fix: report OPFS completion honestly and bound public cache staging

A durable write whose journal transaction could not be completed returned
plain success with `SUCCEEDED` telemetry. The payload was committed but
the transaction stayed `COMMITTED`, so the reconcile backlog and its quota
pressure grew while every caller was told the write had settled. That is
now a `RECONCILE` failure with the effect certainty preserved, and an
unfinished delete is observed `DEGRADED` rather than clean.

The worker seam lost causes in both directions. A bootstrap failure
answered every request with kind `CAPABILITIES`, so the gateway read a
kind mismatch and replaced the real `BLOCKED` or `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` with a
generic `UNSUPPORTED`; the envelope's correlation is now captured once at
the listener. On the client, the pending row and its timer were released
before the reply was decoded, so a trap that threw inside the decoder left
the public promise pending with nothing left to time it out, and a
throwing `requestId` getter produced a timeout instead of a prompt
protocol failure.

Public cache staging handed its signal to each `Request` and called that
ownership. A fetch that ignored it held the mutation lock forever, and a
digest that finished after the abort still wrote both the asset and the
activation marker — publishing a release nobody was waiting for. One
terminal owner now covers the whole staging body and every await
re-checks it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/adapters/cache-storage/public-response-cache-adapter.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import {
   browserDataSuccess,
   mapBrowserDataException,
 } from "../browser-file-storage/result.ts";
+import { createAbortableOperation } from "../platform/abortable-operation.ts";
 import {
   cacheByteBucket,
   cacheEntryBucket,
@@ -409,16 +410,42 @@ export function createPublicResponseCacheAdapter(
         entryBucket: cacheEntryBucket(normalized.assets.length),
       });
 
+      // NS-08. One owner covers the whole staging body. Handing the signal to
+      // each `Request` only asked a cooperative fetch to stop: a stream or a
+      // digest that ignored it kept the mutation lock and, worse, could finish
+      // after the abort had already ended the operation and still write both the
+      // asset and the marker, publishing a release nobody was waiting for.
+      const owner = createAbortableOperation({ signal });
+      const ownedStep = async <Value>(
+        task: Promise<Value>,
+        compensate?: (value: Value) => void,
+      ): Promise<Value> => {
+        const raced = await owner.race(task, compensate);
+        if (raced.kind === "REJECTED") throw raced.reason;
+        if (raced.kind !== "VALUE") {
+          throw new CacheValidationFailure("ABORTED");
+        }
+        return raced.value;
+      };
+      const assertOwned = (): void => {
+        if (owner.terminal() !== null) {
+          throw new CacheValidationFailure("ABORTED");
+        }
+      };
+
       try {
         const result = await dependencies.mutationLock!.run(
           signal,
           async () => {
+            assertOwned();
             const cacheName = releaseCacheName(
               policy,
               normalized.releaseRegistryId,
               normalized.manifestDigestHex,
             );
-            const existingNames = await dependencies.cacheStorage!.keys();
+            const existingNames = await ownedStep(
+              Promise.resolve(dependencies.cacheStorage!.keys()),
+            );
             // STO-RR-05. A candidate this call did not create may be the one
             // currently serving traffic, so nothing about it is deleted before
             // a replacement has been fetched and verified.
@@ -467,42 +494,56 @@ export function createPublicResponseCacheAdapter(
               }
             }
 
-            const cache = await dependencies.cacheStorage!.open(cacheName);
+            const cache = await ownedStep(
+              Promise.resolve(dependencies.cacheStorage!.open(cacheName)),
+            );
             try {
               let totalBytes = 0;
               for (const asset of normalized.assets) {
-                if (signal?.aborted) {
-                  throw new CacheValidationFailure("ABORTED");
-                }
+                assertOwned();
                 const cacheRequest = createNativeRequest(asset);
                 const networkRequest = createNativeRequest(
                   asset,
-                  signal,
+                  owner.signal,
                 );
-                const response =
-                  await dependencies.fetcher!(networkRequest);
-                const read = await readAndValidateResponse(
-                  response,
-                  asset,
-                  policy,
-                  dependencies.crypto,
-                  signal,
+                const response = await ownedStep(
+                  Promise.resolve(dependencies.fetcher!(networkRequest)),
+                  // A response that arrives after the owner ended is released
+                  // rather than read.
+                  (late) => {
+                    void late.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+                  },
+                );
+                const read = await ownedStep(
+                  readAndValidateResponse(
+                    response,
+                    asset,
+                    policy,
+                    dependencies.crypto,
+                    owner.signal,
+                  ),
                 );
                 if (!read.ok) throw new CacheValidationFailure(read.error.code);
+                assertOwned();
                 totalBytes += read.value.bytes.byteLength;
                 if (totalBytes > policy.maxReleaseBytes) {
                   throw new CacheValidationFailure("LIMIT_EXCEEDED");
                 }
-                await cache.put(
-                  cacheRequest,
-                  new Response(Uint8Array.from(read.value.bytes), {
-                    status: 200,
-                    headers: read.value.headers.map(
-                      ([name, value]) => [name, value],
+                await ownedStep(
+                  Promise.resolve(
+                    cache.put(
+                      cacheRequest,
+                      new Response(Uint8Array.from(read.value.bytes), {
+                        status: 200,
+                        headers: read.value.headers.map(
+                          ([name, value]) => [name, value],
+                        ),
+                      }),
                     ),
-                  }),
+                  ),
                 );
               }
+              assertOwned();
 
               const marker: ReleaseMarker = Object.freeze({
                 schemaVersion: 1,
@@ -514,10 +555,14 @@ export function createPublicResponseCacheAdapter(
                 stagedAtEpochMs: now(),
                 assets: normalized.assets,
               });
-              await cache.put(
-                markerRequest(policy),
-                jsonResponse(marker),
+              await ownedStep(
+                Promise.resolve(
+                  cache.put(markerRequest(policy), jsonResponse(marker)),
+                ),
               );
+              // The marker is the activation record, so it is only a success
+              // once this call still owns the operation that wrote it.
+              assertOwned();
               return browserDataSuccess(summaryFromMarker(marker));
             } catch (error) {
               // STO-RR-05. Only a candidate this call created is removed. A
@@ -552,6 +597,8 @@ export function createPublicResponseCacheAdapter(
           dependencies.observer,
           normalized.releaseRegistryId,
         );
+      } finally {
+        owner.close();
       }
     },
 

src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-byte-store-adapter.ts

@@ -325,10 +325,32 @@ export function createOpfsByteStoreAdapter(
           request.source.byteLength!,
         );
       }
-      await dependencies.journal.complete(
+      const completed = await dependencies.journal.complete(
         transactionId,
         begun.value.fencingToken,
       );
+      if (!completed.ok) {
+        // NS-04. The payload is durable and finalized, so nothing is rolled
+        // back and the `COMMITTED` row stays the reconciler's authority. What
+        // did not happen is settling the transaction, and reporting a plain
+        // success for it claimed a state nobody observed while the reconcile
+        // backlog and its quota pressure grew unseen.
+        observeOpfsSafely(dependencies.observer, {
+          operation: "OBJECT_WRITE",
+          outcome: "DEGRADED",
+          failureCode: completed.error.code,
+          byteBucket: byteBucket(prepared.value.descriptor.byteLength),
+        });
+        return {
+          ok: false as const,
+          error: Object.freeze({
+            ...completed.error,
+            operation: "OBJECT_WRITE" as const,
+            retryable: true,
+            recovery: "RECONCILE" as const,
+          }),
+        };
+      }
       observeOpfsSafely(dependencies.observer, {
         operation: "OBJECT_WRITE",
         outcome: "SUCCEEDED",
@@ -495,17 +517,27 @@ export function createOpfsByteStoreAdapter(
         request.expectedGeneration,
         request.signal,
       );
-      if (removed.ok) {
-        await dependencies.journal.complete(
-          transactionId,
-          begun.value.fencingToken,
-        );
-      }
+      const completed = removed.ok
+        ? await dependencies.journal.complete(
+            transactionId,
+            begun.value.fencingToken,
+          )
+        : null;
       // Logical deletion is already committed. Physical cleanup is retryable
       // maintenance and must not make the caller repeat a non-idempotent delete.
+      // NS-04. It is still not a settled state: an unfinished physical removal
+      // or an unsettled journal row is maintenance debt the reconciler owns, so
+      // it is observed as such instead of as a clean success.
+      const settled = removed.ok && completed !== null && completed.ok;
+      const debtCode = removed.ok
+        ? completed !== null && !completed.ok
+          ? completed.error.code
+          : undefined
+        : removed.error.code;
       observeOpfsSafely(dependencies.observer, {
         operation: "OBJECT_DELETE",
-        outcome: "SUCCEEDED",
+        outcome: settled ? "SUCCEEDED" : "DEGRADED",
+        ...(debtCode ? { failureCode: debtCode } : {}),
       });
       return browserDataSuccess(undefined);
     },

src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-policy.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,11 @@ export type OpfsRuntimePolicy = Readonly<{
 
 export type OpfsSafeObservation = Readonly<{
   operation: BrowserDataOperation;
-  outcome: "STARTED" | "SUCCEEDED" | "FAILED";
+  /**
+   * NS-04. `DEGRADED` is a committed effect whose bookkeeping is unsettled:
+   * the payload is durable but a reconciler still owns the transaction.
+   */
+  outcome: "STARTED" | "SUCCEEDED" | "FAILED" | "DEGRADED";
   failureCode?: BrowserDataFailureCode;
   byteBucket?: "0" | "1B_1MiB" | "1MiB_16MiB" | "16MiB_256MiB" | "GT_256MiB";
   transactionBucket?: "0" | "1_10" | "11_100" | "GT_100";

src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-worker-client.ts

@@ -81,31 +81,44 @@ export function createOpfsWorkerGateway(
   const pending = new Map<string, PendingRequest>();
   let disposed = false;
 
-  const rejectAllPending = (): void => {
+  const rejectAllPending = (
+    code: "UNAVAILABLE" | "UNSUPPORTED" = "UNAVAILABLE",
+  ): void => {
     for (const request of pending.values()) {
       clearTimeout(request.timeout);
       request.removeAbortListener();
-      request.reject(new OpfsRpcError("UNAVAILABLE"));
+      request.reject(new OpfsRpcError(code));
     }
     pending.clear();
   };
 
   const onMessage = (event: MessageEvent<unknown>): void => {
     if (disposed) return;
-    const requestId = ownStringField(event.data, "requestId");
-    if (requestId === null) return;
-    const request = pending.get(requestId);
+    const correlation = readCorrelation(event.data);
+    if (correlation === IGNORE_MESSAGE) return;
+    if (correlation === UNREADABLE_CORRELATION) {
+      // NS-06. A reply whose correlation cannot even be read is a protocol
+      // breach on the only channel this client has. Ignoring it left every
+      // in-flight request to expire on the RPC timer, so the whole channel
+      // fails closed promptly instead.
+      rejectAllPending("UNSUPPORTED");
+      return;
+    }
+    const request = pending.get(correlation);
     if (!request) return;
-    pending.delete(requestId);
-    clearTimeout(request.timeout);
-    request.removeAbortListener();
     // STO-07 / STO-RR-03. A reply is decoded, never adopted. A different
     // operation, an unknown kind, an unknown failure code, an inherited or
     // extra field and a hostile accessor are all protocol breaches, and each
     // closes the request rather than leaving it to time out.
     // UNSUPPORTED is the closed-taxonomy code for "this runtime cannot serve
     // this"; no new failure code is invented.
+    // NS-06. The decode happens before the pending row and its timer are
+    // released: releasing them first meant a trap that threw inside the decoder
+    // left the public promise pending with nothing left to time it out.
     const decoded = decodeWorkerResponse(event.data, request.expectedKind);
+    pending.delete(correlation);
+    clearTimeout(request.timeout);
+    request.removeAbortListener();
     if (decoded === null) {
       request.reject(new OpfsRpcError("UNSUPPORTED"));
       return;
@@ -738,6 +751,31 @@ function ownStringField(source: unknown, key: string): string | null {
   return typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0 ? value : null;
 }
 
+/** Not a reply at all: nothing on this channel is waiting for it. */
+const IGNORE_MESSAGE = Symbol("opfs-ignore-message");
+/** A reply whose correlation could not be read without running foreign code. */
+const UNREADABLE_CORRELATION = Symbol("opfs-unreadable-correlation");
+
+function readCorrelation(
+  source: unknown,
+): string | typeof IGNORE_MESSAGE | typeof UNREADABLE_CORRELATION {
+  if (source === null || typeof source !== "object") return IGNORE_MESSAGE;
+  let descriptor: PropertyDescriptor | undefined;
+  try {
+    descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(source, "requestId");
+  } catch {
+    return UNREADABLE_CORRELATION;
+  }
+  if (!descriptor) return IGNORE_MESSAGE;
+  // An accessor would have to be invoked to be read, and invoking foreign code
+  // to find out who a message belongs to is exactly what must not happen.
+  if (!("value" in descriptor)) return UNREADABLE_CORRELATION;
+  const value = descriptor.value;
+  return typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 128
+    ? value
+    : UNREADABLE_CORRELATION;
+}
+
 function hasOnlyOwnDataKeys(
   source: object,
   allowed: ReadonlySet<string>,
@@ -758,6 +796,20 @@ function hasOnlyOwnDataKeys(
 function decodeWorkerResponse(
   value: unknown,
   expectedKind: OpfsWorkerRequest["kind"],
+): OpfsWorkerResponse | null {
+  // NS-06. Total by construction: every reflection operation below can be
+  // trapped, and a decoder that throws would strand the request it was
+  // decoding rather than closing it.
+  try {
+    return decodeWorkerResponseUnguarded(value, expectedKind);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function decodeWorkerResponseUnguarded(
+  value: unknown,
+  expectedKind: OpfsWorkerRequest["kind"],
 ): OpfsWorkerResponse | null {
   if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return null;
   if (!hasOnlyOwnDataKeys(value, WORKER_RESPONSE_KEYS)) return null;

src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-worker-runtime.ts

@@ -157,12 +157,21 @@ export async function startBrowserOpfsDedicatedWorker(
   host.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
     if (!hasRequestId(event.data)) return;
     const requestData = event.data;
+    // NS-05. The envelope's correlation is captured once, up front. Answering a
+    // bootstrap failure with a default `CAPABILITIES` kind made the client see
+    // an expected-kind mismatch and overwrite the real cause — a `BLOCKED` or
+    // `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` outage was reported to operators as `UNSUPPORTED`.
+    const correlation = requestCorrelation(requestData);
     void runtimePromise
       .then((runtime) => runtime.handleRequest(requestData))
       .then((response) => postWorkerResponse(host, response))
       .catch((error: unknown) => {
         host.postMessage(
-          failure(requestData.requestId, mapRuntimeFailure(error)),
+          failure(
+            correlation.requestId,
+            mapRuntimeFailure(error),
+            correlation.kind,
+          ),
         );
       });
   });
@@ -1871,6 +1880,31 @@ function hasRequestId(
   );
 }
 
+/**
+ * NS-05. Reads a request envelope's correlation exactly once, through its own
+ * data descriptors, so a reply can name the request it answers even when the
+ * runtime that would have handled it never came up. An envelope whose kind
+ * cannot be read stays a protocol-level failure rather than borrowing an
+ * unrelated kind.
+ */
+function requestCorrelation(
+  value: Readonly<{ requestId: string }>,
+): Readonly<{ requestId: string; kind: OpfsWorkerRequest["kind"] }> {
+  let kind: unknown;
+  try {
+    kind = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(value, "kind")?.value;
+  } catch {
+    kind = undefined;
+  }
+  return {
+    requestId: value.requestId,
+    kind:
+      typeof kind === "string" && WORKER_REQUEST_KINDS.has(kind)
+        ? (kind as OpfsWorkerRequest["kind"])
+        : "CAPABILITIES",
+  };
+}
+
 function isWorkerRequest(value: unknown): value is OpfsWorkerRequest {
   return Boolean(
     hasRequestId(value) &&

tests/unit/opfs-byte-store.test.ts

@@ -352,6 +352,123 @@ describe("OPFS byte-store coordinator", () => {
     expect(JSON.stringify(observations)).not.toContain("object_12345678");
   });
 
+  /**
+   * NS-04. Awaiting `journal.complete` without checking it reported a settled
+   * transaction that nobody settled: the caller saw plain success and success
+   * telemetry while the durable row stayed `COMMITTED`, so the reconcile
+   * backlog grew invisibly.
+   */
+  it("does not report a settled write when the journal cannot complete it", async () => {
+    const journal = createJournal();
+    journal.complete = async () =>
+      browserDataFailure("UNAVAILABLE", "INDEXEDDB_WRITE", {
+        retryable: true,
+        recovery: "RECONCILE",
+      });
+    const observations: { operation: string; outcome: string }[] = [];
+    const adapter = createOpfsByteStoreAdapter({
+      journal,
+      worker: createWorker(),
+      scope,
+      storagePolicy,
+      policy: {
+        ...resolveOpfsRuntimePolicy(),
+        chunkSizeBytes: 64 * 1024,
+        maxObjectBytes: 64 * 1024,
+        maxChunkCount: 1,
+      },
+      createTransactionId: () => "transaction_12345678",
+      now: () => 100,
+      observer: (event) =>
+        observations.push(event as { operation: string; outcome: string }),
+    });
+
+    const result = await adapter.objects.put({
+      objectId: "object_12345678",
+      expectedGeneration: null,
+      mediaType: "application/octet-stream",
+      source: sourceFrom(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])),
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      // The payload is durable, so recovery is reconciliation, not a rewrite.
+      expect(result.error.recovery).toBe("RECONCILE");
+      expect(result.error.operation).toBe("OBJECT_WRITE");
+    }
+    expect(
+      observations.some(
+        (event) =>
+          event.operation === "OBJECT_WRITE" && event.outcome === "SUCCEEDED",
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    // The committed row stays the reconciler's authority.
+    expect(journal.transactions.get("transaction_12345678")?.phase).toBe(
+      "COMMITTED",
+    );
+    expect(journal.objects.get("object_12345678")).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it("records maintenance debt when a committed delete cannot be completed", async () => {
+    const journal = createJournal();
+    const observations: { operation: string; outcome: string }[] = [];
+    const policy = {
+      ...resolveOpfsRuntimePolicy(),
+      chunkSizeBytes: 64 * 1024,
+      maxObjectBytes: 64 * 1024,
+      maxChunkCount: 1,
+    };
+    const writer = createOpfsByteStoreAdapter({
+      journal,
+      worker: createWorker(),
+      scope,
+      storagePolicy,
+      policy,
+      createTransactionId: () => "transaction_12345678",
+      now: () => 100,
+    });
+    await writer.objects.put({
+      objectId: "object_12345678",
+      expectedGeneration: null,
+      mediaType: "application/octet-stream",
+      source: sourceFrom(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])),
+    });
+
+    // The journal can commit the deletion but cannot settle the transaction.
+    const remover = createOpfsByteStoreAdapter({
+      journal: {
+        ...journal,
+        complete: async () =>
+          browserDataFailure("UNAVAILABLE", "INDEXEDDB_WRITE", {
+            retryable: true,
+            recovery: "RECONCILE",
+          }),
+      },
+      worker: createWorker(),
+      scope,
+      storagePolicy,
+      policy,
+      createTransactionId: () => "transaction_87654321",
+      now: () => 200,
+      observer: (event) =>
+        observations.push(event as { operation: string; outcome: string }),
+    });
+
+    // Logical deletion is already committed, so the caller must not be asked to
+    // repeat a non-idempotent delete — but it is not a settled success either.
+    const result = await remover.objects.remove({
+      objectId: "object_12345678",
+      expectedGeneration: 1,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    const deleteOutcomes = observations
+      .filter((event) => event.operation === "OBJECT_DELETE")
+      .map((event) => event.outcome);
+    expect(deleteOutcomes.at(-1)).toBe("DEGRADED");
+    expect(deleteOutcomes).not.toContain("SUCCEEDED");
+  });
+
   it("deep-snapshots scope and policy at composition against caller mutation", async () => {
     const journal = createJournal();
     const mutableScope = { ...scope };

tests/unit/opfs-worker-runtime.test.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ import type {
 } from "../../src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-worker-protocol.ts";
 import {
   createOpfsWorkerRuntime,
+  startBrowserOpfsDedicatedWorker,
   type OpfsMutationLeaseManager,
+  type OpfsWorkerMessageHost,
 } from "../../src/adapters/storage/opfs/opfs-worker-runtime.ts";
 
 const scopeA: OpfsStorageScope = Object.freeze({
@@ -1117,6 +1119,144 @@ describe("STO-RR-03 worker responses are decoded against closed sets", () => {
     });
   }
 
+  /**
+   * NS-06. Correlation was read separately and the pending row and its timer
+   * were removed before the reply was decoded. A trap that threw inside the
+   * decoder therefore left the public promise pending forever, and a throwing
+   * `requestId` getter produced a timeout instead of a prompt protocol failure.
+   */
+  const uncorrelatableReplies: readonly (readonly [
+    string,
+    (request: OpfsWorkerRequest) => unknown,
+  ])[] = [
+    [
+      "throwing requestId getter",
+      (request) =>
+        Object.defineProperty(
+          {
+            protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            kind: request.kind,
+            ok: true,
+            value: {},
+          },
+          "requestId",
+          {
+            enumerable: true,
+            get: () => {
+              throw new TypeError("hostile requestId getter");
+            },
+          },
+        ),
+    ],
+    [
+      "throwing ownKeys trap",
+      (request) =>
+        new Proxy(
+          {
+            requestId: request.requestId,
+            protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            kind: request.kind,
+            ok: true,
+            value: {},
+          },
+          {
+            ownKeys() {
+              throw new TypeError("hostile ownKeys trap");
+            },
+          },
+        ),
+    ],
+    [
+      "descriptor trap that throws after correlation",
+      (request) => {
+        let reads = 0;
+        return new Proxy(
+          {
+            requestId: request.requestId,
+            protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            kind: request.kind,
+            ok: true,
+            value: {},
+          },
+          {
+            getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, key) {
+              reads += 1;
+              if (reads > 1) {
+                throw new TypeError("stateful descriptor trap");
+              }
+              return Reflect.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, key);
+            },
+          },
+        );
+      },
+    ],
+    [
+      "symbol-keyed field",
+      (request) => ({
+        requestId: request.requestId,
+        protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        kind: request.kind,
+        ok: true,
+        value: {},
+        [Symbol.for("injected")]: true,
+      }),
+    ],
+    [
+      "non-enumerable own field",
+      (request) =>
+        Object.defineProperty(
+          {
+            requestId: request.requestId,
+            protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            kind: request.kind,
+            ok: true,
+            value: {},
+          },
+          "injected",
+          { enumerable: false, value: true },
+        ),
+    ],
+  ];
+
+  for (const [label, reply] of uncorrelatableReplies) {
+    it(`closes a ${label} promptly as UNSUPPORTED`, async () => {
+      const gateway = createOpfsWorkerGateway({
+        worker: respondingWorker(reply),
+        policy: { ...runtimePolicy, rpcTimeoutMs: 60_000 },
+        createRequestId: () => `request_uncorr_${label.replace(/\W/gu, "")}`,
+      });
+      // The RPC timeout is far beyond the test budget, so a pass here means the
+      // reply itself closed the request rather than the timer.
+      const result = await withTimeout(gateway.capabilities(), label);
+      expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+      expect(result.ok ? null : result.error.code).toBe("UNSUPPORTED");
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("keeps serving requests after a malformed reply", async () => {
+    let replies = 0;
+    const gateway = createOpfsWorkerGateway({
+      worker: respondingWorker((request) => {
+        replies += 1;
+        if (replies === 1) return { requestId: request.requestId };
+        return {
+          requestId: request.requestId,
+          protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+          kind: request.kind,
+          ok: false,
+          failure: { code: "QUOTA_EXCEEDED", retryable: true },
+        };
+      }),
+      policy: { ...runtimePolicy, rpcTimeoutMs: 60_000 },
+      createRequestId: () => `request_sequence_${replies}`,
+    });
+
+    const first = await withTimeout(gateway.capabilities(), "first");
+    expect(first.ok ? null : first.error.code).toBe("UNSUPPORTED");
+    const second = await withTimeout(gateway.capabilities(), "second");
+    expect(second.ok ? null : second.error.code).toBe("QUOTA_EXCEEDED");
+  });
+
   it("still admits a well-formed closed failure", async () => {
     const gateway = createOpfsWorkerGateway({
       worker: respondingWorker((request) => ({
@@ -1134,3 +1274,83 @@ describe("STO-RR-03 worker responses are decoded against closed sets", () => {
     expect(result.ok ? null : result.error.code).toBe("QUOTA_EXCEEDED");
   });
 });
+
+/**
+ * NS-05. When the runtime never came up, the message host answered with a
+ * default `CAPABILITIES` kind. The gateway saw that as an expected-kind
+ * mismatch and replaced the real cause — `BLOCKED`, `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` — with a
+ * generic `UNSUPPORTED` protocol breach, so the outage was misreported.
+ */
+describe("NS-05 a bootstrap failure answers the request it belongs to", () => {
+  function hostFor(): Readonly<{
+    host: OpfsWorkerMessageHost;
+    posted: OpfsWorkerResponse[];
+    deliver(message: unknown): void;
+  }> {
+    const listeners: ((event: MessageEvent<unknown>) => void)[] = [];
+    const posted: OpfsWorkerResponse[] = [];
+    return {
+      host: {
+        addEventListener(_type, listener) {
+          listeners.push(listener);
+        },
+        postMessage(message) {
+          posted.push(message);
+        },
+      },
+      posted,
+      deliver(message: unknown) {
+        for (const listener of listeners) {
+          listener({ data: message } as MessageEvent<unknown>);
+        }
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  const requestKinds = [
+    "CAPABILITIES",
+    "BEGIN_PUT",
+    "APPEND_CHUNK",
+    "FINISH_PUT",
+    "ABORT_PUT",
+    "VERIFY_OBJECT",
+    "READ_CHUNK",
+    "REMOVE_OBJECT",
+    "CLEANUP_TRANSACTION",
+    "FINALIZE_PUT",
+    "LIST_ORPHAN_CANDIDATES",
+    "DELETE_ORPHAN_CHUNK",
+  ] as const;
+
+  for (const kind of requestKinds) {
+    it(`preserves the ${kind} correlation when bootstrap fails`, async () => {
+      const { host, posted, deliver } = hostFor();
+      const start = startBrowserOpfsDedicatedWorker(host, {
+        storageManager: {
+          getDirectory: () =>
+            Promise.reject(
+              new DOMException("blocked", "SecurityError"),
+            ),
+        } as unknown as StorageManager,
+        crypto: globalThis.crypto,
+      });
+      // The bootstrap rejection must not escape the worker entry point either.
+      await expect(start).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+
+      deliver({
+        requestId: "request_bootstrap_failure",
+        protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        kind,
+      });
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
+
+      expect(posted).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(posted[0]).toMatchObject({
+        requestId: "request_bootstrap_failure",
+        protocolVersion: OPFS_WORKER_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        kind,
+        ok: false,
+      });
+    });
+  }
+});

tests/unit/public-response-cache.test.ts

@@ -528,6 +528,150 @@ describe("public response Cache Storage adapter", () => {
     await expect(cacheStorage.keys()).resolves.toEqual([]);
   });
 
+  /**
+   * NS-08. Handing the signal to each `Request` only asked a cooperative fetch
+   * to stop. A stream that ignored it held the mutation lock forever, and work
+   * that finished after the abort still wrote its asset and its marker.
+   */
+  it("does not wait for a non-cooperative fetch after the caller aborts", async () => {
+    const cacheStorage = new MemoryCacheStorage();
+    const policy = createDefaultPublicCachePolicy(
+      "https://assets.example.test",
+    );
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4]);
+    const asset: PublicCacheAsset = {
+      absoluteUrl: "https://assets.example.test/never-settles.js",
+      expectedByteLength: bytes.byteLength,
+      expectedContentType: "application/javascript",
+      integrity: { algorithm: "SHA-256", digestHex: await digestHex(bytes) },
+    };
+    const manifest = await manifestFor("never-settles", [asset], policy);
+    const fetchStarted = deferred<void>();
+    let locksHeld = 0;
+    const adapter = createPublicResponseCacheAdapter({
+      cacheStorage: cacheStorage as unknown as CacheStorage,
+      crypto: globalThis.crypto,
+      mutationLock: {
+        async run(signal, operation) {
+          locksHeld += 1;
+          try {
+            return await operation();
+          } finally {
+            locksHeld -= 1;
+          }
+        },
+      },
+      policy,
+      fetcher: () => {
+        fetchStarted.resolve(undefined);
+        // Ignores the signal entirely.
+        return new Promise<Response>(() => {});
+      },
+    });
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+
+    const staging = adapter.admin.stageRelease(manifest, {
+      signal: controller.signal,
+    });
+    await fetchStarted.promise;
+    controller.abort();
+
+    await expect(staging).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      error: { code: "ABORTED" },
+    });
+    expect(locksHeld).toBe(0);
+    await expect(cacheStorage.keys()).resolves.toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("writes neither asset nor marker when a digest completes after the abort", async () => {
+    const cacheStorage = new MemoryCacheStorage();
+    const policy = createDefaultPublicCachePolicy(
+      "https://assets.example.test",
+    );
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array([9, 9, 9, 9]);
+    const asset: PublicCacheAsset = {
+      absoluteUrl: "https://assets.example.test/late-digest.js",
+      expectedByteLength: bytes.byteLength,
+      expectedContentType: "application/javascript",
+      integrity: { algorithm: "SHA-256", digestHex: await digestHex(bytes) },
+    };
+    const manifest = await manifestFor("late-digest", [asset], policy);
+    const digestStarted = deferred<void>();
+    const releaseDigest = deferred<void>();
+    let delayFirstDigest = true;
+    const realCrypto = globalThis.crypto;
+    const delayedCrypto = {
+      subtle: {
+        async digest(
+          algorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,
+          data: BufferSource,
+        ): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
+          if (delayFirstDigest) {
+            delayFirstDigest = false;
+            digestStarted.resolve(undefined);
+            await releaseDigest.promise;
+          }
+          return await realCrypto.subtle.digest(algorithm, data);
+        },
+      },
+    } as unknown as Crypto;
+    let puts = 0;
+    const adapter = createPublicResponseCacheAdapter({
+      cacheStorage: new Proxy(cacheStorage, {
+        get(target, key, receiver) {
+          if (key === "open") {
+            return async (name: string) => {
+              const cache = await target.open(name);
+              return new Proxy(cache, {
+                get(cacheTarget, cacheKey, cacheReceiver) {
+                  if (cacheKey === "put") {
+                    return async (...args: readonly unknown[]) => {
+                      puts += 1;
+                      return await (
+                        cacheTarget.put as (
+                          ...values: readonly unknown[]
+                        ) => Promise<void>
+                      )(...args);
+                    };
+                  }
+                  return Reflect.get(cacheTarget, cacheKey, cacheReceiver);
+                },
+              });
+            };
+          }
+          return Reflect.get(target, key, receiver);
+        },
+      }) as unknown as CacheStorage,
+      crypto: delayedCrypto,
+      mutationLock: immediateLock,
+      policy,
+      fetcher: async () =>
+        new Response(bytes, {
+          headers: {
+            "cache-control": "public, max-age=60",
+            "content-type": "application/javascript",
+          },
+        }),
+    });
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+
+    const staging = adapter.admin.stageRelease(manifest, {
+      signal: controller.signal,
+    });
+    await digestStarted.promise;
+    controller.abort();
+    releaseDigest.resolve(undefined);
+
+    await expect(staging).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      error: { code: "ABORTED" },
+    });
+    // Neither the asset nor the activation marker may be written by work the
+    // abort already disowned.
+    expect(puts).toBe(0);
+  });
+
   it("keeps the original activation signal while waiting for the mutation lock", async () => {
     const cacheStorage = new MemoryCacheStorage();
     const policy = createDefaultPublicCachePolicy(