문제: 재리뷰 수정 커밋(bbe944bd)만 다시 본 2차 재리뷰가 Important 7건,
Minor 22건을 찾았다. 결과 불명 503 뒤 같은 키를 다시 보내면 Redis
store가 lease 지난 실행을 넘겨받아 작업을 다시 돌렸다. replay TTL이
lease보다 짧으면 lease 도중 key가 사라져 같은 키가 두 번 실행됐다.
@SystemInvoked 규칙이 매뉴얼 09장의 이벤트 소비 경로까지 막았다. V22가
outbox_event에 가장 강한 잠금을 lock_timeout 없이 걸었다. prod의
fixture- 거부가 HOSTNAME 같은 비밀 아닌 값까지 막았다. 데모 허용 목록의
test·demo 프로필로 sample이 뜨지 않았다. 기동 rule bean의 @Value 필드가
조용히 null이 됐다.
방법: 영역별 4묶음이 test-driven-development 절차로 실패 테스트를
먼저 쓰고 고쳤다. 결정은 재리뷰 README 9.1절이다.
- 두 멱등성 store가 같은 계약을 따른다. lease가 지난 실행 기록은 다시
돌리지 않고 포기로 표시해 500 RECOVERY_REQUIRED로 답한다. 기록 수명은
lease + replay TTL이고, replay-ttl < processing-lease면 기동이 실패한다.
- 사용자 transport만 @SystemInvoked use case에 닿지 못한다. 메시지
handler·scheduler는 새 표시 @SystemCaller(reason)를 달고 use case를
생성자에서 new로 만든다. 매뉴얼 경로를 테스트로 고정했다.
- 아직 어디에도 적용되지 않은 마이그레이션(V20·V22·알림 V11~V13·sample
V8_1·grpc V002·V003)에 lock_timeout 5s를 넣고, 텍스트 검사기와 실 PG
lane을 더했다. 이미 배포된 24개는 동결 목록으로 둔다.
- fixture- 검사는 비밀로 분류된 값만 본다. sample은 local·test·demo에서
object storage를 끈다. 기동 rule bean에 주입 멤버가 있으면 모든
프로필에서 기동이 실패한다. 리뷰어가 제안한 "static @Bean 선언 강제"는
문제없는 등록을 막고 @Value 필드는 통과시켜서 버렸다.
- 이 수정 전에 move된 파일의 쿼터 차이를 찾는 쿼리와 재계산 SQL을
docs/fileserver/operations.md에 적었다.
위험·한계: lease 뒤 늦게 끝난 첫 시도의 결과는 기록되지 않는다(그 요청도
500). @SystemCaller가 없는 메시지 handler, 주입 멤버가 있는 기동 rule,
working-directory 없이 ./gradlew를 부르는 workflow 명령은 파생 서비스에서
새로 실패하거나 세지지 않는다(업그레이드 안내 B-14~16·B-36·B-39).
spotbugsTestFixtures는 게이트 밖이고 기준 커밋에서도 실패하며, 새 검사기의
정규식 경고 8건이 더해졌다. 실제 CI runner 실행은 확인하지 못했다(Gitea
repo의 Actions가 꺼져 있다).
검증: ci, 두 빌드의 verifyStrictLaneStages --dry-run, mainCheck,
:integrationCheck, -p optional-platforms ci integrationCheck
performanceCheck, :performanceCheck, :releaseCheck(-PgitRevision),
verify-compose-profile-contracts(18 lane) 첫 실행 통과. 쿼터 재계산
SQL은 실 PostgreSQL 16에서 차이 2행 → 0행을 확인했다.
Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-03-rereview/README.md 9·9.1·10절
BREAKING CHANGE: replay-ttl < processing-lease 설정은 기동 실패, ledger
release가 claim token을 받는다, HttpBodyReadException(IOException 하위)이
본문 실패를 싣는다, 기동 rule·비밀 목록 bean의 주입 멤버 금지,
verifyStrictLaneStages가 workflow 명령의 working-directory로 빌드를 정한다.
290 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
290 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
# HTTP Client Platform — Configuration Reference
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Every outbound call resolves exactly one **Named Client Profile**. The whole capability lives under
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the `app.httpclient` prefix: profiles under `app.httpclient.clients[N]`, Dynamic Target policies
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under `app.httpclient.dynamic-targets[N]`.
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Design §30.1 forbids a production profile from inheriting large framework defaults. Anything a
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production deployment must decide has either no default or an unusable one, and
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`HttpClientStartupValidator` fails the context rather than guessing.
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## The master switch
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| Property | Type | Default | Environment |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `app.httpclient.enabled` | boolean | `true` | `APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED` |
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The module is on when present: a service adds `runtimeOnly project(':adapter:outbound:httpclient')`
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to `app-bootstrap/build.gradle`, and the module's own `config/module-defaults/httpclient.yml` (loaded at the lowest
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precedence by the support leaf's `ModuleDefaultsEnvironmentPostProcessor`) supplies `enabled: true`. Absent from the
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build is the ordinary off state. `false` is the explicit off: `HttpClientPlatformAutoConfiguration`
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is then never processed and neither is anything it imports — no property is bound, and no transport
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provider, connection pool, TLS context, credential, thread, gateway or actuator endpoint exists. A
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malformed HTTP client setting cannot fail the startup of a deployment that switched it off.
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Anything that is not exactly `true` — `yes`, `1`, blank — turns the platform off. On with no client
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declared is a startup failure carrying `HTTPCLIENT_ACTIVE_WITHOUT_CLIENTS`: a platform with nothing
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to call still holds transport providers and gateways no caller can reach.
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## Declaring clients from the environment
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Clients are an indexed list carrying their own `name`, not a map keyed by name. A map key becomes a
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segment of the environment variable and the relaxed binder normalises it, so `payment-api` and
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`payment_api` would arrive as one entry with nothing said about the one that was lost. Both a
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duplicate name and a name that collides once normalised fail startup.
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```dotenv
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED=true
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_NAME=payment
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_BASE_URL=https://payment.example
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_ALLOWED_HOSTS_0=payment.example
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_ALLOWED_PORTS_0=443
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES=1048576
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_TLS_PROFILE_ID=payment
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_DYNAMIC_TARGETS_0_NAME=webhook
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APP_HTTPCLIENT_DYNAMIC_TARGETS_0_ALLOWED_SCHEMES_0=https
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```
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`docs/httpclient/env-fields.yaml` is the registry of accepted variable names. It is
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derived from the settings record and held to it in both directions, and the platform refuses to
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start on an `APP_HTTPCLIENT_` variable that is not in it — so
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`APP_HTTPCLIENT_CLIENTS_0_TIMEUOT_TOTAL_CALL` fails startup instead of silently leaving the client
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on its default budget. Unknown keys supplied through a configuration file rather than the
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environment are refused by strict binding for the same reason.
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Only `APP_HTTPCLIENT_ENABLED` appears in `src/.env` and `docs/registries/env-keys.yaml`. It is the
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one key with a deployment-independent value; templating an indexed client in `application.yml` would
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materialise a nameless client in every deployment, which the aggregate validation refuses.
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## `app.httpclient.clients[N]`
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| Property | Type | Default | Notes |
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| `name` | string | — | Required, unique, and distinct from every other name once normalised for the environment |
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| `mode` | `TRUSTED` \| `DYNAMIC` | `TRUSTED` | A dynamic profile may not carry a default credential |
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| `base-url` | URI | — | Required for a trusted profile; no userinfo, no query |
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| `allowed-hosts` | list | empty | Required in production |
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| `allowed-ports` | list | empty | Compared against the effective port |
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| `transport` | `APACHE` \| `JDK` \| `JETTY` \| `SIMPLE` | `APACHE` | `SIMPLE` is rejected in production; `JETTY` needs a deployment-registered provider |
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| `protocols` | list | `HTTP_1_1` | The default transport is Apache, whose classic client is HTTP/1.1 only; a profile that wants HTTP/2 declares it together with a transport that can deliver it. `HTTP_3` requires the experimental acknowledgement |
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| `experimental-acknowledgement` | string | — | Must equal `I_ACCEPT_HTTP3_EXPERIMENTAL_SEMANTICS` |
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### `pool`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `max-total-connections` | `50` | Socket ceiling for the runtime |
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| `max-connections-per-route` | `25` | Per-upstream ceiling |
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| `max-pending-acquires` | `100` | Waiting-request memory ceiling |
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| `pending-acquire-timeout` | `200ms` | Pool or stream wait ceiling |
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| `max-idle-time` | `30s` | Idle eviction |
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| `max-life-time` | `5m` | Picks up DNS, load-balancer, and certificate changes |
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| `validate-after-inactivity` | `5s` | Stale and half-open detection |
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| `requires-route-pool` | `false` | Set when route-scoped limits are mandatory; the JDK transport then refuses the profile |
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| `requires-bounded-pending-queue` | `false` | Same, for a bounded pending queue |
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### `timeout`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `dns` | `300ms` | Hostname resolution |
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| `connect` | `500ms` | Socket connect |
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| `tls-handshake` | `1s` | TLS and ALPN |
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| `response-header` | `2s` | Until final response headers |
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| `read-idle` | `3s` | Between response chunks |
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| `total-call` | `4s` | The whole logical call, including retry backoff |
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`total-call` must not be shorter than `connect` or `response-header`; the validator emits
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`INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET` otherwise. Every timeout above, and `pool.pending-acquire-timeout`, must be
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greater than zero (`TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE`): both engines read zero as "wait forever".
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`total-call` also bounds the setup of a streaming download — connect, send, and the wait for
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response headers. Once the stream is handed over, each gap of the body is bounded by `read-idle`
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instead, so a long download is not cut at an arbitrary total (design §15.3). This holds on both
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transports. The JDK transport keeps its exchange-wide timeout off a streamed body and bounds each
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read with its own `read-idle` timer, because the JDK client has no socket read timeout; before
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review 2026-11-03 RR-04-03 every JDK download longer than `response-header` was cut mid-body. A body
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failure after hand-over is thrown from `read` as `HttpBodyReadException` — an `IOException`, as
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`InputStream` promises, so `catch (IOException)` still sees it — whose `failure()` is
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`HttpResponseTimeoutException` (a wait longer than `read-idle`) or `HttpResponseTruncatedException`
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(the connection ended early), stage `RESPONSE_BODY`, evidence `PARTIAL_RESPONSE` (re-review
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2026-11-04 RR-03-14). On the JDK transport `read-idle` bounds each read's wait, `skip` included, and
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time the caller spends between reads does not count (RR-03-12).
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### Removed settings
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Six keys were removed because they were bound and reached no transport (review 2026-11-01 05-15).
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Setting one now fails startup with a bind error naming the key (`The elements
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[app.httpclient.clients[0].timeout.request-write-idle] were left unbound.`), instead of being
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accepted and ignored.
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| Removed key | Why |
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| `timeout.request-write-idle` | Neither engine can bound a blocking socket write |
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| `timeout.proxy-connect`, `proxy.connect-timeout` | The TCP connect to a proxy is governed by `timeout.connect` |
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| `pool.eviction-interval` | Apache's idle evictor runs at `max-idle-time` |
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| `pool.shutdown-timeout` | A retired runtime drains for `app.httpclient.rotation-drain-timeout` |
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| `observability.operation-name-required` | An operation name is mandatory in the API; the switch could only be true |
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### `circuit-breaker`
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What counts as a failure is fixed: a 5xx, 408 or 429 response — whether the call throws or returns
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it as a result — and every transport failure. Every other 4xx is a healthy answer. These settings
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only say how many failures, out of how many calls, open the circuit. Defaults are Resilience4j's own,
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which every profile ran with before the keys existed.
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Two deadlines can end an attempt in flight, and they are counted differently (review 2026-11-03
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RR-04-01):
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| Ended by | Breaker | Why |
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| The caller's own deadline (`HttpOperation.deadline()`, when earlier than `total-call`) | Not recorded; the permission is given back | The caller ran out of time. Counting it opened the circuit on a healthy upstream whenever callers passed short budgets |
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| The profile's `timeout.total-call` | Recorded as a failure | `total-call` is the operator's statement of how long a healthy upstream may take; a slow-drip upstream that never trips a per-gap timeout is seen only through it |
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The first row has a blind spot (re-review 2026-11-04 RR-03-16). The attempt is let off whenever the
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caller's deadline was the earlier one and had passed when the attempt failed — the code does not ask
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whether the upstream was still answering within the profile's limits. If every caller of a profile
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passes a budget shorter than `connect` or `response-header`, an upstream that hangs (drops packets,
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never answers) ends every attempt at the caller's deadline first, so no attempt is recorded and the
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circuit never opens; every call waits out its own budget. A failure that comes before the caller's
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deadline — a refused connection — is still counted. For such a profile, set `connect` and
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`response-header` shorter than the shortest caller budget.
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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| `failure-rate-threshold` | `50` | Percent of failed calls in the window that opens the circuit, 1–100 |
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| `minimum-number-of-calls` | `100` | Calls recorded before the rate is evaluated; at most `sliding-window-size` |
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| `sliding-window-size` | `100` | The last N calls the rate is computed over (count-based) |
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| `wait-duration-in-open-state` | `60s` | How long an open circuit rejects before trial calls; positive |
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| `permitted-calls-in-half-open-state` | `10` | Trial calls while half-open; at least 1 |
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An out-of-range value fails startup with `CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID`. The breaker belongs to
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the profile, not to a runtime generation, so a certificate rotation keeps its state.
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### `redirect`, `request`, `response`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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| `redirect.enabled` | `false` | Engine redirect handling is always off; the platform follows hops itself |
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| `redirect.max-hops` | `0` | Enabling redirects with zero hops is a configuration error |
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| `redirect.allow-cross-origin` | `false` | When enabled, credentials are stripped on the hop |
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| `request.max-body-bytes` | `0` | Required in production |
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| `request.compression` | `false` | |
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| `response.max-wire-bytes` | `5242880` | Bytes on the wire |
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| `response.max-decoded-bytes` | `10485760` | Bytes after decoding; hard maximum is 64 MiB |
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| `response.allowed-content-types` | JSON + problem+json | Empty means "any" |
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### `authentication`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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| `type` | `NONE` | One of the design §20.1 methods |
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| `registration-id` | — | Required for OAuth2 |
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| `scopes` | empty | Part of the token cache key |
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| `audience` | — | Part of the token cache key |
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| `header-name` | — | Required for `API_KEY_HEADER`; must be on the allowlist |
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| `secret-reference` | — | Resolved by the deployment's secret loader, never a literal |
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### `retry`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `policy` | `none` | Named policy for reporting |
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| `max-attempts` | `1` | Attempts, not retries; at most 5 (`RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED`) |
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| `base-backoff` | `50ms` | |
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| `max-backoff` | `200ms` | |
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| `jitter` | `FULL` | `NONE` \| `FULL` \| `DECORRELATED` |
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| `retry-after` | `HONOR` | `HONOR` \| `IGNORE` \| `CAP` |
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| `budget` | — | Shared token bucket name. A retrying profile that names none gets its own bucket, with the same pool-derived capacity (`max-total-connections / 10`, at least 1, refilled each minute) |
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### `tls`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `profile-id` | — | Required in production; the only TLS identifier the actuator exposes |
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| `protocols` | `TLSv1.3, TLSv1.2` | Anything else is rejected |
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| `hostname-verification` | `true` | Setting it false fails startup |
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| `trust-all` | `false` | Exists only so the unsafe intent is rejectable; nothing acts on `true` |
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| `allow-plain-http` | `false` | Plaintext fallback fails startup in production |
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| `trust-material-reference` | — | Custom CA, resolved by the secret loader |
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| `key-material-reference` | — | Client certificate for mTLS |
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### `proxy` and `observability`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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| `proxy.enabled` | `false` | |
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| `proxy.host` / `proxy.port` / `proxy.type` | — / `0` / `HTTP` | |
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| `proxy.credential-provider` | — | Proxy authentication is separate from target authentication |
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| `proxy.import-ambient-no-proxy` | `false` | Ambient `NO_PROXY` never widens a validated profile |
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| `observability.full-url-recording` | `false` | |
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| `observability.body-logging` | `false` | |
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## `app.httpclient.dynamic-targets[N]`
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| Property | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `name` | — | Required, unique, and subject to the same normalisation rule as a client name |
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| `allowed-schemes` | `https` | |
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| `allowed-ports` | `443` | |
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| `allowed-host-suffixes` | empty | |
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| `allowed-hosts` | empty | Empty means "any host that survives address validation" |
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| `max-redirect-hops` | `0` | Each hop repeats the full validation flow |
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| `trace-propagation` | `false` | Off by default for dynamic targets |
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| `blocked-cidrs` | empty | Organisation-defined internal ranges |
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## Startup violation codes
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`TRUSTED_BASE_URL_REQUIRED`, `BASE_URL_USERINFO_FORBIDDEN`, `BASE_URL_QUERY_FORBIDDEN`,
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`PLAINTEXT_PRODUCTION_TARGET`, `ALLOWED_HOST_MISMATCH`, `ALLOWED_PORT_MISMATCH`,
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`REDIRECT_POLICY_INVALID`, `REDIRECT_CROSS_ORIGIN_CREDENTIAL_POLICY_REQUIRED`,
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`INVALID_TIMEOUT_BUDGET`, `RESPONSE_HARD_MAXIMUM_EXCEEDED`, `PRODUCTION_SIMPLE_FACTORY_FORBIDDEN`,
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`JDK_FINE_GRAINED_POOL_UNSUPPORTED`, `HTTP3_STABLE_FORBIDDEN`,
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`DYNAMIC_TARGET_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED`, `DYNAMIC_DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_FORBIDDEN`,
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`OAUTH2_REGISTRATION_REQUIRED`, `API_KEY_HEADER_NAME_REQUIRED`, `TRUST_ALL_FORBIDDEN`,
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`HOSTNAME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED`, `PLAINTEXT_FALLBACK_FORBIDDEN`, `TLS_PROTOCOL_FORBIDDEN`,
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`RETRY_BACKOFF_REQUIRED`, `MISSING_PRODUCTION_SETTING`, `DUPLICATE_CLIENT_NAME`,
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`HTTPCLIENT_ACTIVE_WITHOUT_CLIENTS`, `DYNAMIC_BASE_URL_REQUIRED`,
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`DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`,
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`HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED`, `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL`,
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`TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED`,
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`RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS`, `FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN`, `BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN`,
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`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED`,
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`TIMEOUT_NOT_POSITIVE`, `RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED`, `CIRCUIT_BREAKER_SETTING_INVALID`.
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A key that names no setting is not a violation code: the shared strict binder
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(`adapter:outbound:support` `StrictSettingsBinder`) refuses it while binding, at any depth. Spring's
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own unbound-key check stops at the first level under a list element, so `clients[0].timeout.<typo>`
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used to bind nothing and fail nothing; the binder now refuses a key under `clients[N]` or
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`dynamic-targets[N]` that bound nothing, for every capability rather than for this platform alone
|
||
(review 2026-11-01 05-15). The platform's own guard for it, and its `HTTPCLIENT_UNKNOWN_SETTING`
|
||
code, were removed with that change.
|
||
|
||
`DNS_TIMEOUT_UNSUPPORTED`, `PROXY_CREDENTIAL_UNSUPPORTED` and `PROXY_AMBIENT_NO_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED` name settings the platform binds but cannot yet honour. Neither the Apache classic
|
||
client nor the JDK client exposes a DNS-resolution timeout, and no proxy-credential path exists, so
|
||
a non-default value is refused rather than accepted and ignored. Leaving the defaults alone is
|
||
unaffected — only a deliberate, unmet request fails.
|
||
|
||
Three of these are about a guarantee that used to be silently unmet rather than refused:
|
||
|
||
- `HTTP2_REQUIRED_TRANSPORT_UNSUPPORTED` — declaring `protocols: [HTTP_2]` alone states that HTTP/2
|
||
is required. No transport can be configured to offer H2 and nothing else; the JDK client treats it
|
||
as a preference and negotiates HTTP/1.1, and Apache's classic client is HTTP/1.1 only.
|
||
- `POOL_ROUTE_EXCEEDS_TOTAL` — a per-route ceiling above the total is incoherent.
|
||
- `TLS_PROTOCOL_SET_REQUIRED` — an empty `tls.protocols` used to pass and then let the JVM choose,
|
||
so emptying the list to "tighten" a profile loosened it.
|
||
- `RETRY_POLICY_CONTRADICTS_ATTEMPTS` — `retry.policy` was read by nothing on the execution path, so
|
||
the actuator could report `none` for a profile retrying three times. The two settings must now
|
||
agree: `policy: none` requires `max-attempts: 1`, and any other policy requires more than one.
|
||
- `FULL_URL_RECORDING_FORBIDDEN` / `BODY_LOGGING_FORBIDDEN` — both settings were bindable and inert.
|
||
Recording an expanded URL puts path identifiers and query strings into unbounded metric tags;
|
||
recording bodies puts someone else's data into logs. Representable so the intent is rejectable,
|
||
refused under a production profile.
|
||
|
||
`DYNAMIC_TARGET_PROXY_UNSUPPORTED` is worth spelling out: a forward proxy resolves the hostname on
|
||
its own side, so the addresses this platform validated and pinned are not the addresses the
|
||
connection reaches. The SSRF defence would be present, correct, and bypassed — so the combination is
|
||
refused rather than served with a guarantee it cannot keep.
|