The declared CSP was never applied in a browser. A Playwright spec now serves
the build with config/hosting/security-headers.json and fails on any
securitypolicyviolation. It found one: zod's Function('') probe, listed in the
spec as a known violation until zod is configured jitless before first use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.5 KiB
Browser security boundary
The browser bundle is public. Secrets, token lifecycle, raw HTML injection, dynamic code execution, untrusted script URLs, and public production source maps are prohibited defaults.
config/hosting/security-headers.json is the declared header set. Hosting
verification compares that declaration with live responses. CSP deliberately
omits unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval; production code and built assets must
remain compatible with that baseline. tests/e2e/production-csp.spec.ts (part of
test:e2e, FE-GATE-008) serves the build with these headers and fails on a
securitypolicyviolation event (review 13-08). One violation is known and
listed in that spec: zod probes Function("") on its first object schema and
the policy refuses it. Parsing still works; the report is noise until zod is
configured jitless before the first schema is built. Features that are off by
default need CSP additions when a project selects them; see step 9 in
optional adapter recipes.
connect-src 'self' https: lets script reach any HTTPS origin. Narrowing it to
the runtime config's API_BASE_URL and TELEMETRY_ENDPOINT origins needs a
header generated per environment at deploy time, because those values are set
per deployment (scripts/generate-runtime-config.ts). That generator does not
exist yet; a project that deploys should add it with its provider adapter.
Route guards are UX hints and client validation does not replace backend authorization or validation.