The kubelet has no memory eviction threshold and no reservations, so
under memory pressure the kernel OOM killer picks a victim and
Postgres (oom_score_adj 985) is near the front. The API server writes
no audit log. Namespaces without labels have no Pod Security level, and
graceful node shutdown is off.
Add the files for one k3s restart: a kubelet drop-in (system 1 CPU/2Gi,
kube 0.5 CPU/1Gi, hard eviction memory 500Mi plus the two k3s disk
defaults, soft eviction 1Gi for 1m, shutdown 60s/20s), an API server
drop-in that appends the audit and admission-config flags, a Metadata
audit policy and a cluster Pod Security default (baseline, warn and
audit restricted, kube-system exempt).
Rejected: protect-kernel-defaults, recommended in review 7.3. CIS
dropped it in v1.7, and the sysctls it requires include
kernel.panic_on_oops=1, which reboots this dual-boot desktop on any
kernel oops; a reboot started the 2026-11-11 clock incident. The README
records the reason.
Risk: nothing is installed by this commit. The kubelet merges the
drop-in after k3s's 00-k3s-defaults.conf (k3s passes only --config-dir);
evictionHard lists all three keys because setting the map zeroes the
others.
Verification: the apply script's --check parses every file and asserts
the invariants (next commit).
The keycloak namespace only has the ingress policy the Keycloak
Operator creates. Neither the Keycloak pod nor the Operator pod has any
egress restriction, unlike every other platform namespace.
Add a namespace-wide default deny and allow only what is used: DNS,
platform-postgres 5432 (server and realm-import jobs), JGroups between
Keycloak pods, and for the Operator the API server and the Keycloak
management ports. Keycloak ingress stays owned by the Operator policy.
Rejected: allowing public 443 like Gitea does. Neither the repository
nor the Keycloak CR configures SMTP or an external identity provider,
and the only open TCP connections from keycloak-0 on 2026-11-12 were to
PostgreSQL. Adding SMTP or an IdP later needs a new egress rule; the
README says so.
Risk: a missed dependency would break logins for every service. The
README lists the post-apply checks (OIDC discovery, a new TCP
connection to Postgres from keycloak-0, Operator logs) and the one-line
rollback.
Verification: render and kubectl diff only add the five policies.
The k3s-bundled Traefik runs with no requests or limits, so it is a
BestEffort pod. The kubelet on this node has no memory eviction
threshold (the k3s default evictionHard only covers nodefs and
imagefs), so under memory pressure the kernel OOM killer chooses, and
BestEffort containers have oom_score_adj 1000. Every public route goes
through this one pod.
Set requests cpu 50m / memory 64Mi and a 256Mi memory limit in the base
and in both overlay patches, because the baseline and trust patches
replace valuesContent as a whole. No CPU limit, to avoid throttling.
Measured use on 2026-11-11 was about 5m CPU and 42Mi memory.
Rejected: raising Traefik to Guaranteed. It would reserve CPU the
ingress does not use, and the real fix for memory pressure is kubelet
reservation and eviction thresholds, which need a k3s restart.
Risk: applying the trust overlay makes the k3s helm-controller roll
Traefik once (RollingUpdate, a few seconds). Not applied here.
Verification (desktop):
- infrastructure/networking/traefik/scripts/validate.sh passes.
- kubectl diff of the trust overlay against the live HelmChartConfig
adds only the resources block.
- baseline and observe renders both contain the same resources.
The template repositories need a real runner for their CI, and the
owner chose one container on the desktop host (the k3s node).
Add compose.yaml and config.yaml for the official Gitea Runner 5.4.1
dind image, pinned by index digest, plus the operating guide. The
runner has capacity 1, one ubuntu-latest label pinned to
runner-images ubuntu-24.04-v26.11.03 by digest, restart: always, and
a 6 CPU / 10g cap (no more than half of the 12 cores and 31GiB).
Jobs use the dind daemon through the runner's Docker proxy for
Testcontainers; the host Docker socket is never mounted, job
containers stay unprivileged, valid_volumes is empty, and sweep
removes what a job created.
Dropped alternatives: the deprecated gitea/act_runner 0.6.1 (moved
to gitea/runner), the basic image with the host docker.sock (jobs
would own the host daemon), and dind-rootless (Testcontainers
compatibility needs separate checks).
Risk: the runner container is privileged; a job can still start a
privileged container on the inner daemon, so only trusted repository
workflows should run here. Runner jobs do not take the desktop's
heavy-work lock; the CPU and memory caps are the only guard.
Verification: config keys checked with `gitea-runner config get`,
`docker compose config` passes, the runner registered at user scope
and the Gitea API shows desktop-runner online and idle; it came back
online after `docker restart` without registering again.