Promotion needs two offline signing providers and a bwrap/systemd/cgroup v2 runner that this repository never ran end to end, and no document said what a project without them gets or how to rotate or revoke a provider key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
362 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
362 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
# Build and supply-chain gate
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## Local blocking controls
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- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` and a real manifest/lock
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mismatch fixture; contract loading applies the root-only graph and lifecycle
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policy to every registered command before the gate runner can spawn one, and
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rejects nested installs without effective `--ignore-scripts`; npm script
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traversal includes existing pre/post hooks unless an ordered bare or explicit
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true `--ignore-scripts` suppresses them. Workspace/prefix and indirect
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user/global config authority are rejected in npm options, direct or dynamic
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assignments, exact `command`/`exec`/`env` prefix chains, cross-segment shell
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state, and the inherited runner environment. Unknown or cwd-changing `env`
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options and unquoted pre-delimiter pathname expansion fail closed, while the
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explicitly modeled non-scope `env` options remain usable
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- all direct and transitive lockfile rows with package SHA-512 integrity
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- production/development, direct/transitive and platform-optional classification
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- package-manifest license allow/deny policy
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- approved inventory baseline digest and actual add/remove/change/upgrade diff
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- independent review for new direct production dependencies
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- CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM and inventory component/edge coherence
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- source/lock/SBOM/dist-linked local provenance statement
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- source, opt-in recipes, scripts, tests, tracked config/schema, public, built asset and generated
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release metadata secret scan
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- two-build `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` reproducibility check
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The canonical commands are:
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```bash
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corepack pnpm verify:lockfile
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corepack pnpm verify:reproducible-build
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corepack pnpm build:release-candidate
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corepack pnpm verify:local-evidence
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corepack pnpm check:supply-chain:fixtures
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```
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`config/security/dependency-baseline.json` is the approved local baseline.
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Changing it requires `DEPENDENCY_BASELINE_OWNER` and
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`DEPENDENCY_BASELINE_REASON`; editing the digest or hardcoding an empty diff is
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rejected.
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## 무엇을 증명하고 무엇을 증명하지 않는가
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리뷰 13-12. 산출물마다 증명 범위가 다르다. 아래 "증명하지 못하는 것"을 증명된
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것으로 읽지 않는다.
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| 산출물 | 증명하는 것 | 증명하지 못하는 것 |
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| SBOM(`artifacts/release/sbom.cdx.json`) | lockfile에 고정된 설치 그래프(`pnpm list --depth Infinity`, `scripts/generate-supply-chain.ts`)와 각 패키지의 sha512 integrity, license | 배포물에 실제로 들어간 부분 집합, 취약점 없음 |
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| 번들 패키지 목록(`artifacts/quality/vite-module-inventory.json`의 `packages`) | 배포 번들에 모듈이 하나 이상 들어간 패키지의 `name@version`. Vite가 번들에 넣은 모듈에서 바로 만든다(`scripts/lib/vite-module-inventory.ts`) | 패키지 안의 어떤 코드가 실행되는지, 취약점 없음 |
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| local provenance(`artifacts/release/provenance.json`) | dist digest, lockfile, source set, SBOM digest가 서로 맞음 | 빌드 과정이 변조되지 않았음, 빌드한 주체. 서명이 없는 자기 보고다(`builder.id`가 `local:`, `invocationId`가 `LOCAL_UNSIGNED`). `predicateType`이 SLSA provenance v1이어도 SLSA 수준을 뜻하지 않는다 |
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| 외부 provenance 서명 | 지정 키 보유자가 이 run, source revision, 후보 digest를 보고 서명함 | 빌드 job 자체의 격리, provider가 성실히 검사했음 |
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| 외부 vulnerability 서명 | provider가 이 lockfile·dist에 대해 결과를 주장함 | 오프라인 DB의 최신성, 누락 없음 |
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번들 패키지 목록은 SBOM의 production 항목에 모두 들어 있어야 한다. 2026-09-25
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기준으로 한 건이 어긋난다. `scheduler@0.27.0`은 `react-dom`의 의존성이라 번들에
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들어가지만, SBOM과 `config/security/dependency-baseline.json`은 이것을
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`development`로 분류한다. `pnpm list` JSON이 production 트리 아래에서 이 패키지를
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다시 보여 주지 않고, 그래서 `scripts/lib/supply-chain.ts`의 순회가 development
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경로에서만 이것을 만난다. 분류를 고치면 dependency baseline을 다시 승인해야 하므로
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(`update:dependency-baseline`) 이 문서에 알려진 차이로 남긴다.
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## 최소 구성과 전체 구성
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리뷰 13-13. 승격 단계까지 쓰려면 이 문서 아래의 runner 조건(bwrap, prlimit,
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systemd-run, systemd user manager 254 이상, cgroup v2 위임)과 오프라인 데이터로
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Ed25519 서명 보고서를 내는 provider 두 개가 필요하다. 이 repo는 그 환경에서
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workflow 전체를 한 번도 돌리지 않았다. 그래서 두 구성을 나눠 적는다.
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| 구성 | 켜는 것 | 보장하는 것 | 보장하지 않는 것 |
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| 최소 구성(provider 없음) | merge·release stage 게이트, `immutable_build`(FE-GATE-015·027). provider 변수는 비워 둔다 | lockfile 무결성과 설치 스크립트 차단, SBOM과 local provenance의 digest 정합, secret scan, 재현 빌드, 후보 archive의 exact member와 digest, release 대상 환경 승인(FE-GATE-027) | 외부 취약점 검사, 서명된 provenance. provider job은 명령과 키가 없어 실패하고, `promotion` job은 두 provider job의 성공을 요구하므로 돌지 않는다. 승격은 사람이 결정한다 |
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| 전체 구성 | 위 전부와 `vulnerability_provider`·`provenance_provider`·`promotion` job, 아래 runner 조건과 provider 키 | 위 전부와, 지정 키 보유자가 이 후보 digest·run·source에 서명했다는 것, 승격된 exact-five bundle(`verify:promotion`) | provider가 성실히 검사했는지, 빌드 job 격리(위 "무엇을 증명하고" 표 참고) |
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최소 구성으로 운영할 때 승격은 수동 승인이다. 승인자는 `immutable_build`가
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올린 후보 archive의 SHA-256(job output `archive_sha256`)과 local evidence를
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기록하고, 그 archive를 그대로 배포한다. 다시 빌드하지 않는다. `production_gate`는
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`promotion` 뒤에만 돌므로 이 구성의 workflow에서는 실행되지 않는다. 운영
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게이트(FE-GATE-019, 021~025)는 배포한 release를 대상으로
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`corepack pnpm ci:gate -- FE-GATE-0xx`로 따로 돌려 기록한다.
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### provider 신뢰 키 교체와 폐기
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신뢰 키는 repo 변수 `VULNERABILITY_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`·`VULNERABILITY_KEY_ID`,
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`PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`·`PROVENANCE_KEY_ID`가 가리키는 공개 키 파일이다
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(`scripts/lib/provider-trust.ts`). 두 provider는 서로 다른 키를 써야 한다
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(`assertDistinctProviderTrust`). 승격 기록은 키 ID·지문과 trust policy
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SHA-256을 남긴다.
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교체 순서:
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1. provider가 새 키 쌍을 만들고 공개 키만 넘긴다.
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2. 새 공개 키 파일을 runner가 읽을 수 있는 경로에 두고, 두 변수를 새 경로와 새
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key ID로 한꺼번에 바꾼다. 키 ID는 새 값을 쓴다. 이전 ID를 재사용하면 기록만
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보고 어느 키였는지 구분할 수 없다.
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3. provider 쪽 서명 키를 새 키로 바꾼 뒤 release를 한 번 돌려 `promotion`이
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통과하는지 확인한다.
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4. 이전 공개 키 파일은 지우지 않고 보관한다. 이전 키로 승격된 release를 나중에
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배포하거나 그 release로 롤백할 때 `verify:promotion -- --archived`가 그 키를
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요구한다(`docs/operations/release-cache-rollback.md`).
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폐기 순서(키 유출 등):
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1. 해당 변수에서 그 키를 즉시 뺀다. 그 키로 서명된 새 승격은 이때부터 실패한다.
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2. 보관 중인 이전 공개 키 파일도 지운다. 그 키로만 서명된 과거 release는
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`verify:promotion -- --archived`를 통과하지 못한다.
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3. 그런 release를 다시 써야 하면 새 키로 provider 검증을 다시 받는다. 같은 후보
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archive를 대상으로 한 새 provider 실행이 필요하고, 다시 빌드하지 않는다. 이
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repo에는 이 재검증 전용 job이 없다. 필요한 프로젝트가 만든다.
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## External promotion controls
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Promotion reads the provider files named by `VULNERABILITY_REPORT_PATH` and
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`PROVENANCE_ATTESTATION_PATH`. The vulnerability report must bind both the
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exact lockfile digest and candidate `distSha256`; the provenance attestation
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must name `dist` with that same digest. Both documents use strict schemas and
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Ed25519 signatures verified with separately configured trusted public keys and
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key IDs (`VULNERABILITY_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`, `VULNERABILITY_KEY_ID`,
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`PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`, and `PROVENANCE_KEY_ID`). Keys of another curve,
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including Ed448, are rejected even if a document labels its algorithm
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`Ed25519`. The two roles must use different key IDs and different canonical
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DER-SPKI key bytes; giving the same key two IDs is rejected.
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`immutable_build` archives the raw `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `dist` (including hidden
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`.vite` files), the build manifest, module inventory, release verification,
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secret-scan result, and local supply-chain evidence once. The candidate
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manifest hashes the raw lockfile bytes and requires that digest to equal the
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dependency inventory's `lockfileSha256`. Before upload, the producer validates
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the manifest-bound exact archive member set and every member digest, then
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publishes the archive SHA-256 as an immutable job output. The two provider jobs
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download this same archive separately, compare that output digest, validate the
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exact member set before extracting only into isolated roots, and receive
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`CANDIDATE_LOCKFILE_PATH` and `CANDIDATE_DIST_SHA256`; configured
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`VULNERABILITY_PROVIDER_COMMAND` and `PROVENANCE_PROVIDER_COMMAND` must emit the
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signed reports. After each external command returns, provider upload validation
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rechecks the unchanged archive and extracted candidate, parses the provider JSON
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with its strict schema, and binds its dist and lockfile digests before upload.
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If either provider input is absent, local verification remains meaningful but
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`artifacts/security/supply-chain-verification.json` records
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`promotionStatus: FAIL_UNVERIFIED`. The finalizer and downstream
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`verify:promotion` exact-five validator then exit non-zero. Promotion derives
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the candidate file set and digests only from the captured tar bytes, then
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read-only revalidates archived executable schemas, archived policy/verifier
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source bytes, raw lockfile, module inventory, build outputs, release coherence,
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SBOM, provenance and supply-chain coherence. Candidate-internal checks are
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recomputed; for the checkout-dependent secret scan, promotion independently
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checks the archived policy, exact rule set, strict SARIF, zero findings and all
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manifest/assessment digest bindings. It does not claim to rescan source bytes
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that are not candidate members. It never rebuilds or rewrites candidate
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evidence and never falls back to the checkout tree.
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Promotion uploads the already verified archive itself with the two provider
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reports and generated verification records; it does not create a replacement
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archive from extracted files. Scanner or signing outages are not converted to
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an empty PASS.
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The generated workflow is also a supply-chain control. `config/ci/gates.json`
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is its sole typed authority. Run `corepack pnpm generate:ci-workflow` after a
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contract change and `corepack pnpm check:ci-workflow` (or the encompassing
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`corepack pnpm check:ci`) to reject byte drift in the checked-in Gitea adapter.
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Action resolution is separately closed over one typed, runtime-frozen registry
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in `scripts/contracts/ci-gates.ts`. Every generated `uses:` value is an absolute
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upstream URL pinned to a full commit SHA:
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- `https://github.com/actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5`
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(`v4.3.1`)
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- `https://github.com/actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020`
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(`v4.4.0`)
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- `https://github.com/ChristopherHX/gitea-upload-artifact@81f940d004763f986ba3582c007fd842dd5cb0d7`
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(patched `v4` branch)
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- `https://github.com/ChristopherHX/gitea-download-artifact@75635f32b4c1c41c4b3d64e8f85210112ed4c9c7`
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(patched `v4` branch)
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Unknown actions, relative repositories, tags/branches and short SHAs are
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rejected. Gitea 1.22's official Actions documentation recommends the
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`ChristopherHX` patched artifact forks for v4 compatibility; the supported
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deployment baseline is nevertheless Gitea 1.26.4+ with Gitea Runner 1.0.0+.
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A real end-to-end provider smoke on the staging Gitea instance remains
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mandatory before any generated job becomes a required check.
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External provider supervision is fail-closed and requires a Linux runner with
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executable `/usr/bin/bwrap`, `/usr/bin/prlimit`, `/usr/bin/systemd-run`, and
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`/usr/bin/systemctl`, bubblewrap support for `--size`, an active user bus, a
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systemd user manager version 254 or newer, unified cgroup v2, and delegated
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memory, pids, and CPU controllers. Executable access, user-manager/version,
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trust, archive, and path failures are rejected before raw creation. Bubblewrap
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`--size` acceptance and effective delegated controller values can only be
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verified after the owned raw inode exists inside a new scope; failures there
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remove that inode by identity and fail closed. Each invocation runs in a unique collected user scope and verifies
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its effective cgroup membership and limits before bubblewrap starts: memory is
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exactly 1 GiB, swap is zero, `TasksMax` is 64, and CPU quota is 100% per 100 ms.
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The inner process also has zero core size, a 8,388,607-byte file-size limit,
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64 open files and at most 1,200 CPU seconds. `TasksMax=64` is the authoritative
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aggregate PID boundary; no per-provider `RLIMIT_NPROC=32` claim is made because
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that limit is counted across the runner's same-UID process population.
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Bubblewrap uses a private network namespace (`--unshare-net`), mounts the
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workspace and verified candidate read-only, hides `.git`, and read-only binds
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the trusted `process.execPath` at `/tmp/node`. The supervisor creates and pins
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the exact configured raw-report inode only after sandbox/trust/archive
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preflight; that inode is the only provider evidence path mounted read-write.
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The provider cannot write the surrounding `untrusted` directory, workspace,
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candidate, host home/toolcache, sealed evidence path, or general temporary
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filesystem. Pre-execution and provider failures remove only the supervisor-
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owned raw inode so the same job can retry without a stale empty report.
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The complete bwrap argument/environment vector, including the provider command
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and provider-prefixed environment, is carried in a bounded length-prefixed frame over
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`systemd-run` stdin rather
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than placed in the supervisor, systemd, or bwrap wrapper argv. This prevents
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credentials from entering unit metadata and wrapper command lines. The final
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provider executable and its ordinary arguments remain visible to same-UID
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process inspection, so commands must never contain tokens or secrets. The same
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stdin remains open as a parent-liveness channel until normal provider exit; EOF
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caused by supervisor death makes the in-scope wrapper kill the provider process
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group and remove only the dev/inode-matched raw report. Supply
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credentials only through the provider-kind prefix
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(`VULNERABILITY_PROVIDER_*` or `PROVENANCE_PROVIDER_*`, excluding `*_COMMAND`).
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A separate trusted guardian starts outside the provider scope and owns the
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filesystem transaction. Before spawn, the client opens and identity-checks the
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canonical raw and evidence directories with `O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW`, derives
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the exact canonical and nonce-private leaves, and exclusively allocates empty
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mode-`0600` raw-staging and sealed-temp files. It records both dev/inode pairs
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before spawn and inherits the directory descriptors as guardian fd 3/fd 4 and
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the private file descriptors as fd 5/fd 6. Its argv contains only the trusted
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Node and helper paths. A bounded canonical v2 request carries only provider
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kind, an absolute deadline, and a random 32-byte control nonce.
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At bootstrap the guardian fstats fd 5/fd 6 before reading their procfs links.
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Each procfs target is accepted only as a direct-child alias whose exact grammar,
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descriptor-relative lstat, type, mode, size, link count, and dev/inode match the
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already-recorded descriptor identity. The guardian publishes raw staging to the
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fixed raw leaf with a no-overwrite hard link, verifies both aliases at link
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count two, removes the private raw alias, syncs the raw directory, and verifies
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the canonical raw alias at link count one before authenticated READY. If startup
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ends before READY is accepted, the client cleans raw staging/canonical only when
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they match its pre-spawn raw identity and sealed temp/final only when they match
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its pre-spawn sealed identity. It never derives cleanup ownership by opening a
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current canonical pathname, so an external file or a concurrent same-kind
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winner is preserved. Provider execution starts only after the supervisor
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confirms that the returned identities and canonical targets match exactly.
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After evidence validation, the supervisor writes schema-validated bytes to the
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pinned temp inode, changes it to `0400`, fsyncs it, and sends authenticated
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size/hash/identity metadata. The guardian verifies the held descriptor and
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pathname, publishes without replacement using same-directory `link`, removes
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the temp name, fsyncs the directory, and returns authenticated PUBLISHED. Only
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after successful `GITHUB_OUTPUT` append does the supervisor send commit. Commit
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removes the raw inode and enters `commitPending`; clean control EOF is the sole
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success terminal and preserves the sealed final. EOF without that terminal,
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deadline expiry, malformed/trailing control data, a wrong nonce, or premature
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guardian exit cleans every matching raw/temp/final identity and fails closed.
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Guardian loss while the provider scope is active also triggers whole-scope kill
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and collection.
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`GITHUB_OUTPUT` is assumed to be a runner-owned regular file. This protocol
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does not claim OS-level cancellation of sealing or output I/O. If the guardian
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exits after scope collection, the scope-active latch records the lifecycle error
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without starting a late kill. Publication or terminal commit observes the
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nonzero exit and the client removes every identity-pinned raw/temp/final
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fallback before failing closed. The lease is bounded by the 30-minute provider
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wall limit plus a fixed ten-minute post-processing allowance.
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A client hard stop after private allocation but before guardian spawn can leave
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only empty mode-`0600` nonce-private leaves. Automatic sweeping is intentionally
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omitted because an unrecorded pathname does not prove ownership; these private
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leaves cannot occupy the fixed raw or final names and do not block a retry.
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Provider stdout and stderr are untrusted secret-bearing bytes. The supervisor
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does not retain or forward them to CI logs; it counts them only to enforce one
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1 MiB aggregate limit. Guardian diagnostics are best effort, so closed stderr
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or control descriptors cannot bypass cleanup or the required nonzero exit. The
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|
provider wall-clock limit is 30 minutes. Wall timeout, output overflow, parent-liveness loss,
|
|
and active-scope guardian loss explicitly SIGKILL the whole provider process group. Ordinary command and
|
|
RLIMIT failures complete through systemd with their concrete exit/signal; every
|
|
path still waits for wrapper closure and requires the systemd unit/cgroup to be
|
|
collected before returning. Provider adapters must therefore operate entirely from pre-populated
|
|
offline data, consume the supplied candidate bindings, and write exactly the
|
|
pinned report inode. Missing prerequisites, cgroup drift, stale or misplaced
|
|
outputs, post-command candidate drift, and residual scope cleanup all stop
|
|
publication.
|
|
|
|
Provider documents are strict schema v2. Their Ed25519 signature covers the
|
|
supervisor-supplied evidence type, validity window, run ID/attempt, independent
|
|
32-byte invocation nonce, archived source identity, and all four candidate
|
|
digests. Each provider job exposes its supervisor-generated nonce as a job
|
|
output; promotion treats those outputs as the independent expected values and
|
|
never lets a report define its own expected nonce. A report from another
|
|
attempt, source, archive, nonce, or key fingerprint is fail-closed even when it
|
|
has been correctly re-signed.
|
|
|
|
The immutable archive contains a strict producer-local assessment plus the
|
|
policy and verifier source bytes needed to validate its archived relationships.
|
|
Promotion recomputes candidate-internal checks and validates the captured
|
|
secret-scan policy/rules/SARIF/digest relationships from an isolated extraction
|
|
root; it does not reopen checkout policy or source paths or claim to rescan
|
|
unarchived checkout source. The finalizer captures the archive,
|
|
both reports, and both public keys once, generates both verification v3 records
|
|
in memory, and writes exactly five mode-`0400` files beneath a random
|
|
mode-`0700` directory in `RUNNER_TEMP`, independently of a restrictive runner
|
|
umask. The exact five are the captured archive, captured vulnerability report,
|
|
captured provenance attestation, generated provider-verification v3, and
|
|
generated promotion-verification v3. Before returning, the finalizer validates
|
|
those exact bytes again with live-time provider signature/freshness checks. The
|
|
promotion record binds the exact provider-record hash, local-assessment hash,
|
|
both report hashes, run/source/candidate identities, both nonces, both key
|
|
IDs/fingerprints, canonical trust-policy hash, and the vulnerability provider's
|
|
signed `secretScanAttestation`. That strict attestation says `PASS` and binds
|
|
the captured local-assessment, source-set, secret-scan policy, SARIF, and actual
|
|
scan-input digests. The supervisor derives the expected tuple from the captured
|
|
archive and exact equality is rechecked at upload and finalization. The trusted
|
|
vulnerability provider remains responsible for independently scanning that
|
|
source set and refusing to sign a forged empty SARIF or incomplete scan input;
|
|
the signature proves the provider made the claim, not that an untrusted
|
|
provider performed the scan honestly. It never creates or reuses
|
|
`.release/promoted-staging`.
|
|
|
|
The final promotion verification/staging step must be immediately adjacent to
|
|
the promoted-release upload, and that upload must not use `always()`. This
|
|
reduces the post-verification mutation window but does not seal a pathname
|
|
across two action steps. The runner is therefore required to be trusted,
|
|
exclusive and single-tenant, with no provider command or other same-UID process
|
|
surviving from staging into the immediately following upload. The artifact
|
|
service and transfer actions also remain outside the candidate's cryptographic
|
|
identity: every downstream consumer must revalidate the downloaded archive,
|
|
manifest member digests and signed provider evidence. Producer-side adjacency
|
|
does not provide consumer-side digest revalidation.
|
|
The promotion job has no job-level `if`: ordinary `needs` success semantics
|
|
require immutable build and both provider jobs to succeed, and cancellation is
|
|
not overridden with `always()` or `cancelled()`. Cleanup alone uses bare `always()`
|
|
and is guarded by all six finalizer outputs: staging path, token, parent
|
|
device/inode, and staging-leaf device/inode. Cleanup opens the pinned leaf,
|
|
requires the exact five names, unlinks only those known files through the
|
|
descriptor, and uses a non-recursive `rmdir`; an exchanged directory or canary
|
|
is never recursively removed.
|
|
The immediately following upload action still reopens pathnames. The
|
|
descriptor-relative staging and cleanup code does not claim an atomic
|
|
`renameat2` handoff or close a malicious same-UID Gitea upload adapter; the
|
|
staging Gitea smoke/native platform adapter remains the required closure for
|
|
that boundary. That smoke must exercise exact-five upload and download plus
|
|
cleanup on success, validation failure, upload failure, and cancellation. No
|
|
native uploader or `renameat2` guarantee exists in this repository today.
|
|
Portable Node also cannot make `mkdir` plus the first pathname `lstat` atomic.
|
|
The implementation compares the immediate post-`mkdir` identity with the
|
|
subsequent `O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW` descriptor before changing permissions, but
|
|
a malicious same-UID actor that wins before that first `lstat` remains part of
|
|
the native/privilege boundary. The private `0700` runner-temp ancestor and
|
|
single-tenant runner requirement are therefore security controls, not merely
|
|
hardening.
|
|
Failure cleanup is armed only after that created device/inode matches the opened
|
|
descriptor. If the opened descriptor is a replacement, it is closed without
|
|
unlinking or removing anything; the visible replacement is likewise untouched.
|
|
Portable Node cannot safely rediscover an attacker-moved original directory by
|
|
scanning the parent, so that residual must be removed by the isolated test
|
|
fixture or trusted runner/native cleanup after the attacker is excluded.
|
|
|
|
Approved vulnerability exceptions require vulnerability/package identity,
|
|
owner, a different reviewer, reason and expiry. Expired or self-approved
|
|
exceptions are blocking.
|