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clean-architecture-backend-…/docs/jpa/security.md
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DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5.5 6d27356e2b refactor: 부가 기능을 capability 모듈로 포장하고 기본 조립을 web-only로 전환
설계: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging-design.md
계획/진행 기록: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging.md

- Wave 0: 규칙 고정(AGENTS.md capability 완료 기준·테스트 규칙) + 차단 결함 7건
  (compose overlay 검사, redis-sdk CI job, 적용된 V9/V13 원복 + V16, @EnableScheduling,
  messaging bridge 순서, prod 에러 상세 validator, sample loggers read-only)
- Wave 1: 데이터·보안 Critical 10건 (durable operation 25P02, operation 유스케이스 이동,
  outbox 재인코딩, Kafka TLS/SASL, 알림 트랜잭션, SNS 서명, tus checksum, GraphQL fragment,
  Redis lane, gRPC FAILED_TERMINAL)
- Wave 2: 리팩터링 잔재·실험용 자리 삭제, outbox v1 fencing(V17), 멱등성 V2 정본화
- Wave 3: 라이브러리형 코드 정리(동작하지 않는 설정·인터페이스·gate 제거, web-advanced 분리)
- Wave 4: capability 11개를 "있으면 켜짐" 모듈로 포장, 끄는 장치 제거, 기본 조립 web-only,
  qualificationBootJar 분리
- Wave 5: 빌드 로직 축소(17.2k -> 10.8k줄), sample 테스트 컨벤션 적용

삭제한 코드는 docs/capability-status.md "제거된 코드" 표에 복구 커밋(208077fd)과 함께 기록.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 12:49:07 +09:00

2.7 KiB

Security

Design §36. Credential separation, privilege verification, and what never leaves the process.

Three credentials

Role May
app_migration own the schema, apply migrations (DDL)
app_runtime select, insert, update, delete (DML only)
app_admin J4 operations — COPY, backfill, maintenance

The separation is what makes "Flyway owns schema change" enforceable rather than aspirational. If the application's own credential cannot execute DDL, then no code path, no library, and no injected statement can alter the schema at runtime, regardless of what the application intended.

infra/jpa/roles/runtime-roles.sql provisions them.

Startup verification

PostgreSqlRuntimeRoleVerifier asks the server what the connection can do:

select current_user,
       current_setting('search_path'),
       has_schema_privilege(current_user, current_schema(), 'CREATE'),
       has_database_privilege(current_user, current_database(), 'CREATE')

Configuration cannot answer this. Effective privileges come from direct grants, inherited role memberships, PUBLIC grants, and schema ownership, and no reading of a deployment manifest reconstructs that combination reliably.

Startup fails when the runtime role is not on the allowlist, or holds CREATE on the schema or the database.

search_path

SearchPathPolicy is an allowlist. search_path decides which schema an unqualified name resolves to, so a writable untrusted schema on it — classically public, where CREATE was granted broadly before PostgreSQL 15 — lets a planted table, function, or operator shadow the real one, and the application executes it without noticing. $user is exempt: only the connected role owns it.

Refusing the runtime role CREATE closes the same route from the other side.

What never leaves the process

  • SQL parameter values, entity ids, tenant ids, and PII: not in exception messages, not in metric tags, not in logs. JpaFailureContext composes messages from bounded values only.
  • Constraint names reach the application as registered ConstraintCodes; an unregistered physical name maps to a bounded unknown code rather than being passed through.
  • Cursors are HMAC-signed. An unsigned cursor is client-controlled ordering state.
  • The actuator report carries no JDBC URL, username, or SQL.

Injection surfaces, and how each is closed

Surface Why it cannot be a parameter Closed by
sort field part of ORDER BY SafeSortRegistry allowlist
JSON path part of the statement registered JsonPathName
schema name an identifier registered SchemaTenantRegistry
COPY table an identifier registered RegisteredCopyStatement

Values are always bound. Identifiers are always registered.