ACL accounts
One file per CommandAccess level. Each account is deliberately narrower than the SDK's own rules:
the account is the last enforcement boundary and a permit issued inside the process never widens it,
so a mistake in the SDK is still refused by the server.
A Redis ACL file accepts nothing but complete user lines — no comments and no line continuations —
which is why the rationale lives here instead of inline.
Every account here carries a fixture password (fixture-*). None of them is a deployment
credential and none is read by anything but the local lanes; a deployment replaces the whole file
with one whose passwords come from its secret store. They are written down rather than left as
nopass because an account that accepts any password makes every assertion about authentication
pass for the same reason a typo would have — and because these files are what a fork copies. The
four per-role files carried nopass long after all-accounts.acl, the file a deployment actually
loads, had been fixed; a fork that copied one of them got an open account and a green lane.
| File | Account | Grants |
|---|---|---|
application.acl |
CommandAccess.APPLICATION |
the typed data-structure commands over prod:*, with the dangerous and deprecated names denied |
application-advanced.acl |
APPLICATION_ADVANCED |
the above plus pub/sub, transactions, and the registered-script path. EVAL is absent: only EVALSHA of an already loaded digest is reachable. +time is granted because the rate-limit and idempotency scripts read the server clock with redis.call('TIME'), and TIME is in no data category (@read/@write): without it every such script fails with an ACL error. The startup SCRIPT probe runs TIME so a template missing it fails at boot |
raw-gateway.acl |
RAW_GATEWAY |
exactly the commands the catalog classifies RAW_ONLY, and nothing else |
all-accounts.acl |
– | the four accounts concatenated; Redis takes one aclfile, so this is what a deployment loads |
admin-readonly.acl |
ADMIN_READONLY |
read-only diagnostics. Every destructive counterpart is denied here and blocked in the command policy catalog — two independent controls for the same rule |