isValidIdempotencyKey only rejected blank values and C0/C1 control
characters. Keys with surrounding whitespace passed and fetch trimmed them
on the wire (two commands could share one key), and non-ASCII keys passed
and made Headers.set throw a TypeError that the client reported as a
retryable NETWORK_UNREACHABLE. The key is now /^[\x21-\x7e]+$/ within the
existing 256-byte bound, the same rule as the realtime HEADER_SAFE_CURSOR.
App-generated keys (randomUUID) and all test fixtures are visible ASCII.
The existing OPT-NET-02 test pinned "키-값" and "ключ" as valid keys; it
encoded the bug and is fixed here: those values plus " order-1 ",
"order-1\t", "key with-space" and a NBSP key are now in the rejected list,
and a UUID key was added to the accepted list.
RED: "OPT-NET-02 shared idempotency key validation > rejects the same values
at intent definition and at admission" failed with '" order-1 ": expected
true to be false' before the fix.
Gates: check:architecture, check:types:app/test/node, lint, test:component,
test:runtime-schema, test:contract pass; test:unit passes except
removal-fixture.test.ts, which needs generated artifacts/release files that
a fresh worktree does not have (unrelated to this change).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
LEG-01. AuthSessionPort.recover now takes the request's lifetime context, and
the raw recovery helper returns data only. The sign-out notification moved to
the site that adopts the result, so a recovery that answers after the deadline
or a caller abort is observed and discarded instead of logging the user out of
a request nobody is waiting on.
LEG-02. The V2 client shares V3's credential admission validator instead of
checking the allowed set alone. A bearer profile whose patch omits, empties,
duplicates or corrupts Authorization now fails closed with zero fetches rather
than dispatching an anonymous request under an authenticated profile.
OPT-NET-01. A cursor loader rejection is re-thrown exactly as it is with no
signal at all. Only a signal that has actually aborted classifies the outcome
as PAGINATION_ABORTED, so a real upstream failure stops being filed as a user
cancellation.
OPT-NET-02. defineMutationIntent and the V3 admission site now share the single
isValidIdempotencyKey authority, closing the drift that let a control character
through intent definition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
N-06: export one idempotency-key authority from mutation-intent.ts and use it
in the V2 client. A caller-supplied key is validated before credentials, timers
and fetch, and an invalid value is rejected as VALIDATION_REJECTED /
IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID rather than trimmed, regenerated or dropped, so a keyed
command can no longer replay while sending no key.
N-07: bound the legacy credential wait by the existing attempt controller,
which already carries the total deadline and the caller signal, so a
non-cooperative owner cannot hold the request open and no extra timer is
introduced. The owner receives the operation context, and the failure follows
ownership: deadline to REQUEST_TIMEOUT, caller to REQUEST_ABORTED, and only a
genuine rejection to AUTH_INTEGRATION_FAILURE. None of these paths fetch.
N-08: readBoundedJson delegates to the common bounded reader, so cancel and
releaseLock throws stay isolated inside the closed result, and the V2
content-type mismatch now cancels the response body.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>