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clean-architecture-frontend…/docs/operations/release-cache-rollback.md
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DongHyeonkaandClaude Opus 5.5 839205c134 feat(release): re-verify a promoted release in archived mode (13-04)
Provider evidence expires two hours after issue, so no repo tool could
re-verify a release before deploying it later or rolling back to it.
verify:promotion --archived keeps every signature, digest and member check and
judges freshness at the recorded promotion time; the FE-RB-005 drill takes the
extracted release with --release-root.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 22:58:37 +09:00

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# Release, cache, and rollback contract
Each deployment is an immutable `releases/<releaseId>/` artifact set. The
provider adapter must upload assets, release manifest, runtime config, and
verify asset reachability before atomically switching the active HTML pointer.
The post-switch boot, route, API, telemetry, and reload-loop smoke checks close
the deployment.
Rollback selects a prior release tuple, confirms its assets and runtime/API
compatibility, atomically switches the complete set, performs the provider
cache action, and repeats the smoke checks. Rebuilding an old commit, replacing
HTML alone, or declaring recovery from cache-purge completion is prohibited.
Recovery is established by old/new reachability probes.
Before deploying a promoted release later, or rolling back to one, re-verify
its promoted bundle (the five files uploaded by the `promotion` job) with the
archived mode (review 13-04). Provider evidence expires two hours after issue,
so the normal mode refuses any release promoted before that. The archived mode
still checks signatures, digests and the exact five members, and judges
freshness at the release's recorded promotion time
(`promotion-verification.json` `verifiedAt`, which may not lie in the future).
New promotion never uses it (`scripts/lib/exact-promotion-bundle.ts`).
```bash
VULNERABILITY_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=... VULNERABILITY_KEY_ID=... \
PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH=... PROVENANCE_KEY_ID=... \
EXPECTED_PROMOTION_RUN_ID=<run id> EXPECTED_PROMOTION_RUN_ATTEMPT=<attempt> \
EXPECTED_PROMOTION_SOURCE_REVISION=<commit> \
EXPECTED_PROMOTION_ARCHIVE_SHA256=<archive sha256> \
corepack pnpm verify:promotion -- --root <promoted bundle directory> --archived
mkdir <release dir> && tar -xzf <promoted bundle directory>/release-candidate.tar.gz -C <release dir>
corepack pnpm drill:runbook -- FE-RB-005 --release-root <release dir>
```
The expected values come from the release record, not from the bundle. The
drill then checks that release's build/config/manifest tuple and its assets,
not the local build. It ends `UNVERIFIED` until the provider switch and smoke
are recorded, because those happen outside this repository.
The provider-independent cache defaults are:
- hashed assets: `public, max-age=31536000, immutable`
- HTML: `no-cache`
- runtime config and release manifest: `no-store`
- public source maps: disabled
- service worker/offline cache: disabled, unless the static selection in
`src/features/installed-runtime-capabilities.ts` is `ACTIVE`; then `dist`
holds exactly the selected `service-worker.js`
HTML, JSON config/manifest, and hashed JavaScript MIME types are also compared
to the declared allowlist; a cache-correct response with a mismatched
`Content-Type` still fails the hosting gate.
`corepack pnpm verify:hosting-headers` uses a deterministic fixture locally.
Set `HOSTING_BASE_URL` to probe deployed responses; production promotion
requires the artifact to report `mode: "live"`. The live target must be its
canonical, non-loopback HTTPS root URL. Each required surface must return HTTP
200 without leaving that origin before its cache, content-type, and security
headers can count as deployment evidence.