Files
tech-log-frontend/tests/unit/supply-chain.test.ts
DongHyeonka c80320dfc7 chore: sync the frontend template from ebea300 to af3d8e6
Carries 359 template commits, tag v0.2.0 plus one documentation commit: the
generator-built feature index with its app, bounded-context and feature
declarations, the src/platform kernel and scale tooling, the 2026-09-24 src
review fixes, and the 2026-09-25 maturity review round with its CHANGELOG
[보안]/[계약] rows. 691 of the 824 template paths are applied, 85 of them
merged with product changes; 127 are not carried.

Product identity is unchanged: name, version 0.1.0, routes, design and the
TechLog domain.

Three decisions worth naming. TechLog stays composed directly, as the last
two syncs recorded; its directory carries a NOT_INSTALLED marker that says so,
and every installed-* composer takes the template's projection with TechLog
added on top. The reference sample is no longer installed: the template now
installs a feature only through feature-module.ts and context-routes.ts,
which load the screens this product deleted, so its three operations, six
schemas and one topic leave the registries, recorded as registry change
evidence. And AppRouter mounts the platform and TechLog routes only; the
template's bounded-context route gateway waits for a generator-installed
feature.

Required fixes: readSubject on the BFF session owner (without it every HTTP
Studio session would close as integration-failed), zod through the facade in
nine TechLog files, noUnusedLocals, and public/config.json written out to
match the local profile. Derived baselines were recomputed after reproducing
both sides' values: CI contract 101 commands / 106 references / 141
artifacts, gate shape c9adcf85; registry approval 2dc6c3a3; the runtime
config schema baseline equals the schema at 8210d48.

Verified here: types, lint, architecture, adapter inventory, CI contract,
i18n, design system, diagnostics, browser security, dev release manifest,
TechLog contract and build pass; 220 component, 155 integration, 15
contract, 418 TechLog, 43 reference-feature, 18 recipe and 46
release-coherence tests pass, and 2381 of 2383 unit tests. Reproduced at
8210d48 first and unchanged: check:registries (byte-identical),
test:runtime-schema, verify:documentation. Brought by the template and
escalated rather than suppressed: check:request-fanout on TechLog's cursor
pagination, check:remediation-ledger (fails upstream too), the shared-chunk
hash test, and the registry-dependent sample removal and second-feature
tests. Playwright suites were not run.

Full record, the five open questions and the follow-ups in
docs/operations/template-sync-2026-09-29.md.

(cherry picked from commit b2170cf265dea45dc9cc05d3c61e627e97f31cdb)
2026-11-12 08:28:54 +09:00

642 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash, generateKeyPairSync, sign } from "node:crypto";
import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
diffDependencyInventories,
isValidSha512Integrity,
parsePnpmLockfilePackages,
supplyChainDigest,
validateDependencyReview,
validateLicensePolicy,
} from "../../scripts/lib/supply-chain.ts";
import { digestReleaseInputFiles } from "../../scripts/lib/release-input-evidence.ts";
import { findSecretMatches } from "../../scripts/lib/secret-scan.ts";
import {
parseSecretScanIncludedPaths,
selectIncludedInventoryFiles,
} from "../../scripts/lib/secret-scan-policy.ts";
import { checkSecurityFixtures } from "../../scripts/lib/security-fixture-check.ts";
import {
evaluatePromotionEvidence,
providerEvidenceSignaturePayload,
providerPublicKeyFingerprint,
} from "../../scripts/lib/provider-evidence.ts";
import {
createReleaseCandidateManifest,
RELEASE_CANDIDATE_EVIDENCE_PATHS,
verifyReleaseCandidate,
} from "../../scripts/lib/release-candidate.ts";
import { deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt } from "../../scripts/lib/supply-chain-time.ts";
import {
indexCiGateContract,
loadCiGateContract,
} from "../../scripts/contracts/ci-gates.ts";
const integrity = `sha512-${Buffer.alloc(64, 7).toString("base64")}`;
const dependency = {
name: "fixture",
version: "1.0.0",
direct: true,
scope: "production",
optional: false,
license: "MIT",
integrity,
dependencies: [],
};
const candidateDistSha256 = "1".repeat(64);
const lockfileSha256 = "2".repeat(64);
const NOW = Date.parse("2026-08-02T01:00:00.000Z");
const sourceIdentity = Object.freeze({
revision: "a".repeat(40),
sourceSetSha256: "b".repeat(64),
});
const expectedProviderContext = Object.freeze({
run: Object.freeze({ id: "fixture-run", attempt: 1 }),
source: sourceIdentity,
candidate: Object.freeze({
archiveSha256: "3".repeat(64),
bundleSha256: "4".repeat(64),
distSha256: candidateDistSha256,
lockfileSha256,
}),
vulnerabilityInvocationNonce: "5".repeat(64),
provenanceInvocationNonce: "6".repeat(64),
secretScanAttestation: Object.freeze({
status: "PASS" as const,
localEvidenceAssessmentSha256: "7".repeat(64),
sourceSetSha256: sourceIdentity.sourceSetSha256,
policySha256: "8".repeat(64),
sarifSha256: "9".repeat(64),
scanInputSha256: "a".repeat(64),
}),
});
function signedProviderEvidence(
value: Record<string, unknown>,
keyId: string,
privateKey: ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPairSync>["privateKey"],
publicKeyFingerprint: string,
) {
return {
...value,
signature: {
algorithm: "Ed25519",
keyId,
publicKeyFingerprint,
value: sign(
null,
providerEvidenceSignaturePayload(value),
privateKey,
).toString("base64"),
},
};
}
function providerPair(input: Readonly<{
vulnerabilityKeys: ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPairSync>;
provenanceKeys: ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPairSync>;
candidate?: typeof expectedProviderContext.candidate;
vulnerabilityFingerprint?: string;
provenanceFingerprint?: string;
}>) {
const candidate = input.candidate ?? expectedProviderContext.candidate;
const vulnerabilityFingerprint = input.vulnerabilityFingerprint ??
providerPublicKeyFingerprint(input.vulnerabilityKeys.publicKey);
const provenanceFingerprint = input.provenanceFingerprint ??
providerPublicKeyFingerprint(input.provenanceKeys.publicKey);
return {
vulnerabilityReport: signedProviderEvidence({
schemaVersion: 2,
evidenceType: "vulnerability-report",
provider: "fixture-vulnerability-provider",
issuedAt: "2026-08-02T01:00:00.000Z",
expiresAt: "2026-08-02T02:00:00.000Z",
run: { ...expectedProviderContext.run, invocationNonce: expectedProviderContext.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce },
source: expectedProviderContext.source,
candidate,
secretScanAttestation: expectedProviderContext.secretScanAttestation,
findings: [],
}, "fixture-vulnerability-key", input.vulnerabilityKeys.privateKey, vulnerabilityFingerprint),
provenanceAttestation: signedProviderEvidence({
schemaVersion: 2,
evidenceType: "provenance-attestation",
provider: "fixture-provenance-provider",
issuedAt: "2026-08-02T01:00:00.000Z",
expiresAt: "2026-08-02T02:00:00.000Z",
run: { ...expectedProviderContext.run, invocationNonce: expectedProviderContext.provenanceInvocationNonce },
source: expectedProviderContext.source,
candidate,
signer: "fixture-workload-identity",
subject: { name: "dist", digest: { sha256: candidate.distSha256 } },
}, "fixture-provenance-key", input.provenanceKeys.privateKey, provenanceFingerprint),
};
}
function providerTrust(
keyId: string,
publicKey: ReturnType<typeof generateKeyPairSync>["publicKey"],
publicKeyFingerprint = providerPublicKeyFingerprint(publicKey),
) {
return { keyId, publicKey, publicKeyFingerprint };
}
describe("supply-chain policy", () => {
it("derives a stable supply-chain timestamp from the immutable build epoch", () => {
const input = {
generatedAt: "2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z",
sourceDateEpoch: "1785542400",
};
expect(deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt(input)).toBe(
"2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z",
);
expect(deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt(input)).toBe(
deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt({ ...input }),
);
expect(() =>
deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt({
generatedAt: "not-a-time",
sourceDateEpoch: "1785542400",
}),
).toThrow(/generatedAt/u);
expect(() =>
deterministicSupplyChainGeneratedAt({
generatedAt: "2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z",
sourceDateEpoch: "1785542401",
}),
).toThrow(/SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH/u);
});
it("rejects release candidate dist bytes changed after manifest creation", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "release-candidate-"));
try {
const rawLockfile = "lockfileVersion: '9.0'\n";
const rawLockfileSha256 = createHash("sha256")
.update(rawLockfile)
.digest("hex");
await mkdir(path.join(root, "dist/.vite"), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path.join(root, "dist/app.js"), "immutable\n");
await writeFile(path.join(root, "dist/.vite/metadata.json"), "{}\n");
await writeFile(path.join(root, "pnpm-lock.yaml"), rawLockfile);
for (const file of RELEASE_CANDIDATE_EVIDENCE_PATHS) {
if (file === "pnpm-lock.yaml") continue;
await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(root, file)), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(
path.join(root, file),
file === "artifacts/release/dependency-inventory.json"
? `${JSON.stringify({ lockfileSha256: rawLockfileSha256 })}\n`
: `${file}\n`,
);
}
const manifest = await createReleaseCandidateManifest(root);
expect(manifest.lockfileSha256).toBe(rawLockfileSha256);
expect(manifest.files).toContainEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
path: "pnpm-lock.yaml",
sha256: rawLockfileSha256,
}),
);
expect(await createReleaseCandidateManifest(root)).toEqual(manifest);
expect((await verifyReleaseCandidate(manifest, root)).failures).toEqual(
[],
);
await writeFile(path.join(root, "dist/app.js"), "mutated\n");
expect(
(await verifyReleaseCandidate(manifest, root)).failures,
).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
"release candidate dist digest mismatch",
"release candidate bundle digest mismatch",
"release candidate file set or file digest mismatch",
]),
);
} finally {
await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("rejects a dependency inventory digest that differs from raw pnpm-lock bytes", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "release-lockfile-"));
try {
await mkdir(path.join(root, "dist"), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path.join(root, "dist/app.js"), "immutable\n");
await writeFile(path.join(root, "pnpm-lock.yaml"), "lockfileVersion: '9.0'\n");
for (const file of RELEASE_CANDIDATE_EVIDENCE_PATHS) {
if (file === "pnpm-lock.yaml") continue;
await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(root, file)), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(
path.join(root, file),
file === "artifacts/release/dependency-inventory.json"
? `${JSON.stringify({ lockfileSha256 })}\n`
: `${file}\n`,
);
}
await expect(createReleaseCandidateManifest(root)).rejects.toThrow(
/raw pnpm-lock digest mismatch/u,
);
} finally {
await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("fails promotion when external provider evidence is absent", () => {
const result = evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: expectedProviderContext,
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport: null,
provenanceAttestation: null,
vulnerabilityTrust: null,
provenanceTrust: null,
nowEpochMs: () => NOW,
});
expect(result.status).toBe("FAIL_UNVERIFIED");
});
it("passes only signed provider evidence for the exact immutable candidate", () => {
const vulnerabilityKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const provenanceKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const { vulnerabilityReport, provenanceAttestation } = providerPair({
vulnerabilityKeys,
provenanceKeys,
});
const result = evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: expectedProviderContext,
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport,
provenanceAttestation,
vulnerabilityTrust: providerTrust(
"fixture-vulnerability-key",
vulnerabilityKeys.publicKey,
),
provenanceTrust: providerTrust(
"fixture-provenance-key",
provenanceKeys.publicKey,
),
nowEpochMs: () => NOW,
});
expect(result).toMatchObject({
status: "PASS",
vulnerabilityStatus: "PASS",
provenanceAttestationStatus: "PASS",
failures: [],
});
});
it("rejects correctly signed provider evidence for a different digest", () => {
const vulnerabilityKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const provenanceKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const wrongDistSha256 = "3".repeat(64);
const { vulnerabilityReport, provenanceAttestation } = providerPair({
vulnerabilityKeys,
provenanceKeys,
candidate: { ...expectedProviderContext.candidate, distSha256: wrongDistSha256 },
});
const result = evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: expectedProviderContext,
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport,
provenanceAttestation,
vulnerabilityTrust: providerTrust("fixture-vulnerability-key", vulnerabilityKeys.publicKey),
provenanceTrust: providerTrust("fixture-provenance-key", provenanceKeys.publicKey),
nowEpochMs: () => NOW,
});
expect(result.status).toBe("FAIL_UNVERIFIED");
expect(result.failures).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
"vulnerability report candidate identity mismatch",
"provenance attestation candidate identity mismatch",
]),
);
});
it("rejects candidate bytes changed after provider attestation", () => {
const vulnerabilityKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const provenanceKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const { vulnerabilityReport, provenanceAttestation } = providerPair({
vulnerabilityKeys,
provenanceKeys,
});
const result = evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: {
...expectedProviderContext,
candidate: { ...expectedProviderContext.candidate, distSha256: "4".repeat(64) },
},
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport,
provenanceAttestation,
vulnerabilityTrust: providerTrust("fixture-vulnerability-key", vulnerabilityKeys.publicKey),
provenanceTrust: providerTrust("fixture-provenance-key", provenanceKeys.publicKey),
nowEpochMs: () => NOW,
});
expect(result.status).toBe("FAIL_UNVERIFIED");
expect(result.failures).toContain("vulnerability report candidate identity mismatch");
});
it("rejects Ed448 keys mislabeled as Ed25519 evidence", () => {
const vulnerabilityKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed448");
const provenanceKeys = generateKeyPairSync("ed448");
const fakeFingerprint = `sha256:${"7".repeat(64)}`;
const { vulnerabilityReport, provenanceAttestation } = providerPair({
vulnerabilityKeys,
provenanceKeys,
vulnerabilityFingerprint: fakeFingerprint,
provenanceFingerprint: fakeFingerprint,
});
expect(
evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: expectedProviderContext,
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport,
provenanceAttestation,
vulnerabilityTrust: {
keyId: "fixture-vulnerability-key",
publicKey: vulnerabilityKeys.publicKey,
publicKeyFingerprint: fakeFingerprint,
},
provenanceTrust: {
keyId: "fixture-provenance-key",
publicKey: provenanceKeys.publicKey,
publicKeyFingerprint: fakeFingerprint,
},
nowEpochMs: () => NOW,
}).status,
).toBe("FAIL_UNVERIFIED");
});
it.each([
["empty", []],
["empty entry", [""]],
["blank entry", [" "]],
["absolute", ["/src"]],
["backslash", ["src\\file.ts"]],
["dot", ["."]],
["dotdot", [".."]],
["traversal", ["src/../docs"]],
["trailing slash", ["src/"]],
["mixed", ["src", 42]],
["duplicate", ["src", "src"]],
])("rejects %s secret-scan include paths", (_name, includedPaths) => {
expect(() => parseSecretScanIncludedPaths(includedPaths)).toThrow();
});
it("requires every configured include path to match the inventory", () => {
expect(
selectIncludedInventoryFiles(
["README.md", "src/app.ts"],
["src"],
),
).toEqual(["src/app.ts"]);
expect(() =>
selectIncludedInventoryFiles(
["README.md", "src/app.ts"],
["misspelled"],
),
).toThrow(/misspelled/u);
expect(
selectIncludedInventoryFiles(
["README.md", "src/app.ts"],
null,
),
).toEqual(["README.md", "src/app.ts"]);
});
it("rejects a crashed fixture scan and cannot reuse a stale repository artifact", async () => {
const cleaned: string[] = [];
await expect(
checkSecurityFixtures({
createTempDirectory: async () => "/tmp/fresh-security-fixture",
runScan: () => ({
status: 1,
signal: null,
stdout: "",
stderr: "Security scan found 3 blocking result(s).\n",
}),
readArtifact: async (artifactPath) => {
expect(artifactPath).toBe(
"/tmp/fresh-security-fixture/scan-fixture.sarif",
);
throw Object.assign(new Error("fresh artifact missing"), {
code: "ENOENT",
});
},
cleanup: async (directory) => {
cleaned.push(directory);
},
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/fresh artifact missing/u);
expect(cleaned).toEqual(["/tmp/fresh-security-fixture"]);
await expect(
checkSecurityFixtures({
createTempDirectory: async () => "/tmp/fresh-security-fixture",
runScan: () => ({
status: null,
signal: "SIGTERM",
stdout: "",
stderr: "Security scan found 3 blocking result(s).\n",
}),
readArtifact: async () => "{}",
cleanup: async () => undefined,
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/did not fail exactly/u);
});
it("wires the exact security fixture checker as a passing CI gate", async () => {
const contract = await loadCiGateContract(process.cwd());
const index = indexCiGateContract(contract);
const securityGate = index.gates.get("FE-GATE-013");
expect(securityGate).toBeDefined();
const commands = securityGate!.commandIds.map((commandId) =>
index.commands.get(commandId),
);
expect(commands).toContainEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
script: "check:security:fixtures",
expect: "pass",
}),
);
expect(commands).not.toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ script: "scan:security:fixture" }),
]),
);
const evidence = securityGate!.evidenceArtifactIds.map(
(artifactId) => index.artifacts.get(artifactId)?.path,
);
expect(evidence).not.toContain(
"artifacts/security/scan-fixture.sarif",
);
});
it("uses one fail-closed repository inventory for provenance and secret scanning", async () => {
const [provenanceSource, securityCliSource, securityEvaluatorSource] =
await Promise.all([
readFile("scripts/generate-supply-chain.ts", "utf8"),
readFile("scripts/security-scan.ts", "utf8"),
readFile("scripts/lib/secret-scan-evaluator.ts", "utf8"),
]);
expect(securityCliSource).toContain("evaluateRepositorySecretScan");
for (const source of [provenanceSource, securityEvaluatorSource]) {
expect(source).toContain("buildRepositoryFileInventory");
expect(source).not.toContain("async function filesWithin");
}
});
it("binds provenance digest behavior to tracked files outside policy roots", async () => {
const contents = new Map([
["src/app.ts", Buffer.from("app\n")],
["README.md", Buffer.from("one\n")],
]);
const first = await digestReleaseInputFiles(
["README.md", "src/app.ts"],
async (file) => contents.get(file)!,
);
contents.set("README.md", Buffer.from("two\n"));
const second = await digestReleaseInputFiles(
["README.md", "src/app.ts"],
async (file) => contents.get(file)!,
);
expect(second).not.toBe(first);
});
it("detects every forbidden secret fixture, including quoted JSON keys", async () => {
const fixtureRoot = "tests/fixtures/security/secret-detection/forbidden";
const findings = (
await Promise.all(
["source.ts", "dist.ts", "config.json"].map(async (file) =>
findSecretMatches(
`${fixtureRoot}/${file}`,
await readFile(`${fixtureRoot}/${file}`, "utf8"),
),
),
)
).flat();
expect(findings.map((finding) => [finding.file, finding.ruleId])).toEqual([
[`${fixtureRoot}/source.ts`, "aws-access-key"],
[`${fixtureRoot}/dist.ts`, "assigned-secret"],
[`${fixtureRoot}/config.json`, "assigned-secret"],
]);
});
// A removal fixture deletes some of these inputs on purpose — removing the
// browser file/storage capability takes the whole browser-capability harness
// with it. The claim is about the inputs this checkout has.
it("covers every mandatory release input in the secret scan policy", async () => {
const policy = JSON.parse(
await readFile("config/security/secret-scan-policy.json", "utf8"),
) as { trackedRoots: string[] };
const mandatory = [
"index.html",
".dependency-cruiser.json",
".nvmrc",
".npmrc",
"eslint.config.ts",
"package.json",
"pnpm-lock.yaml",
"pnpm-workspace.yaml",
"scripts",
"schemas",
"config",
".gitea/workflows/quality-gates.yml",
"vite.config.ts",
"vite.service-worker.config.ts",
"vitest.config.ts",
"playwright.config.ts",
"playwright.capabilities.config.ts",
"playwright.dev.config.ts",
"playwright.storybook.config.ts",
"playwright.visual.config.ts",
"tsconfig.json",
"tsconfig.app.json",
"tsconfig.base.json",
"tsconfig.node.json",
"tsconfig.recipes.json",
"tsconfig.service-worker.json",
"tsconfig.test.json",
"tsconfig.web-worker.json",
];
expect(policy.trackedRoots).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining(mandatory.filter((input) => existsSync(input))),
);
});
it("parses every top-level lockfile package and validates SRI", () => {
const parsed = parsePnpmLockfilePackages(`
packages:
'@scope/one@1.0.0':
resolution: {integrity: ${integrity}}
two@2.0.0:
resolution: {integrity: ${integrity}}
snapshots:
`);
expect(parsed).toEqual([
{ name: "@scope/one", version: "1.0.0", integrity },
{ name: "two", version: "2.0.0", integrity },
]);
expect(parsed.every((entry) => isValidSha512Integrity(entry.integrity))).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("keeps inventory digests stable when dependency ordering changes", () => {
const other = { ...dependency, name: "other" };
expect(supplyChainDigest([dependency, other])).toBe(
supplyChainDigest([other, dependency]),
);
});
it("calculates actual additions and requires independent high-risk review", () => {
const before = { dependencies: [] };
const after = { dependencies: [dependency] };
const diff = diffDependencyInventories(before, after);
expect(diff.added).toEqual(["fixture@1.0.0"]);
expect(
validateDependencyReview(diff, after, {
changes: [
{
changeId: "add:fixture@1.0.0",
owner: "one",
reviewer: "one",
reason: "fixture",
rollback: "remove",
},
],
}).passed,
).toBe(false);
});
it("allows explicit policy licenses and rejects denied licenses", () => {
expect(
validateLicensePolicy(
{ dependencies: [dependency] },
{ allowedLicenses: ["MIT"], deniedLicensePatterns: ["AGPL"] },
).passed,
).toBe(true);
expect(
validateLicensePolicy(
{
dependencies: [{ ...dependency, license: "AGPL-3.0" }],
},
{ allowedLicenses: ["MIT"], deniedLicensePatterns: ["AGPL"] },
).passed,
).toBe(false);
});
});