Nothing backs up the k3s datastore or Gitea's repositories, packages and
app.ini. W1 covers platform-postgres only. One SSD failure loses the
source, CI artefacts, published libraries and every cluster Secret.
Add two root systemd timers that write to a new AIStor bucket on the
HDD (platform-host-backups, same AIStor as W1's postgres backups):
- k3s datastore, daily: sqlite3 .backup of the live state.db plus the
server token (k3s backup/restore docs: the token is needed to read
it back), integrity_check, tar.gz, sha256, upload. Off-host copy is
prepared behind two variables (gpg recipient file, rclone target) and
stays off until the owner chooses a place.
- Gitea, weekly: gitea dump --skip-db streamed from the live container,
listing checked for app.ini and repositories, sha256, upload. The DB
is in the CNPG backup.
Each run writes textfile metrics for the alerts in the next commit.
create-host-backup-credentials.sh makes the bucket (50GiB quota,
lifecycle 56 days for gitea/, 30 days for k3s-datastore/), a
bucket-scoped policy and user, and a root-only env file; no key is
printed and mc gets keys only through a 0600 env file.
Rejected: in-cluster CronJobs. The datastore is a root-owned host file
and the dump needs the Gitea DB connection; a hostPath root pod or a
second Gitea-labelled pod is a larger privilege than a root timer.
Risk: not installed here (owner sudo steps). The k3s archive holds the
token; together with the datastore it decrypts every Secret. It lives
in a bucket only the backup user can read.
Verification (desktop): a dump streamed with --file - is a valid
tar.gz with app.ini; repositories appear as repos/<owner>/<name>.git
(29, matching the live count). The scripts parse with bash -n.
The 2026-11-11 review found a pg_hba rule that existed only in the
cluster by rendering every root by hand and running kubectl diff.
Nothing does that regularly, so drift is found by accident.
live-drift-check.sh renders all live roots (Phase 1 and 2, admin
services, observability core, the Traefik trust overlay, the tenant,
PriorityClass and keycloak policy roots), strips Secrets and runs
kubectl diff, which is a server-side dry run. It prints one line per
drifted object, honours a dated accepted-drift list and can write
Prometheus textfile metrics for a later alert.
Risk: read-only. It consumes the render scripts' verified-output-dir
handoff and deletes those directories on exit; the README notes this
second consumer. Secret values are not compared.
Verification (desktop, before this series is applied): 17 drifted
objects, matching the review plus the new roots; exit 1; the textfile
holds platform_live_drift_objects 17.
The tech-log tenant needs objects inside platform namespaces: its
database and role, ingress to Postgres and AIStor, blackbox probes,
alert rules, a dashboard and two observability NetworkPolicies. They
were only ever applied with kubectl and no repository holds them, so a
deleted object cannot be recreated and a platform re-apply can drop
tech-log access without anyone noticing.
Declare them in services/tenants/techlog, copied from each object's
last-applied configuration. The dashboard follows the repository's
dashboard pattern (JSON file + configMapGenerator, same name, same
labels). The hyeonworks-prod Namespace moves here as the tenant
boundary and gets PSA enforce=baseline, warn/audit=restricted.
Rejected: enforce=restricted now. A server dry-run shows all three
tech-log pods would violate it; baseline has zero violations.
Risk: the render matches the live objects exactly except the added PSA
labels. The pg_hba rules and the Secret stay out of this root (Cluster
owner and Git policy).
Verification (desktop):
- render-tenants-and-policies.sh passes.
- kubectl diff of the render shows only the Namespace PSA labels.
- kubectl label --dry-run=server enforce=baseline: no warnings.