Backups, the daily drift check and the k3s serving certificates have no
alert. k3s renews certificates only when it starts within 120 days of
expiry, and the two kube-prometheus-stack kubelet certificate alerts
can never fire because the k3s kubelet exports no
kubelet_certificate_manager_* metric.
Add a PrometheusRule (platform-host-checks) for backup age, failed
runs, missing metrics, drift left for 6h, a stale drift check, and
serving certificate expiry (warning under 100 days, critical under 14).
Add the two remaining host timers (certificate expiry via openssl on
6443 and 10250; the drift check against origin/main) and an installer
that copies the scripts to a root-owned path, creates the textfile and
work directories and enables all four timers. Disable the two dead
kubelet certificate rules in kube-prometheus-stack.
Risk: the metrics need the node-exporter textfile collector, a one-line
change in W1's node-exporter values that was asked of W1. Until then
PlatformHostBackupMetricsAbsent fires after a day, which is the point.
Verification (desktop):
- test-platform-host-checks-alerts.sh: promtool check and unit tests
pass; with the k3s threshold changed from 2 to 5 days they fail.
- render-observability-core.sh passes; the render has no Kubelet*
certificate alerts and still has both KubeClientCertificateExpiration.
- k3s-cert-expiry.sh as the desktop user reads both certificates.
- install-host-checks.sh --check: systemd-analyze verify is clean.
The 2026-11-11 review found a pg_hba rule that existed only in the
cluster by rendering every root by hand and running kubectl diff.
Nothing does that regularly, so drift is found by accident.
live-drift-check.sh renders all live roots (Phase 1 and 2, admin
services, observability core, the Traefik trust overlay, the tenant,
PriorityClass and keycloak policy roots), strips Secrets and runs
kubectl diff, which is a server-side dry run. It prints one line per
drifted object, honours a dated accepted-drift list and can write
Prometheus textfile metrics for a later alert.
Risk: read-only. It consumes the render scripts' verified-output-dir
handoff and deletes those directories on exit; the README notes this
second consumer. Secret values are not compared.
Verification (desktop, before this series is applied): 17 drifted
objects, matching the review plus the new roots; exit 1; the textfile
holds platform_live_drift_objects 17.
The tech-log tenant needs objects inside platform namespaces: its
database and role, ingress to Postgres and AIStor, blackbox probes,
alert rules, a dashboard and two observability NetworkPolicies. They
were only ever applied with kubectl and no repository holds them, so a
deleted object cannot be recreated and a platform re-apply can drop
tech-log access without anyone noticing.
Declare them in services/tenants/techlog, copied from each object's
last-applied configuration. The dashboard follows the repository's
dashboard pattern (JSON file + configMapGenerator, same name, same
labels). The hyeonworks-prod Namespace moves here as the tenant
boundary and gets PSA enforce=baseline, warn/audit=restricted.
Rejected: enforce=restricted now. A server dry-run shows all three
tech-log pods would violate it; baseline has zero violations.
Risk: the render matches the live objects exactly except the added PSA
labels. The pg_hba rules and the Secret stay out of this root (Cluster
owner and Git policy).
Verification (desktop):
- render-tenants-and-policies.sh passes.
- kubectl diff of the render shows only the Namespace PSA labels.
- kubectl label --dry-run=server enforce=baseline: no warnings.