설계: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging-design.md
계획/진행 기록: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging.md
- Wave 0: 규칙 고정(AGENTS.md capability 완료 기준·테스트 규칙) + 차단 결함 7건
(compose overlay 검사, redis-sdk CI job, 적용된 V9/V13 원복 + V16, @EnableScheduling,
messaging bridge 순서, prod 에러 상세 validator, sample loggers read-only)
- Wave 1: 데이터·보안 Critical 10건 (durable operation 25P02, operation 유스케이스 이동,
outbox 재인코딩, Kafka TLS/SASL, 알림 트랜잭션, SNS 서명, tus checksum, GraphQL fragment,
Redis lane, gRPC FAILED_TERMINAL)
- Wave 2: 리팩터링 잔재·실험용 자리 삭제, outbox v1 fencing(V17), 멱등성 V2 정본화
- Wave 3: 라이브러리형 코드 정리(동작하지 않는 설정·인터페이스·gate 제거, web-advanced 분리)
- Wave 4: capability 11개를 "있으면 켜짐" 모듈로 포장, 끄는 장치 제거, 기본 조립 web-only,
qualificationBootJar 분리
- Wave 5: 빌드 로직 축소(17.2k -> 10.8k줄), sample 테스트 컨벤션 적용
삭제한 코드는 docs/capability-status.md "제거된 코드" 표에 복구 커밋(208077fd)과 함께 기록.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security and privacy
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## Protected values
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Email addresses, phone numbers, FCM installation ids and legacy tokens, APNs device tokens, Web Push
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endpoints and keys, VAPID private keys, provider credentials, callback signing secrets, template
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variables, rendered bodies, attachment references and unsubscribe tokens.
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## At rest
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Contact points are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. Equality lookup uses a separate HMAC-SHA-256
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fingerprint.
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Two keys, not one, because the requirements are opposite: the ciphertext must be non-deterministic so
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two records of the same address are not visibly identical, while equality lookup must be
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deterministic. The fingerprint is keyed rather than a plain digest because phone numbers and email
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addresses come from a small, enumerable space — an unkeyed hash of a phone number is recoverable in
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seconds.
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The contact point kind is bound into the GCM associated data, so a ciphertext cannot be moved between
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contact kinds without failing the authentication tag.
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An unknown key id is refused rather than silently falling back to the current key: a silent fallback
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would turn every historical row into a tag failure at read time.
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## Never logged, never a metric tag
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Addresses, tokens, Web Push endpoints and keys, message bodies, template variables, provider
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credentials, unsubscribe tokens, attachment URLs, raw callback payloads and raw provider request ids.
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`CardinalityGuard` enforces this for metrics rather than convention: it validates every metric tag
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against a closed allowlist.
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An allowlist rather than a denylist, because the failure mode of a denylist is that the one field
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nobody thought of is the one that leaks.
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Every contact point value type overrides `toString()` to print `[redacted]`. That covers the case a
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central redactor cannot: a value interpolated into a log line by accident.
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## Web Push endpoints
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RFC 8030 defines the push URI as a capability URL — knowing it is sufficient to push to the
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subscriber. It is handled as a secret, not as a URL.
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## Callbacks
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TLS, provider signature verification over the exact received bytes and external URL, replay defence
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where a timestamp or nonce is available, body-size and content-type limits, profile binding, rate
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limiting, idempotent ingestion and a security audit trail for rejections.
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## Tenant isolation
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Every store port carries the tenant boundary in its signature. Administrative operations require an
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explicit tenant or a global authority.
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