BT-X-01: add the shared abortable-operation utility with golden tests for first terminal owner, idempotent close, listener and timer cleanup under a throwing scheduler, observed late rejection and late-handle compensation. It carries no subsystem result taxonomy. BT-PRE-01: make the presigned download lease lazy and single-start. open() now validates, claims and consumes the capability without any network I/O; the fetch, the transfer deadline and the expiry recheck happen at first stream consumption. The source gained close(), which discards an unused lease with no I/O and otherwise cancels the body and releases the scope exactly once. BT-UP-01: require removeEventListener in the AbortSignal structural guard and isolate release cleanup so a hostile facade cannot replace a typed terminal result with a rejection. BT-UP-03: deleteDatabase cannot be cancelled after dispatch, so a blocked deadline now returns PENDING with effect UNKNOWN instead of a failure that reads as NOT_APPLIED. A realm-scoped (factory, databaseName) registry prevents recreating the partition until the native request settles. BT-UP-04: reject non-finite and negative upload clocks as a dependency failure instead of letting them bypass every capability expiry comparison. BT-IMG-02: replace the naive Cache-Control quote stripping with a quote- and escape-aware tokenizer, so max-age="60 or 60" is no longer read as 60 and a comma inside a quoted extension is not a directive boundary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Image CDN composition
This adapter accepts no source URL or transform query from a feature. Product
composition owns the origin registry and named presets. A backend gateway may
use runtime.assets; presentation receives only the narrow
runtime.presentation facade plus registry-issued asset and preset
references.
import {
ImageCdnPolicyRegistry,
createBrowserImageProbe,
createImageCdnRuntime,
createP256ImageCapabilityVerifier,
imageCdnPresetReference,
} from "./index.ts";
const cardImage = imageCdnPresetReference(
"product-card",
"render-product-card-image",
);
const policies = new ImageCdnPolicyRegistry({
applicationOrigin: "https://app.example.com",
origins: [{
originKey: "product-images",
origin: "https://images.example.com",
assetPathPrefix: "/v1/assets/",
minimumPublicMaxAgeSeconds: 31_536_000,
}],
presets: [{
reference: cardImage,
bindingId: "product-card-v1",
width: 640,
height: 360,
fit: "cover",
dprs: [1, 2],
responsiveWidths: [320, 640],
quality: 80,
formats: ["avif", "webp", "jpeg"],
sizes: "(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px",
loading: "eager",
decoding: "async",
fetchPriority: "high",
referrerPolicy: "no-referrer",
probeMode: "PRIMARY_REQUIRED",
allowUpscale: false,
maxTransformedPixels: 1_048_576,
maxDecodedBytes: 4_194_304,
maxEncodedBytes: 524_288,
}],
hardLimits: {
maxIntrinsicWidth: 4_096,
maxIntrinsicHeight: 4_096,
maxSourcePixels: 16_777_216,
maxCssDimension: 2_048,
maxDpr: 2,
maxQuality: 90,
maxCandidateCount: 8,
maxTransformedPixels: 1_048_576,
maxDecodedBytes: 4_194_304,
maxEncodedBytes: 524_288,
maxUrlLength: 2_048,
maxCapabilityLifetimeMs: 3_600_000,
maxClockSkewMs: 60_000,
minCapabilityRemainingMs: 30_000,
maxPresetBindingsPerCapability: 8,
maxConcurrentCapabilityVerifications: 8,
allowedSourceMediaTypes: [
"image/avif",
"image/jpeg",
"image/png",
"image/webp",
],
formatQualityCeilings: {
avif: 80,
jpeg: 85,
png: 90,
webp: 85,
},
},
capability: {
issuer: "image-bff",
acceptedKeyIds: [
"image-signing-2026-02",
"image-signing-2026-01",
],
},
});
const runtime = createImageCdnRuntime({
policies,
subtle: crypto.subtle,
capabilityVerifier: createP256ImageCapabilityVerifier({
subtle: crypto.subtle,
publicKeys: [{
keyId: "image-signing-2026-02",
key: currentImageCapabilityPublicKey,
}, {
keyId: "image-signing-2026-01",
key: previousImageCapabilityPublicKey,
}],
}),
capabilityVerificationTimeoutMs: 5_000,
probe: createBrowserImageProbe(),
observer: safeBrowserDataObserver,
});
// `payload` is a strictly decoded BackendIssuedImageAsset from the BFF.
const accepted = await runtime.assets.acceptBackendIssued(payload, {
signal,
});
if (!accepted.ok) return accepted;
// Expose only this closure to the feature/presentation composition.
const resolveCardImage = (signal: AbortSignal) =>
runtime.presentation.resolve({
asset: accepted.value,
preset: cardImage,
signal,
});
// Application-scope teardown, logout, account/tenant partition change, or
// replacement by a newly composed runtime. Never call this per render.
const closeImageRuntime = (): void => runtime.close();
For a public immutable asset, the trusted gateway calls
acceptPublicImmutable with only an allowlisted originKey, opaque assetId
and revision, raster metadata and intrinsic dimensions. applicationOrigin
must be the deployment's canonical HTTPS origin, without a trailing slash,
and every CDN origin must differ from it. This is required because an
anonymous image request omits credentials only when it is cross-origin.
Private descriptors must be backend-signed, remain above the configured
minimum TTL at every resolve, and use an eager, non-low-priority
PRIMARY_REQUIRED preset. Digest and signature verification share one
composition-owned deadline and race the caller's abort signal. The probe sends
no credentials, rejects any final URL other than the exact signed URL, and
requires the private response to declare the flag-only directive
Cache-Control: no-store.
Before native decode, the adapter parses the bounded PNG, JPEG, WebP or AVIF
container, rejects animation and enforces both pixel and decoded-byte budgets.
Its adapter-owned timeout covers response headers, streamed body consumption
and decode; abort paths cancel the reader and close even a late ImageBitmap.
The client never purges a CDN: public URLs roll forward by revision, while
private delivery relies on backend capability revocation or expiry.
Composition-supplied hard limits may only tighten
IMAGE_CDN_IMPLEMENTATION_CEILINGS; configuration cannot raise intrinsic,
source/output pixel, decoded/encoded byte, candidate, URL or capability
lifetime ceilings owned by the adapter. Private verification additionally
reserves one of the bounded maxConcurrentCapabilityVerifications slots and
always releases it after success, failure, abort or close.
acceptedKeyIds is a bounded, unique overlap set, not the active signing-key
selector. The verifier registry must cover every accepted ID. Rotate by first
deploying the new public key and an old/new overlap set, then switch the
backend signer. Retain the old key for client rollout plus at least
maxCapabilityLifetimeMs + maxClockSkewMs; remove it only after old clients
and capabilities are exhausted. A compromised key instead requires backend
revocation, runtime.close(), recomposition and a forced client rollout.
close() is terminal and idempotent. It aborts in-flight private verification
and probing and replaces the runtime's WeakMap capability registry, immediately
revoking every issued reference without retaining them strongly. Every later
accept or resolve returns closed UNAVAILABLE; resuming requires a newly
composed runtime.