Files
clean-architecture-backend-…/scripts/ci/trivy-scan.sh
T
DongHyeonka cfc80ae8d4
pr / done (pull_request) Failing after 12m44s
build(release): 기본 이미지를 noble로 올리고 이미지 검사를 취약점과 라이선스로 나눈다
문제: release 수동 실행(run 62)의 app-image-release가 Trivy에서 실패한다. 기본
이미지 eclipse-temurin:21-jre-jammy(ubuntu 22.04)에 고친 버전이 있는 OS 취약점
HIGH 7건(apt, libssl3/openssl, libbrotli1 등)과 OS 패키지 라이선스 HIGH 370건이
걸렸다. 앱 jar는 0건이다.

고른 방법(2026-11-11 소유자 결정 「권하는 안」):
- builder·runtime을 eclipse-temurin:21-{jdk,jre}-noble(ubuntu 24.04.5)의
  2026-10-29 digest로 올린다. noble 이미지에는 uid·gid 1000인 `ubuntu` 계정이
  있어, 앱 계정(uid 1000)을 만들기 전에 지운다. wget(healthcheck)과 C.UTF-8은
  noble에도 있다(desktop에서 확인).
- 취약점: OS·앱 모두 High/Critical이면 실패를 유지한다. 고친 버전이 있으면
  새 digest로 고치고, 아직 없는 것만 .trivyignore.yaml에 만료일 예외로 둔다.
- 라이선스: 앱 의존성(`--pkg-types library`)의 금지 라이선스(Trivy CRITICAL)만
  실패. OS 패키지 것을 포함한 나머지는 보고만 한다.
- 정책 문서(.github/dependency-vulnerability-policy.md)에 같은 내용을 적는다.

위험·한계: noble로 바꾸며 아직 고친 버전이 없는 High가 새로 보일 수 있다.
그때는 이유와 만료일을 달아 예외로 둔다. PR의 filesystem 검사는 그대로라
앱 의존성의 restricted(HIGH) 라이선스는 PR에서 여전히 막힌다.

검증: runner release 수동 실행의 app-image-release(이 PR 본문에 적는다),
desktop compose smoke(같은 Dockerfile로 qualification 이미지를 만든다).
2026-11-12 01:18:24 +09:00

120 lines
6.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Vulnerability gate, shared by the stage workflows. Called by .gitea/workflows/pr.yml and main.yml
# (`filesystem`) and release.yml (`image <reference>`); not by Gradle and not on the desktop, because
# it downloads and installs its tools (docs/work/operate.md 4.1).
#
# bash scripts/ci/trivy-scan.sh filesystem dependency tree: block High/Critical, report
# Medium/Low, fail on any CISA KEV match
# bash scripts/ci/trivy-scan.sh image <reference> release image: write image-sbom.cdx.json,
# block High/Critical vulnerabilities and
# forbidden application licenses, report the rest
#
# Tools are pinned release binaries with an asserted SHA-256, installed under RUNNER_TEMP (or a
# temporary directory): a checksum is a supply-chain claim that can be checked offline, an action
# pinned to a commit is not. .trivyignore.yaml is the one suppression source; each entry carries a
# reason and an expiry by policy (.github/dependency-vulnerability-policy.md).
# Optional mirrors: TRIVY_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL, JQ_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL, KEV_FEED_URL.
set -euo pipefail
readonly TRIVY_VERSION='0.71.2'
readonly TRIVY_SHA256_AMD64='0510e71e2fd39bf863856d499c8dc19feb4e7336546394c502a8f5cc7ab27460'
readonly TRIVY_SHA256_ARM64='fe1c7106e15a5365d485b098a8c338f91e3b7ba71cb0e4963b98a3a098763cfc'
readonly JQ_VERSION='1.8.1'
readonly JQ_SHA256_AMD64='020468de7539ce70ef1bceaf7cde2e8c4f2ca6c3afb84642aabc5c97d9fc2a0d'
readonly JQ_SHA256_ARM64='6bc62f25981328edd3cfcfe6fe51b073f2d7e7710d7ef7fcdac28d4e384fc3d4'
readonly DEFAULT_KEV_FEED_URL='https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json'
cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.."
tools="$(mktemp -d "${RUNNER_TEMP:-/tmp}/trivy-scan.XXXXXX")"
trap 'rm -rf "${tools}"' EXIT
download() { # url, sha256, destination
curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 "$1" --output "$3"
printf '%s %s\n' "$2" "$3" | sha256sum -c -
}
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64 | amd64) trivy_arch='64bit'; trivy_sha="${TRIVY_SHA256_AMD64}"; jq_asset='jq-linux-amd64'; jq_sha="${JQ_SHA256_AMD64}" ;;
aarch64 | arm64) trivy_arch='ARM64'; trivy_sha="${TRIVY_SHA256_ARM64}"; jq_asset='jq-linux-arm64'; jq_sha="${JQ_SHA256_ARM64}" ;;
*) echo "trivy-scan: unsupported architecture $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
download "${TRIVY_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL:-https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-${trivy_arch}.tar.gz" \
"${trivy_sha}" "${tools}/trivy.tar.gz"
tar -xzf "${tools}/trivy.tar.gz" -C "${tools}" trivy
download "${JQ_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL:-https://github.com/jqlang/jq/releases/download/jq-${JQ_VERSION}}/${jq_asset}" \
"${jq_sha}" "${tools}/jq"
chmod 0755 "${tools}/trivy" "${tools}/jq"
export PATH="${tools}:${PATH}"
[ "$(jq --version)" = "jq-${JQ_VERSION}" ] || { echo "trivy-scan: unexpected $(jq --version)" >&2; exit 1; }
scan_filesystem() {
trivy fs --scanners vuln,license --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --exit-code 1 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml .
trivy fs --scanners vuln,license --severity MEDIUM,LOW --exit-code 0 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml .
trivy fs --scanners vuln --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW,UNKNOWN --exit-code 0 \
--ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml --format json --output "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" .
# A KEV-listed vulnerability fails regardless of its CVSS score. The feed and the scan are both
# checked for shape first: an empty or malformed input would otherwise intersect to nothing and
# print "no catalog match" for a check that never ran.
if ! curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --retry 3 --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \
"${KEV_FEED_URL:-${DEFAULT_KEV_FEED_URL}}" --output "${tools}/kev.json"; then
echo "trivy-scan: KEV feed unavailable; set KEV_FEED_URL to an approved mirror" >&2
exit 1
fi
jq -e '
(.catalogVersion | type == "string" and test("\\S"))
and (.dateReleased | type == "string" and test("\\S"))
and (.count | type == "number")
and (.count > 0)
and (.count == (.count | floor))
and (.vulnerabilities | type == "array")
and ((.vulnerabilities | length) > 0)
and (.count == (.vulnerabilities | length))
and (all(.vulnerabilities[]; (.cveID | type == "string" and test("^CVE-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4,}$"))))
and (([.vulnerabilities[].cveID] | unique | length) == .count)
' "${tools}/kev.json" > /dev/null || { echo "trivy-scan: the KEV feed is malformed" >&2; exit 1; }
jq -e '
(type == "object")
and (.Results | type == "array")
and ((.Results | length) > 0)
and (all(.Results[]; type == "object"))
and (all(.Results[]; (.Vulnerabilities == null) or (.Vulnerabilities | type == "array")))
and (all(.Results[]; all(.Vulnerabilities[]?;
(type == "object") and (.VulnerabilityID | type == "string" and test("\\S")))))
' "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" > /dev/null || { echo "trivy-scan: the Trivy KEV input is malformed" >&2; exit 1; }
jq -r '[.Results[]?.Vulnerabilities[]?.VulnerabilityID] | unique[]' "${tools}/trivy-kev.json" | sort -u > "${tools}/found.txt"
jq -r '.vulnerabilities[].cveID' "${tools}/kev.json" | sort -u > "${tools}/kev.txt"
hits="$(comm -12 "${tools}/found.txt" "${tools}/kev.txt")"
if [ -n "${hits}" ]; then
printf 'trivy-scan: CISA KEV-listed vulnerability found regardless of CVSS:\n%s\n' "${hits}" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "trivy-scan: no KEV catalog match."
}
# The image scan sees the base image's OS packages, which the filesystem scan cannot. The SBOM is
# written before the blocking scan, so the inventory survives the run that refuses to publish.
scan_image() {
trivy image --format cyclonedx --scanners license --output image-sbom.cdx.json "$1"
test -s image-sbom.cdx.json
# Vulnerabilities, OS and application packages alike: High or Critical fails the release. A
# finding with a fix is fixed (a newer base image digest or dependency); one with no fix yet is
# carried in .trivyignore.yaml with its expiry (owner decision 2026-11-11).
trivy image --scanners vuln --severity CRITICAL,HIGH --exit-code 1 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1"
trivy image --scanners vuln --severity MEDIUM,LOW --exit-code 0 --ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1"
# Licenses (same decision): an application dependency under a forbidden license (Trivy's
# CRITICAL) fails the release. Every other license finding, the OS packages' included, is
# reported and does not block: a distribution's GPL packages are not this application's terms.
trivy image --scanners license --pkg-types library --severity CRITICAL --exit-code 1 \
--ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1"
trivy image --scanners license --severity HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW,UNKNOWN --exit-code 0 \
--ignorefile .trivyignore.yaml "$1"
}
case "${1:-}" in
filesystem) scan_filesystem ;;
image) scan_image "${2:?image reference}" ;;
*) sed -n '2,13p' "$0" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac