설계: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging-design.md
계획/진행 기록: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-25-capability-module-packaging.md
- Wave 0: 규칙 고정(AGENTS.md capability 완료 기준·테스트 규칙) + 차단 결함 7건
(compose overlay 검사, redis-sdk CI job, 적용된 V9/V13 원복 + V16, @EnableScheduling,
messaging bridge 순서, prod 에러 상세 validator, sample loggers read-only)
- Wave 1: 데이터·보안 Critical 10건 (durable operation 25P02, operation 유스케이스 이동,
outbox 재인코딩, Kafka TLS/SASL, 알림 트랜잭션, SNS 서명, tus checksum, GraphQL fragment,
Redis lane, gRPC FAILED_TERMINAL)
- Wave 2: 리팩터링 잔재·실험용 자리 삭제, outbox v1 fencing(V17), 멱등성 V2 정본화
- Wave 3: 라이브러리형 코드 정리(동작하지 않는 설정·인터페이스·gate 제거, web-advanced 분리)
- Wave 4: capability 11개를 "있으면 켜짐" 모듈로 포장, 끄는 장치 제거, 기본 조립 web-only,
qualificationBootJar 분리
- Wave 5: 빌드 로직 축소(17.2k -> 10.8k줄), sample 테스트 컨벤션 적용
삭제한 코드는 docs/capability-status.md "제거된 코드" 표에 복구 커밋(208077fd)과 함께 기록.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
45 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
45 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-JPA-003 — Completion unknown is never retried
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- Status: Accepted; amended 2026-09-25 — `TransactionCompletionResolver`, `CommitFailureClassifier`
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and the retry engine were removed. The invariant holds because `SpringTransactionPort`, the only
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transaction engine, retries nothing; enforcement below is updated accordingly.
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- Date: 2026-08-11
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- Design: §17
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## Context
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A connection can break while a commit is in flight. The server may have committed; the
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acknowledgement may simply have been lost. The driver cannot tell the two apart.
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## Decision
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`TransactionCompletionUnknownException` is never retried, automatically or otherwise. It is
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produced only by a failure observed while the transaction phase is `COMMITTING`, and only for
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SQLSTATE `40003`, a connection-class (`08*`) state, or a transport break. Recovery is
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domain-specific reconciliation.
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## Consequences
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Retrying a possibly-committed write is the most damaging thing this platform could do: a duplicate
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payment, a duplicate order, a double decrement. There is no budget or backoff that makes it safe,
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because the failure is epistemic rather than transient.
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The invariant is enforced at the type level rather than by policy alone. `JpaFailureContext` refuses
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to construct a retryable completion-unknown context, and the exception rebuilds its context through
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the safe factory whatever it is handed. A future policy bug therefore cannot produce an unsafe
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retry — the value it would need does not exist.
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The rule is deliberately narrow in the other direction too. Classifying every connection failure as
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completion-unknown would push ordinary pool exhaustion and server restarts into the reconciliation
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queue, which trains operators to clear that queue without reading it — and then the one entry that
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mattered gets cleared with the rest.
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The cost is that the domain must supply the resolver. The platform cannot: only the domain knows
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which idempotency record, business row, or outbox entry proves the write happened.
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## Enforcement
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`JpaFailureContextTest`;
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`PostgreSqlTransactionIntegrationTest#connectionLossDuringCommitSurfacesAsAFailureAndIsNeverRetried`
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(also the `jpa-failure` lane, i.e. release gate `completion-unknown-no-retry`).
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