The keycloak project ended with four open questions that design could not
settle. A two-VM lab was built to answer them by measurement, and this is
that material: 26 experiments, 125 raw command outputs, 22 browser captures.
Follows the import procedure in README.md.
source/ the originating repository verbatim — 78 documents, 28 SVGs,
8 manifests, plus .source-revision recording the commit
final/ the SSOT
document.md 729 lines written from the 29 experiment documents, not
concatenated: what was predicted, what was measured, and
where the measurement itself was wrong
evidence/raw 125 outputs, flattened to <experiment>__<file> because
the originals collided (01-baseline.txt appeared three
times) and the audit only globs the top level
evidence/meta one per raw file; command and exitCode are null and the
README says why rather than inventing them
evidence/browser 22 captures
assets/ three diagrams through techviz
.techviz/ their VizSpecs
A separate project rather than an addition to keycloak: the B-layer answers
that project's four questions, but the A, C and D layers are about cluster
failure, SSO and operations, and one document.md should hold one subject.
The four question records there can point here through 관계.
Recorded rather than papered over: only three of the 28 diagrams were
remade. The repository forbids hand-drawn SVG and forbids titles inside the
canvas; all 28 originals carry both, so converting them is redrawing, not
reformatting. They stay in source/ and the gap is written into the document.
verify-pipeline.py passes. audit-records.py reports no issues.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
63 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
63 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
# Restrict who may reach the echo pods.
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#
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# Traefik is configured to trust X-Forwarded-* from the whole pod CIDR, and the
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# app's Tomcat valve trusts every private range by default. Both are IP-range
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# decisions, so any pod in the cluster can forge those headers by talking to the
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# Service directly and bypassing Traefik entirely. Measured, not hypothetical:
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#
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# kubectl -n header-lab run t --rm -i --restart=Never --image=curlimages/curl -- \
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# curl -s http://echo:8081/api/echo -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: evil.example.com'
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# → serverName evil.example.com, remoteAddr 1.2.3.4
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#
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# A NetworkPolicy closes that path. It selects by label rather than IP, so it
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# survives pod restarts and rescheduling — unlike the trustedIPs list, which
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# could not name Traefik because its IP changes.
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#
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# "Trusting forwarded headers" and "guaranteeing a proxy sits in front" are a
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# pair. Doing only the first leaves this hole.
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: echo-allow-traefik-only
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namespace: header-lab
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app: echo
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policyTypes:
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- Ingress
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ingress:
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# The proxy itself. namespaceSelector and podSelector in one list item are
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# ANDed, so this is "traefik pods in kube-system" and nothing else.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik
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ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 8081
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# kubelet readiness/liveness probes originate from the node, not from a pod,
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# so they need their own rule. Without it the probes fail and the pods are
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# restarted in a loop.
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#
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# The probe's source address is the node's flannel bridge (cni0), which
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# holds the first address of that node's /24:
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# kc-lab-1 10.42.0.1 kc-lab-2 10.42.1.1
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# Listing them as /32 keeps this rule from re-admitting arbitrary pods,
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# which a broader 10.42.0.0/16 block would do and would undo the policy.
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#
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# Adding a node means adding its gateway here. Verify with:
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# kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.podCIDR}{"\n"}{end}'
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- from:
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- ipBlock:
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cidr: 10.42.0.1/32
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- ipBlock:
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cidr: 10.42.1.1/32
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ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 8081
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