oauth2-proxy carries the authorization request in a signed cookie, so the callback can land on a different replica and still succeed, which is the opposite of the BFF failure in B-0. Sharing is therefore just sharing one Secret.
Rotating it is all-or-nothing: --cookie-secret is singular, so there is no second key to read old tickets with, and the log shows both the validation failure and Error removing session, leaving the Redis session orphaned because the key cannot be derived from a ticket that will not decode.
Getting there required two diagnoses: the callback 502 came from the full session riding in Set-Cookie past nginx's buffer, and every earlier attempt to read nginx config returned nothing because sudo on the host asks for a password while the guests do not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stopping Redis returns HTTP 000 rather than an error because the client waits on reconnect, and the pod keeps serving traffic because the redis health indicator is not in the readiness group even though /actuator/health returns 503. That is the mirror image of A-2, where Keycloak put its database check in readiness and the pods left the Service.
Turning on AOF with config set created the appendonlydir and still lost everything on pod deletion, because /data was the container filesystem; adding a PVC makes the same setting work. Volume first, persistence setting second.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moving the authorized client to JdbcOAuth2AuthorizedClientService makes tokens work across replicas, so the session-in-Redis plus tokens-in-PostgreSQL split holds. The table then shows what sharing cannot fix: the primary key is (client_registration_id, principal_name) with no session in it, so a second login for the same user updates the same row rather than adding one.
The refresh token sits in bytea as the raw JWT, readable with convert_from, and logout clears only the Redis session while the plaintext token row and the Keycloak SSO session both survive. The schema itself failed silently first because the default DDL uses blob, which PostgreSQL does not have, and continue-on-error swallowed it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adding Spring Session Redis grows the context by 81 beans and swaps sessionRepository for RedisSessionRepository, while authorizedClientService stays InMemoryOAuth2AuthorizedClientService. The user then reads as logged in with principal labuser while accessTokenStoredOnServer is false, which is worse than being logged out.
Redis holds only the security context, serialized with Java native serialization, and the refresh token is not there to encrypt in the first place. Three problems on the way: Kubernetes service links overwrote REDIS_PORT with a tcp:// URL, the tests tried to reach Redis, and the resource server was never deployed so a DNS failure looked like a token failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The authorized client repository is AuthenticatedPrincipalOAuth2AuthorizedClientRepository, keyed by principal with no session id in it, which is the mechanism behind the sharing problem Q1 and Q3 describe. Sharing a store does not fix a lookup key.
Five problems on the way in: only build output was committed under bff/, a duplicate YAML key broke the image build and was invisible until the full log was captured, env placeholders without defaults broke the tests, actuator was behind the login redirect so a 200 was the login page, and the 117KB beans response failed through the proxy.
Deploying two replicas made the login itself fail before any experiment started, because the authorization request lives in per-instance memory and the callback lands elsewhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cutting TCP 7800 leaves cross-node refresh working (200), confirming sessions travel through PostgreSQL rather than the cluster transport. Logout is the opposite: the database row is deleted but the other node answers from its stale local cache, so the A-0 conclusion that invalidation rides the database is corrected here.
Two things the plan did not anticipate: a NetworkPolicy cannot sever an established connection because conntrack accepts it before policy evaluation, and Keycloak reports the partition through its readiness probe so the split node removes itself from the Service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
