# Browser security boundary The browser bundle is public. Secrets, token lifecycle, raw HTML injection, dynamic code execution, untrusted script URLs, and public production source maps are prohibited defaults. `config/hosting/security-headers.json` is the declared header set. Hosting verification compares that declaration with live responses. CSP deliberately omits `unsafe-inline` and `unsafe-eval`; production code and built assets must remain compatible with that baseline. `tests/e2e/production-csp.spec.ts` (part of `test:e2e`, FE-GATE-008) serves the build with these headers and fails on a `securitypolicyviolation` event (review 13-08). One violation is known and listed in that spec: zod probes `Function("")` on its first object schema and the policy refuses it. Parsing still works; the report is noise until zod is configured `jitless` before the first schema is built. Features that are off by default need CSP additions when a project selects them; see step 9 in [optional adapter recipes](../architecture/optional-adapter-recipes.md). `connect-src 'self' https:` lets script reach any HTTPS origin. Narrowing it to the runtime config's `API_BASE_URL` and `TELEMETRY_ENDPOINT` origins needs a header generated per environment at deploy time, because those values are set per deployment (`scripts/generate-runtime-config.ts`). That generator does not exist yet; a project that deploys should add it with its provider adapter. Route guards are UX hints and client validation does not replace backend authorization or validation.