DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5
5f10b791d3
Snapshot of the in-flight state that already existed, identically, in both this worktree and the main checkout before this session began: the initial HTTP Client platform implementation (previously untracked), the redis-lab removal, and the JPA / object-storage / notification integration work. Kept separate from this session's HTTP Client review response, which lands in the following commit, so the two bodies of work stay reviewable apart. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# HTTP Client Platform — Security Guide
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## What the platform owns
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`Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `Host`, `Content-Length`, `Transfer-Encoding`,
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`Traceparent`, `Tracestate`, `Baggage`, and (unless a profile opts in) `Cookie` are platform-owned.
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A caller cannot set them. `Idempotency-Key` is accepted only when the operation declares it. Any
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header name or value containing CR or LF is rejected before the request is built.
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## Target policy
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A trusted profile accepts only a profile-relative URI template. An absolute URI is rejected rather
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than sanitised: varying the destination is what H3 is for, and H3 has its own policy, credentials,
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and address validation. Template variables are encoded per component, so a value containing `/`,
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`?`, or `#` cannot change the shape of the request.
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## TLS
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Allowed: TLS 1.2 and 1.3, hostname verification, the JVM trust store, a per-profile custom CA, a
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per-profile client certificate, mTLS, SNI and ALPN, and certificate rotation through a new runtime
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generation.
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Forbidden and unrepresentable: a trust-all trust manager, disabled hostname verification, ignoring
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certificate errors, automatically trusting a production self-signed certificate, falling back to
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plaintext after an HTTPS failure, and writing key material into configuration or logs.
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Unknown CA, hostname mismatch, expired certificate, revoked certificate, protocol mismatch, and a
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missing client certificate are permanent. Only a transient handshake timeout may be retried, inside
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the deadline.
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## Dynamic Target (SSRF)
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Every hop — the first one included — runs the whole flow:
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1. strict URI parse
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2. scheme allowlist
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3. reject userinfo and invalid ports
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4. IDNA-canonicalise the host
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5. host allowlist or suffix policy
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6. resolve **every** A and AAAA answer
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7. normalise each address, including IPv4-mapped IPv6
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8. reject loopback, link-local, RFC1918, ULA, carrier-grade NAT, unspecified, multicast, cloud
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metadata, and organisation-defined ranges
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9. pin the connection to the approved addresses through the same validated resolver
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10. apply response size and content policy
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11. repeat for each redirect
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Any forbidden address in the answer set rejects the whole target. Validating only the first answer
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would let a host that resolves to one public and one private address through.
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Dynamic profiles inherit no API key, OAuth token, Cookie, or default header, and no Cookie jar is
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created. A specific host may be granted a credential only through an explicitly registered
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`DynamicCredentialBinding`.
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Application-level validation is not sufficient on its own. A network control — Kubernetes
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NetworkPolicy, service-mesh egress policy, firewall, or proxy ACL — is an operational completion
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requirement.
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## Redirects
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Disabled by default. Engine redirect handling is off in every transport so the platform can
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re-validate each hop. 307 and 308 preserve method and body and are therefore allowed only for a
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replayable body. Cross-origin hops are refused unless the profile opts in, and when they are
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allowed `Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `Cookie`, and API-key headers are stripped.
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## Observability
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Allowed tags: `clientName`, `operationName`, `method`, `uriTemplate`, `status`, `outcome`,
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`transport`, `protocol`, `timeoutType`, `retryReason`, `evidence`, `circuitState`.
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Rejected outright: full URL, query parameters, path variable values, user ID, raw tenant ID,
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resolved IP, API key, token, Cookie, idempotency key, request or response body, exception message.
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Failures are logged once, structured, at the end of a logical call. Retry attempts are DEBUG or span
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events. URLs appear only as templates.
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