문제: 성숙도 리뷰 수정을 다시 읽은 재리뷰(Critical 0, 회귀 0)가 Important 27건·Minor 41건을 찾았다. 수정이 새로 만든 결함이 많았다. @SystemInvoked가 권한 규칙의 탈출구가 됐고, 데모 계정 거부가 정확히 prod일 때만 걸렸고, outbox 순서 번호가 업그레이드 때 뒤로 갔고, GraphQL union 아래 복잡도가 0이었고, 서블릿 오류 응답이 success:true로 나갔고, 호출자 deadline이 breaker를 열었다. 원래 리뷰 색인이 06 영역 발견 5건(06-10~14)을 빠뜨려 그동안 처리되지 않았다. 방법: 영역별 7묶음이 test-driven-development 절차로 실패 테스트를 먼저 쓰고 고쳤다. 결정은 재리뷰 README 4절에 적었다: 순서 번호는 V21이 기록한 전역 floor부터, 데모 계정은 local·test·demo 허용 목록, @SystemInvoked bean은 기동 실패, complete 단계 실패는 IDEMPOTENCY_COMPLETION_UNKNOWN(결과 불명), 캐시 조건부 쓰기는 별도 SCRIPT lane, strict lane 정책은 build cache 입력, 끝나지 않는 재시도 행은 원인 코드·지표·PARKED 절차. 레지스트리가 선언만 하고 아무 코드도 내보내지 않던 redis.capability.* 지표 6개는 빼고 runbook을 실제 지표(redis.lane.*) 기준으로 고쳤다. 위험·한계: V21을 V22 없이 직접 고쳤다(어느 배포에도 아직 없음). 이 브랜치의 V21을 적용한 개발 DB는 다시 만들어야 한다. 서블릿 오류 디스패치를 보안 체인이 허용한다. 발행·저장소 포트 시그니처가 바뀌어 파생 서비스 코드가 깨진다. prod에서 fixture-로 시작하는 설정값은 기동을 막는다. httpclient failure-injection lane의 main 단계 중복 실행은 이전 결정대로 남겼다. 실제 CI runner 실행은 확인하지 못했다. 검증: ci, mainCheck, :integrationCheck, -p optional-platforms ci integrationCheck performanceCheck, :performanceCheck, :releaseCheck (-PgitRevision), verify-compose-profile-contracts(18 lane) 통과. 첫 실행의 실패 2건(FindSecBugs 1, sample 동시 생성 테스트의 v4 event id)은 고친 뒤 ci·integrationCheck·mainCheck를 다시 돌려 통과했다. Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-03-rereview/README.md 3·4·6·7절 BREAKING CHANGE: outbox 발행 포트와 저장소 포트 시그니처, 순서 번호 첫 값(V21 floor 다음), 샘플 데모 계정 프로필 허용 목록, 새 오류 코드 IDEMPOTENCY_COMPLETION_UNKNOWN, prod의 fixture- 값 거부, 기동 rule은 static·의존 없음이어야 한다.
ACL accounts — test fixtures, not a deployment file
Nothing in this directory is loaded by a deployment. Every file here is a fixture for the local
and test lanes: its passwords are public (fixture-*, written in this repository), and
lane-fixture-accounts.acl also provisions three accounts that only a lane topology needs — among
them ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap, which has ~* &* +@all, every command on every key. Loaded into
a real Redis, that line alone gives anyone who can reach the server and read this repository full
control of it (CONFIG, MODULE, every key). A deployment writes its own ACL file of the same
shape: the application accounts it actually uses, passwords from its secret store, and none of the
lane-only accounts (review 2026-11-03 RR-07-04). The application enforces its half of that: under
the prod runtime profile it refuses to start while any setting or environment variable holds a
value beginning with fixture- (SecretSourceValidator), so a deployment that copied a lane's
REDIS_LANE_* values stops before it connects.
One file per CommandAccess level. Each account is deliberately narrower than the SDK's own rules:
the account is the last enforcement boundary and a permit issued inside the process never widens it,
so a mistake in the SDK is still refused by the server.
A Redis ACL file accepts nothing but complete user lines — no comments and no line continuations —
which is why the rationale lives here instead of inline.
Every account here carries a fixture password (fixture-*). They are written down rather than
left as nopass because an account that accepts any password makes every assertion about
authentication pass for the same reason a typo would have — and because these files are what a fork
copies. The four per-role files carried nopass long after the combined lane file had been fixed;
a fork that copied one of them got an open account and a green lane.
| File | Account | Grants |
|---|---|---|
application.acl |
CommandAccess.APPLICATION |
the typed data-structure commands over prod:*, with the dangerous and deprecated names denied |
application-advanced.acl |
APPLICATION_ADVANCED |
the above plus pub/sub, transactions, and the registered-script path. EVAL is absent: only EVALSHA of an already loaded digest is reachable. +time is granted because the rate-limit and idempotency scripts read the server clock with redis.call('TIME'), and TIME is in no data category (@read/@write): without it every such script fails with an ACL error. The startup SCRIPT probe runs TIME so a template missing it fails at boot |
raw-gateway.acl |
RAW_GATEWAY |
exactly the commands the catalog classifies RAW_ONLY, and nothing else |
lane-fixture-accounts.acl |
– | what the lanes load (Redis takes one aclfile): user default off, the four per-role accounts of this table, and three lane-only accounts — ca-skeleton-replication (replica sync) and ca-skeleton-sentinel for the replicated and sentinel topologies, ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap (+@all) to create the cluster lane's slots. Never a deployment file |
admin-readonly.acl |
ADMIN_READONLY |
read-only diagnostics. Every destructive counterpart is denied here and blocked in the command policy catalog — two independent controls for the same rule |
Who loads lane-fixture-accounts.acl
The Redis topology lanes (../standalone, ../sentinel, ../cluster, ../tls) and the
application's Compose lanes that switch Redis on (local-redis, all-adapters in
src/config/runtime/compose-profile-contracts.json). Both mount this directory read-only; neither
keeps a copy, because a second copy of these lines is a second place for a password or a key
pattern to drift.
The Compose lanes connect the application as ca-skeleton-application and
ca-skeleton-application-advanced, through secret://<account>@environment/<variable> references
whose variables carry the fixture passwords above. They run with the Redis namespace environment
prod, because every account here is fenced to ~prod:*. scripts/verify-compose-profile-contracts.sh
compares each Redis lane's references, passwords and namespace with the account lines in this file,
so changing a password or a key pattern here without the lanes fails that check rather than the
lane's first command.