문제: 앞 커밋 뒤에도 알림·파일 서버 묶음이 합쳐지지 않았고, 포트 다수에 fake와 실제 구현이 함께 통과하는 공유 계약이 없었고, SpotBugs가 신뢰도 HIGH만 봤고, application-core에 관계없는 클래스 묶음 패키지(outbound)가 있었다. 묶음을 합치자 lane·검사가 새로 드러낸 결함도 있었다(JpaOutbox Store가 읽기 전용 트랜잭션에서 이벤트를 조용히 잃음, gRPC admission controller가 public synchronized라 외부 lock에 막힘, 소비자 decode 타입 등록 경로 없음, compose Redis 익명 접근, local-fileserver lane DB 없음). 방법: 리뷰 README 15절에 남은 결정을 모두 적고 그대로 고쳤다. 트랜잭션· 멱등성·발행·notification 포트에 testFixtures 계약 키트를 두고 fake와 PG·Redis 구현이 상속한다(fake 변이로 계약이 잡는지 확인). SpotBugs는 MEDIUM으로 내리고 진짜 결함은 고치고 오탐은 위치·패턴별 이유를 단 제외로 처리했다. 업무 기능 패키지 규칙을 application-core/CLAUDE.md에 정본으로 두고 ArchUnit 2개와 생성 명령이 강제한다. compose Redis는 infra/redis-sdk ACL로 뜬다. 묶음별 결과는 리뷰 README 16절에 있다. 위험·한계: APP_FLYWAY_ENABLED가 dev·prod에도 적용된다. app.security 오타 키가 이제 기동을 막는다. SES 콜백 replay 창 기본값이 1시간이다. 템플릿 패키지 목록은 CLAUDE.md 표와 TemplatePackageOwnership 두 곳에 있고 일치 검사는 없다. 실제 CI runner 실행은 확인하지 못했다. 검증: ci, mainCheck, integrationCheck, -p optional-platforms ci integrationCheck, performanceCheck, releaseCheck(-PgitRevision), verify-compose-profile-contracts(18 lane) 통과. compose lane 실제 기동: local-fileserver, notification ingest·serving·handoff, local-redis, all-adapters(smoke 3개 포함). Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-01-maturity-review/README.md 15·16절 BREAKING CHANGE: APP_FLYWAY_ENABLED가 dev·prod 프로필에도 적용되고, app.security의 모르는 키는 기동을 거부한다. MessageHandler에 schemaVersions()가 생겨 decode 목록을 handler 선언에서 만든다.
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HTTP Client Platform — Configuration Reference
Every outbound call resolves exactly one Named Client Profile. The whole capability lives under
the app.httpclient prefix: profiles under app.httpclient.clients[N], Dynamic Target policies
under app.httpclient.dynamic-targets[N].
Design §30.1 forbids a production profile from inheriting large framework defaults. Anything a
production deployment must decide has either no default or an unusable one, and
HttpClientStartupValidator fails the context rather than guessing.
The master switch
| Property | Type | Default | Environment |
|---|---|---|---|
app.httpclient.enabled |
boolean | true |
APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED |
The module is on when present: a service adds runtimeOnly project(':adapter:outbound:httpclient')
to app-bootstrap/build.gradle, and the module's own config/module-defaults/httpclient.yml (loaded at the lowest
precedence by the support leaf's ModuleDefaultsEnvironmentPostProcessor) supplies enabled: true. Absent from the
build is the ordinary off state. false is the explicit off: HttpClientPlatformAutoConfiguration
is then never processed and neither is anything it imports — no property is bound, and no transport
provider, connection pool, TLS context, credential, thread, gateway or actuator endpoint exists. A
malformed HTTP client setting cannot fail the startup of a deployment that switched it off.
Anything that is not exactly true — yes, 1, blank — turns the platform off. On with no client
declared is a startup failure carrying HTTPCLIENT_ACTIVE_WITHOUT_CLIENTS: a platform with nothing
to call still holds transport providers and gateways no caller can reach.
Declaring clients from the environment
Clients are an indexed list carrying their own name, not a map keyed by name. A map key becomes a
segment of the environment variable and the relaxed binder normalises it, so payment-api and
payment_api would arrive as one entry with nothing said about the one that was lost. Both a
duplicate name and a name that collides once normalised fail startup.
APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED=true
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_NAME=payment
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_BASE_URL=https://payment.example
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_ALLOWED_HOSTS_0=payment.example
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_ALLOWED_PORTS_0=443
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES=1048576
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_TLS_PROFILE_ID=payment
APP_HTTPCLIENT_DYNAMIC_TARGETS_0_NAME=webhook
APP_HTTPCLIENT_DYNAMIC_TARGETS_0_ALLOWED_SCHEMES_0=https
docs/httpclient/env-fields.yaml is the registry of accepted variable names. It is
derived from the settings record and held to it in both directions, and the platform refuses to
start on an APP_HTTPCLIENT_ variable that is not in it — so
APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_TIMEUOT_TOTAL_CALL fails startup instead of silently leaving the client
on its default budget. Unknown keys supplied through a configuration file rather than the
environment are refused by strict binding for the same reason.
Only APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED appears in src/.env and docs/registries/env-keys.yaml. It is the
one key with a deployment-independent value; templating an indexed client in application.yml would
materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validation refuses.
app.httpclient.clients[N]
| Property | Type | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
name |
string | — | Required, unique, and distinct from every other name once normalised for the environment |
mode |
TRUSTED | DYNAMIC |
TRUSTED |
A dynamic profile may not carry a default credential |
base-url |
URI | — | Required for a trusted profile; no userinfo, no query |
allowed-hosts |
list | empty | Required in production |
allowed-ports |
list | empty | Compared against the effective port |
transport |
APACHE | JDK | JETTY | SIMPLE |
APACHE |
SIMPLE is rejected in production; JETTY needs a deployment-registered provider |
protocols |
list | HTTP_1_1 |
The default transport is Apache, whose classic client is HTTP/1.1 only; a profile that wants HTTP/2 declares it together with a transport that can deliver it. HTTP_3 requires the experimental acknowledgement |
experimental-acknowledgement |
string | — | Must equal I_ACCEPT_HTTP3_EXPERIMENTAL_SEMANTICS |
pool
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
max-total-connections |
50 |
Socket ceiling for the runtime |
max-connections-per-route |
25 |
Per-upstream ceiling |
max-pending-acquires |
100 |
Waiting-request memory ceiling |
pending-acquire-timeout |
200ms |
Pool or stream wait ceiling |
max-idle-time |
30s |
Idle eviction |
max-life-time |
5m |
Picks up DNS, load-balancer, and certificate changes |
validate-after-inactivity |
5s |
Stale and half-open detection |
requires-route-pool |
false |
Set when route-scoped limits are mandatory; the JDK transport then refuses the profile |
requires-bounded-pending-queue |
false |
Same, for a bounded pending queue |
timeout
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
dns |
300ms |
Hostname resolution |
connect |
500ms |
Socket connect |
tls-handshake |
1s |
TLS and ALPN |
response-header |
2s |
Until final response headers |
read-idle |
3s |
Between response chunks |
total-call |
4s |
The whole logical call, including retry backoff |
total-call must not be shorter than connect or response-header; the validator emits
INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET otherwise. Every timeout above, and pool.pending-acquire-timeout, must be
greater than zero (TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE): both engines read zero as "wait forever".
total-call also bounds the setup of a streaming download — connect, send, and the wait for
response headers. Once the stream is handed over, each gap of the body is bounded by read-idle
instead, so a long download is not cut at an arbitrary total (design §15.3).
Removed settings
Six keys were removed because they were bound and reached no transport (review 2026-11-01 05-15).
Setting one now fails startup with a bind error naming the key (The elements [app.httpclient.clients[0].timeout.request-write-idle] were left unbound.), instead of being
accepted and ignored.
| Removed key | Why |
|---|---|
timeout.request-write-idle |
Neither engine can bound a blocking socket write |
timeout.proxy-connect, proxy.connect-timeout |
The TCP connect to a proxy is governed by timeout.connect |
pool.eviction-interval |
Apache's idle evictor runs at max-idle-time |
pool.shutdown-timeout |
A retired runtime drains for app.httpclient.rotation-drain-timeout |
observability.operation-name-required |
An operation name is mandatory in the API; the switch could only be true |
circuit-breaker
What counts as a failure is fixed: a 5xx, 408 or 429 response — whether the call throws or returns it as a result — and every transport failure. Every other 4xx is a healthy answer. These settings only say how many failures, out of how many calls, open the circuit. Defaults are Resilience4j's own, which every profile ran with before the keys existed.
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
failure-rate-threshold |
50 |
Percent of failed calls in the window that opens the circuit, 1–100 |
minimum-number-of-calls |
100 |
Calls recorded before the rate is evaluated; at most sliding-window-size |
sliding-window-size |
100 |
The last N calls the rate is computed over (count-based) |
wait-duration-in-open-state |
60s |
How long an open circuit rejects before trial calls; positive |
permitted-calls-in-half-open-state |
10 |
Trial calls while half-open; at least 1 |
An out-of-range value fails startup with CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID. The breaker belongs to
the profile, not to a runtime generation, so a certificate rotation keeps its state.
redirect, request, response
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
redirect.enabled |
false |
Engine redirect handling is always off; the platform follows hops itself |
redirect.max-hops |
0 |
Enabling redirects with zero hops is a configuration error |
redirect.allow-cross-origin |
false |
When enabled, credentials are stripped on the hop |
request.max-body-bytes |
0 |
Required in production |
request.compression |
false |
|
response.max-wire-bytes |
5242880 |
Bytes on the wire |
response.max-decoded-bytes |
10485760 |
Bytes after decoding; hard maximum is 64 MiB |
response.allowed-content-types |
JSON + problem+json | Empty means "any" |
authentication
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
type |
NONE |
One of the design §20.1 methods |
registration-id |
— | Required for OAuth2 |
scopes |
empty | Part of the token cache key |
audience |
— | Part of the token cache key |
header-name |
— | Required for API_KEY_HEADER; must be on the allowlist |
secret-reference |
— | Resolved by the deployment's secret loader, never a literal |
retry
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
policy |
none |
Named policy for reporting |
max-attempts |
1 |
Attempts, not retries; at most 5 (RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED) |
base-backoff |
50ms |
|
max-backoff |
200ms |
|
jitter |
FULL |
NONE | FULL | DECORRELATED |
retry-after |
HONOR |
HONOR | IGNORE | CAP |
budget |
— | Shared token bucket name. A retrying profile that names none gets its own bucket, with the same pool-derived capacity (max-total-connections / 10, at least 1, refilled each minute) |
tls
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
profile-id |
— | Required in production; the only TLS identifier the actuator exposes |
protocols |
TLSv1.3, TLSv1.2 |
Anything else is rejected |
hostname-verification |
true |
Setting it false fails startup |
trust-all |
false |
Exists only so the unsafe intent is rejectable; nothing acts on true |
allow-plain-http |
false |
Plaintext fallback fails startup in production |
trust-material-reference |
— | Custom CA, resolved by the secret loader |
key-material-reference |
— | Client certificate for mTLS |
proxy and observability
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
proxy.enabled |
false |
|
proxy.host / proxy.port / proxy.type |
— / 0 / HTTP |
|
proxy.credential-provider |
— | Proxy authentication is separate from target authentication |
proxy.import-ambient-no-proxy |
false |
Ambient NO_PROXY never widens a validated profile |
observability.full-url-recording |
false |
|
observability.body-logging |
false |
app.httpclient.dynamic-targets[N]
| Property | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
name |
— | Required, unique, and subject to the same normalisation rule as a client name |
allowed-schemes |
https |
|
allowed-ports |
443 |
|
allowed-host-suffixes |
empty | |
allowed-hosts |
empty | Empty means "any host that survives address validation" |
max-redirect-hops |
0 |
Each hop repeats the full validation flow |
trace-propagation |
false |
Off by default for dynamic targets |
blocked-cidrs |
empty | Organisation-defined internal ranges |
Startup violation codes
TRUSTED_BASE_URL_REQUIRED, BASE_URL_USERINFO_FORBIDDEN, BASE_URL_QUERY_FORBIDDEN,
PLAINTEXT_PRODUCTION_TARGET, ALLOWED_HOST_MISMATCH, ALLOWED_PORT_MISMATCH,
REDIRECT_POLICY_INVALID, REDIRECT_CROSS_ORIGIN_CREDENTIAL_POLICY_REQUIRED,
INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET, RESPONSE_HARD_MAXIMUM_EXCEEDED, PRODUCTION_SIMPLE_FACTORY_FORBIDDEN,
JDK_FINE_GRAINED_POOL_UNSUPPORTED, HTTP3_STABLE_FORBIDDEN,
DYNAMIC_TARGET_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED, DYNAMIC_DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_FORBIDDEN,
OAUTH2_REGISTRATION_REQUIRED, API_KEY_HEADER_NAME_REQUIRED, TRUST_ALL_FORBIDDEN,
HOSTNAME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED, PLAINTEXT_FALLBACK_FORBIDDEN, TLS_PROTOCOL_FORBIDDEN,
RETRY_BACKOFF_REQUIRED, MISSING_PRODUCTION_SETTING, DUPLICATE_CLIENT_NAME,
HTTPCLIENT_ACTIVE_WITHOUT_CLIENTS, DYNAMIC_BASE_URL_REQUIRED,
DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED,
HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED, POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL,
TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED,
RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS, FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN, BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN,
DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED, PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED, PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED,
TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE, RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED, CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID.
A key that names no setting is not a violation code: the shared strict binder
(adapter:outbound:support StrictSettingsBinder) refuses it while binding, at any depth. Spring's
own unbound-key check stops at the first level under a list element, so clients[0].timeout.<typo>
used to bind nothing and fail nothing; the binder now refuses a key under clients[N] or
dynamic-targets[N] that bound nothing, for every capability rather than for this platform alone
(review 2026-11-01 05-15). The platform's own guard for it, and its HTTPCLIENT_UNKNOWN_SETTING
code, were removed with that change.
DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED, PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED and PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED name settings the platform binds but cannot yet honour. Neither the Apache classic
client nor the JDK client exposes a DNS-resolution timeout, and no proxy-credential path exists, so
a non-default value is refused rather than accepted and ignored. Leaving the defaults alone is
unaffected — only a deliberate, unmet request fails.
Three of these are about a guarantee that used to be silently unmet rather than refused:
HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED— declaringprotocols: [HTTP_2]alone states that HTTP/2 is required. No transport can be configured to offer H2 and nothing else; the JDK client treats it as a preference and negotiates HTTP/1.1, and Apache's classic client is HTTP/1.1 only.POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL— a per-route ceiling above the total is incoherent.TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED— an emptytls.protocolsused to pass and then let the JVM choose, so emptying the list to "tighten" a profile loosened it.RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS—retry.policywas read by nothing on the execution path, so the actuator could reportnonefor a profile retrying three times. The two settings must now agree:policy: nonerequiresmax-attempts: 1, and any other policy requires more than one.FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN/BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN— both settings were bindable and inert. Recording an expanded URL puts path identifiers and query strings into unbounded metric tags; recording bodies puts someone else's data into logs. Representable so the intent is rejectable, refused under a production profile.
DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED is worth spelling out: a forward proxy resolves the hostname on
its own side, so the addresses this platform validated and pinned are not the addresses the
connection reaches. The SSRF defence would be present, correct, and bypassed — so the combination is
refused rather than served with a guarantee it cannot keep.