Files
clean-architecture-frontend…/scripts/verify-hosting-headers.ts
T
DongHyeonka 4c4248aac5 feat(ci): 제품이 배포 job과 merge 검사를 제품 소유 overlay에 적는다
문제: 배포 슬롯을 채우거나 제품 전용 merge 검사를 더하려면 템플릿 소유
config/ci/gates.json(약 3,000줄)과 생성 workflow를 고쳐야 했다. 문서도
"deployment job을 gates.json에서 고치라"고 적었다. 템플릿 gates.json이
바뀔 때마다 제품은 큰 JSON과 생성 YAML의 충돌을 손으로 풀어야 했고,
다운스트림 tech-log는 이미 제품 커밋 3개에서 gates.json을 고쳤다.

고른 방법: 제품 소유 config/ci/product-gates.json을 둔다. 템플릿은 빈
파일로 싣고 고치지 않는다. 담을 수 있는 것은 둘뿐이다.
- deployment: deploy package script와 vars.*·secrets.* 바인딩. 나머지
  슬롯(promoted-release download, digest로 확인하는 extract, deploy)은
  템플릿이 렌더링하고, 채운 계약을 다시 parse해 슬롯 규칙(앞 커밋)을
  그대로 적용한다. secret은 deploy 단계에만 간다. gates.json과 overlay
  양쪽에서 슬롯을 채우면 거절한다.
- mergeGates: PRODUCT-GATE-NNN id의 package script. 템플릿 job 뒤의
  product_merge_gate job이 merge와 같은 조건에서 matrix로 돈다. FE-GATE
  id·명령·산출물·readiness 공식은 건드리지 못한다.
loadCiGateContract와 생성기, check:ci가 두 파일을 함께 읽고, 계약
기준선(contract-baseline.json)은 템플릿 계약만 센다. 없는 script는
거절하고, 제품 gate script는 ungated 검사에서 gated로 센다.
버린 대안: 저장소 변수로 배포 명령만 받기(제품 게이트를 못 풀고 실행할
명령이 저장소 밖에 숨는다), 제품 전용 workflow 파일(Gitea에서 run 사이
산출물 전달이 검증되지 않았다).

위험·한계: 제품 gate는 ci:gate의 로그·증거 산출물과 readiness 공식
밖이다. merge를 막으려면 제품이 그 job을 필수 검사로 지정한다. 생성
workflow는 여전히 커밋되는 파일이라, 템플릿 변경과 같은 줄을 건드리면
재생성이 필요하다. 실제 Gitea runner에서는 돌리지 않았다.

검증: tests/unit/product-ci-overlay.test.ts 11건(빈 overlay, 슬롯
채우기와 기준선 유지, 양쪽 채우기 거절, 없는 script 거절, 제품 job
렌더링과 실행 확인, 스키마 거절 6건). 작업 트리에서 overlay와 script를
채워 generate:ci-workflow → check:ci PASS, CI workflow bytes PASS, 생성
YAML 파싱 확인 후 되돌렸다. 그 상태의 workflow와 gates.json에 템플릿
변경(게이트 이름 2개)을 diff3로 3-way 병합하면 충돌 0이다.
ci-workflow-generation 425건, check:ci PASS.

Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-03-maturity-review/12-guardrails-ci.md 12-07
2026-11-04 20:48:50 +09:00

241 lines
8.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { mkdir, readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import { INSTALLED_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES } from "../src/features/installed-runtime-capabilities.ts";
import { hostingHeadersArtifactSchema } from "./contracts/release-artifacts.ts";
import {
checkPublicServiceWorkers,
classifyLiveHostingBaseUrl,
hostingVerdict,
probeLiveRelease,
releaseIdentity,
shipsServiceWorker,
type HostingMode,
type ProbeResult,
type ResponseHeaders,
} from "./lib/hosting-probe.ts";
import { writeValidatedJsonArtifact } from "./lib/validated-json-artifact.ts";
type Document = Record<string, unknown>;
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Document {
return Boolean(value) && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function recordValue(value: unknown): Document {
return isRecord(value) ? value : {};
}
function strings(value: unknown): string[] {
return Array.isArray(value)
? value.filter((entry): entry is string => typeof entry === "string")
: [];
}
function stringRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, string> {
return Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(recordValue(value)).filter(
(entry): entry is [string, string] => typeof entry[1] === "string",
),
);
}
function responseHeaders(value: unknown): ResponseHeaders {
return Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(recordValue(value)).map(([surface, headers]) => [
surface,
stringRecord(headers),
]),
);
}
async function readDocument(file: string): Promise<Document> {
const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(await readFile(file, "utf8"));
if (!isRecord(parsed)) throw new Error(`${file} must be a JSON object`);
return parsed;
}
const cachePolicy = await readDocument("config/hosting/cache-policy.json");
const cacheSurfaces = recordValue(cachePolicy.surfaces);
const securityPolicy = await readDocument(
"config/hosting/security-headers.json",
);
const securityHeaders = stringRecord(securityPolicy.headers);
const baseUrl = process.env.HOSTING_BASE_URL;
const liveTarget = baseUrl ? classifyLiveHostingBaseUrl(baseUrl) : null;
// 1101/13-01. FE-GATE-019 passes the promoted archive it extracted, so the
// files checked here and the identity the host must serve are the candidate's,
// not a local rebuild's. Without the flag a local run checks its own `dist`.
const releaseRootFlag = process.argv.indexOf("--release-root");
const releaseRoot = releaseRootFlag >= 0 ? process.argv[releaseRootFlag + 1] : ".";
if (!releaseRoot) {
process.stderr.write("Usage: verify:hosting-headers [-- --release-root <extracted release archive>]\n");
process.exit(2);
}
const distRoot = path.join(releaseRoot, "dist");
const distFiles = (await readdir(distRoot, { recursive: true })).map(String);
// 1101/13-01. The deployment slot job reports whether it deployed this
// candidate. An empty slot deployed nothing, so the host still serves an
// earlier release: probing it proves nothing about this one (UNVERIFIED).
const deployedBySlot = process.env.RELEASE_DEPLOYED;
const slotEmpty = deployedBySlot !== undefined && deployedBySlot !== "true";
const publicSourceMaps = distFiles.filter((file) => file.endsWith(".map"));
// 1101/13-04. The worker script surface exists only in a build that ships one.
const workerShipped = shipsServiceWorker(INSTALLED_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES.serviceWorker);
const requiredSurfaces = Object.entries(cacheSurfaces)
.map(([surface, policy]) => [surface, recordValue(policy)] as const)
.filter(([, policy]) => policy.requiredWhen !== "service-worker-shipped" || workerShipped);
let responses: ResponseHeaders = {};
let mode: HostingMode;
const probeResults: ProbeResult[] = [];
if (liveTarget?.passed && !slotEmpty) {
mode = "live";
const paths = Object.fromEntries(
requiredSurfaces.flatMap(([surface, policy]) =>
typeof policy.path === "string" ? [[surface, policy.path] as const] : [],
),
);
const candidateManifest = await readFile(path.join(distRoot, "release-manifest.json"), "utf8").catch(() => null);
const identity = releaseIdentity(candidateManifest);
if (!identity) {
throw new Error(`${distRoot}/release-manifest.json does not name a buildId and releaseId`);
}
// 1103/13-01. The served config.json and index.html are compared with the
// candidate's, not only the manifest names a rebuild in the same run shares.
const candidate = {
...identity,
runtimeConfig: await readFile(path.join(distRoot, "config.json"), "utf8"),
indexHtml: await readFile(path.join(distRoot, "index.html"), "utf8"),
};
const probed = await probeLiveRelease(liveTarget.url, paths, candidate, {
alpnProtocols: strings(recordValue(cachePolicy.transport).alpnProtocols),
});
responses = probed.responses;
probeResults.push(...probed.results);
} else if (liveTarget && !liveTarget.passed) {
mode = "invalid-live";
probeResults.push({
surface: "deployment",
header: "base-url",
expected: "canonical non-loopback HTTPS root URL",
observed: liveTarget.observedOrigin,
reason: liveTarget.reason,
passed: false,
});
} else {
mode = "fixture";
const fixture = await readDocument(
"config/hosting/response-headers.fixture.json",
);
responses = responseHeaders(fixture.responses);
}
const results: ProbeResult[] = [...probeResults];
for (const [surface, policy] of requiredSurfaces) {
if (typeof policy.cacheControl !== "string") continue;
const contentTypes = strings(policy.contentTypes);
const observed = responses[surface]?.["cache-control"];
results.push({
surface,
header: "cache-control",
expected: policy.cacheControl,
observed,
passed: observed === policy.cacheControl,
});
const observedContentType = responses[surface]?.["content-type"];
const observedMime = observedContentType
?.split(";", 1)[0]
?.trim()
.toLowerCase();
results.push({
surface,
header: "content-type",
expected: contentTypes,
observed: observedContentType,
passed: observedMime !== undefined && contentTypes.includes(observedMime),
});
// 1103/13-02. The bundle budget counts gzip bytes. The probe's fetch offers
// br and gzip, so an uncompressed answer is the host's choice.
const contentEncodings = strings(policy.contentEncodings);
if (contentEncodings.length > 0) {
const observedEncoding = responses[surface]?.["content-encoding"];
results.push({
surface,
header: "content-encoding",
expected: contentEncodings,
observed: observedEncoding,
passed: observedEncoding !== undefined && contentEncodings.includes(observedEncoding.trim().toLowerCase()),
});
}
if (policy.securityHeaders === true) {
for (const [header, expected] of Object.entries(securityHeaders)) {
const observedSecurity = responses[surface]?.[header.toLowerCase()];
results.push({
surface,
header: header.toLowerCase(),
expected,
observed: observedSecurity,
passed: observedSecurity === expected,
});
}
}
}
const sourceMapPolicy = recordValue(cacheSurfaces.sourceMap);
results.push({
surface: "sourceMap",
header: "public",
expected: false,
observed: publicSourceMaps.length > 0,
passed: sourceMapPolicy.public === false && publicSourceMaps.length === 0,
});
results.push(
checkPublicServiceWorkers(
distFiles,
INSTALLED_RUNTIME_CAPABILITIES.serviceWorker,
),
);
const passed = results.every((result) => result.passed);
const status = hostingVerdict(mode, passed);
await mkdir("artifacts/release", { recursive: true });
await writeValidatedJsonArtifact({
path: "artifacts/release/hosting-headers.json",
schema: hostingHeadersArtifactSchema,
value: {
schemaVersion: 1,
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
mode,
// The schema records a base URL only for a host that was probed.
baseUrl: mode === "live" ? (liveTarget?.observedOrigin ?? null) : null,
providerVerificationRequired: mode !== "live",
results,
passed,
status,
},
});
if (status === "FAIL") {
process.stderr.write(
"Hosting cache/content-type/security header verification failed.\n",
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (status === "UNVERIFIED" && slotEmpty) {
process.stderr.write(
"Hosting header contract: UNVERIFIED (the deployment slot is empty: nothing deployed this release, so the host was not probed; fill deployment in config/ci/product-gates.json)\n",
);
process.exit(3);
}
if (status === "UNVERIFIED") {
// Not a pass (D-14): set HOSTING_BASE_URL to the deployed release.
process.stderr.write(
"Hosting header contract: UNVERIFIED (fixture: declared headers are consistent; set HOSTING_BASE_URL to probe the deployed release)\n",
);
process.exit(3);
}
process.stdout.write("Hosting header contract: PASS (live)\n");