음). Fix: plugin, alias task, `ArchitecturePlugin.java:216-225`, `ConditionalTransportQualificationPlugin.java:56` 연결 삭제. Counter: 싸고 미래 보호막. 8. **[Consider][simplicity] "지정 테스트가 실행됐고 skip 없음" 검사 구현이 5개** — `ca.strict-test-lane` `requires`/`rejectSkipped`; `ca.strict-qualification`(RequiredClasses task + listener + XML 재검사, 10개 leaf); `ConditionalTransportQualificationPlugin` XML 재읽기; `GraphQlPlatformPlugin` `graphqlStableTest` 자체 XML 검사; build-tools `JUnitEvidenceReader`(build-logic `JUnitEvidence` 복사본, README는 "one JUnit XML reader"). 규모: build-logic main 83파일/5,995 LOC, build-tools 98파일/5,888 LOC. Fix: 모두 `strictTestLanes { lane { requires ...; rejectSkipped = true } }`로, 나머지 삭제. Status: known-open (13-build §0-A/0-B) 9. **[Consider][performance] quarantine job이 테스트 0개를 돌리려고 저장소 전체 컴파일** — `ci-quality-gates.yml:212-217`, `src/build.gradle:88-92`, `JavaConventionsPlugin.java:149-165` (leaf마다 test JVM, up-to-date 판정 없음; `Tag("quarantine")` 0건). Fix: job·task 삭제, 첫 quarantine 테스트 때 재추가. 10. **[Nit][readability]** httpclient가 같은 sysprop 3줄을 7번 반복(`adapter/outbound/httpclient/build.gradle:131-229`); `-Duser.timezone=UTC`가 leaf build 파일에 18번 → `JavaConventionsPlugin`에 `withType(Test).configureEach { systemProperty 'user.timezone','UTC' }` 한 번(jvmArgs 아님 — `StrictTestLanePlugin.java:176-178` `setJvmArgs`가 덮어씀). 11. **[Nit][docs]** CLAUDE.md `ci` 정의에 `sampleWebContractCheck`(`build.gradle:146`) 누락, `verifyDependencyLocks`는 `ci` 밖(workflow에서만, `ci-quality-gates.yml:62`); `libs.versions.toml:27-31`은 BOM override가 `src/build.gradle`에 이유와 함께 있다고 적었지만 실제 `JavaConventionsPlugin.java:90-92`이고 이유 사라짐, `netty.version`은 Boot 4.0.8 BOM 값(4.2.17.Final)과 같아 무효; `optional-platforms/README.md:3` 모듈 개수("18") 기재(no-count 규칙 위반). #### 확인했지만 문제 아닌 것 - M6 (parallel): 방향/purity/membership task가 소유 project 안에서 `Provider`로 resolve(`ArchitecturePlugin.java:96-189`), `parallel=true` — 닫힌 것으로 보임(`--parallel` TestKit 없음). - H9 (commit 포함): untracked는 graphify-out/.playwright-mcp뿐, 모든 leaf에 lockfile — 닫힌 것으로 보임. - 이전 H1/H2, gRPC ledger lane 호출자: 닫힘. - 정적 edge 감사: 모든 leaf ` project(...)`를 스크립트로 registry와 대조 → 허용 밖 production edge 0. - 품질 게이트 약화 없음(checkstyle severity=error라 `maxWarnings=MAX` 무영향; errorprone/`-Werror`/`ignoreFailures`/`onlyIf` 해제 0). build-logic/build-tools catch 블록 전부 재던짐/실패. - tree-sitter 파싱 실패 22건: 유효한 Groovy(파서 한계); `fileserver/build.gradle:10`의 `\`만 불필요. - wrapper sha256 검증, action SHA 고정; quarantine·http3 job은 의도된 advisory. #### 커버리지 깊게: root build/settings/properties, ArchitecturePlugin·task들, ModuleRegistry, RuntimeMembership, Java/Quality conventions, StrictTestLane/StrictQualification, DependencyPolicy, ReleaseProvenance, DeveloperBootstrap, ci-quality-gates·reusable workflow, Dockerfile builder stage, 큰 leaf build 4개, modules.json(스크립트). 훑음: build-tools, 나머지 leaf, integration/release workflow.