fix(ci): 배포 슬롯이 승격 후보를 받게 하고 secret을 deploy 단계에만 준다

문제: (1) 배포 슬롯 계약은 단계 종류만 제한하고 "마지막이 deploy 하나"만
강제했다. checkout → setup-node → frozen-install → deploy(script)처럼
후보 archive를 받지 않고 다시 빌드하는 슬롯도 check:ci를 통과했고,
생성된 job 이름은 그대로 deploy-promoted-release였다(리뷰 실험 E-3).
(2) 생성기는 슬롯의 환경 바인딩을 job 수준 env:로 썼다. 그래서
secrets.* 배포 자격 증명이 checkout, setup-node, frozen-install과
제3자 download action에도 보였다.

고른 방법: (1) deploy 단계에 script가 있으면 promoted-release 전송 하나만
download하고, 그 경로의 release-candidate.tar.gz를 extract하고,
CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_SHA256을 immutable_build의 digest로 바인딩해야 한다.
extract는 verify-ci-candidate-archive.ts가 digest로 확인한다. 빈 슬롯은
그대로 허용한다. (2) 배포 슬롯의 secrets.* 바인딩은 deploy 단계의 env:로만
렌더링한다. vars.*와 후보 digest는 job 수준에 남는다(extract가 digest를
쓴다).
버린 대안: 슬롯 단계를 템플릿이 통째로 고정하기. 다음 커밋의 제품
overlay가 채우는 모양을 고정하고, gates.json으로 채우는 길은 이 규칙으로
막는다.

위험·한계: 슬롯이 받은 파일을 deploy 스크립트가 실제로 올리는지는 계약이
볼 수 없다. 그것은 FE-GATE-019의 config.json·entry 대조(앞 커밋)가 결과로
본다. 템플릿 슬롯은 비어 있어 생성 workflow 바이트는 바뀌지 않는다.

검증: ci-workflow-generation.test.ts에 후보 없이 deploy하는 슬롯과
digest 없이 extract하는 슬롯의 거절, secret이 deploy 단계 env에만 한 번
나오는 것을 더했다(고치기 전 3건 실패). 425건 통과. check:ci PASS,
CI workflow bytes PASS.

Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-03-maturity-review/13-build-release-supply-chain.md 13-01, 13-05
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-11-04 20:43:19 +09:00
parent 4bce8bf379
commit 2e12d2f0d1
4 changed files with 87 additions and 5 deletions
+42
View File
@@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ function validateContractSemantics(
if (duplicate || foreign.length > 0) {
issue(`deployment slot binding must be the candidate digest or a vars.* or secrets.* value: ${job.id}`);
}
for (const failure of deploymentSlotInputFailures(job)) issue(failure);
} else if (duplicate || JSON.stringify(job.environment) !== JSON.stringify(expectedEnvironmentBindings[job.id])) {
issue(`job environment binding drift: ${job.id}`);
}
@@ -1244,6 +1245,47 @@ function validateCanonicalStepFields(
}
}
/**
* 1103/13-01. A slot that runs a deploy script deploys the promoted candidate:
* it downloads the promoted-release transfer and extracts its
* release-candidate.tar.gz, checked against the digest immutable_build
* recorded, before the script runs. A slot that rebuilt instead passed the
* contract under the name deploy-promoted-release, and FE-GATE-019 could not
* tell the rebuild from the candidate.
*/
function deploymentSlotInputFailures(job: z.infer<typeof jobSchema>): string[] {
const deploy = job.steps.find((step) => step.kind === "deploy");
if (deploy?.kind !== "deploy" || deploy.script === undefined) return [];
const failures: string[] = [];
const downloads = job.steps.filter((step) => step.kind === "download");
const download = downloads[0];
const extract = job.steps.find((step) => step.kind === "extract");
if (
downloads.length !== 1 ||
download?.kind !== "download" ||
download.transferId !== "promoted-release" ||
extract?.kind !== "extract" ||
extract.archivePath !== `${download.path}/release-candidate.tar.gz` ||
job.steps.indexOf(download) > job.steps.indexOf(extract)
) {
failures.push(
`deployment slot with a deploy script must download only the promoted-release transfer and extract its release-candidate.tar.gz before deploying: ${job.id}`,
);
}
if (
!job.environment.some(
({ name, value }) =>
name === "CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_SHA256" &&
value === "${{ needs.immutable_build.outputs.archive_sha256 }}",
)
) {
failures.push(
`deployment slot with a deploy script must bind CANDIDATE_ARCHIVE_SHA256 so its extract step checks the promoted archive: ${job.id}`,
);
}
return failures;
}
function validateJobStepKinds(
job: z.infer<typeof jobSchema>,
issue: (message: string, path?: PropertyKey[]) => void,
+19 -3
View File
@@ -144,9 +144,10 @@ function renderJob(
if (job.kind === "deployment") {
lines.push(" outputs:", " deployed: ${{ steps.deploy.outputs.deployed }}");
}
if (job.environment.length > 0) {
const jobEnvironment = job.environment.filter((binding) => !isStepScopedSecret(job, binding));
if (jobEnvironment.length > 0) {
lines.push(" env:");
for (const binding of job.environment) {
for (const binding of jobEnvironment) {
lines.push(` ${binding.name}: ${yamlScalar(binding.value)}`);
}
}
@@ -276,11 +277,15 @@ function renderStep(
];
// 1101/13-01. `run` fails on the first failing command, so deployed=true
// is written only after the project's script succeeded.
case "deploy":
case "deploy": {
const secrets = job.environment.filter((binding) => isStepScopedSecret(job, binding));
return step.script
? [
" - name: Deploy the promoted release",
" id: deploy",
...(secrets.length > 0
? [" env:", ...secrets.map((binding) => ` ${binding.name}: ${yamlScalar(binding.value)}`)]
: []),
" run: |",
// The contract limits the name to [A-Za-z0-9:_-], a plain shell word.
` corepack pnpm ${step.script}`,
@@ -291,6 +296,7 @@ function renderStep(
" id: deploy",
' run: echo "deployed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"',
];
}
case "upload": {
const lines = [
` - name: Upload ${humanize(step.transferId)}`,
@@ -310,6 +316,16 @@ function renderStep(
}
}
/**
* 1103/13-05. Job env reaches every step of the job: checkout, setup-node and
* the third-party download action as well. In the deployment slot a
* `secrets.*` binding is rendered on the deploy step instead, the one step
* that uses it.
*/
function isStepScopedSecret(job: CiWorkflowJob, binding: CiWorkflowJob["environment"][number]): boolean {
return job.kind === "deployment" && /^\$\{\{ secrets\./u.test(binding.value);
}
function requiredStepActionUses(stepKind: string): string {
const uses = resolveCiStepActionUses(stepKind);
if (!uses) throw new TypeError(`workflow step has no registered CI action: ${stepKind}`);