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clean-architecture-frontend…/docs/security/browser-boundary.md
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DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5.5 8a0e5f55bb test(security): smoke the build under the production CSP (13-08)
The declared CSP was never applied in a browser. A Playwright spec now serves
the build with config/hosting/security-headers.json and fails on any
securitypolicyviolation. It found one: zod's Function('') probe, listed in the
spec as a known violation until zod is configured jitless before first use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 23:10:59 +09:00

1.5 KiB

Browser security boundary

The browser bundle is public. Secrets, token lifecycle, raw HTML injection, dynamic code execution, untrusted script URLs, and public production source maps are prohibited defaults.

config/hosting/security-headers.json is the declared header set. Hosting verification compares that declaration with live responses. CSP deliberately omits unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval; production code and built assets must remain compatible with that baseline. tests/e2e/production-csp.spec.ts (part of test:e2e, FE-GATE-008) serves the build with these headers and fails on a securitypolicyviolation event (review 13-08). One violation is known and listed in that spec: zod probes Function("") on its first object schema and the policy refuses it. Parsing still works; the report is noise until zod is configured jitless before the first schema is built. Features that are off by default need CSP additions when a project selects them; see step 9 in optional adapter recipes. connect-src 'self' https: lets script reach any HTTPS origin. Narrowing it to the runtime config's API_BASE_URL and TELEMETRY_ENDPOINT origins needs a header generated per environment at deploy time, because those values are set per deployment (scripts/generate-runtime-config.ts). That generator does not exist yet; a project that deploys should add it with its provider adapter.

Route guards are UX hints and client validation does not replace backend authorization or validation.