DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5
0cd959a494
The review found one defect shape repeated across the platform: surfaces that were declared, bound, and documented, but that nothing read. An operator configuring fullUrlRecording, bodyLogging, retry.policy, validatedDnsPinning, timeout.dns, or any of ten declared metric names got a guarantee the code never delivered. Every such surface is now in exactly one of three states -- wired for real, rejected at startup, or registered in a test-enforced gap list with its reason. No silent no-ops remain. P0: - Activate the platform from bootstrap behind app.httpclient.enabled, with a single auto-configuration importing the nine child configurations. - Give the platform a strict, repository-level ENV contract: 74 leaf fields derived from the settings record tree, unknown APP_HTTPCLIENT_* rejected. - Route typed HTTP service clients through the call kernel via KernelHttpExchangeAdapter, so they stop bypassing platform policy. - Pin dynamic-target DNS resolution to the socket for the life of a call, closing the resolve-then-connect TOCTOU / rebinding window. - Actually transmit the idempotency key, and make retry eligibility depend on transmission rather than on merely holding one. - Reject reactive authentication and reactive redirect at startup instead of declaring support that does not function. - Fix the Reactor-only Stable contract row so the lane stops failing. - Stop advertising HTTP/3 on a transport that negotiates HTTP/1. P1 covers execution and retry accounting, redirect security (per-hop target guarding, sensitive-header stripping, 303 body handling), runtime rotation and transport resource ownership keyed by generation, dynamic-target hardening (subdomain matching, global-unicast classification, strict CIDR parsing), protocol intent, pool and timeout wiring, streaming and body limits, observability parity, and OAuth single-flight refresh on a bounded pool with a bounded wait. P2 covers configuration and documentation drift, the Gradle check wiring for the four hermetic lanes, and the CI gate matrix. Two test-quality defects surfaced while closing these: the HTTP/2 stream saturation test ran against cleartext HTTP/1.1 while asserting nothing about the protocol, and an OAuth contention test slept on a latch that could fire before the callers it meant to observe. Both now assert what their names claim. Verification run: :adapter:outbound:httpclient:check and :app-bootstrap:check (checkstyle, spotless, spotbugs, and the four hermetic lanes), verifyCleanArchitectureDependencies, verifyEnvKeys, verifyOneTypePerFile, verifyDependencyLocks, the documentation and gate-matrix verifiers, and the performance lane against a real TLS+ALPN HTTP/2 server. Not executed, and tracked rather than claimed: Docker/Toxiproxy fault injection, JMH, a real QUIC/HTTP3 server, a real Spring Framework 6.2 distribution (now a delegated-pending gate), live OAuth/TLS/proxy/DNS integration, and a whole-repository check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ACL accounts
One file per CommandAccess level. Each account is deliberately narrower than the SDK's own rules:
the account is the last enforcement boundary and a permit issued inside the process never widens it,
so a mistake in the SDK is still refused by the server.
A Redis ACL file accepts nothing but complete user lines — no comments and no line continuations —
which is why the rationale lives here instead of inline. Password material is supplied at deploy
time; none of these files carries one.
| File | Account | Grants |
|---|---|---|
application.acl |
CommandAccess.APPLICATION |
the typed data-structure commands over prod:*, with the dangerous and deprecated names denied |
application-advanced.acl |
APPLICATION_ADVANCED |
the above plus pub/sub, transactions, and the registered-script path. EVAL is absent: only EVALSHA of an already loaded digest is reachable |
raw-gateway.acl |
RAW_GATEWAY |
exactly the commands the catalog classifies RAW_ONLY, and nothing else |
all-accounts.acl |
– | the four accounts concatenated; Redis takes one aclfile, so this is what a deployment loads |
admin-readonly.acl |
ADMIN_READONLY |
read-only diagnostics. Every destructive counterpart is denied here and blocked in the command policy catalog — two independent controls for the same rule |