Files
clean-architecture-backend-…/docs/notification/configuration-reference.md
T
DongHyeonka 5786126cfa fix!: 남은 리뷰 항목과 합친 뒤 드러난 결함을 고친다
문제: 앞 커밋 뒤에도 알림·파일 서버 묶음이 합쳐지지 않았고, 포트 다수에
fake와 실제 구현이 함께 통과하는 공유 계약이 없었고, SpotBugs가 신뢰도
HIGH만 봤고, application-core에 관계없는 클래스 묶음 패키지(outbound)가
있었다. 묶음을 합치자 lane·검사가 새로 드러낸 결함도 있었다(JpaOutbox
Store가 읽기 전용 트랜잭션에서 이벤트를 조용히 잃음, gRPC admission
controller가 public synchronized라 외부 lock에 막힘, 소비자 decode 타입
등록 경로 없음, compose Redis 익명 접근, local-fileserver lane DB 없음).

방법: 리뷰 README 15절에 남은 결정을 모두 적고 그대로 고쳤다. 트랜잭션·
멱등성·발행·notification 포트에 testFixtures 계약 키트를 두고 fake와
PG·Redis 구현이 상속한다(fake 변이로 계약이 잡는지 확인). SpotBugs는
MEDIUM으로 내리고 진짜 결함은 고치고 오탐은 위치·패턴별 이유를 단
제외로 처리했다. 업무 기능 패키지 규칙을 application-core/CLAUDE.md에
정본으로 두고 ArchUnit 2개와 생성 명령이 강제한다. compose Redis는
infra/redis-sdk ACL로 뜬다. 묶음별 결과는 리뷰 README 16절에 있다.

위험·한계: APP_FLYWAY_ENABLED가 dev·prod에도 적용된다. app.security
오타 키가 이제 기동을 막는다. SES 콜백 replay 창 기본값이 1시간이다.
템플릿 패키지 목록은 CLAUDE.md 표와 TemplatePackageOwnership 두 곳에
있고 일치 검사는 없다. 실제 CI runner 실행은 확인하지 못했다.

검증: ci, mainCheck, integrationCheck, -p optional-platforms ci
integrationCheck, performanceCheck, releaseCheck(-PgitRevision),
verify-compose-profile-contracts(18 lane) 통과. compose lane 실제 기동:
local-fileserver, notification ingest·serving·handoff, local-redis,
all-adapters(smoke 3개 포함).

Refs: docs/reviews/2026-11-01-maturity-review/README.md 15·16절
BREAKING CHANGE: APP_FLYWAY_ENABLED가 dev·prod 프로필에도 적용되고,
app.security의 모르는 키는 기동을 거부한다. MessageHandler에
schemaVersions()가 생겨 decode 목록을 handler 선언에서 만든다.
2026-11-03 19:52:06 +09:00

212 lines
14 KiB
Markdown

# Configuration reference
The notification delivery platform binds under `app.notification.platform`. The tree lives in
`src/composition/notification-platform/src/main/resources/config/module-defaults/notification.yml`,
which the support leaf's `ModuleDefaultsEnvironmentPostProcessor` loads at the lowest precedence,
so an application without the module carries none of it. The module is in no default composition: a
service selects it with `runtimeOnly project(':composition:notification-platform')` (plus the
persistence-jpa line) in `app-bootstrap/build.gradle`, and it is on when present. Every value carries
an inline default, so a deployment that switches the platform off supplies nothing.
Until 2026-08-15 this page named properties the binding did not have — `max-retry-concurrency`,
`scheduler-poll-interval`, `callback-worker-concurrency` — and omitted three it did. There was no
tree in `application.yml` at all, so the only way to configure the platform was to guess environment
variable names from Boot's relaxed binding. `NotificationEnvironmentRegistryTest`
(`:composition:notification-platform:test`) now fails when the shipped YAML and
`docs/registries/env-keys.yaml` disagree.
## Master switch
| Property | Environment variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| `enabled` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_ENABLED` | `true` | On while the module is present. `false` binds nothing at all: no runtime, no schema check, no scheduler thread, no secret required |
| `mode` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_MODE` | `SERVING` | `SERVING` refuses to start without a working provider; `INGEST_ONLY` stores requests and does not dispatch: it builds no provider runtime but records each enabled profile's route, so a request accepted now is delivered later on that route by a `SERVING` deployment (handoff) |
## Dispatch
| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|---|
| `dispatch.claim-batch-size` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CLAIM_BATCH_SIZE` | `50` | 1..1000 |
| `dispatch.lease-duration` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_LEASE_DURATION` | `2m` | positive, finite |
| `dispatch.poll-interval` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_POLL_INTERVAL` | `1s` | positive, finite |
| `dispatch.max-global-concurrency` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_MAX_CONCURRENCY` | `64` | positive |
| `dispatch.max-additional-attempts` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_MAX_ADDITIONAL_ATTEMPTS` | `4` | non-negative |
| `dispatch.max-queue-age` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_MAX_QUEUE_AGE` | `24h` | positive |
| `dispatch.allow-ambiguous-fallback` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_ALLOW_AMBIGUOUS_FALLBACK` | `false` | boolean |
Every value is bounded. "Unlimited" is not an accepted configuration.
The lease must outlast a provider call plus its timeout. Below that, a delivery a live worker is
still waiting on gets claimed by a second worker, and the recipient receives the notification twice.
## Callbacks
| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|---|
| `callbacks.enabled` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACKS_ENABLED` | `false` | boolean |
| `callbacks.max-body-bytes` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_MAX_BODY_BYTES` | `65251` | 1..65251 |
| `callbacks.replay-skew` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_REPLAY_SKEW` | `1h` | positive; SNS messages whose `Timestamp` is further than this from receipt, either way, are rejected. The default is SNS's longest HTTP/S retry period (3,600 s), so a bounce or complaint SNS redelivers after an outage is still accepted; a replay inside the window is a duplicate in the provider event ledger, not a second event (review 05-20) |
| `callbacks.trusted-proxies` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | *(empty)* | CSV of peer addresses |
콜백 응답: 기록(중복 포함) `204`, 거절 `400`(서명·topic·시각·형식), 본문 초과 `413`. SNS 서명 인증서를 가져오지 못하면 거절하지 않고 `503`+`Retry-After`로 답한다 — SNS는 4xx를 처리 완료로 보고 재전송을 멈추지만 5xx는 다시 보낸다(review 05-20).
여러 provider가 요청 URL에 서명하므로, 그 URL을 잘못 재구성하면 정상 webhook이 전부 서명 실패가 된다.
`trusted-proxies`가 비어 있으면 forwarded 헤더를 **믿지 않고** 컨테이너가 관측한 값을 쓴다. 무조건 믿으면
아무 호출자나 자기 서명이 검증될 URL을 고를 수 있어 서명 자체가 무의미해진다. 로드밸런서 뒤에 있는 배포는
그 peer를 명시한다.
65251 is not a round number by accident: it is the ciphertext column's 65536 bytes minus the largest
envelope the protector writes — a version byte, a key-id length byte, a key id of up to 255 bytes, the
AES-GCM nonce and tag. A larger configured value is refused when the settings bind, so the capability
does not start; before that check existed it passed every layer above the database and failed the
`CHECK` constraint after the callback had already been acknowledged to the provider. The shipped
default was 65508 (nonce and tag only) for a while after the envelope gained its key id, and every
deployment that turned the platform on failed to start until it was corrected (review 2026-11-01
r3-i, found by booting the compose lanes).
## Provider profiles
Profiles are a map under `providers`, keyed by profile id. Arbitrary deployment-chosen ids can be
supplied as YAML or through Spring relaxed binding (`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDERS_<ID>_<FIELD>`).
The shipped reference profiles `smtp` and `ses` additionally expose explicit `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_*`
and `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_*` aliases so operators do not have to invent binding names.
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `type` | `SES`, `SMTP` — a closed enum, so an unknown value fails binding rather than assembling into nothing |
| `enabled` | A disabled profile is bound and validated but contributes no runtime |
| `primary-for-channel` | Exactly one primary per channel |
| `environment` | Required when enabled |
| `credential-profile` | Provider credential key id resolved through `SecretMaterialProvider`; never inline secret material |
| `timeout` | Positive and finite |
| `max-concurrency` | Positive |
| `rate-per-second` | Positive |
A profile pins provider type, environment, credential profile, timeouts, concurrency and rate limit.
Sender identity and credential profile are separate concerns.
### SES profile fields
An enabled SES profile adds a typed `ses` block:
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `ses.endpoint` | SES API base URI, used as the AWS SDK client's endpoint override |
| `ses.region` | AWS region the SDK signs for |
| `ses.sender-identity` | verified SES From identity |
| `ses.access-key-id` | AWS access key id; identifier only, not secret material |
| `ses.configuration-set` | optional SES configuration-set name |
| `ses.allowed-topic-arns` | SNS topic ARNs whose SES events this profile accepts (`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_ALLOWED_TOPIC_ARNS`, comma-separated). Required when `callbacks.enabled=true`: binding fails without it, because a valid SNS signature only proves AWS sent the message and anyone can own a topic |
| `credential-profile` | key id for the secret access-key material; generation 1 is activated at assembly |
The shipped reference profile is `providers.ses` and is disabled by default. It is controlled by
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_*`; its secret material comes from
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY`, whose active key id must match
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SES_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ID`.
`type` lists only the families the shipped composition can assemble. Current shipped
reachability is:
| Provider type | Contract/adapter code | Shipped dispatch assembler | Shipped callback assembler | What happens when enabled for dispatch |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `SMTP` | yes | **yes** | no | assembles when Spring Mail relay settings are complete |
| `SES` | yes | **yes** | **yes** | assembles an EMAIL runtime from the typed `ses` block; SNS callback verification remains available in `INGEST_ONLY` |
APNs, FCM, Twilio, Web Push and Webhook adapters used to ship as protocol code with no assembler, so
enabling one failed startup. They were removed; the `docs/capability-status.md` "제거된 코드" table
names the last commit that had them. Adding a family back means adding its adapter, a
`ProviderRuntimeAssembler`, its `ProviderType` constant and the settings/secret inputs it actually
needs, together.
## SMTP relay
The one provider profile the template ships, off. A deployment that wants the common case sets
`APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENABLED=true` and the relay address; one that wants a different
profile id or a second family declares it in its own YAML instead.
The profile and the relay are separate tables below because they answer different questions. The
profile says *which* provider serves EMAIL and under what limits; the relay says *what the transport
is*. Host, port and credentials are not here at all — they stay `spring.mail.*`, because Spring
already owns them and a second spelling would be a second thing to keep in step.
| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|---|
| `providers.smtp.enabled` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENABLED` | `false` | boolean |
| `providers.smtp.primary-for-channel` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_PRIMARY` | `true` | boolean; exactly one primary per channel |
| `providers.smtp.environment` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` | required when enabled |
| `providers.smtp.credential-profile` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_CREDENTIAL_PROFILE` | `default` | resolved through `SecretMaterialProvider`, never inline material |
| `providers.smtp.timeout` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_TIMEOUT` | `10s` | positive, finite |
| `providers.smtp.max-concurrency` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_MAX_CONCURRENCY` | `4` | positive |
| `providers.smtp.rate-per-second` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_RATE_PER_SECOND` | `10` | positive |
| Property | Environment variable | Default | Bound |
|---|---|---|---|
| `smtp.sender-identity` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_SENDER_IDENTITY` | `no-reply@example.invalid` | address |
| `smtp.dispatch-concurrency` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_SMTP_DISPATCH_CONCURRENCY` | `4` | positive |
SMTP transport configuration has one owner: Spring Mail. The actual `JavaMailSenderImpl` must use required STARTTLS (`mail.smtp.starttls.enable=true` plus `mail.smtp.starttls.required=true`) or implicit TLS (`mail.smtp.ssl.enable=true`). It must also have positive `mail.smtp.connectiontimeout`, `mail.smtp.timeout`, and `mail.smtp.writetimeout` values. SMTP assembly fails before serving traffic when those properties are absent or invalid.
The native environment contract is `SPRING_MAIL_HOST`, `SPRING_MAIL_PORT`, optional
`SPRING_MAIL_USERNAME` / secret `SPRING_MAIL_PASSWORD`, plus the
`SPRING_MAIL_PROPERTIES_MAIL_SMTP_*` TLS and timeout keys listed in `.env.example`. These names stay
Spring-native because Spring Boot itself owns and consumes `spring.mail.*`; the notification module
does not create a second alias for the same relay.
The default sender is an RFC 2606 reserved domain that resolves nowhere, so a deployment that forgot
to set one produces a traceable bounce instead of mail apparently sent from an address it does not
own.
## Startup failures
Startup fails rather than degrading when:
- a payload or queue setting is unbounded
- a timeout is negative
- a TTL-required profile has no expiry source
- a callback signing secret is missing
- a production profile enables trust-all
- an SES profile is missing its `ses` block, or callbacks are on and `ses.allowed-topic-arns` is empty
- two provider profiles share an id
- a route points only at disabled providers
- `mode` is `SERVING` and no provider profile is enabled
- the notification schema stream is not applied and promoted
## Secrets
All key material arrives through `SecretMaterialProvider`. Nothing is read from source, from a
committed file, or from a plaintext log. Contact point encryption and lookup HMAC keys must be
distinct, and the encryption key must be exactly 256 bits.
Seven purposes, seven keys. Each is base64 of at least 32 bytes and each must differ from every
other; the platform decodes them at startup and refuses to boot if one is blank, short or shared. A
blank value used to be skipped, which meant the platform started without the key and found out on
the first contact point — in production, on a recipient's notification.
Every default below is **unset**, deliberately. Supply the values out of band, per environment. Do
not write one into this table, into `application.yml`, into an `.env` file that is tracked, or into
any example: a value that appears in the repository is a value that has been disclosed.
| Purpose | Key material | Active key id |
|---|---|---|
| Contact point encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID` |
| Contact point lookup HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CONTACT_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
| Callback signing | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_SIGNING_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_SIGNING_KEY_ID` |
| Callback fingerprint HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_FINGERPRINT_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_CALLBACK_FINGERPRINT_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
| Provider credential encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ID` |
| Provider request lookup HMAC | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PROVIDER_REQUEST_LOOKUP_HMAC_KEY_ID` |
| Payload encryption | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_NOTIFICATION_PLATFORM_PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID` |
A key id is not secret — an id identifies key material without revealing it — but it is required,
and it has no default on purpose. A constant id makes a rotation indistinguishable from the key it
replaced, so nothing could decrypt what was written before it. Change the id in the same deployment
that changes the material, and keep the superseded key readable under its old id until the data it
wrote has been re-encrypted. The rotation sequence is in
[at-rest-threat-model.md](at-rest-threat-model.md).
## Readiness
The platform contributes a `notifications` actuator endpoint and a health indicator. It reports DOWN
when a provider's credentials were rejected, when a configured provider has no channel route, and
when the measured backlog, stuck-lease count, projection lag or reconciliation lag passes the
thresholds in `NotificationServingThresholds`. See [operations.md](operations.md).