Five simultaneous refreshes with one token return a single 200, and that winner's new token is already dead. Reuse detection removes the client session while the user session stays, which is why the other responses read Session doesn't have required client rather than a reuse error.
Comparing policies shows rotation off passes all five and keeps the session, while raising refreshTokenMaxReuse to one still destroys it. Since no retry can recover a removed client session, Q2's own criterion resolves to a lock, and a database row lock is the natural place because its lifetime is tied to the connection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moving the authorized client to JdbcOAuth2AuthorizedClientService makes tokens work across replicas, so the session-in-Redis plus tokens-in-PostgreSQL split holds. The table then shows what sharing cannot fix: the primary key is (client_registration_id, principal_name) with no session in it, so a second login for the same user updates the same row rather than adding one.
The refresh token sits in bytea as the raw JWT, readable with convert_from, and logout clears only the Redis session while the plaintext token row and the Keycloak SSO session both survive. The schema itself failed silently first because the default DDL uses blob, which PostgreSQL does not have, and continue-on-error swallowed it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adding Spring Session Redis grows the context by 81 beans and swaps sessionRepository for RedisSessionRepository, while authorizedClientService stays InMemoryOAuth2AuthorizedClientService. The user then reads as logged in with principal labuser while accessTokenStoredOnServer is false, which is worse than being logged out.
Redis holds only the security context, serialized with Java native serialization, and the refresh token is not there to encrypt in the first place. Three problems on the way: Kubernetes service links overwrote REDIS_PORT with a tcp:// URL, the tests tried to reach Redis, and the resource server was never deployed so a DNS failure looked like a token failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The authorized client repository is AuthenticatedPrincipalOAuth2AuthorizedClientRepository, keyed by principal with no session id in it, which is the mechanism behind the sharing problem Q1 and Q3 describe. Sharing a store does not fix a lookup key.
Five problems on the way in: only build output was committed under bff/, a duplicate YAML key broke the image build and was invisible until the full log was captured, env placeholders without defaults broke the tests, actuator was behind the login redirect so a 200 was the login page, and the 117KB beans response failed through the proxy.
Deploying two replicas made the login itself fail before any experiment started, because the authorization request lives in per-instance memory and the callback lands elsewhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disabling persistent-user-sessions moves the session from PostgreSQL into the cluster, and the A-1 and A-8 outcomes flip to 400 Session not active while a new login during database loss starts working. The control group in each case still returns 200, so the injections cut only what they were meant to cut.
This is the pair that makes the A layer legible: the conventional wisdom that sessions ride TCP 7800 is correct for Keycloak 24 and earlier, and the mistake is applying it to 26 without checking the version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nine samples through the restart all returned 200, the refresh token issued beforehand still works, and the session count is unchanged at 151 while both caches reset to zero. The updated last_session_refresh proves the write path recovered too, not just the response code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nine database round trips per login multiply the injected delay to 1.9 seconds, and connection pool queueing multiplies it again under twenty concurrent requests. The readiness probe joins the same queue and times out, so the node leaves the load balancer and pushes its load onto the one still standing.
Two injections missed first: the guest interface is enp1s0 rather than eth0, and a filter on it can never match a pod IP because flannel has already encapsulated the packet. The delay has to go on flannel.1, before encapsulation.
The predicted rise in optimistic lock conflicts did not happen, because logins insert new rows rather than contending for one. That belongs to B-3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three injections failed first: kube-router keeps reinserting its chain above a hand-placed FORWARD rule, the JGroups connection direction had reversed since A-1, and only the raw table runs ahead of conntrack. Each failure looked like nothing happening.
Blocking one direction never partitioned the cluster because JGroups reconnected the other way before failure detection fired. Blocking both produced a real split brain with two coordinators in JGROUPS_PING, yet only the non-coordinator node reported DOWN, so the Service kept an endpoint and the front door stayed at 200. That answers the question A-1 left open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kubernetes keeps calling the node Ready for forty seconds while users already see failures, and the pod on the powered-off machine stays ready=true because its kubelet can no longer contradict itself. Eviction waits another five minutes, then the StatefulSet refuses to recreate its pod and the replacement Deployment pod cannot schedule because the local-path volume is pinned to the dead node.
Killing the server node instead shows the opposite shape: containerd keeps the workload running while the API server, Traefik and the observability stack disappear, so the outage is the missing path rather than the missing application. Traefik at one replica is the ingress single point of failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keycloak commits the login INSERT with synchronous_commit off, so a crash loses whole sessions and not just refresh timestamps. Measured 4 of 153 lost, matching the default wal_writer_delay window.
Two injections failed silently first: --grace-period=0 --force lets the container runtime send SIGTERM so PostgreSQL flushes and shuts down cleanly, and SIGKILL to PID 1 from inside its own namespace is ignored by the kernel. Killing a backend makes the postmaster reinitialize, which is a real crash recovery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both pods go NotReady, the Service endpoint list empties and the front door returns 503, so adding Keycloak replicas buys nothing against database loss. The node holding the session in cache fails too, because a refresh writes LAST_SESSION_REFRESH. Recovery was automatic in about fifteen seconds with no restart, which is what readiness rather than liveness buys.
The observability finding matters as much: up stayed at 1 through a total outage, so alerting on it would have caught nothing. kube-state-metrics is missing and pod readiness is therefore not recorded as a metric.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cutting TCP 7800 leaves cross-node refresh working (200), confirming sessions travel through PostgreSQL rather than the cluster transport. Logout is the opposite: the database row is deleted but the other node answers from its stale local cache, so the A-0 conclusion that invalidation rides the database is corrected here.
Two things the plan did not anticipate: a NetworkPolicy cannot sever an established connection because conntrack accepts it before policy evaluation, and Keycloak reports the partition through its readiness probe so the split node removes itself from the Service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-checked each question's 남은 미지수, 다음 검증 and 제약 against the plan item by item. Adds B-0 (autoconfiguration actually chosen), B-6 (encryption key rotation) and B-7 (oauth2-proxy cookie secret rotation) as new experiments, plus lock-holder death, rotation-disabled comparison, partial-logout recovery, store latency and the Q4 design checklist. Restores the Redis persistence comparison and records the correct index URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Twenty experiments across four layers, each with a topology diagram marking where the fault goes in, the metrics to watch, a falsifiable prediction written before the run, and a pass/fail rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Builds up from HTTP statelessness to why session storage location determines the operational response, so the measurements have context to land in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PostgreSQL statement logging shows keycloak-1 reading and updating the session created on keycloak-0. The same transaction reveals optimistic locking via VERSION, SKIP LOCKED, and synchronous_commit turned off. Fixes the earlier concept note that credited Infinispan with cross-node propagation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Experiment 0 with three probes: cross-node refresh/logout, cache counter deltas around a single login, and cache entry ownership. Each node caches only what it handled; cache totals sum exactly to the database count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds backup rehearsal, version upgrade, observability, secret management and certificate renewal. Corrects the experiment order so the refresh-token contention test runs after the shared store exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Control experiment isolates two independent causes: the nginx 443 block still emits X-Forwarded-Proto http, and Traefik rewrites forwarded headers regardless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
