Files
tech-log-frontend/scripts/lib/exact-promotion-bundle.ts
T
DongHyeonka c80320dfc7 chore: sync the frontend template from ebea300 to af3d8e6
Carries 359 template commits, tag v0.2.0 plus one documentation commit: the
generator-built feature index with its app, bounded-context and feature
declarations, the src/platform kernel and scale tooling, the 2026-09-24 src
review fixes, and the 2026-09-25 maturity review round with its CHANGELOG
[보안]/[계약] rows. 691 of the 824 template paths are applied, 85 of them
merged with product changes; 127 are not carried.

Product identity is unchanged: name, version 0.1.0, routes, design and the
TechLog domain.

Three decisions worth naming. TechLog stays composed directly, as the last
two syncs recorded; its directory carries a NOT_INSTALLED marker that says so,
and every installed-* composer takes the template's projection with TechLog
added on top. The reference sample is no longer installed: the template now
installs a feature only through feature-module.ts and context-routes.ts,
which load the screens this product deleted, so its three operations, six
schemas and one topic leave the registries, recorded as registry change
evidence. And AppRouter mounts the platform and TechLog routes only; the
template's bounded-context route gateway waits for a generator-installed
feature.

Required fixes: readSubject on the BFF session owner (without it every HTTP
Studio session would close as integration-failed), zod through the facade in
nine TechLog files, noUnusedLocals, and public/config.json written out to
match the local profile. Derived baselines were recomputed after reproducing
both sides' values: CI contract 101 commands / 106 references / 141
artifacts, gate shape c9adcf85; registry approval 2dc6c3a3; the runtime
config schema baseline equals the schema at 8210d48.

Verified here: types, lint, architecture, adapter inventory, CI contract,
i18n, design system, diagnostics, browser security, dev release manifest,
TechLog contract and build pass; 220 component, 155 integration, 15
contract, 418 TechLog, 43 reference-feature, 18 recipe and 46
release-coherence tests pass, and 2381 of 2383 unit tests. Reproduced at
8210d48 first and unchanged: check:registries (byte-identical),
test:runtime-schema, verify:documentation. Brought by the template and
escalated rather than suppressed: check:request-fanout on TechLog's cursor
pagination, check:remediation-ledger (fails upstream too), the shared-chunk
hash test, and the registry-dependent sample removal and second-feature
tests. Playwright suites were not run.

Full record, the five open questions and the follow-ups in
docs/operations/template-sync-2026-09-29.md.

(cherry picked from commit b2170cf265dea45dc9cc05d3c61e627e97f31cdb)
2026-11-12 08:28:54 +09:00

384 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import {
PROMOTED_FILE_NAMES,
type PromotedFileName,
} from "../contracts/promotion-artifacts.ts";
import {
PROMOTION_VERIFIER_ID,
PROMOTION_VERIFIER_VERSION,
PROVIDER_FUTURE_SKEW_MS,
assertDistinctProviderTrust,
evaluatePromotionEvidence,
providerVerificationArtifactSchema,
provenanceProviderAttestationSchema,
vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema,
trustPolicySha256,
type ProviderTrust,
} from "./provider-evidence.ts";
import { verifyCapturedCiCandidateArchive } from "./ci-candidate-archive.ts";
import { LOCAL_EVIDENCE_ASSESSMENT_PATH } from "./release-candidate.ts";
import { verifyArchivedLocalEvidence } from "./local-release-evidence.ts";
export type ExactPromotionBundle = Readonly<
Partial<Record<PromotedFileName, Buffer>>
>;
export type ExactPromotionExpectedContext = Readonly<{
run: Readonly<{ id: string; attempt: number }>;
sourceRevision: string;
archiveSha256: string;
sourceSetSha256?: string;
bundleSha256?: string;
distSha256?: string;
lockfileSha256?: string;
}>;
/**
* 13-04. `current` checks provider evidence against the clock, as a new
* promotion must. `archived` re-verifies a release promoted earlier (deploying
* it later, or rolling back to it): signatures, digests and members are checked
* the same way, but freshness is judged at the promotion's recorded
* `verifiedAt`, which may not lie in the future. Promotion itself
* (promotion-stager.ts) never passes `archived`.
*/
export type PromotionFreshness = "current" | "archived";
export function promotionEvidenceTime(
freshness: PromotionFreshness,
verifiedAt: string,
now: number,
): number {
if (freshness === "current") return now;
const verified = Date.parse(verifiedAt);
if (!Number.isFinite(verified) || verified > now + PROVIDER_FUTURE_SKEW_MS) {
throw new Error("archived promotion verifiedAt is in the future or invalid");
}
return verified;
}
export async function verifyExactPromotionBundle(
files: ExactPromotionBundle,
options: Readonly<{
vulnerabilityTrust: ProviderTrust;
provenanceTrust: ProviderTrust;
expected: ExactPromotionExpectedContext;
nowEpochMs?: () => number;
freshness?: PromotionFreshness;
}>,
): Promise<Readonly<{ status: "PASS" }>> {
assertDistinctProviderTrust(options);
assertExternalExpectedContext(options.expected);
const names = Object.keys(files).sort(asciiCompare);
const expectedNames = [...PROMOTED_FILE_NAMES].sort(asciiCompare);
if (JSON.stringify(names) !== JSON.stringify(expectedNames)) {
throw new Error("promotion bundle must contain the exact five canonical files");
}
for (const name of PROMOTED_FILE_NAMES) {
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(files[name])) {
throw new TypeError(`promotion bundle file is missing or not captured bytes: ${name}`);
}
}
const archiveBytes = files["release-candidate.tar.gz"]!;
const vulnerabilityBytes = files["vulnerability-report.json"]!;
const provenanceBytes = files["provenance-attestation.json"]!;
const providerBytes = files["provider-verification.json"]!;
const promotionBytes = files["promotion-verification.json"]!;
const vulnerability = vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema.parse(parseJson(
vulnerabilityBytes,
"vulnerability report",
));
const provenance = provenanceProviderAttestationSchema.parse(parseJson(
provenanceBytes,
"provenance attestation",
));
const provider = providerVerificationArtifactSchema.parse(parseJson(
providerBytes,
"provider verification",
));
const promotion = providerVerificationArtifactSchema.parse(parseJson(
promotionBytes,
"promotion verification",
));
if (
provider.artifactType !== "provider-verification" ||
promotion.artifactType !== "promotion-verification"
) {
throw new Error("promotion verification artifact role mismatch");
}
for (const [label, record] of [
["provider", provider],
["promotion", promotion],
] as const) {
if (
record.verifier.id !== PROMOTION_VERIFIER_ID ||
record.verifier.version !== PROMOTION_VERIFIER_VERSION
) {
throw new Error(`${label} verification literal verifier identity mismatch`);
}
if (record.status !== "PASS" || record.failures.length !== 0) {
throw new Error(`${label} verification must be PASS without failures`);
}
}
if (
provider.vulnerabilityStatus !== "PASS" ||
provider.provenanceAttestationStatus !== "PASS"
) {
throw new Error("provider verification subordinate statuses must both be PASS");
}
if (promotion.localEvidenceStatus !== "PASS") {
throw new Error("promotion local evidence subordinate status must be PASS");
}
assertEqual("shared verifiedAt", provider.verifiedAt, promotion.verifiedAt);
assertEqual("shared run", provider.run, promotion.run);
assertEqual("shared source", provider.source, promotion.source);
assertEqual("shared candidate", provider.candidate, promotion.candidate);
assertEqual(
"shared provider evidence",
provider.providerEvidence,
promotion.providerEvidence,
);
assertEqual(
"shared trust policy",
provider.trustPolicySha256,
promotion.trustPolicySha256,
);
assertEqual("external expected run", provider.run, options.expected.run);
assertEqual(
"external expected source revision",
provider.source.revision,
options.expected.sourceRevision,
);
assertEqual(
"external expected archive digest",
provider.candidate.archiveSha256,
options.expected.archiveSha256,
);
for (const [label, actual, expected] of [
["source set", provider.source.sourceSetSha256, options.expected.sourceSetSha256],
["bundle", provider.candidate.bundleSha256, options.expected.bundleSha256],
["dist", provider.candidate.distSha256, options.expected.distSha256],
["lockfile", provider.candidate.lockfileSha256, options.expected.lockfileSha256],
] as const) {
if (expected !== undefined) {
assertEqual(`external expected ${label} digest`, actual, expected);
}
}
const anchoredTrustPolicySha256 = trustPolicySha256(options);
if (provider.trustPolicySha256 !== anchoredTrustPolicySha256) {
throw new Error("verification trust policy does not match anchored provider keys");
}
if (promotion.providerVerificationSha256 !== sha256(providerBytes)) {
throw new Error("promotion provider verification byte hash mismatch");
}
if (
provider.candidate.archiveSha256 !== sha256(archiveBytes) ||
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityReportSha256 !== sha256(vulnerabilityBytes) ||
provider.providerEvidence.provenanceAttestationSha256 !== sha256(provenanceBytes)
) {
if (provider.candidate.archiveSha256 !== sha256(archiveBytes)) {
throw new Error("candidate archive actual digest mismatch");
}
if (
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityReportSha256 !==
sha256(vulnerabilityBytes)
) {
throw new Error("vulnerability report actual digest mismatch");
}
throw new Error("provenance attestation actual digest mismatch");
}
for (const [label, evidence, nonce, keyId, fingerprint] of [
[
"vulnerability",
vulnerability,
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce,
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityKeyId,
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityKeyFingerprint,
],
[
"provenance",
provenance,
provider.providerEvidence.provenanceInvocationNonce,
provider.providerEvidence.provenanceKeyId,
provider.providerEvidence.provenanceKeyFingerprint,
],
] as const) {
assertEqual(`${label} run`, { id: evidence.run.id, attempt: evidence.run.attempt }, provider.run);
assertEqual(`${label} source`, evidence.source, provider.source);
assertEqual(`${label} candidate`, evidence.candidate, provider.candidate);
if (
evidence.run.invocationNonce !== nonce ||
evidence.signature.keyId !== keyId ||
evidence.signature.publicKeyFingerprint !== fingerprint
) {
throw new Error(`${label} provider evidence nonce or trust role mismatch`);
}
}
if (provenance.subject.digest.sha256 !== provider.candidate.distSha256) {
throw new Error("provenance subject dist digest mismatch");
}
if (vulnerability.findings.length !== 0) {
throw new Error("vulnerability report is not PASS");
}
assertEqual(
"signed secret scan attestation",
vulnerability.secretScanAttestation,
provider.providerEvidence.secretScanAttestation,
);
let assessmentSha256: string | null = null;
const localIdentityHolder: {
current: null | Readonly<{
sourceRevision: string;
sourceSetSha256: string;
assessmentSha256: string;
secretScan: Readonly<{
policySha256: string;
sarifSha256: string;
scanInputSha256: string;
}>;
}>;
} = { current: null };
await verifyCapturedCiCandidateArchive(
archiveBytes,
provider.candidate.archiveSha256,
{
verifyExtracted: async (extractionRoot, manifest) => {
assertEqual("archive candidate", {
bundleSha256: manifest.bundleSha256,
distSha256: manifest.distSha256,
lockfileSha256: manifest.lockfileSha256,
}, {
bundleSha256: provider.candidate.bundleSha256,
distSha256: provider.candidate.distSha256,
lockfileSha256: provider.candidate.lockfileSha256,
});
assessmentSha256 = sha256(
await readFile(path.join(extractionRoot, LOCAL_EVIDENCE_ASSESSMENT_PATH)),
);
const local = await verifyArchivedLocalEvidence({
extractionRoot,
expectedManifest: manifest,
});
if (local.status !== "PASS" || !local.identity) {
throw new Error(
`exact-five archived local verification is not PASS: ${local.failures.join(", ")}`,
);
}
localIdentityHolder.current = local.identity;
},
},
);
if (assessmentSha256 !== promotion.localEvidenceAssessmentSha256) {
throw new Error("promotion local evidence assessment actual digest mismatch");
}
if (
!localIdentityHolder.current ||
localIdentityHolder.current.sourceRevision !== provider.source.revision ||
localIdentityHolder.current.sourceSetSha256 !== provider.source.sourceSetSha256 ||
localIdentityHolder.current.assessmentSha256 !== promotion.localEvidenceAssessmentSha256
) {
throw new Error("exact-five archived local identity mismatch");
}
assertEqual("archived secret scan attestation", {
status: "PASS",
localEvidenceAssessmentSha256: localIdentityHolder.current.assessmentSha256,
sourceSetSha256: localIdentityHolder.current.sourceSetSha256,
policySha256: localIdentityHolder.current.secretScan.policySha256,
sarifSha256: localIdentityHolder.current.secretScan.sarifSha256,
scanInputSha256: localIdentityHolder.current.secretScan.scanInputSha256,
}, vulnerability.secretScanAttestation);
const reevaluated = evaluatePromotionEvidence({
expected: {
run: provider.run,
source: provider.source,
candidate: provider.candidate,
vulnerabilityInvocationNonce:
provider.providerEvidence.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce,
provenanceInvocationNonce:
provider.providerEvidence.provenanceInvocationNonce,
secretScanAttestation: provider.providerEvidence.secretScanAttestation,
},
localStatus: "PASS",
vulnerabilityReport: vulnerability,
provenanceAttestation: provenance,
vulnerabilityTrust: options.vulnerabilityTrust,
provenanceTrust: options.provenanceTrust,
nowEpochMs: () =>
promotionEvidenceTime(
options.freshness ?? "current",
promotion.verifiedAt,
(options.nowEpochMs ?? Date.now)(),
),
});
if (
reevaluated.status !== "PASS" ||
reevaluated.vulnerabilityStatus !== "PASS" ||
reevaluated.provenanceAttestationStatus !== "PASS"
) {
throw new Error(
`exact-five provider signature/freshness revalidation is not PASS: ${reevaluated.failures.join(", ")}`,
);
}
return Object.freeze({ status: "PASS" as const });
}
function assertExternalExpectedContext(
expected: ExactPromotionExpectedContext,
): void {
if (
!expected ||
typeof expected.run?.id !== "string" ||
expected.run.id.length === 0 ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(expected.run.attempt) ||
expected.run.attempt < 1 ||
!/^(?:[a-f0-9]{40}|[a-f0-9]{64})$/u.test(expected.sourceRevision) ||
!isSha256(expected.archiveSha256)
) {
throw new TypeError("external expected promotion context is invalid or incomplete");
}
for (const digest of [
expected.sourceSetSha256,
expected.bundleSha256,
expected.distSha256,
expected.lockfileSha256,
]) {
if (digest !== undefined && !isSha256(digest)) {
throw new TypeError("external optional expected promotion digest is invalid");
}
}
}
function isSha256(value: unknown): value is string {
return typeof value === "string" && /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/u.test(value);
}
function parseJson(bytes: Buffer, label: string): unknown {
try {
return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes)) as unknown;
} catch {
throw new TypeError(`${label} is not strict UTF-8 JSON`);
}
}
function assertEqual(label: string, left: unknown, right: unknown): void {
if (JSON.stringify(left) !== JSON.stringify(right)) {
throw new Error(`${label} mismatch`);
}
}
function sha256(bytes: Buffer): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
}
function asciiCompare(left: string, right: string): number {
return left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0;
}