- 결정 16: `ca-skeleton.*`·`backend.graphql` 등 → `app.*`(APP_* env 키 이름 유지), selector 키 상수 하나(`CapabilitySelectors`), 바인딩만 되던 `streaming-idle` 삭제 - `StrictSettingsBinder`가 env 오타까지 거부 — 모든 capability(graphql·websocket·mongo는 edge 제약으로 파일만 strict), httpclient 리플렉션 `HttpClientEnvironmentKeys` 삭제 - persistence-jpa가 `APP_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD` secret 요구를 기여(bootstrap이 JPA 스위치를 읽지 않음), Redis ACL fixture에서 pub/sub 권한 제거 - 결함 수정: SMTP 설정 env 이름 충돌(P20-new-1), `bindExcept`가 system env까지 filter(P20-new-2), graphql 빈 deployment-mode 메시지(P20-new-6) - 통합: P30과 충돌 11건(P30의 명시적 bean 구조 유지), P30 코드의 옛 키를 app.*로, persistence-jpa 포맷 - 현황표: 소유자 결정 36(persistence-jpa 설정은 플랫폼 키만 app.persistence-jpa.*로, 공유 기능 트리 예외), 재개 문서에 일시 정지 상태 Wave 3 종료 검증: check · ci verifyDependencyLocks --warning-mode=fail(714 task) · mainCheck · architectureCheck verifyPublicPathSnapshot :app-bootstrap:verifyEnvKeys configContractCheck · :app-bootstrap:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:integrationTest :sample-portfolio:systemTest · integrationCheck · -p build-logic test · -p optional-platforms ci · :app-bootstrap:qualificationBootJar releaseCheck 통과 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
95 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
95 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Runbook: gRPC advanced capabilities
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Scope: the `:grpc-advanced:*` family. Everything here is off by default and stays off until a
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deployment names it. Nothing in this family ships in a runtime composition today.
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Flags are `app.grpc.advanced.<capability>.enabled`. `GrpcAdvancedCapability` owns the list of
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capability names; `GrpcAdvancedSupportMatrix` owns their current grades.
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---
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## A capability refuses to start
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`GrpcAdvancedModuleGuard` gives three different refusals, and the remedy differs:
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| Message contains | Meaning | Remedy |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| "its feature flag is not set" | Nobody enabled it | Set the property named in the message |
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| "tracked rather than implemented" | Grade is `WATCH` | Nothing to do here; the capability is not implemented |
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| "uncharacterised failure modes" | Grade is `EXPERIMENTAL` and this is production | Record a production approval, or run it outside production |
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The refusal message always names the property key, so the first case is a configuration line rather
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than a support question.
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---
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## xDS: the control plane went away
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**What you are seeing.** The control plane is unreachable and clients are still routing.
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**What it means.** `GrpcXdsFailurePolicy` serves the last-known-good snapshot, up to its staleness
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bound.
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**What to do.**
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1. Check the snapshot's age. `SERVE_LAST_KNOWN_GOOD` is the healthy degraded state.
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2. `STALE_BEYOND_BOUND` means the snapshot is older than the policy allows and is no longer trusted.
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Beyond that bound, a decommissioned backend would otherwise keep receiving traffic indefinitely.
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3. `NO_SNAPSHOT_YET` on a starting instance means it never reached the control plane. It fails after
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the initial fetch timeout rather than starting with no routing.
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**Do not** add application-level retry policy while xDS is enabled. `GrpcXdsProfile` refuses an
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`APPLICATION` retry owner, because retry defined in two places has a winner that depends on
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resolution order rather than on a decision.
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---
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## gRPC-Web: a browser call hangs and then fails with no status
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**Almost always the proxy.** A gRPC status arrives as a trailer, and a browser cannot read a trailer
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the proxy did not expose. Check that the proxy's CORS `expose_headers` includes `grpc-status` and
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`grpc-message`; `GrpcWebProxyContract.violations` reports exactly this, and the reference
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configuration in `envoy/envoy.yaml` shows it in place.
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**If the method is client- or bidirectional-streaming**, it cannot work over gRPC-Web at all — a
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browser has no way to send a stream of messages. `GrpcWebRpcSupport.require` refuses such a method.
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---
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## Servlet: a transport setting appears to be ignored
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It is ignored. The container owns the socket, so keepalive tuning, maximum connection age and
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flow-control window tuning belong to it. This repository has no Servlet transport code that would
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refuse them, so configure them on the container.
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A Servlet run never substitutes for Netty certification.
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---
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## Hedging: backend load doubled
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**Expected, within a bound.** Hedging trades duplicate load for tail latency.
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`GrpcHedgingResult` records both `duplicateBackendCalls` and `cancelledLoserAttempts`; a dashboard
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showing only the latency improvement makes the trade look free.
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**What to check.** `GrpcHedgingBudget` caps hedges as a fraction of completed calls. If duplicate
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load is above that fraction, the budget is not being consumed — which means something is issuing
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hedges outside the coordinator.
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**Hedging is refused** for anything but a read-only unary method. A hedged mutation runs twice by
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design, and an idempotency key does not help: the second attempt duplicates a success in progress
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rather than retrying a failure.
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---
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## Promoting a capability
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Promotion to `ADVANCED_STABLE` needs compatibility evidence, a security review, fault evidence,
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performance evidence, an ADR, a runbook, a real-environment test and seven days of soak. A Stable
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default needs thirty. Promotions are independent: promoting one capability changes no other's
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grade. This is a review checklist; the in-code `GrpcAdvancedPromotionGate` that restated it was
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removed (review 2026-09-24 S5-lead-4) because nothing but its own test called it.
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Before citing a suite as evidence, check that it ran against the real infrastructure it needs (proxy,
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container, control plane or toolchain). A suite that ran without it passed and established nothing.
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