Files
clean-architecture-backend-…/docs/notification/security-privacy.md
T
DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5.5 6d27356e2b refactor: 부가 기능을 capability 모듈로 포장하고 기본 조립을 web-only로 전환
설계: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging-design.md
계획/진행 기록: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging.md

- Wave 0: 규칙 고정(AGENTS.md capability 완료 기준·테스트 규칙) + 차단 결함 7건
  (compose overlay 검사, redis-sdk CI job, 적용된 V9/V13 원복 + V16, @EnableScheduling,
  messaging bridge 순서, prod 에러 상세 validator, sample loggers read-only)
- Wave 1: 데이터·보안 Critical 10건 (durable operation 25P02, operation 유스케이스 이동,
  outbox 재인코딩, Kafka TLS/SASL, 알림 트랜잭션, SNS 서명, tus checksum, GraphQL fragment,
  Redis lane, gRPC FAILED_TERMINAL)
- Wave 2: 리팩터링 잔재·실험용 자리 삭제, outbox v1 fencing(V17), 멱등성 V2 정본화
- Wave 3: 라이브러리형 코드 정리(동작하지 않는 설정·인터페이스·gate 제거, web-advanced 분리)
- Wave 4: capability 11개를 "있으면 켜짐" 모듈로 포장, 끄는 장치 제거, 기본 조립 web-only,
  qualificationBootJar 분리
- Wave 5: 빌드 로직 축소(17.2k -> 10.8k줄), sample 테스트 컨벤션 적용

삭제한 코드는 docs/capability-status.md "제거된 코드" 표에 복구 커밋(208077fd)과 함께 기록.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 12:49:07 +09:00

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# Security and privacy
## Protected values
Email addresses, phone numbers, FCM installation ids and legacy tokens, APNs device tokens, Web Push
endpoints and keys, VAPID private keys, provider credentials, callback signing secrets, template
variables, rendered bodies, attachment references and unsubscribe tokens.
## At rest
Contact points are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. Equality lookup uses a separate HMAC-SHA-256
fingerprint.
Two keys, not one, because the requirements are opposite: the ciphertext must be non-deterministic so
two records of the same address are not visibly identical, while equality lookup must be
deterministic. The fingerprint is keyed rather than a plain digest because phone numbers and email
addresses come from a small, enumerable space — an unkeyed hash of a phone number is recoverable in
seconds.
The contact point kind is bound into the GCM associated data, so a ciphertext cannot be moved between
contact kinds without failing the authentication tag.
An unknown key id is refused rather than silently falling back to the current key: a silent fallback
would turn every historical row into a tag failure at read time.
## Never logged, never a metric tag
Addresses, tokens, Web Push endpoints and keys, message bodies, template variables, provider
credentials, unsubscribe tokens, attachment URLs, raw callback payloads and raw provider request ids.
`CardinalityGuard` enforces this for metrics rather than convention: it validates every metric tag
against a closed allowlist.
An allowlist rather than a denylist, because the failure mode of a denylist is that the one field
nobody thought of is the one that leaks.
Every contact point value type overrides `toString()` to print `[redacted]`. That covers the case a
central redactor cannot: a value interpolated into a log line by accident.
## Web Push endpoints
RFC 8030 defines the push URI as a capability URL — knowing it is sufficient to push to the
subscriber. It is handled as a secret, not as a URL.
## Callbacks
TLS, provider signature verification over the exact received bytes and external URL, replay defence
where a timestamp or nonce is available, body-size and content-type limits, profile binding, rate
limiting, idempotent ingestion and a security audit trail for rejections.
## Tenant isolation
Every store port carries the tenant boundary in its signature. Administrative operations require an
explicit tenant or a global authority.