The keycloak project ended with four open questions that design could not
settle. A two-VM lab was built to answer them by measurement, and this is
that material: 26 experiments, 125 raw command outputs, 22 browser captures.
Follows the import procedure in README.md.
source/ the originating repository verbatim — 78 documents, 28 SVGs,
8 manifests, plus .source-revision recording the commit
final/ the SSOT
document.md 729 lines written from the 29 experiment documents, not
concatenated: what was predicted, what was measured, and
where the measurement itself was wrong
evidence/raw 125 outputs, flattened to <experiment>__<file> because
the originals collided (01-baseline.txt appeared three
times) and the audit only globs the top level
evidence/meta one per raw file; command and exitCode are null and the
README says why rather than inventing them
evidence/browser 22 captures
assets/ three diagrams through techviz
.techviz/ their VizSpecs
A separate project rather than an addition to keycloak: the B-layer answers
that project's four questions, but the A, C and D layers are about cluster
failure, SSO and operations, and one document.md should hold one subject.
The four question records there can point here through 관계.
Recorded rather than papered over: only three of the 28 diagrams were
remade. The repository forbids hand-drawn SVG and forbids titles inside the
canvas; all 28 originals carry both, so converting them is redrawing, not
reformatting. They stay in source/ and the gap is written into the document.
verify-pipeline.py passes. audit-records.py reports no issues.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
5.9 KiB
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108 lines
5.9 KiB
Plaintext
Command: git history for cursor/capability/entity-not-found API hotspots
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Working directory: /shared/codebase/clean-architecture-backend-template
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Executed at: 2026-08-29T07:50:26Z
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Source revision: a24ece9cf797f7ea647e33bf846b115208ed1ba5
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Observation boundary: Repository history for the three selected API hotspots; commit text/diffs show when code entered or changed but do not establish unstated author intent.
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--- stdout/stderr ---
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=== SignedJsonCursorCodec history ===
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2f5d2fc feat: jpa, messaging, notification, mongo, graphql 어댑터터 구현체 추가
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0e61f86 feat(jpa): implement the JPA relational persistence platform
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=== decodedLengthOf introducing diff ===
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COMMIT 2f5d2fc21954286213c1474d19935f571ef896ea feat: jpa, messaging, notification, mongo, graphql 어댑터터 구현체 추가
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diff --git a/src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/persistence/api/query/SignedJsonCursorCodec.java b/src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/persistence/api/query/SignedJsonCursorCodec.java
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index 0263e77..7c306cd 100644
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--- a/src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/persistence/api/query/SignedJsonCursorCodec.java
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+++ b/src/adapter/outbound/persistence-jpa/src/main/java/dev/caskeleton/adapter/outbound/persistence/api/query/SignedJsonCursorCodec.java
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@@ -50,13 +50,33 @@ public final class SignedJsonCursorCodec<C> implements CursorCodec<C> {
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this.key = key.clone();
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}
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+ /** Longest token this codec will look at, in characters. */
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+ public static final int MAX_ENCODED_LENGTH = 4096;
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+
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+ /** Largest payload this codec will decode, in bytes. */
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+ public static final int MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2048;
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+
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+ /** HMAC-SHA256 produces exactly this many bytes. */
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+ private static final int MAC_LENGTH_BYTES = 32;
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+
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@Override
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public String encode(C cursor) {
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Objects.requireNonNull(cursor, "cursor");
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- String payload =
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- encoder.encodeToString(payloadCodec.toJson(cursor).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
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+ byte[] json = payloadCodec.toJson(cursor).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
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+ if (json.length > MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES) {
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+ // The application's own bug, not a caller's: a cursor this large is a payload the codec
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+ // cannot hand back, so producing it would mint a token that fails on the next page.
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+ throw new IllegalStateException(
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+ "cursor payload is " + json.length + " bytes; the bound is " + MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES);
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+ }
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+ String payload = encoder.encodeToString(json);
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String signed = VERSION + SEPARATOR + payload;
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- return signed + SEPARATOR + encoder.encodeToString(mac(signed));
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+ String token = signed + SEPARATOR + encoder.encodeToString(mac(signed));
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+ if (token.length() > MAX_ENCODED_LENGTH) {
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+ throw new IllegalStateException(
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+ "cursor token is " + token.length() + " characters; the bound is " + MAX_ENCODED_LENGTH);
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+ }
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+ return token;
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}
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@Override
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@@ -64,6 +84,13 @@ public final class SignedJsonCursorCodec<C> implements CursorCodec<C> {
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if (encoded == null || encoded.isBlank()) {
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throw new IllegalArgumentException("cursor must not be blank");
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}
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+ // First line, before any substring, decode or MAC. A paging endpoint is public, and everything
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+ // below this point allocates in proportion to what the caller sent: repeatedly posting a very
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+ // large token made the server build strings, byte arrays and a MAC input before it had any
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+ // reason to believe the token was real. A page-size bound does not bound the token.
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+ if (encoded.length() > MAX_ENCODED_LENGTH) {
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+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("cursor exceeds the maximum token length");
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+ }
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int payloadSeparator = encoded.indexOf(SEPARATOR);
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int macSeparator = encoded.lastIndexOf(SEPARATOR);
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if (payloadSeparator <= 0 || macSeparator <= payloadSeparator) {
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@@ -73,15 +100,33 @@ public final class SignedJsonCursorCodec<C> implements CursorCodec<C> {
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if (!VERSION.equals(version)) {
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throw new IllegalArgumentException("unknown cursor version");
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}
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+ // Base64 expands by 4/3, so the encoded payload segment's length bounds the decoded size
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+ // exactly. Checking it here refuses an oversized payload without allocating it first.
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+ int encodedPayloadLength = macSeparator - payloadSeparator - 1;
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+ if (decodedLengthOf(encodedPayloadLength) > MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES) {
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+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("cursor payload exceeds the maximum size");
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+ }
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String signed = encoded.substring(0, macSeparator);
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byte[] presented = decodeBase64(encoded.substring(macSeparator + 1));
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+ if (presented.length != MAC_LENGTH_BYTES) {
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+ // Checked before the comparison. `MessageDigest.isEqual` is constant time for equal-length
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+ // inputs; feeding it a differently-sized array asks it a question it was not built to answer.
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+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("malformed cursor");
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+ }
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if (!MessageDigest.isEqual(mac(signed), presented)) {
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throw new IllegalArgumentException("cursor signature does not verify");
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}
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+ // The payload decoder runs only after the signature verified, so an unsigned token never
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+ // reaches the application's JSON parsing at all.
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byte[] payload = decodeBase64(encoded.substring(payloadSeparator + 1, macSeparator));
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return payloadCodec.fromJson(new String(payload, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
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}
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+ /** The number of bytes a Base64 segment of this many characters decodes to, at most. */
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+ private static int decodedLengthOf(int encodedLength) {
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+ return encodedLength / 4 * 3 + 3;
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+ }
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+
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private byte[] decodeBase64(String value) {
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try {
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return decoder.decode(value);
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=== CapabilitySupport history ===
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0e61f86 feat(jpa): implement the JPA relational persistence platform
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=== JpaEntityNotFoundException history ===
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0e61f86 feat(jpa): implement the JPA relational persistence platform
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Exit code: 0
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