# Build and supply-chain gate

## Local blocking controls

- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` and a real manifest/lock mismatch fixture
- all direct and transitive lockfile rows with package SHA-512 integrity
- production/development, direct/transitive and platform-optional classification
- package-manifest license allow/deny policy
- approved inventory baseline digest and actual add/remove/change/upgrade diff
- independent review for new direct production dependencies
- CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM and inventory component/edge coherence
- source/lock/SBOM/dist-linked local provenance statement
- source, opt-in recipes, scripts, tests, tracked config/schema, public, built asset and generated
  release metadata secret scan
- two-build `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` reproducibility check

The canonical commands are:

```bash
corepack pnpm verify:lockfile
corepack pnpm verify:reproducible-build
corepack pnpm build:release-candidate
corepack pnpm verify:local-evidence
corepack pnpm check:supply-chain:fixtures
```

`config/security/dependency-baseline.json` is the approved local baseline.
Changing it requires `DEPENDENCY_BASELINE_OWNER` and
`DEPENDENCY_BASELINE_REASON`; editing the digest or hardcoding an empty diff is
rejected.

## External promotion controls

Promotion reads the provider files named by `VULNERABILITY_REPORT_PATH` and
`PROVENANCE_ATTESTATION_PATH`. The vulnerability report must bind both the
exact lockfile digest and candidate `distSha256`; the provenance attestation
must name `dist` with that same digest. Both documents use strict schemas and
Ed25519 signatures verified with separately configured trusted public keys and
key IDs (`VULNERABILITY_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`, `VULNERABILITY_KEY_ID`,
`PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`, and `PROVENANCE_KEY_ID`). Keys of another curve,
including Ed448, are rejected even if a document labels its algorithm
`Ed25519`.

`immutable_build` archives the raw `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `dist` (including hidden
`.vite` files), the build manifest, module inventory, release verification,
secret-scan result, and local supply-chain evidence once. The candidate
manifest hashes the raw lockfile bytes and requires that digest to equal the
dependency inventory's `lockfileSha256`. The two provider jobs download this
same archive separately and receive `CANDIDATE_LOCKFILE_PATH` and
`CANDIDATE_DIST_SHA256`; configured `VULNERABILITY_PROVIDER_COMMAND` and
`PROVENANCE_PROVIDER_COMMAND` must emit the signed reports.

If either provider input is absent, local verification remains meaningful but
`artifacts/security/supply-chain-verification.json` records
`promotionStatus: FAIL_UNVERIFIED`. `verify:provider-evidence` and
`verify:promotion` then exit non-zero. Promotion recomputes the candidate file
set and digests, then read-only revalidates the archived executable schemas,
raw lockfile, module inventory, build outputs, release coherence, SBOM,
provenance, security scan and supply-chain coherence. It never rebuilds or
rewrites candidate evidence. Scanner or signing outages are not converted to
an empty PASS.

Approved vulnerability exceptions require vulnerability/package identity,
owner, a different reviewer, reason and expiry. Expired or self-approved
exceptions are blocking.