fix(contracts): refuse IPv6, mapped, CGNAT and internal hosts at admission (Q-6.7-10)

Production admission only knew IPv4 private ranges and `localhost`, so
`[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[fd00::1]`, `[fe80::1]`, `100.64.0.1`,
`0.1.2.3`, `api.internal`, `printer.local` and a trailing-dot
`localhost.` were all admitted as public API endpoints.

isNonPublicHost now also refuses 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT),
IPv6 unique-local (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), every IPv4-mapped
address (::ffff:0:0/96), and `.local` / `.internal` names, after
stripping one trailing dot. URL.hostname already canonicalises the
literals, so no separate IP parser is needed.

The loopback list that allows plain http (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`,
`[::1]`) now lives once in deployment-admission.ts
(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES / isLoopbackHostname); rest-profiles.ts and
browser-rpc.ts use it instead of their own copies (same list, no
behavior change there).

Verified: new cases in tests/unit/deployment-admission.test.ts; a probe
showed 13 of the 14 forms admitted before and all refused after, while
2001:db8::1, fec0::1, 100.63/100.128 and *.example.com names stay
admitted. Gates green except the known removal-fixture test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-09-24 13:45:37 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 5124c2f65f
commit 375b563961
4 changed files with 87 additions and 16 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
decodeOwnDataRecord,
snapshotExactArray,
} from "./exact-snapshot.ts";
import { isLoopbackHostname } from "./deployment-admission.ts";
import type { InstalledBoundaryMapper } from "./boundary-mapper.ts";
import type { RuntimeSchemaCodec } from "./schema-registry.ts";
@@ -744,7 +745,7 @@ function validateProviderProfile(profile: BrowserRpcProviderProfile): void {
}
const localHttp =
endpoint.protocol === "http:" &&
["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"].includes(endpoint.hostname);
isLoopbackHostname(endpoint.hostname);
if (
!REGISTRY_ID.test(profile.runtimeProfileId) ||
!REGISTRY_ID.test(profile.providerId) ||
+39 -8
View File
@@ -131,30 +131,61 @@ function publicEndpointViolations(
return violations;
}
/**
* Q-6.7-10. The one list of loopback hosts (in `URL.hostname` form) on which
* a REST or browser RPC provider may use plain `http:`.
*/
export const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = Object.freeze([
"localhost",
"127.0.0.1",
"[::1]",
] as const);
export function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
return (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES as readonly string[]).includes(hostname);
}
/**
* Hosts that only resolve inside the machine or network that built the
* artifact. A deployment pointing at one of these is a developer configuration
* that escaped, not a production endpoint.
* that escaped, not a production endpoint. `hostname` comes from `URL`, so
* IPv4 and IPv6 literals are already in canonical form.
*/
function isNonPublicHost(hostname: string): boolean {
const host = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/gu, "");
if (isLoopbackHostname(hostname)) return true;
const host = hostname
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/^\[|\]$/gu, "")
.replace(/\.$/u, "");
if (
host === "localhost" ||
host.endsWith(".localhost") ||
host === "::1" ||
host === "0.0.0.0" ||
host === "::"
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".internal")
) {
return true;
}
if (host.includes(":")) return isNonPublicIpv6(host);
const octets = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/u.exec(host);
if (!octets) return false;
const [first, second] = [Number(octets[1]), Number(octets[2])];
return (
first === 127 ||
first === 0 ||
first === 10 ||
(first === 192 && second === 168) ||
first === 127 ||
(first === 100 && second >= 64 && second <= 127) ||
(first === 169 && second === 254) ||
(first === 172 && second >= 16 && second <= 31) ||
(first === 169 && second === 254)
(first === 192 && second === 168)
);
}
/** Unspecified, loopback, IPv4-mapped, unique-local (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10). */
function isNonPublicIpv6(host: string): boolean {
if (host === "::" || host === "::1") return true;
if (/^::ffff:[0-9a-f]{1,4}:[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/u.test(host)) return true;
const first = host.startsWith(":")
? 0
: Number.parseInt(host.slice(0, host.indexOf(":")), 16);
return (first & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00 || (first & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80;
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import {
type ReadOnlyRegistry,
} from "./read-only-registry.ts";
import { snapshotExactArray, snapshotExactObject } from "./exact-snapshot.ts";
import { isLoopbackHostname } from "./deployment-admission.ts";
export type FetchCredentialsMode = "omit" | "same-origin" | "include";
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ export function createRestProviderProfile(
const parsed = new URL(baseUrl);
const localHttp =
parsed.protocol === "http:" &&
["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"].includes(parsed.hostname);
isLoopbackHostname(parsed.hostname);
if (
!providerId ||
(parsed.protocol !== "https:" && !localHttp) ||
+44 -6
View File
@@ -80,13 +80,51 @@ describe("deployment admission", () => {
}
});
it("permits a routable public host", () => {
expect(
findAdmissionViolations("production", {
it("refuses IPv6, mapped, CGNAT, 0/8 and internal-name hosts (Q-6.7-10)", () => {
for (const host of [
"https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/",
"https://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/",
"https://[fd00::1]/",
"https://[fc12:3456::1]/",
"https://[fe80::1]/",
"https://[febf::1]/",
"https://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/",
"https://100.64.0.1/",
"https://100.127.255.254/",
"https://0.1.2.3/",
"https://api.internal/",
"https://printer.local/",
"https://localhost./",
"https://api.internal./",
]) {
const violations = findAdmissionViolations("production", {
...PRODUCTION_ARTIFACT,
API_BASE_URL: "https://api.172.16.example.com/",
} as AdmissionInput),
).toEqual([]);
API_BASE_URL: host,
} as AdmissionInput);
expect(violations.map((violation) => violation.field), host).toContain(
"API_BASE_URL",
);
}
});
it("permits a routable public host", () => {
for (const host of [
"https://api.172.16.example.com/",
"https://100.128.0.1/",
"https://100.63.255.255/",
"https://[2001:db8::1]/",
"https://[fec0::1]/",
"https://internal.example.com/",
"https://local.example.com/",
]) {
expect(
findAdmissionViolations("production", {
...PRODUCTION_ARTIFACT,
API_BASE_URL: host,
} as AdmissionInput),
host,
).toEqual([]);
}
});
it("refuses a placeholder identity on a public target", () => {