Production admission only knew IPv4 private ranges and `localhost`, so
`[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[fd00::1]`, `[fe80::1]`, `100.64.0.1`,
`0.1.2.3`, `api.internal`, `printer.local` and a trailing-dot
`localhost.` were all admitted as public API endpoints.
isNonPublicHost now also refuses 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT),
IPv6 unique-local (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), every IPv4-mapped
address (::ffff:0:0/96), and `.local` / `.internal` names, after
stripping one trailing dot. URL.hostname already canonicalises the
literals, so no separate IP parser is needed.
The loopback list that allows plain http (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`,
`[::1]`) now lives once in deployment-admission.ts
(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES / isLoopbackHostname); rest-profiles.ts and
browser-rpc.ts use it instead of their own copies (same list, no
behavior change there).
Verified: new cases in tests/unit/deployment-admission.test.ts; a probe
showed 13 of the 14 forms admitted before and all refused after, while
2001:db8::1, fec0::1, 100.63/100.128 and *.example.com names stay
admitted. Gates green except the known removal-fixture test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six modules each had their own exact-key check. Several validated the
caller's object and then copied it again, so an accessor, an own
Symbol.iterator or a non-enumerable key could make the checked value
differ from the installed one (e.g. a TEMPLATE_FIXTURE contribution
passed the events.length === 0 check and still installed an event
through its iterator; a realtime limit getter installed 999,999,999).
exact-snapshot.ts now owns the single reader (decodeExactObject /
decodeOwnDataRecord report a reason; snapshotExactObject,
snapshotOwnDataRecord and exactOwnDataSnapshot are thin forms of it;
read-only-registry.ts re-exports exactOwnDataSnapshot). Contract
composition, browser RPC install, realtime registry, cache invalidation
wire decode, static asset manifest decode and REST auth profile install
validate that snapshot, and copy arrays by index (snapshotExactArray).
Behavior: accessors, non-enumerable keys and custom prototypes are now
rejected in all of these; a throwing reflection trap during contract
composition is a ContractContributionError instead of a native error.
Verified: new tests/unit/contract-snapshot-bypass.test.ts (10 cases,
all RED before), gates green except the known removal-fixture test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A server stream's registration was pruned on any settled close receipt.
`waitClosed()` rejecting, throwing synchronously, or not returning a
promise at all was absorbed into a fulfilled `undefined`, so the runtime
opened a second physical stream for the same operation while the first was
still running against the server. Only a fulfilled, contract-shaped
receipt confirms closure now; every negative receipt keeps the operation
DRAINING.
Cleanup also read foreign state outside the result boundary. A throwing
iterator `return` accessor replaced the already selected timeout with a
native `TypeError` and skipped the rest of the teardown, and the exported
lease decoder threw on a hostile `Symbol.asyncIterator`. Both reads move
inside their own boundaries, and the positive-close subscription is
installed before any fallible cleanup.
Composition validated the caller's registries before snapshotting them, so
a hostile accessor ran twice during validation, and rows hiding fields
behind a prototype or a non-enumerable key installed. Transport results
were checked for allowed own keys only, so own `{ok,message,encodedBytes}`
plus a prototype `injected` was a success and a missing `message` reached
a permissive schema as `undefined`.
In Realtime the tracked task was registered after the collaborator
returned. An authority that re-entered `close()` from inside its own
invocation saw an empty registry and got `{ok:true}` while its effect was
pending. The task is now registered first and the collaborator is invoked
a microtask later. A `scheduleTimeout` that threw was worse: the caller's
own catch treated it as an apply failure and started a recovery beside the
still-running effect, and `close()` rejected with a native `TypeError`. An
uninstallable deadline now fails closed as an expired one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RPC-RR-02. The server-stream path captured the generation fence outside its
protected boundary and raceWithin invoked clock.sleep outside a promise
boundary, so a synchronous throw from either escaped the Result contract and
skipped the listener and timer release. Both now run inside the boundary, and
release moved to finally.
RPC-RR-03. The runtime snapshotted its transports only after validating the
caller's raw objects, which ran their accessors first. It now decodes the
registry from own data descriptors before anything reads it — refusing an
accessor without invoking it and rejecting extra, inherited and symbol-keyed
fields — and validates that snapshot. Every installed binding registry is a
read facade over a private store instead of a frozen Map whose set, delete and
clear still worked.
RPC-RR-04. Transport results and stream frames are decoded per union variant
from own data descriptors into new frozen values. A throwing getter, an
inherited or extra field, a symbol key, an unknown failure code and an
out-of-range retryAfterMs all close as protocol failures instead of escaping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
R-04: install the RPC contract bindings as exact immutable snapshots. Registry
and row data are copied from own data descriptors into frozen null-prototype
maps before validation, so a getter is never invoked, extra and symbol keys and
malformed descriptors are composition-time TypeErrors, and the runtime reads
only the snapshot. A post-validation mutation can no longer change replay
policy, deadlines, byte ceilings or transport selection.
R-01: bound transport stream cleanup. The generation is fenced and listeners
released immediately, and iterator.return() is awaited only within a cleanup
bound, so a non-cooperative iterator cannot keep the application generator, its
listeners or the total deadline alive. Unresolved cleanup stays observed.
R-05: reject oversized WebSocket text frames before allocating an encoded copy
and count UTF-8 bytes incrementally with an early exit, matching TextEncoder for
surrogate pairs and lone surrogates.
R-06: canonicalise clock and generation-fence failures into the closed Result
taxonomy instead of letting them escape as native rejections, with listener and
timer cleanup on every exit path.
Browser RPC remains AVAILABLE_NOT_COMPOSED; R-07 transport evidence is still
required before composition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>