fix: decode resumable control-plane responses against hostile objects

TR-RR-08. Object.keys sees only enumerable own string keys, so a symbol or non-enumerable extra field passed the exactness check unseen and the property reads that followed invoked whatever accessor the sender installed — escaping the Result contract as a native rejection out of a public method. Key exactness is now checked against own property descriptors inside a catch, and each decode runs within the adapter's failure boundary so a proxy trap becomes a typed CORRUPT_DATA result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 14:17:00 +09:00
parent fb5b449031
commit 69cb7e35ca
2 changed files with 150 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -158,6 +158,111 @@ function rangeSource(bytes: Uint8Array) {
 }

 describe("resumable upload HTTP control plane", () => {
+  /**
+   * TR-RR-08. `Object.keys` sees only enumerable own string keys, so a symbol
+   * or non-enumerable extra passed unseen and a later property read invoked
+   * whatever accessor the sender installed — escaping the Result contract as a
+   * rejection of a public method.
+   */
+  it("closes every hostile control-plane object as typed CORRUPT_DATA", async () => {
+    const fingerprint: UploadFileFingerprint = Object.freeze({
+      algorithm: "SHA-256-PARTS-V1",
+      digestHex: "a".repeat(64),
+      byteLength: 4,
+      partSizeBytes: 4,
+      partCount: 1,
+    });
+    const validSession = () => ({
+      protocol: RESUMABLE_UPLOAD_PROTOCOL,
+      sessionId: "session_01",
+      requestBindingSha256: "b".repeat(64),
+      fingerprint,
+      partSizeBytes: 4,
+      partCount: 1,
+      maxConcurrency: 1,
+      expiresAtEpochMs: NOW + 10_000,
+    });
+
+    const hostile: readonly (readonly [string, () => unknown])[] = [
+      [
+        "throwing getter",
+        () => {
+          const value = validSession() as Record<string, unknown>;
+          Object.defineProperty(value, "sessionId", {
+            configurable: true,
+            enumerable: true,
+            get: () => {
+              throw new TypeError("hostile getter");
+            },
+          });
+          return value;
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "symbol key",
+        () => ({ ...validSession(), [Symbol("injected")]: "leak" }),
+      ],
+      [
+        "non-enumerable extra",
+        () => {
+          const value = validSession() as Record<string, unknown>;
+          Object.defineProperty(value, "signedUrl", {
+            configurable: true,
+            enumerable: false,
+            value: "https://objects.example/secret?signature=leak",
+          });
+          return value;
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "ownKeys trap",
+        () =>
+          new Proxy(validSession() as Record<string, unknown>, {
+            ownKeys() {
+              throw new TypeError("hostile ownKeys");
+            },
+          }),
+      ],
+      [
+        "getOwnPropertyDescriptor trap",
+        () =>
+          new Proxy(validSession() as Record<string, unknown>, {
+            getOwnPropertyDescriptor() {
+              throw new TypeError("hostile descriptor");
+            },
+          }),
+      ],
+    ];
+
+    for (const [label, build] of hostile) {
+      const control = createResumableUploadHttpControlPlane({
+        transport: {
+          async execute() {
+            return browserDataSuccess(build());
+          },
+        },
+        partCapabilities: { issueUploadPart: vi.fn() },
+      });
+      const result = await control.createSession({
+        protocol: RESUMABLE_UPLOAD_PROTOCOL,
+        uploadKey: "upload_key_strict",
+        purpose: "attachment",
+        mediaType: "application/octet-stream",
+        requestBindingSha256: "b".repeat(64),
+        fingerprint,
+        requestedPartSizeBytes: 4,
+        requestedMaxConcurrency: 1,
+        idempotencyKey: "upload-create-idempotency-01",
+        signal: activeSignal,
+      });
+      expect(result, label).toMatchObject({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: "CORRUPT_DATA", operation: "UPLOAD_SESSION" },
+      });
+      expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain("signature=leak");
+    }
+  });
+
  it("rejects unknown response fields so URLs cannot cross the DTO boundary", async () => {
    const fingerprint: UploadFileFingerprint = Object.freeze({
      algorithm: "SHA-256-PARTS-V1",