fix(browser-transfer): report oversized uploads as LIMIT_EXCEEDED (R-1.4)

snapshotRequest() threw a TypeError when the source exceeded maxFileBytes
or maxPartCount, and upload() mapped every snapshot error to INVALID_INPUT.
The LIMIT_EXCEEDED branch in executeUpload() re-checked the same policy
and could never run, so a 6 GB file was reported as invalid input.

snapshotRequest() now validates only request shape; executeUpload() owns
the size check and returns LIMIT_EXCEEDED before any control-plane call.

Verified: RED "reports a source over maxFileBytes as LIMIT_EXCEEDED"
(tests/unit/resumable-upload-runtime.test.ts) received INVALID_INPUT before
the fix and passes after. A valid policy already bounds the part count by
maxFileBytes, so the maxPartCount branch is covered by the same check.
Gates: check:architecture, check:types:app, check:types:test, lint,
test:component pass; test:unit passes except removal-fixture.test.ts, which
needs untracked artifacts/release/* absent from a fresh worktree (unrelated).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DongHyeonka
2026-09-24 11:57:58 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 3f2cd87f6f
commit 961f124ecd
2 changed files with 32 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ export function createResumableUploadRuntime<Capability>(
}
let request: UploadRequestSnapshot;
try {
request = snapshotRequest(input, dependencies.policy);
request = snapshotRequest(input);
} catch {
return browserDataFailure("INVALID_INPUT", "UPLOAD_SESSION");
}
@@ -1742,7 +1742,6 @@ function quarantinedOutcome(
function snapshotRequest(
input: ResumableUploadRequest,
policy: ResumableUploadRuntimePolicy,
): UploadRequestSnapshot {
if (
!input ||
@@ -1759,14 +1758,8 @@ function snapshotRequest(
) {
throw new TypeError("Upload request is invalid.");
}
// R-1.4. Size limits are checked by executeUpload as LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
const source = snapshotUploadSource(input.source);
if (
source.byteLength > policy.maxFileBytes ||
Math.ceil(source.byteLength / policy.partSizeBytes) >
policy.maxPartCount
) {
throw new TypeError("Upload request exceeds policy.");
}
return Object.freeze({
uploadKey: input.uploadKey,
purpose: input.purpose,
@@ -215,6 +215,36 @@ describe("production resumable upload runtime", () => {
});
});
// R-1.4. The size check used to throw inside request validation and surface
// as INVALID_INPUT; a file over the policy limit is LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
it("reports a source over maxFileBytes as LIMIT_EXCEEDED", async () => {
const harness = createControlHarness();
const createSession = vi.spyOn(harness.control, "createSession");
const runtime = createResumableUploadRuntime({
controlPlane: harness.control,
partExecutor: executorFor(harness),
checkpoints: new MemoryCheckpointStore(),
mutationLock: noContentionLock,
crypto,
// A valid policy already bounds the part count by maxFileBytes.
policy: runtimePolicy({ maxFileBytes: 4 }),
now: () => 1_000,
sleep: async () => {},
});
const result = await runtime.upload({
uploadKey: "upload_key_too_large",
purpose: "attachment",
mediaType: "application/octet-stream",
source: byteStreamSource(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5])),
signal: activeSignal,
});
expect(result).toMatchObject({
ok: false,
error: { code: "LIMIT_EXCEEDED" },
});
expect(createSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("fails closed when server list-parts disagrees with the current source manifest", async () => {
const checkpoints = new MemoryCheckpointStore();
const harness = createControlHarness({