Files
clean-architecture-frontend…/tests/unit/archived-promotion.test.ts
T
DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5.5 839205c134 feat(release): re-verify a promoted release in archived mode (13-04)
Provider evidence expires two hours after issue, so no repo tool could
re-verify a release before deploying it later or rolling back to it.
verify:promotion --archived keeps every signature, digest and member check and
judges freshness at the recorded promotion time; the FE-RB-005 drill takes the
extracted release with --release-root.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 22:58:37 +09:00

49 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { promotionEvidenceTime } from "../../scripts/lib/exact-promotion-bundle.ts";
import { evaluatePromotionEvidence } from "../../scripts/lib/provider-evidence.ts";
import { syntheticSignedPromotionBundle } from "./security-followup-fixture.ts";
// 13-04. Provider evidence lives two hours at most, so a promoted release could
// not be re-verified the next day, which the rollback runbook requires. The
// archived mode checks freshness at the recorded promotion time instead.
const promotedAt = Date.parse("2026-08-02T01:00:00.000Z");
const threeHoursLater = promotedAt + 3 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;
function evidenceAt(freshness: "current" | "archived", now: number) {
const fixture = syntheticSignedPromotionBundle();
const provider = JSON.parse(fixture.files["provider-verification.json"].toString("utf8"));
return evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: {
run: provider.run,
source: provider.source,
candidate: provider.candidate,
vulnerabilityInvocationNonce: provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce,
provenanceInvocationNonce: provider.providerEvidence.provenanceInvocationNonce,
secretScanAttestation: provider.providerEvidence.secretScanAttestation,
},
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport: JSON.parse(fixture.files["vulnerability-report.json"].toString("utf8")),
provenanceAttestation: JSON.parse(fixture.files["provenance-attestation.json"].toString("utf8")),
vulnerabilityTrust: fixture.verification.vulnerabilityTrust,
provenanceTrust: fixture.verification.provenanceTrust,
nowEpochMs: () => promotionEvidenceTime(freshness, provider.verifiedAt, now),
});
}
describe("archived promotion re-verification", () => {
it("accepts evidence three hours after promotion in archived mode only", () => {
expect(evidenceAt("archived", threeHoursLater).status).toBe("PASS");
expect(evidenceAt("current", threeHoursLater)).toMatchObject({
status: "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
failures: expect.arrayContaining(["vulnerability report is expired"]),
});
});
it("refuses a promotion time recorded in the future", () => {
expect(() =>
promotionEvidenceTime("archived", "2026-08-02T05:00:00.000Z", promotedAt),
).toThrow(/verifiedAt is in the future/u);
});
});