refactor: generate CI workflow from gate contracts
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
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import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
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import { constants } from "node:fs";
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import { access, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import {
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provenanceProviderAttestationSchema,
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vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema,
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} from "./lib/provider-evidence.ts";
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import { validateProviderUpload } from "./lib/provider-upload-validator.ts";
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import { writeValidatedJsonArtifact } from "./lib/validated-json-artifact.ts";
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import {
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assertSafePublishLeaf,
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ensureSafePublishDirectory,
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} from "./lib/ci-gate-log.ts";
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const kind = process.argv[process.argv.indexOf("--kind") + 1];
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if (kind !== "vulnerability" && kind !== "provenance") {
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process.stderr.write("Usage: run-and-validate-provider --kind vulnerability|provenance\n");
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process.exit(2);
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}
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const command =
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kind === "vulnerability"
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? process.env.VULNERABILITY_PROVIDER_COMMAND
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: process.env.PROVENANCE_PROVIDER_COMMAND;
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const reportPath =
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kind === "vulnerability"
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? process.env.VULNERABILITY_REPORT_PATH
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: process.env.PROVENANCE_ATTESTATION_PATH;
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const sealedPath = process.env.VALIDATED_PROVIDER_REPORT_PATH;
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const candidateLockfile = process.env.CANDIDATE_LOCKFILE_PATH;
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const archivePath = process.env.CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_PATH;
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const archiveSha256 = process.env.CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_SHA256;
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const candidateDistSha256 = process.env.CANDIDATE_DIST_SHA256;
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if (
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!command ||
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!reportPath ||
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!sealedPath ||
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!candidateLockfile ||
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!archivePath ||
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!archiveSha256 ||
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!candidateDistSha256
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) {
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process.stderr.write("Provider supervisor environment is incomplete\n");
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process.exit(2);
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}
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const workspaceRoot = process.cwd();
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const reportAbsolute = path.resolve(reportPath);
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const rawDirectory = path.dirname(reportAbsolute);
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const sealedAbsolute = path.resolve(sealedPath);
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if (
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path.basename(rawDirectory) !== "untrusted" ||
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path.dirname(rawDirectory) !== path.dirname(sealedAbsolute) ||
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reportAbsolute === sealedAbsolute
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) {
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throw new TypeError("provider raw and sealed evidence paths are not isolated");
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}
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await prepareMissingProviderOutput(workspaceRoot, reportAbsolute, reportPath, "raw provider report");
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await prepareMissingProviderOutput(workspaceRoot, sealedAbsolute, sealedPath, "sealed provider report");
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await access("/usr/bin/bwrap", constants.X_OK).catch(() => {
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throw new Error("provider sandbox unavailable: /usr/bin/bwrap is required");
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});
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const childEnvironment = createProviderEnvironment(kind, reportPath, {
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candidateLockfile,
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archivePath,
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archiveSha256,
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candidateDistSha256,
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});
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await runProviderInSandbox(command, childEnvironment, rawDirectory, workspaceRoot);
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const parsed = await validateProviderUpload({
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kind,
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candidateRoot: path.dirname(path.resolve(candidateLockfile)),
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archivePath,
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expectedArchiveSha256: archiveSha256,
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reportPath,
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workspaceRoot,
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expectedDistSha256: candidateDistSha256,
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});
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await assertSafePublishLeaf(sealedAbsolute, sealedPath);
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await writeValidatedJsonArtifact({
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path: sealedPath,
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schema:
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kind === "vulnerability"
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? vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema
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: provenanceProviderAttestationSchema,
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value: parsed,
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});
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process.stdout.write(`${kind} provider supervised validation: PASS\n`);
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function createProviderEnvironment(
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providerKind: "vulnerability" | "provenance",
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rawReportPath: string,
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candidate: Readonly<{
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candidateLockfile: string;
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archivePath: string;
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archiveSha256: string;
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candidateDistSha256: string;
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}>,
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): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
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const environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {
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PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
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HOME: "/tmp/provider-home",
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TMPDIR: "/tmp",
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CI: "true",
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GITHUB_ENV: "/tmp/github-env",
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GITHUB_PATH: "/tmp/github-path",
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CANDIDATE_LOCKFILE_PATH: candidate.candidateLockfile,
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CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_PATH: candidate.archivePath,
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CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_SHA256: candidate.archiveSha256,
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CANDIDATE_DIST_SHA256: candidate.candidateDistSha256,
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...(providerKind === "vulnerability"
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? { VULNERABILITY_REPORT_PATH: rawReportPath }
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: { PROVENANCE_ATTESTATION_PATH: rawReportPath }),
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};
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for (const name of ["LANG", "LC_ALL", "HTTP_PROXY", "HTTPS_PROXY", "NO_PROXY"] as const) {
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if (process.env[name]) environment[name] = process.env[name];
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}
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const credentialPrefix = `${providerKind.toUpperCase()}_PROVIDER_`;
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for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
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if (name.startsWith(credentialPrefix) && !name.endsWith("_COMMAND") && value) {
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environment[name] = value;
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}
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}
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return environment;
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}
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async function runProviderInSandbox(
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command: string,
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environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
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rawDirectory: string,
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workspaceRoot: string,
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): Promise<void> {
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const scratch = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ci-provider-sandbox-"));
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try {
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await mkdir(path.join(scratch, "provider-home"));
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await writeFile(path.join(scratch, "node"), "", { mode: 0o500 });
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const arguments_ = [
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"--die-with-parent",
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"--new-session",
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"--as-pid-1",
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"--unshare-pid",
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"--unshare-ipc",
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"--unshare-uts",
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"--dev", "/dev",
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"--proc", "/proc",
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"--bind", scratch, "/tmp",
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"--dir", "/etc",
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];
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for (const source of ["/usr", "/bin", "/lib", "/lib64"]) {
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if (await exists(source)) arguments_.push("--ro-bind", source, source);
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}
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// setup-node commonly installs outside /usr. Expose only the exact trusted
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// runtime binary, never its credential-bearing user/toolcache directory.
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arguments_.push("--ro-bind", process.execPath, "/tmp/node");
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for (const source of [
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"/etc/ca-certificates",
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"/etc/ssl",
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"/etc/resolv.conf",
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"/etc/hosts",
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"/etc/nsswitch.conf",
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"/etc/passwd",
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"/etc/group",
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]) {
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if (await exists(source)) arguments_.push("--ro-bind", source, source);
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}
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for (const directory of missingDestinationAncestors(workspaceRoot)) {
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arguments_.push("--dir", directory);
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}
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arguments_.push(
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"--ro-bind", workspaceRoot, workspaceRoot,
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);
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if (await exists(path.join(workspaceRoot, ".git"))) {
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arguments_.push("--tmpfs", path.join(workspaceRoot, ".git"));
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}
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arguments_.push(
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"--bind", rawDirectory, rawDirectory,
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"--chdir", workspaceRoot,
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"/bin/sh", "-eu", "-c", command,
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);
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await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn("/usr/bin/bwrap", arguments_, {
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env: { ...environment, PATH: `/tmp:${environment.PATH ?? ""}` },
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stdio: "inherit",
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});
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let settled = false;
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const finish = (error?: Error): void => {
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if (settled) return;
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settled = true;
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clearTimeout(timeout);
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error ? reject(error) : resolve();
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};
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
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child.kill("SIGKILL");
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finish(new Error("sandboxed external provider command timed out"));
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}, 30 * 60 * 1_000);
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child.once("error", (error) => finish(error));
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child.once("close", (code, signal) => {
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if (code === 0 && signal === null) finish();
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else finish(new Error(`sandboxed external provider failed: exit=${code ?? "none"}, signal=${signal ?? "none"}`));
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});
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});
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} finally {
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await rm(scratch, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}
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function missingDestinationAncestors(target: string): string[] {
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const ancestors: string[] = [];
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let current = path.dirname(path.resolve(target));
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while (current !== path.parse(current).root && !["/usr", "/bin", "/lib", "/lib64", "/tmp"].includes(current)) {
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ancestors.push(current);
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current = path.dirname(current);
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}
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return ancestors.reverse();
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}
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async function exists(target: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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await lstat(target);
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return true;
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} catch (error) {
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if (hasErrorCode(error, "ENOENT")) return false;
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throw error;
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}
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}
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async function prepareMissingProviderOutput(
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root: string,
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absolutePath: string,
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configuredPath: string,
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label: string,
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): Promise<void> {
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await ensureSafePublishDirectory(root, path.dirname(absolutePath));
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await assertSafePublishLeaf(absolutePath, configuredPath);
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try {
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await lstat(absolutePath);
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throw new Error(`${label} already exists: ${configuredPath}`);
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} catch (error) {
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if (!hasErrorCode(error, "ENOENT")) throw error;
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}
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}
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function hasErrorCode(error: unknown, code: string): boolean {
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return Boolean(error && typeof error === "object" && "code" in error && error.code === code);
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}
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